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1 Introduction 
1.1 History of the Consolidation Process and Relevance of the 
Topic 
Similar to the general trend of increasing corporate expansion, the financial 
services industry, the insurance industry in particular, has experienced an 
unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions (hereafter, M&A) in the last 50 
years.1 This ongoing transformation process can be attributed to several 
factors, such as improvements in computing and communication technology, 
changes in risk and interest rates, insurance premium deregulation, market 
saturation, and economic forces (Swiss Re, 1999, 2000; OECD, 2000; CEA, 
2013b; Okura & Yanase, 2013). Moreover, the standardization of accounting 
rules (IFRS 4), the development of EU-wide solvency standards (Solvency II), 
the implementation of the euro, and the European Union’s Third Generation 
Insurance Directives in 1994, which deregulated the European insurance 
market, led to a rising number of cross-border EU transactions (transactions 
across national boundaries).2  
 
Regulatory changes in the form of the EU’s Second Banking Coordination 
Directive of 1993 and later amendments, as well as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act in the US (1999), also helped push forward the integration of the financial 
services industry, resulting in an increasing amount of cross-industry 
transactions (deals involving companies of different industries, e.g., banks and 
insurers).3 As a result of this consolidation process, the number of financial 
services firms has declined substantially in recent years, although the number 
of insurance companies has remained fairly constant.4 This suggests that the 
restructuring process in the insurance sector was primarily conducted for 
                                            
 
1 In this context, Fustec and Faroult (2011) provide the examples of the brilliant expansion of the 
French insurer AXA and the disastrous undertaking of Allianz buying Dresdner Bank.  
2  See, e.g., Klumpes (2006 p. 2), Schertzinger (2008, p. 36), and Farny (2011, p. 168). 
3  See, e.g., Group of Ten (2001), Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2003, p. 323), Fields, Fraser, and 
Kolari (2005, p. 777), and Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008, p. 1). 
4 For example in the European insurance industry, the CEA reported that slightly more than 
5,300 insurance companies were operating in Europe in 2012. Almost the same number (i.e., 
5,391) was reported in the year 1997 (see CEA, 2013 and 1998, respectively). See also 
Schertzinger (2008, p. 16). 
  
2 
strategic purposes, such as to focus on a core business or geographical 
expansion into new regions, instead of consolidations in which the acquired 
insurer merged with the acquirer.5 In summary, corporate expansion through 
mergers and acquisitions has become an increasingly popular means of 
restructuring and repositioning in the global market; as such, M&A activity has 
become an important dynamic in the insurance landscape. 
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Gaps 
In light of the enormous economic importance and the high level of global M&A 
activity in the financial services, and in the insurance sector in particular, a 
plethora of research has addressed the economic justifications and effects of 
these M&A deals. From a theoretical standpoint, various academic arguments 
and rationales for value creation in M&A, as well as motives for insurance M&A, 
are addressed in the existing literature.6 Interestingly, in spite of this theoretical 
logic and the drastic increase in M&A activity in recent decades, there has been 
little empirical evidence of positive wealth effects and the success of M&A in the 
insurance sector as well as in the financial services industry. A plethora of 
research on M&A transactions in the banking industry regularly doubts value 
creation or even detects value destruction through this form of external 
restructuring.7  
 
Likewise, empirical studies focusing on the insurance industry obtain 
inconsistent results regarding the success of M&A activity; therefore, the overall 
effect of such corporate activity remains controversial and inconclusive. 
According to various authors,8 the vast majority of M&A transactions do not lead 
                                            
 
5  See, e.g., Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998, p. 7) and Klumpes (2006, p. 19). In addition 
to this brief history of the consolidation process in the insurance industry, the subject has been 
more thoroughly discussed in the recent work of Schertzinger (2008). 
6  For detailed information on drivers and hurdles as well as motives for M&A, see, for example, 
Pilloff and Santomero (1998, p. 61), BarNiv and Hathorn (1997, p. 105), Achleitner (2002, p. 
142), Beitel (2002, p. 14), Sudarsanam (2010, p. 124), Cummins and Weiss (2004, p. 5), 
Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 6), Subramanyam (2005, p. 762), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki 
(2006, p. 56), Klumpes (2006, p. 17), Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 32), Schertzinger (2008, p. 
23), and DeYoung, Evanoff, and Molyneux (2009, p. 95). 
7 See, e.g., the literature review of Young, Douglas, and Molyneux (2009) and cited references. 
8 E.g., Marks (1988), Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (1990), Marks and Mirvis (1998), Chaigneau 
(1999), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), and The Boston Consulting Group (2009a). 
  
3 
to the desired increase in value and hence cannot be seen as successful. 
Habeck, Kroeger, and Traem (2000) hence conclude that “[w]hile value creation 
might be the credo, value destruction is often the fact” (p. 3). In view of the 
constant rise in M&A activity over recent decades, this unfavorable finding leads 
to a paradox and consequently to the following questions being raised 
repeatedly in previous research9: (a) If M&A transactions in general are not 
successful, then why do companies continue to engage in M&A? (b) If M&A 
transactions on average are successful, then why have these positive effects 
not been revealed in prior M&A research? (c) Which determinants increase (or 
decrease) the probability of success in insurance M&A? 
 
To answer these questions, one must first clearly define “success” and how it is 
measured. In general, there are various ways of measuring the success of M&A 
transactions. Major differences exist with regard to the choice of the success 
metric, the dimension of success, the timeframe for measuring success, the 
construction of the benchmark, and the perspective from which success is 
evaluated.10 According to numerous authors, these differences—in particular, 
the analysis from differing success perspectives (Meglio & Risberg, 2010), the 
widespread use of alternative success and performance metrics (Schoenberg, 
2006), and differences in the timeframe of the studies (Schertzinger, 2008)—
may have held back knowledge development and may have at least been partly 
responsible for the mixed and contradictory findings of previous research.11 
However, even if the same perspective is taken, the same methodology and 
measurement of success are applied, and the same time horizon is chosen, 
inconsistent findings between publications are the rule rather than the 
exception. For example, most capital market research on the success of 
insurance M&A has focused on the short-term effects of such corporate activity, 
however, yielding ambiguous results with respect to the average wealth effect of 
                                            
 
9 E.g., Lubatkin (1983), Gregory (1997), Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2006), 
Schertzinger (2008), among others.  
10 Gerpott (1993, p. 190) and Wuebben (2007, p. 12). See section 2.3.1 for a further discussion 
on these various matrices and criteria. 
11 E.g., Larsson (2004, p. 5), Schoenberg (2006, p. 2), Meglio and Risberg (2010, p. 89), and 
the references therein. 
  
4 
the acquirer.12 Also, the long-term effects of insurance M&A remain 
controversial, with only two capital market investigations, that is, Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006) and Schertzinger (2008), finding contrasting results. 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) provide empirical evidence for a strong 
positive relationship between M&A engagement and the financial success of 
acquiring insurance companies over a three-year post-M&A horizon. This 
contradicts the recent results of Schertzinger (2008), who finds the opposite 
relationship between insurance M&A transactions and long-term success. 
Consequently, while general conclusions and recommendations for acquiring 
insurance companies cannot be made on the basis of findings from the extant 
insurance M&A literature, such information would be of great value for the 
decision making of managers, investors, and even regulators, as pointed out by 
Schertzinger (2008). In view of the controversial results in the published 
literature, some authors go even further by stating that no two M&A transactions 
are alike, thereby questioning the existence of general principles of success in 
M&A transactions.13 Haspeslagh and Jemison (1987) exaggerate the point by 
stating that “[n]othing can be said or learned about acquisitions in general” (p. 
53).  
 
Notwithstanding the problem of conflict regarding the average overall success 
of insurance M&A, the extant literature has identified a second problem area, 
namely the meaningfulness of the average overall result. One common finding 
is that in many cases, the average effect does not convey the substantial 
variation that exists between various M&A.14 Due to this great variety in M&A 
outcomes, the average value does not say much about the success of individual 
transactions. Consequently, in addition to the analysis of the overall effect of 
                                            
 
12 For example, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2007), and 
Staikouras (2009) detect strong positive CARs for mergers of banks and insurance 
companies. Moreover, a positive short-term market reaction of insurance acquirers upon the 
announcement of pure insurance deals is found in the studies of Akhigbe and Madura (2001), 
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), and Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009). In contrast, Cummins and 
Weiss (2004), Elango (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009) attain negative 
abnormal returns following the announcement of an M&A transaction. 
13 See, e.g., Kitching (1973), Schubert (1981), Kusewitt (1985), Lubatkin (1987), and Bower 
(2001). 
14 E.g., Merchant and Schendel (2000, p. 724), Akhigbe and Madura (2001, p. 496), and 
Schertzinger (2008, p. 98 & p. 133). 
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insurance M&A, earlier studies also investigate potential determinants of 
insurance transaction success that might help to explain the observed variations 
and differences in M&A outcomes. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of the 
extant literature does not include important influencing factors in the analysis or 
does not even conduct an analysis of the major influencing factors at all. 
Moreover, previous research on this topic has not produced a consistent set of 
findings related to these influencing factors; hence, research has provided few 
insights into the significant correlations between the individual determinants and 
M&A success in the insurance industry. For example, the influence of the 
determinant “acquirer’s pre-merger participation in the target” is found to have a 
significant positive relationship to an acquirer’s post-merger performance in 
Cummins and Xie’s (2009) paper; however, their earlier work found a small 
negative relationship (Cummins & Xie, 2005). To summarize, it can be stated 
that little empirical evidence has addressed the potential influencing variables of 
M&A success in the insurance industry, and the available results have not given 
us many answers on how to increase the success rate of insurance M&A. 
Against this backdrop and the results on the overall effect of insurance M&A, 
previous authors state that “research to this topic area shows a significant 
industry-specific gap,”15 and they postulate the need for further research on this 
topic, especially considering the huge practical relevance of M&A in the 
insurance industry.16 
1.3 Research Objectives and Development of Research 
Questions 
As portrayed above, despite decades of research, there are still many open 
questions regarding the success and the valuation effects of M&A transactions 
in the insurance industry. The most fundamental questions are whether M&A 
transactions in the insurance industry create value and which factors lead to 
value generation in insurance M&A, or in other words: 
 
                                            
 
15 Schertzinger (2008, p. V). See also Merchant and Schendel (2000, p. 725), Javidan et al. 
(2004, p. 257), Meglio and Risberg (2010, p. 88), and Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 
18). 
16 E.g., Merchant and Schendel (2000), Schertzinger (2008), and Cooper and Finkelstein 
(2010.) 
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(i) How successful are M&A transactions in the insurance industry? 
(ii) Which factors increase the success of insurance M&A 
transactions? 
 
Our work aims at answering these two fundamental questions or at least 
providing valuable insights into the overall success and the variables that 
potentially influence the M&A success of the acquiring insurance company. To 
achieve this, we break down these two fundamental questions into four 
research questions that allow for a better overview and that go as follows: 
 
- RQ 1: What is the definition of M&A success and how can it be 
measured?  
- RQ 2: Is it possible to develop a research cluster for the insurance 
M&A literature that is helpful in categorizing the findings of 
previous studies? 
- RQ 3: How successful are insurance companies in conducting M&A 
transactions? 
- RQ 4: Which factors lead to successful M&A transactions in the 
insurance industry? 
 
In order to provide an answer to these research questions, we first have to 
understand how M&A success can be defined and how it can be quantified and 
measured. This understanding is a necessary prerequisite for analyzing the 
effects of M&A transactions on the involved companies. Next, having gained the 
understanding of the term success and defined its use in this work, we ask the 
question: What does the previous empirical literature tell us about the success 
in insurance M&A and its influencing factors? However, in order to be able to 
give answers to this question and grasp the complexity inherent in the 
evaluation task, we have to structure the existing literature on the effects of 
insurance M&A. Accordingly, in a second step, we aim to develop a research 
cluster to categorize and structure the various findings of previous studies on 
M&A activity in the insurance industry. The third question concerns the overall 
success of insurance M&A transactions. Previous research on this topic has not 
come up with consistent answers regarding the average success rates, neither 
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in the announcement period nor in the medium- and long-term period. Our work 
therefore attempts to structure the diverse findings of recent insurance M&A 
research and thereby aims at understanding these seemingly contradicting 
results. Fourthly, we identify the potential influencing factors of M&A success 
that have been studied by the extant literature and outline the influences of 
these factors on the success of insurance M&A. The aim is to analyze why 
some insurance transactions succeed while others fail. Or, to put it in another 
way, this work investigates whether specific factors can explain the huge 
variations in the outcomes of individual M&A transactions and aims at 
identifying conditions under which M&A success in the insurance industry is 
increased or decreased. To further investigate the overall effect of insurance 
M&A and identify whether specific factors have a decisive influence on the 
success of these corporate undertakings, an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between M&A activity in the European insurance market and the 
financial success of these firms is conducted in the second major part of the 
book. By this we aim at testing the reliability and validity of the findings of 
previous research on the success of insurance M&A. This procedure—that is, 
first reviewing previous empirical literature and then conducting an own 
empirical analysis—enables us to approach research questions 3 and 4 in 
general17 and later on for a sample of 102 European insurance M&A 
transactions in particular.18 
 
This work makes the following contributions relative to prior research on the 
success of insurance M&A:  
 
First, even though various literature reviews on the performance and success of 
M&A transactions in the financial services industry (and in particular in the 
banking industry) exist, the work of Schertzinger (2008) is the first and so far 
only literature review that exclusively focuses on the success of M&A 
                                            
 
17 For example, research question 3, in a modified form, is therefore: How successful are 
insurance companies in conducting M&A transactions in general? 
18 Similarly, the modified research question 3 is thus: How successful have European insurance 
companies been in conducting M&A transactions during the period from 1993 to 2009? 
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transactions in the insurance sector. This existing insurance sector-specific 
literature review is not only extended by the inclusion of studies that were 
published after Schertzinger’s paper, but also by the supplemental analysis of 
numerous additional factors influencing the outcome of a transaction. Moreover, 
our work aims at identifying research clusters that may help to explain the 
mixed findings across studies.  
 
Second, besides investigating the short-term market reaction following the 
announcement of an M&A transaction, our empirical study also explores the 
long-term success of insurance M&A and its influencing factors. The current 
capital market literature on the success of insurance M&A seems to be 
dominated by short-term investigations, and empirical evidence on the long-
term success of insurance M&A transactions is virtually non-existent. To the 
best of our knowledge, the capital market research in this field only comprises 
two recent studies that produce opposite results. Hence, our work is only the 
third analysis that examines long-term performance based on stock market 
performance following M&A of insurance firms (and only the second that 
restricts its analysis to transactions of European insurance firms). 
 
Third, so far, all capital market studies that analyze the success of M&A 
transactions in the insurance industry have used the standard event study 
procedure. However, as argued by Javidan et al. (2004) and many others, “the 
conflicting findings and the theoretical shortcomings in this approach point to 
the need for new and innovative thinking and methodologies” (p. 257). 
Consequently, instead of adopting this traditional event study approach, we 
apply a fairly new approach to this problem and study the capital market 
reaction following the announcement of insurance M&A by using tests of 
stochastic dominance (SD). In this context, it is important to note that our work 
does not place particular emphasis on the statistical power of the SD test 
applied. Instead, our empirical study uses the SD approach to introduce an 
alternative measure for success evaluation. 
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1.4 Organization of the Study 
The research structure of this study is directly derived from the above research 
questions. First, theoretical and methodological foundations for the analysis of 
success in insurance M&A are laid in order to enable a complete understanding 
of the investigated topic. Instead of producing another work on the theoretical 
justifications and rationales of insurance M&A activity,19 we directly deal with 
research question 1 about how success can be defined and measured. In this 
second chapter, we furthermore give particular attention to the various 
approaches for investigating M&A success. Following this, Chapter 3 presents a 
comprehensive overview of prior research on the success of insurance M&A 
activity and thereby seeks to provide at least some basis for tentative answers 
to research questions 2 to 4. This chapter contains a description of the literature 
review method that is used in our work. Afterwards, we develop research 
clusters to categorize the existing literature on the success of M&A deals (RQ 
2), which is followed by a summary of the findings of earlier studies on 
insurance M&A by cluster. We examine the status quo (December 2013) of 
academic literature published in this field of research by bringing together the 
various findings of previous studies on the success of insurance M&A in a 
systematic way. The main purpose of this literature review is to brighten the 
picture by structuring the diverse findings and thereby helping to find potential 
explanations for the conflicting results of previous studies regarding M&A 
success. This comprehensive literature review is intended to help identify broad 
patterns in the insurance M&A literature and provide a solid perspective on the 
average success of an insurance transaction and then reveal particular 
specifics of individual transactions (RQ 3 and RQ 4). Moreover, this literature 
review serves as a foundation for the second major part of this book. In Chapter 
4, we conduct an analysis on the success and the effects of M&A in the 
European insurance market and thereby provide supplemental evidence on this 
complex topic. In this way, we test the general findings from previous literature 
regarding the success of insurance M&A (RQ 3) and its influencing factors (RQ 
                                            
 
19 This means that background information on the reasons for M&A activity in general and in the 
insurance industry in particular, as well as information on the relevant theories for explaining 
M&A activity, are not given herein. For this, the reader is instead referred to Boeckli (2003), 
Settnik (2006), Wirtz (2006), Wuebben (2007), Jansen (2008), and Boesecke (2009).  
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4) against a sample of European insurance transactions that were announced 
during the years 1993 to 2009. Lastly, in Chapter 5, we present the conclusions, 
highlight several important limitations, and discuss some of the implications of 
our results. 
 
Figure 1 graphically depicts the structure of this work. 
 
 
Figure 1: Research structure 
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2 Theoretical and Methodological Background 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides the conceptual and methodological framework for 
understanding and analyzing the success of M&A in the insurance industry. 
First, the theoretical foundations are laid. We display basic growth options for 
companies, provide the terminological basis, summarize the several types of 
M&A transactions, and then illustrate the typical transaction process. As there is 
already a rich academic literature that extensively elaborates on the manifold 
motives for conducting M&A transactions and the underlying economic theories 
for explaining these deals,20 we will not cover these general issues in length 
herein, but these are taken into account when presenting and interpreting the 
results of our stochastic dominance analysis. Second, this study concentrates 
on the methodological prerequisites for evaluating the success in insurance 
M&A. A definition of value creation and success in M&A transactions is 
presented and differences in success perspectives, which could help to explain 
varying methodologies and results, are outlined. The various approaches and 
measures for evaluating and quantifying the success of insurance transactions 
are described in the final section of this chapter. 
  
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
2.2.1 Growth Options of Insurance Companies 
Corporate growth can occur in very different ways, as outlined, for example, in 
the academic papers of Hax and Majluff (1991), Canals (2000), Bausch (2003), 
and Boesecke (2009). In general, it can be achieved through both internal and 
external resources.21 In many cases, internal development will be considered 
                                            
 
20 However, as highlighted by several authors (e.g., Weidenbaum & Chilton, 1988; Seth, Song, 
& Pettit, 2002), the understanding of the various motives as well as advantages and 
disadvantages of M&A is a basic prerequisite for understanding and evaluating the success of 
M&A transactions. For a reader without the required background knowledge of the economic 
rationales behind M&A transactions in general and in insurance M&A in particular, we 
recommend the works of Cook (1988, p. 2), Albrecht (1994b, p. 5 & p. 27), Kerler (1999, p. 
33), Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 130), Settnik (2006, p. 73), Schertzinger (2008, 
p. 23), Boesecke (2009, p. 15), and Eisenbarth (2013, p. 85).  
21 See, e.g., Canals (2000), Schweizer (2002), Bausch (2003), and Boesecke (2009). 
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the preferred path, since it provides a cheap way for growth-seeking firms 
without involving substantial higher risks and uncertainty.22 When internal 
resources are scarce or particular growth targets can be achieved more quickly, 
growth can also be achieved externally through different forms of expansion, 
such as mergers and acquisitions and cooperative arrangements in which 
internal and external resources are used. Even though these external forms of 
corporate expansion pose formidable challenges for acquiring firms, they 
simultaneously offer effective opportunities that allow the respective acquirers to 
instantly expand business activities without having the need to build a complex 
organization internally. Further advantages of the external development route 
may comprise opportunities to enhance the capabilities of the respective firms, 
as well as opportunities for cost reduction and scale economies, financial and 
managerial synergy effects (from combining the two firms and running them 
more effectively), and tax advantages.23 
 
In the subsequent section, we will first define the ominous term mergers and 
acquisitions in order to enhance the understanding of the various external 
growth opportunities—especially M&A as a specific form of external growth—
and then turn to the structure of a typical M&A process. 
2.2.2 Definition of the Term Mergers and Acquisitions 
Since the first takeover wave swept the United States in the beginning of the 
20th century, the terms merger, acquisition and takeover are frequently used to 
describe the process of two separate companies coming together to form one 
bigger organization. As these terms are regularly used together or 
interchangeably in the finance literature and among practitioners dealing with 
this part of corporate finance,24 they are often incorporated under the generic 
                                            
 
22 Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 137) and Jansen (2008, p. 171). See also Hayes 
and Garvin (1982, p. 5), who give several arguments against the path of external growth and 
for internal development. 
23 E.g., Lubatkin (1983, p. 218), Kerler (1999, p. 38), Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 
132), Weston, Chung, and Hoang (2007, p. 74), and Boesecke (2009, p. 1), and Farny (2011, 
p. 627). 
24 See, e.g., Ansoff and Weston (1962, p. 56), Napier et al. (1989, p. 105), Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001, p. 4), Wirtz (2003, p. 10), King et al. (2004, p. 187), Weston, Mitchell, and 
Mulherin (2004, p. 6), Jansen (2008, p. 91), and Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (2011, p. 529). 
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term mergers and acquisitions (or abbreviated as M&A).25 Consequently, it 
might seem that they all have the same meaning, but in fact, as pointed out by 
several authors,26 there are important differences between the words merger, 
acquisition, conglomerate, joint venture, takeover, and amalgamation. In order 
to clearly present the relationships between corporate expansion through M&A 
and financial performance and to meaningfully compare results of previous 
empirical research, it is however necessary to provide a precise definition of the 
terminology merger and acquisition and an understanding of the involved terms. 
 
In absence of a consistent terminology, various attempts have been made to 
clearly specify these terms, resulting in a variety of definitions.27 In general, we 
can distinguish two groups of definitions based upon the range of corporate 
activities: Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in a broad Anglo-American sense 
and M&A in a narrower Western sense. The broader definition includes a range 
of different transactions: “[t]he traditional subject of M&A has been expanded to 
include takeovers and related issues of corporate restructurings, corporate 
control, and changes in the ownership structure of firms.”28.29 Within Western 
M&A literature, “the term M&A is strictly confined to strategically motivated 
business combinations, i.e. transactions that result in the transfer of ownership 
as well as management and control rights from one company (the “target”) to 
another (the “acquirer”)”30. Further, Achleitner (2002) points out that under the 
narrow definition, all transactions conducted solely for financial investment 
purposes are excluded. 
                                            
 
25 See, e.g. Brealey and Myers (1991 p. 817) and Wuebben (2007, p. 5). 
26 E.g., Buono and Bowditch (1989, p. 60), Cartwright and Cooper (1992, p. 30), Epstein (2005, 
p. 37), Subramanyam (2005, p. 773), and Weston, Chung, and Hoag (2007, p. 3). 
27 For example, Achleitner (2002, p. 141) states: “The term M&A refers to transactions in the 
market for companies, portfolios of companies’ assets, shares in companies and 
participations, and to the business segment of professional services firms or banks who 
consult transaction parties”. Sudarsanam (2010, p. 1), in contrast, defines M&A as deals “by 
which two companies are combined to achieve certain strategic and business objectives”. 
28 Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 676). See also Herzel and Shepro (1990, p. 3), Hooke (1997, 
p. 1), Gaughan (2002, p. 7), and Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 5). An even wider 
definition is suggested by Sudarsanam (1995), who defines M&A as a “means of corporate 
expansion and growth” (p. 1).  
29 See, e.g., Achleitner (2002, p. 141). 
30 Wuebben (2007, p. 6). See also Wirtz (2003, p. 12), Lucks and Meckel (2002, p. 23), Mueller-
Stewens, Spickers, and Deiss (1999, p. 1), and Vogel (2002, p. 5). Picot (2002, p. 15) extends 
the narrow focus of M&A by also including corporate events such as alliances, cooperations, 
and joint ventures. 
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To further illustrate the diverse areas that can be derived from the broad 
definition of M&A, as well as to outline the classification of M&A in a narrower 
sense, we adopt a model based partially on Copeland and Weston (1988) and 
partially on Nakamura (2005).31 
 
 
Figure 2: The definition of M&A in a broad and narrow sense32 
                                            
 
31 For differentiating the various types of M&A, we follow Wuebben (2007, p. 5), who adopts the 
perspective of companies using M&A as a strategy for growth rather than concentrating on the 
perspective of service providers, such as investment banks that provide advisory and other 
financial services for M&A transactions. For the latter, see Beitel (2004, p. 32). 
32 Source: Adapted from Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 677), Gaughan (2002, p. 7), 
Nakamura (2005, p. 18), and Wuebben (2007, p. 6). 
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In this thesis, we do not present a detailed description of each individual area of 
M&A activity.33 Instead, we concentrate on the specific forms of M&A that will be 
used in this study.  
 
If the term M&A is understood in the broad sense, it comprises manifold forms 
ranging from simple mergers and joint ventures to various types of corporate 
restructuring and changes in ownership structure. Hence, in the context of the 
previous M&A finance literature, using the broad definition of M&A activity could 
often lead to confusion and even misunderstanding, as argued by Nakamura 
(2005, p. 17). Consequently, we will look at M&A from the narrow perspective, 
considering only companies as acquirers. 
 
The early definition of the OECD (1993), which characterizes a merger as “an 
amalgamation or joining of two or more firms into an existing firm or to form a 
new firm,” shall serve as a starting point.34 Technically, such a combination of 
operations can be done either through a “merger by absorption” or through a 
“merger by establishment.”35 Merger by establishment is a situation in which two 
or even more entities (typically of similar size) are dissolved and merged into a 
completely new created company (e.g., JPMorgan Chase and 
DaimlerChrysler).36 According to Gaughan (2002), a consolidation, in which the 
target and acquiring firms become a new firm, can be considered to imply a 
merger by establishment. In an absorption merger, however, all assets of one or 
more company/ies are transferred to the absorbing company, and the absorbed 
companies are dissolved afterwards, as they become part of the acquirer.37  
 
In the other type of business combination, namely in an acquisition, the acquirer 
purchases a significant share of stocks or assets of a (usually much smaller) 
                                            
 
33 See, e.g., Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 676) and Jansen (2008, p. 94) for a detailed 
discussion. 
34 For similar definitions of a merger, see, e.g., Gaughan (2002, p. 7) and Jagersma (2005, p. 
14). Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 6) add in this context that the vast majority of 
mergers are friendly, negotiated transactions, even though negotiations sometimes start out 
hostile before turning friendly. 
35 Chunlai, Chen, and Findlay (2003, p. 23) and Nakamura (2005, p. 18). 
36 Chunlai, Chen, and Findlay (2003, p. 23) and Rui (2009, p. 10). 
37 Chunlai, Chen, and Findlay (2003, p. 23) and Rui (2009, p. 10). In fact, such a form of merger 
could accordingly also be classified as an acquisition, as outlined by Nakamura (2005, p. 19). 
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target company to achieve a managerial influence (e.g., Cisco’s growth 
model).38 Consequently, such deals can be further divided into two major forms 
of acquisition: stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions. In the latter, the 
acquiring firm purchases some or all of the target firm’s assets while the former 
target stockowners receive cash for their shares. In stock acquisitions, however, 
stocks of the acquiring company are issued to a target’s shareholders in 
exchange for their stake in the target company. Depending on the stake the 
acquirer holds (and thereby its voting power) in the target following the 
acquisition, acquisitions are then classified into three types: complete takeovers 
(100% of the issued shares), majority position (less than 100% but more than 
50% of the issued shares), and minority position (less than 50% of the issued 
shares).39 Nakamura (2005) outlines that even though the acquirer is assumed 
to have the power to influence the target’s business strategy in all three cases, 
the acquirer’s ownership (of voting rights) has to be above 50% to possess 
significant voting power to exert complete control over the target’s operations by 
being able to elect the board of directors as well as replace management. 
Hence, acquisitions are characterized by the transfer of ownership, control, and 
voting rights, whereas a combination of the companies’ operations is obviously 
not a necessary condition to be classified as an acquisition.40  
 
With the above discussion as background, it is clear that mergers and 
acquisitions are two forms of transactions that differ in regard to their 
transaction procedures, legal obligations, and tax liabilities.41 Thus, from a legal 
standpoint, a distinction between a merger and an acquisition is crucial,42 but 
from an economic and practical perspective, which is used in this study, it is 
redundant. In both cases, the involved companies ultimately combine their 
business efforts to realize some kind of benefit. In the context of this study, we 
                                            
 
38 Chunlai, Chen, and Findlay (2003, p. 23), and Epstein (2005, p. 38). 
39 Chunlai, Chen, and Findlay (2003, p. 23) and Nakamura (2005, p. 19). 
40 This is a crucial difference to a merger, in which the operations of the involved companies are 
combined (e.g., Mueller-Stewens, Spickers and Deiss, 1999, p. 1; European Council, 2004 Art. 
3 (1); Schertzinger, 2008, p. 4; Spiss, 2008, p. 1). 
41 E.g., Buono and Bowditch (1989, p. 60), Cartwright and Cooper (1992, p. 30), Gerpott (1993, 
p. 27), Marren (1993, p. 77), Achleitner (2002, p. 141), and Rusu (2010, p. 12). 
42 In a merger, the target is dissolved after the closing of the transaction. In an acquisition, the 
target company remains legally in existence after the transaction, e.g., Gerpott (1993, p. 30), 
Kerler (1999, p. 11), and Rusu (2010, p. 12). 
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accordingly follow the narrow interpretation43 of the term M&A and, moreover, 
do not distinguish between a merger and an acquisition.44 It is appropriate 
therefore, to make no differentiation between the terms merger, acquisition, 
transaction, and M&A and use them interchangeably throughout this study. 
 
Further criteria for categorizing the various dimensions of these transactions are 
of much more interest. This will be dealt with in the subsequent section. 
2.2.3 Categorization of M&A 
Similarly to the definition of the generic term mergers and acquisitions, previous 
M&A literature offers a wide range of possible systematizations for types of 
M&A transactions. Table 1 displays these various dimensions for categorization. 
 
Table 1: Criteria for categorizing M&A45 
Criterion Characteristics 
Attitude of the transaction Friendly, hostile 
Competitive impact Beneficial, neutral, limiting 
Duration Temporary, indefinite 
Financing Equity, debt, hybrid 
Geographic area Within-country, cross-border, transcontinental 
Industry relatedness Within-industry, cross-industry 
Method of payment Cash, shares, others 
Motive Profit, non-profit 
Ownership status of the target Private, public 
Status of the transaction Announced, pending, completed, withdrawn 
Strategic direction Horizontal, vertical, concentric, conglomerate 
Structure of the transaction  Asset deal, share deal, portfolio transaction 
Type of business combination Acquisition, merger 
 
                                            
 
43 See, e.g., Gerpott (1993, p. 22), Wuebben (2007, p. 7), and Schertzinger (2008, p. 7), who 
also adopt the definition of M&A in a narrower sense. Wuebben (2007, p. 7) adds that this 
procedure places the focus exclusively on companies as acquirers while transactions by 
private investors (e.g., by investor groups or through a management buyout) as well as 
strategic cooperations (e.g., joint ventures and alliances) are excluded. 
44 We follow, for example, Wuebben (2007, p. 7) and Spiss (2008, p. 1), who do not make a 
distinction between these two terms. 
45 Source: Pausenberg (1993, column 4438), Beitel (2004, p. 34), Eisenbarth (2013, p. 26) own 
research. 
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The most prominent dimensions by which M&A transactions can be categorized 
include the type of business combination, attitude of the transaction, geographic 
area, industry relatedness, payment method, and the ownership status of the 
target. However, as these various dimensions have been discussed extensively 
in several previous publications,46 we omit a detailed description at this point 
and will instead provide a more elaborate discussion on the few specific criteria 
that will become relevant when analyzing the success of insurance M&A and its 
determining factors (see Chapter 4). 
2.2.4 Phases of the M&A Process 
When analyzing value creation in insurance M&A and its influencing factors, we 
first have to grasp the manifold aspects of the M&A transaction process and its 
specific phases in order to provide a basis for evaluating the success of such 
corporate activities. Furthermore, Jemison and Sitkin (1986) highlight that “[t]he 
acquisition process itself is a potentially important determinant of acquisition 
activities and outcomes” (p. 145) and hence has to be portrayed in order to 
attain a comprehensive picture of the relevant issues.47  
 
Given the complex challenges involved in conducting an M&A transaction, the 
popular M&A literature provides a variety of different structures for illustrating 
the typical transaction process from the perspective of the buying firm. These 
various structures of a friendly48 transaction differ mainly with respect to the 
number of phases and their respective denomination, as pointed out by 
Wuebben (2007, p. 39). While Boland (1970) and Schweiger and Weber (1989) 
subdivide the process of managing an M&A transaction only into two phases 
(pre-merger and post-merger or implementation, respectively), Hitt (2002), 
Parenteau, and Weston (2003), and Carpenter and Sanders (2007) divide the 
                                            
 
46 For an in-depth discussion on the several categorization criteria, see, for example, 
Pausenberg (1993, column 4438), Gaughan (2002, p. 3), Beitel (2004, p. 34), Settnik (2006, p. 
33), Wuebben (2007, p. 11), Jansen (2008, p. 99), and Schertzinger (2008, p. 7).  
47 In addition, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1987) assert that “[b]y considering how this process 
affects the results, we believe managers may gain insights into ways to control negative 
outcomes” (p. 53). 
48 Wuebben (2007, p. 39) notes that in hostile transactions as well as in auctions the transaction 
process regularly differs substantially from the one in friendly deals. The author refers here to 
the work of Picot (2002) for a description of such a hostile transaction process. 
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M&A process into four phases.49 Farley and Schwallie (1982) even use six 
phases (integration with the strategic plan, intelligent screening, evaluation of 
targets through creativity and analysis, understanding value and price, 
anticipating the post-acquisition phase, and efficient implementation), and 
seven phases (assessment, joint planning, issues analysis, structure selection, 
securing approvals, final planning, and implementation), respectively, to 
describe a typical transaction process. However, in the recent M&A research, a 
preferred structure has evolved that subdivides the acquisition process into 
three phases: pre-transaction phase, transaction phase, and post-transaction 
phase.50 This three-phase structure, as shown in Figure 3 below, is adopted for 
the purpose of this study and described in more detail hereinafter.51 However, 
as this structure represents a standardized transaction process, real-life 
processes might differ with respect to the individual steps and activities of these 
independent phases.52  
 
                                            
 
49 Parenteau and Weston (2003): Strategy planning, candidate screening, due diligence and 
deal execution, and integration phase; Javidan et al. (2004): Strategic thinking and target 
identification, due diligence, negotiations, post-merger processes; Carpenter and Sanders 
(2007): Idea, justification, acquisition integration, and result appraisal. 
50 E.g., Salus (1989): Premerger, merger, and post-merger; Von Krogh (1994): Pre-acquisition, 
acquisition, and post-acquisition; Dabui (1998): Premerger, merger post-merger; Appelbaum 
et al. (2000): Premerger, during, and post-merger; Picot (2002); Jansen (2008): Planning, 
implementation, and integration; Vogel (2002); Wirtz (2003); Richter (2005); Wuebben (2007): 
Strategic analysis and conception, acquisition structuring and management, and post-closing 
integration; Schertzinger (2008): Planning, transaction, and integration. 
51 Note that for an all-encompassing description of the individual transaction phases and the 
associated buy-side activities, please refer to the works of Wuebben (2007, p. 39), and Jansen 
(2008, p. 250).  
52 Wuebben (2007, p. 39). See also Vogel (2002, p. 113) and Jansen (2008, p. 249). 
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Figure 3: Structure of a typical M&A process53 
 
In the first phase of the M&A transaction process, the so-called “pre-transaction” 
or “planning phase,” an insurance firm has to first formulate its corporate 
strategy and select its individual growth targets.54 If strategic gaps exist 
                                            
 
53 Source: Wuebben (2007, p. 40), Schertzinger (2008, p. 11), own research. Presentation 
follows Jansen (2008, p. 249). 
54 See Kerler (1999, p. 235), Wirtz (2003, p. 108), Wuebben (2007, p. 41), and Schertzinger 
(2008, p. 10). Note that this sentence and the remainder of the paragraph are mainly based on 
Javidan et al. (2004, p. 248), Wuebben (2007, p. 41), Schertzinger (2008, p. 10), and 
Boesecke (2009, p. 12). 
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between the firm’s current state and the desired state of assets and processes, 
the insurer may reach the decision to grow externally through M&A.55 
Thereupon, the specifics of this external growth strategy have to be determined 
based on the individual growth targets of the firm, and transaction objectives 
have to be defined accordingly.56 Next, potential target candidates have to be 
identified and screened by the newly formed M&A team57 of the acquiring 
insurance firm, and the most promising target firms are preliminarily valued from 
an outside-in perspective.58 In the last step of the pre-transaction phase, the 
corresponding transaction is either cancelled or the second phase of the 
transaction process is begun.59 This second phase, namely the “transaction 
phase,” comprises not only pre-signing activities, such as transaction planning, 
negotiation, and documentation, it also comprises the signing and closing of the 
deal.60 During the pre-signing phase, the transaction is planned, and 
simultaneously the most relevant details are negotiated. Typically, this involves 
addressing all relevant issues influencing the success of the combination of 
target and acquirer firms, ranging from expert discussions and several types61 
of due diligence to various aspects of the deal structure, the contractual 
framework, and the legal procedure (e.g., confidentiality agreement, letter of 
intent, and memorandum of understanding).62 Special emphasis should be 
placed on a thorough due diligence process in order get a solid understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective target company, to eliminate 
or at least reduce information asymmetries between the current owner of the 
target and the potential acquirer, and to avoid disruptive surprises in the 
subsequent post-transaction integration phase.63 Based on the gained insights 
                                            
 
55 Pausenberg (1989, p. 621), Wirtz (2003, p. 108), and Wuebben (2007, p. 41). 
56 Krueger and Mueller-Stewens (1994, p. 80) as well as Wuebben (2007, p. 41). 
57 Schertzinger (2008, p. 10) lists the typical team members: financial advisors, legal counsel on 
corporate law and taxation, accountants, and actuaries.  
58 Krueger and Mueller-Stewens (1994, p. 80), Wuebben (2007, p. 41), and Schertzinger (2008, 
p. 10). 
59 Bausch (2003, p. 47) and Wuebben (2007, p. 41). 
60 See Wuebben (2007, p. 42). 
61 The various types of due diligence include managerial, financial, organizational, market, IT, 
employment, environmental, legal, and tax due diligence to name a few. For a discussion on 
these types, see for example, Marten and Koehler (1999, p. 337) and Wuebben (2007, p. 43). 
62 See Wuebben (2007, p. 42) and Schertzinger (2008, p. 10). 
63 See Lucks and Meckel (2002, p. 163), Middelmann and Helmes (2005, p. 656), Richter (2005, 
p. 199), and Wuebben (2007, p. 43). 
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into the target, a detailed valuation of the stand-alone target firm is conducted, 
synergy potentials are identified, and different financing options are assessed.64 
Furthermore, a number of core aspects of post-M&A integration should be 
assessed at this point of time to ensure a proper integration of the target firm’s 
business into the acquirer’s operations.65 At the end of the transaction phase is 
the “signing and closing” phase in which the involved companies negotiate the 
final details of the transaction. If both parties agree to the terms and conditions 
of the planned deal and the M&A transaction further meets the required 
approval of the regulatory authorities (e.g., antitrust, insurance supervisory, and 
exchange supervisory authorities), then the completed transactions will be 
announced to the general public and the market.66 The third phase, the post-
transaction or integration phase, starts upon closing of the deal, and all aspects 
of post-M&A integration and controlling are covered. These aspects include 
activities related to implementation of strategic, operational, organizational, 
legal, administrative, and cultural integration measures, coordination of joint 
operations, and monitoring the achievement of expected benefits as well as 
strategic and operational goals.67 
2.2.5 Overview of M&A Waves 
Looking at M&A activity over the last 125 years, one can observe that M&A 
transactions, both in number and total value, have occurred in so-called “waves” 
of particularly intense activity.68 Overall, six of these M&A waves can be 
identified, each of them varying with respect to their strategic direction and 
underlying motives.69 Table 2 displays these various M&A waves and their 
unique patterns and distinct motives. 
 
                                            
 
64 See Wuebben (2007, p. 45) and Schertzinger (2008, p. 12). 
65 See Schertzinger (2008, p. 12). 
66 See Schertzinger (2008, p. 12). 
67 See Vogel (2002, p. 254), Wirtz (2003, p. 110), Andrade and Stafford (2004, p. 104), 
Wuebben (2007, p. 48), and Schertzinger (2008, p. 12). 
68 See, e.g., Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2005), 
Wuebben (2007), and Spiss (2008).  
69 E.g., Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 171) and Martynova and Renneboog (2005, p. 
5). 
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Table 2: Characteristics of the individual M&A waves70 
 
 
                                            
 
70 Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2005, p. 35), Picot (2012, p. 68), Eisenbarth (2013, p. 
47), own research. Presentation follows Martynova and Renneboog (2005, p. 35). 
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As can be seen from the table above, despite the various differences in their 
strategic rationales and aims, a number of common characteristics of all M&A 
waves can also be identified. Martynova and Renneboog (2005) summarize 
these characteristics as follows:  
First, all waves occur in periods of economic recovery […]. Second, the 
waves coincide with periods of rapid credit expansion and booming stock 
markets. It is notable that all five waves ended with the collapse of stock 
markets […]. Third, takeover waves are preceded by industrial and 
technological shocks often in the form of technological and financial 
innovations, supply shocks (such as oil price shocks), deregulation, and 
increased foreign completion. Finally, takeovers often occur in periods 
when regulatory changes (e.g., related to antitrust or takeover defense 
mechanisms) take place. (p. 7)  
However, due to the huge differences in strategic rationales, geographical 
scope, individual integration requirements, method of payment, and other 
specifics between the individual waves (see Table 2), a comparison between 
M&A that have taken place during different M&A waves is not useful for 
identifying general patterns and driving factors of M&A success. Since this is 
the basic point that is relevant for our further work, there will be no further 
discussion on the M&A waves and their individual characteristics. Instead, the 
reader is referred to the earlier works of, for example, Mirvis and Marks (1992, 
p. 33), Boeckli (2003, p. 43), Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 171), 
Martynova and Renneboog (2005, p. 3), Jansen (2008, p. 60), and Picot (2012, 
p. 50) 
2.3 Methodological Foundations 
2.3.1 Definition of M&A Success 
The obvious question, when analyzing the success of business combinations, is 
how such an analysis works and how the outcomes of M&A transactions are 
measured and judged. Previous papers71 document many alternative ways of 
measuring the success of M&A transactions and give two definitions of the term 
                                            
 
71 E.g., Schoenberg (2006), Wuebben (2007), and Meglio and Risberg (2010). 
  
25 
success. In an archaic sense, success is defined as either “the good or the bad 
outcome of an undertaking.”72 In a more narrow sense, as highlighted by 
Wuebben (2007), “success is defined as the achievement of objectives” (p. 12). 
Hence, the definition of objectives of an M&A, that is, the goals the buying firm 
wants to achieve with the transaction, is the essential starting point for 
measuring the success of such corporate activities.73 The main objective of 
acquiring firm’s shareholders is obviously creating additional shareholder value, 
or, in other words, “making a net addition to the wealth of the company’s 
owners.”74 In the extant literature,75 this shareholder value perspective is the 
most prominent perspective from which the success of M&A transactions can 
be assessed. From another perspective, namely that of the employees, the 
goals of M&A transactions primarily consist of securing jobs, increasing 
compensation, and improving career potentials.76 In addition, M&A are 
motivated by the desire of the acquiring firm’s management to secure their jobs 
and to increase their managerial compensation and status within the firm.77 
However, there are further potentially incompatible perspectives from which the 
success of an M&A transaction can be evaluated, for example, from the 
perspective of company outsiders such as customers or the general society 
(see Figure 4).78 
 
Besides the perspective from which transaction success is evaluated, the extant 
M&A literature offers a wide range of different measurement criteria for 
evaluating the outcome of M&A, which are portrayed in Figure 4. Probably the 
most important dimension to measuring M&A success concerns the applied 
                                            
 
72 Oxford Dictionaries (2010). 
73 See Wuebben (2007, p. 12). 
74 Love and Scouller (1990, p. 5). See also, for example, Bamberger (1994, p. 85) and Kerler 
(1999, p. 39). 
75 See, e.g., Loughran and Vijh (1997), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss 
(2004), Mishra and Goel (2005), and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006). For a detailed 
description of the shareholder value approach, please refer to the works of Rappaport (1986), 
Bamberger (1994), or Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000). 
76 Gerpott (1993, p. 213), Beitel (2002, p. 41), and Wuebben (2007, p. 13).  
77 Gerpott (1993, p. 210), Beitel (2002, p. 40), and Wuebben (2007, p. 13). 
78 Acquisition objectives of customers include improving access to products and services and 
reducing prices, as well as increasing product offering and variety. Objectives of the society 
typically include securing location of companies, securing jobs, and reducing bankruptcy risks 
(Beitel, 2002, p. 37; Wuebben, 2007, p. 13). According to Boesecke (2009), other interest 
groups include creditors, suppliers, governmental bodies, and sometimes even competitors. 
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success metric, which in turn directly determines the data used for analysis 
purpose. As it will be described in more detail in the subsequent section, 
success metrics and related approaches use either quantitative or qualitative 
data. Quantitative information forms the basis for objective measures of 
success, for example, in financial statement-based and capital market-based 
research, whereas qualitative data, which allows a subjective assessment of 
M&A activity, is primarily gathered from interviews and questionnaires with 
personnel involved in the particular transaction.79 In addition to these 
differences in the concept of measuring M&A success, multiple ways of 
benchmarking the success of M&A transactions are available. A first possibility 
consists in an intertemporal comparison, that is, a before-after comparison. 
Another option is benchmarking M&A firms to comparable firms (e.g., of the 
same size and industry) or to industry or market indices. Success can also be 
measured against the original objectives and goals of the involved firms or 
against alternative investment opportunities.80 With regard to the dimension of 
success, it is possible to place the focus on one aspect or multi-dimensional 
aspects of success as well as on financial, market strategic, and social 
aspects.81 Looking at the timeframe, success can be evaluated over various 
time periods ranging from short time frames, such as a couple of days 
surrounding the M&A announcement, to longer time frames up to several years 
after the transaction year. Moreover, success measures can be divided into ex 
ante measures and ex post measures. While ex ante success measures are 
based on expectations about future outcomes, ex post measures 
(predominantly applied in medium- and long-term investigations) are based on 
realized rather than on potential values.82 All these different dimensions and 
ways of analyzing the success of M&A are visually summarized in Figure 4. 
 
                                            
 
79 Wuebben (2007, p. 11). 
80 See Gerpott (1993, p. 234) as well as Wuebben (2007, p. 12). 
81 Wuebben (2007, p. 12). For a deeper understanding of the dimension of success and its two 
aspects, i.e., number and content, please refer to the work of Gerpott (1993, p. 229). 
82 See Gerpott (1993, p. 231). 
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Figure 4: Criteria for categorizing M&A in the insurance industry83 
 
2.3.2 Traditional Approaches to Testing the Success of M&A 
When examining the success of major corporate events such as mergers and 
acquisitions, the choice of adequate success metrics is of central importance, 
as highlighted in the previous section and by a number of other authors.84 
However, despite this crucial role, a consensus regarding the correct 
methodology has not emerged from previous literature, and thus the appropriate 
metric for assessing the outcome of such corporate events is still to be 
determined.85 As a result, a number of different approaches and metrics have 
been proposed in recent years. As can be seen from Figure 4 above, these 
various approaches can be roughly divided into two groups, one that focuses on 
quantitative metrics as be the best predictors of M&A success and the other that 
                                            
 
83 Source: Gerpott (1993, p. 190) and Wuebben (2007, p. 12). 
84 See, e.g., Kerler (1999), Larsson and Finkelstein (1999), Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006), 
and Spiss (2008). 
85 See Schoenberg (2006) as well as Spiss (2008) and the references therein for a more 
thorough treatment of this. 
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uses qualitative metrics for measuring success. The group of studies86 that 
applies a quantitative approach to objectively assess the success of M&A 
transactions can be further divided into a subgroup of studies that make use of 
accounting data and another subgroup of studies that apply market data.  
In contrast, studies belonging to the latter group base their measures of M&A 
success on qualitative, and hence subjective, performance evaluations from 
executives and managers involved in the transaction or external experts. The 
general procedure of the survey approach, as well as its suitability for 
investigating the effects of M&A transactions in the insurance industry, will be 
discussed in the following section. However, before describing this qualitative 
approach, each of the three popular quantitative approaches, namely financial 
statement-based, capital market-based, and retention/divestment approach, will 
be presented and evaluated. 
2.3.2.1 Financial Statement-Based Approach 
2.3.2.1.1 Basic Procedure 
One of the major streams in previous M&A research makes use of 
accounting data taken from the involved firms’ financial statements to 
evaluate the success of M&A transactions. Proponents of such financial 
statement-based analyses, such as Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011), 
argue that “accounting data (when analyzed with the appropriate level of skill 
and competence) remains the best proxy of company economic performance 
available to investors, analysts and academics alike” (p. 20). This argument is 
frequently based on the proposition that the effect of M&A should be reflected 
in a change of company fundamentals (e.g., efficiency, cash flow, 
profitability, margin, asset productivity, growth, solvency, liquidity, leverage, 
and so on), and hence that if M&A activities create value, the value creation 
should be reflected in perceptible and assessable improvements in at least 
some of these measures.87 Accordingly, a first group of researchers 
examines such changes in key accounting measures over time by comparing a 
wide number of differing pre-merger and post-merger accounting figures and 
                                            
 
86 Mostly coming from the field of finance and related disciplines, as noted by Spiss (2008). 
87 Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 17). 
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financial ratios. These various accounting figures and ratios are all based on 
annual financial statement data and are therefore past-oriented success 
measures. In general, they can be broadly divided into two groups of measures, 
depending on whether they measure firm’s performance and profitability (e.g., 
return on equity, return on assets, return on investment, return on 
policyholders’ surplus, and profit margin) or not (e.g., number of employees, 
capital base, total assets, sales, earnings per share, price-earnings-ratio, and 
staff turnover expenses).88 Essential to the methodology and its proper use is 
the correct choice of a benchmark against which the changes in the accounting 
measures can be judged. From a theoretical point of view, the effects of an 
M&A transaction have to be determined based on a comparison of the realized 
post-merger accounting measures with the hypothetical accounting measures 
that would have been reported in the absence of the M&A transaction. 
However, as a result of the fact that these hypothetical accounting measures 
are not observable, a particular reference benchmark has to be constructed. 
Although there is no unique benchmark evident in the extant literature, three 
possible ways of benchmarking can be identified: 1) a comparison with a control 
group comprised of comparable firms, 2) a comparison with average industry 
values, and 3) a before-and-after comparison.89 As will be briefly addressed in 
the next section, each method has its own advantages and shortcomings. 
 
A second large body of literature, namely efficiency research, which uses 
accounting data to measure efficiency changes of merged companies, has 
become the state of the art. Modern frontier efficiency analysis measures 
firms’ efficiency90 relative to “best practice” frontiers, which are derived from the 
most efficient firms in the industry. Firms operating on the frontier have an 
efficiency score of 1 and are considered fully efficient, whereas firms lying 
below the frontier are inefficient relative to “best practice” firms (efficiency 
scores between 0 and 1). To maximize profit and thereby to operate on the 
                                            
 
88 E.g., Bamberger (1994, p. 115) and Kerler (1999, p. 103). 
89 Bamberger (1994, p. 114). For a more detailed exposition on this issue, the reader is referred 
to section 4.3.5.2. 
90 Cost (calculate the minimum costs to produce the given output vector), production (assess the 
minimum inputs required to produce the given output vector), and revenue frontiers (measure 
the maximization of revenues). 
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“best practice” efficiency line, a firm must be both cost and revenue efficient. 
Since the birth of this type of analysis in the late 1970s (Aigner, Lovell, & 
Schmidt, 1997), two major estimation methods, econometric modeling91 and 
mathematical programming,92 have emerged as the standard methods for 
measuring the efficiency effects of M&A transactions. Thus, a bulk of the 
existing M&A literature makes use of these two approaches, which compare 
frontier efficiency estimates or the pre-merger and post-merger performance of 
firms using accounting data.93 From a theoretical standpoint, firms with 
higher efficiency should also be more profitable. Simultaneously, a firm’s 
profitability should be positively related with its cash flow generated. Given 
that, in modern corporate valuation theory, the present value of a 
company’s future cash flows determines the firm’s value,94 we can 
conclude that more efficient firms should also have higher share prices.95 
Consequently, a successful M&A transactions should cause improvements 
in firm’s efficiency and ultimately lead to an increase in the value of the 
firm. 
2.3.2.1.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Measure 
A broad range of relevant merits and limitations of measures based on financial 
statement data is provided by the extant literature (see Table 3 below). Though 
accounting data is an objective success measure, can be easily obtained, and 
is well understood, there are some serious problems with accounting measures 
of performance (e.g., a lack of comparability due to different accounting 
standards across countries and the complexity of measuring past performance 
and managerial manipulation).96 In general, previous studies have regularly 
highlighted the negative impact of managerial manipulation97 of financial 
                                            
 
91 Stochastic frontier analysis, a parametric approach. 
92 Data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric approach. 
93 For a detailed examination, see Berger and Humphrey (1997). They review 130 studies that 
adopt the efficiency methodology to financial institutions (primarily to banks) and find an 
almost equal split between these two methods (69 applicants of non-parametric approaches 
and 60 using parametric techniques). 
94 See, e.g., Weston, Chung, and Hoag (2007, p. 133).  
95 See, e.g., Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 40). 
96 See, e.g., Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986, p. 498), Bamberger (1994, p. 194), and Settnik 
(2006, p. 217).  
97 E.g., Gerpott (1993, p. 194). 
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statements and differences in local accounting standards and practices98 on the 
explanatory power of accounting measures. The latter is a major drawback, 
especially when comparing accounting data of firms from different countries or 
even firms operating in varying economic, political, and cultural settings.99 Even 
though the cross-country information comparability in the European Union was 
significantly enhanced by the mandatory adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005,100 prior to that, companies followed their 
own distinct domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). For 
example, as shown by the study of Joos and Lang (1994) (who compare 
various financial ratios of firms from the UK and Germany101 before the 
harmonization of accounting standards in 2005), individual local accounting 
standards and practices differ and hence constitute a palpable barrier to a 
meaningful cross-country comparison. Furthermore, an insurance-specific 
drawback is that substantial differences between financial statements of life 
insurance and non-life insurance companies exist, which in turn might result in 
an improper comparison of financial figures and ratios of life and non-life 
insurers.102 However, Settnik (2006) emphasizes that besides all these 
drawbacks, the financial statement-based approach provides a major 
advantage when analyzing the success of M&A in the insurance industry. In 
contrast to companies in other industries, all103 insurance players, independent 
of their size and legal form, have the obligation to compile annual financial 
statements. As a result, the author concludes that the one essential requirement 
for performing such an accounting-based analysis is always available in the 
case of insurance companies.104  
 
                                            
 
98 E.g., Bradshaw and Miler (2007) and Soderstrom and Sun (2007). 
99 E.g., Bradshaw and Miller (2002), Meeks and Swann (2008), and Liao, Sellhorn, and Skaife 
(2011). 
100 See, e.g., Yip and Young (2012). 
101 Applying UK GAAP that primarily provide useful information to shareholders and German 
GAAP (HGB) that, in contrast, are stakeholder oriented and place the focus on creditor 
protection, respectively (Iatridis, 2010, p. 198). 
102 See, for example, the discussion by Baete (2009a, p. 84, 2009b, p. 27, and 2009c, p. 32) or 
Antolin, Schich, and Yermo (2011, p. 242). 
103 With the exception of very few and very small insurance firms which are of minor importance 
in the insurance market, as described by Settnik (2006, p. 224). 
104 Settnik (2006, p. 224). 
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For a more detailed and comprehensive discussion on the individual strengths 
and weaknesses of this approach when analyzing the success of insurance 
M&A, see for example, Gerpott (1993, p. 194) and Bamberger (1994, p. 112). In 
addition, Settnik (2006, p. 224) provides arguments specific to the insurance 
industry. 
 
Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of the financial statement-based approach 
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2.3.2.2 Capital Market-Based Approach 
2.3.2.2.1 Basic Procedure 
A second major stream in the extant M&A literature analyzes the stock 
market reaction to special events (such as M&A announcements) and thereby 
relies on capital market data. Proponents of the capital market-based approach 
argue that M&A activities should follow the principle of shareholder wealth 
maximization105 and hence evaluate its success by the change in shareholders’ 
wealth as measured by share price changes. Accordingly, this future-oriented 
performance indicator places its focus on the financial dimension of success. 
 
Since the birth of this approach in 1969 (Fama et al., 1969), an overwhelming 
majority of the existing literature, and in particular almost all of the existing 
capital market research, uses an event study approach to analyze the impact of 
M&A transactions on stock price performance of acquirers (and targets). 
Researchers applying the event methodology argue that, given the assumption 
of capital market efficiency,106 event studies are the best way to assess the real 
economic effects of M&A activity by using reliable market data.107 The 
underlying procedure for estimating the performance effects of M&A 
transactions is quite standardized. The researcher tries to determine if 
                                            
 
105 For example, Jensen (1984) states that “stockholders are not equal with these other groups 
[e.g., management, employees, customers, society – ed. note] because they are the ultimate 
holders of the rights to organization control and therefore must be the focal point for any 
discussion concerning it” (p. 110). In addition, Treynor (1981) remarks that “[t]hose who 
criticize the goal of share value maximization are forgetting that stockholders are not merely 
the beneficiaries of the corporation’s financial success, but also the referees who determine 
management’s financial power. Any management – no matter how powerful and independent 
– that flouts the financial objective of maximizing share value does so at its own peril” (p. 71 
and p. 69). See for example, Rappaport (1986) and Reimann (1989) for more on the 
shareholder value approach. 
106 See, e.g., Boesecke (2009), who states that “[e]vent studies are based on the assumption 
that in an efficient market the immediate wealth effect reflects the capital market’s overall 
unbiased assessment of the present value of the future benefits of the alliance” (p. 51). Bower 
(2004) further elaborates: “Given the assumption that security markets were perfectly efficient 
in their pricing of company shares, then the wisdom of managers in merging or acquiring 
could be measured by examining how the market reacted to the news of an M&A event” (p. 
236). 
107 E.g., Schwert (1981), Fama (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Cummins and Weiss 
(2004). Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2003, p. 9) add: “Many view short-run stock performance 
as the most reliable evidence of value creation because in an efficient capital market, stock 
prices quickly adjust to new information and incorporate any changes in value that the 
acquisitions are expected to bring.” 
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transactions on average result in an abnormal performance of the involved 
companies by calculating the realized stock market returns of acquirers or 
targets, or both, relative to expected returns generated by asset pricing models, 
such as the market model, or relative to specific benchmarks such as non-
merging control firms, reference portfolios of comparable firms, or stock 
indices.108  
 
Some authors assess the overall effect of M&A by calculating the total wealth 
creation for all the involved firms (i.e., value creation for acquirer firm’s 
shareholders and target firm’s shareholders, as well as the value created for 
the combined entity of acquirer and target).109 Others, such as Bamberger 
(1994) and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), argue that this procedure—that 
is, the calculation of the total value creation for all involved firms—conflicts with 
the principle of acquiring firm’s shareholder wealth maximization,110 and hence 
they only evaluate the success of M&A from the perspective of the acquiring 
firm. Possible differences in the stock return between the merged company and 
its respective benchmark are calculated over a certain period (“event window”) 
before, after, or surrounding the announcement day of the transaction in order 
to examine the market reaction from different angles. Intervals prior to the 
announcement of the transaction examine a possible information leakage; 
symmetric intervals (i.e., same number of days before and after the 
announcement) try to compare pre-merger and post-merger returns; and 
intervals afterwards aim to evaluate long-term performance effects of such 
events. Afterwards, these differences in stock returns are used as estimates of 
“abnormal” or “excess” returns. The majority of studies on acquisition 
performance using the event study methodology concentrate on short-term 
capital market reactions to M&A announcements. Under the assumption of at 
                                            
 
108 E.g., Brown and Warner (1985) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008). 
109 As Elgers and Clark (1980) put it, “[f]rom a shareholder’s standpoint, business combinations 
are justified when the market value of the equity shares of buyer and seller firms increases as 
a result of their intention to merge” (p. 66). This is also in line with Rappaport’s (1986) 
definition of value creation. 
110 The reasoning behind this is that if the M&A announcement induces an increase in the stock 
price of the target firm, this price increase represents higher acquisition costs for the acquirer, 
as it must spend additional money to purchase the target firm (Bamberger, 1994, p. 90).  
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least semi-strong market efficiency,111 these short-term event studies use 
announcement period returns in the form of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) surrounding the announcement as the measure of M&A success. 
However, as noted by Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011), “a series of new 
methodologies has given rise to a “new wave” of long-run event studies” (p. 15) 
that investigate the medium- and long-term effects of M&A transactions by 
predominantly relying on buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) or calendar-
time abnormal returns (CTARs).112  
 
In the next section, we will again provide a summary overview table of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the capital market approach that have been 
identified in the previous M&A literature. Furthermore, the most important 
arguments, with a particular emphasis on insurance-specific arguments, are 
briefly outlined. 
2.3.2.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Measure 
Even though various interest groups might have somewhat differing goals, 
empirical studies regularly assess the success of M&A transactions from the 
perspective of shareholders.113 According to Wirtz (2006) and Boesecke 
(2009), this is owing to the fact that, on the one hand, an equal (or even 
weighted) consideration of all stakeholder interests is hardly possible, and on 
the other hand, claims of all other stakeholders (with the exception of 
shareholders)114 are defined by contracts. Hence, M&A activity should primarily 
pursue the objectives of a firm's shareholders.115 Furthermore, Bamberger 
                                            
 
111 For a thorough discussion on market efficiency and its several forms, i.e. weak, semi-strong, 
and strong form, please see Fama (1970), Brealey and Myers (1991), and Spiss (2008). 
112 For additional details on the mechanics of these long-term event methodologies, Antoniou, 
Arbour, and Zhao (2011) refer to the works by Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999), Brav (2000), and others. Toward a better understanding of the event study 
methodology, please consider also the dissertation of Schertzinger (2008), in which the author 
extensively elaborates on the measurement of abnormal returns, the benchmark construction, 
and tests for significance of abnormal returns for short-term as well as medium- and long-term 
event studies. 
113 See, e.g., Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Cummins and Weiss (2004), and Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006). 
114 Boesecke (2009) explains that "shareholders are seen as residual claimants of any surplus 
profits remaining after expenses to other participants have been paid" (p. 14). See also Wirtz 
(2006, p. 296). 
115 See also Franke and Hax (1999, p. 3). 
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(1994) states that the sole emphasis on profit maximization for shareholders, 
that is, creating additional shareholder value, is also in line with the goal of 
securing the survival of the firm, which is shared by other interest groups such 
as employees, creditors, suppliers, and especially the insured customers of the 
insurance company.116 Based on this shareholder value maximization 
paradigm, the capital market approach—with its reliance on stock market data 
for estimating the consequences of M&A transactions—appears plausible, 
since share price movements represent the only direct measure of shareholder 
value.117 Picken (2003) additionally notes that capital markets provide a fully 
objective measure that does not depend on data that can be manipulated.  
 
Moreover, by relying on share price fluctuations for measuring the effects of 
M&A, success can be easily measured and assessed quantitatively.118 From a 
theoretical standpoint, changes in stock market value around the M&A 
announcement should fully capture the valuation effects arising from the M&A 
activity. Accordingly, conclusions drawn out of (short-term) capital market 
studies strictly rely on the assumption of market efficiency.119 In his study on 
the efficiency of capital markets, Fama (1991, p. 1607) comes to the conclusion 
that stock market prices adjust efficiently to new information whether or not they 
regard dividend decisions, investment activities, or others. However, Antoniou, 
Arbour, and Zhao (2011) outline some major problems of the capital market 
approach in general and the event study methodology in particular, which can 
be categorized along the time horizon of analysis. In short-term capital market 
studies, the use of market data causes the problem that the indicated market 
reaction to the transactions is solely based on expectations of investors 
regarding the consequences of the respective M&A transaction and the 
                                            
 
116 To every insurance scheme the survival of the insurance company is of highest importance, 
as the value of insurer’s promise to do certain things as specified in the contract (i.e., 
consideration) is dependent on the survival of the insurer and on the trust of the insured in the 
insurance scheme (See Settnik, 2006, p. 277). Albrecht (1994b, p. 3) and Oletzky (1998, p. 
87) provide an extended discussion on the importance of the survival of insurance companies 
and the safety first principle in the insurance industry.  
117 E.g., Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986, p. 499). 
118 Janisch (1992, p. 30). 
119 See discussion by Pilloff and Santomero (1998) and Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011). 
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expectations of its future cash flow implications.120 However, the consequences 
are often hardly foreseeable as a whole, and predictions are not correct in 
many cases, as noted by Picot (2002). In real market situations, there is plenty 
of evidence that stock market returns may temporarily change independently 
from the underlying fundamentals (see the “dot-com bubble” between 1995 and 
2000), and therefore the assumption of efficient capital markets is doubtful.121 
Moreover, we have to face the premium exacerbation problem122 on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, we have to note that a substantial proportion of 
the negative (short-term) announcement effect is due to merger arbitrage short-
selling, as pointed out by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004). Extending the 
time horizon of the study mitigates most of these problems but, at the same 
time, causes the problem that stock market changes might be attributable to 
other events extraneous to the M&A transaction, for example, new issues of 
stock, dividend changes, or multiple M&A in the event window.123  
 
Furthermore, in studies that apply long-term event windows, we have to 
withstand some methodological and computational problems. The foremost 
issues are the bad-model problem124 and biased test statistics,125 which cause 
problems in receiving accurate and reliable long-run results. Boehmer, 
Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991), Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai (1999), and Erhardt and Koerstein (2007) outline how to deal with these 
                                            
 
120 E.g., Montgomery and Wilson (1986) and Datta (1991). 
121 Budde, Felcht, and Frankemoelle (2006, p. 11 and p. 16). 
122 Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 7) use this term to describe the fact that, even under 
the assumption of efficient markets, substantial premiums offered to target shareholders bias 
weighted average return calculations. As result, the calculated parameter (WACAR) is almost 
inevitably positive regardless of the real economic value effect. 
123 E.g., Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986) and Schertzinger (2008). See also the discussion in 
Kerler (1999, p. 99).  
124 The problem of selecting the correct model and benchmark (see, e.g., Fama, 1998, p. 292). 
125 This is comprised of size and book-to-market biases as a result of non-random samples of 
firms, the new listing bias (i.e., the problem of adding firms to the index after the event; see, 
e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997, p. 342), the rebalancing bias (i.e., reference portfolio returns are 
typically calculated assuming some form of portfolio rebalancing; see, e.g., Barber and Lyon, 
1997, p. 342), the skewness bias (i.e., stock returns are highly skewed with a few big outliners 
influencing the sample; see, e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997, p. 343; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 
1999, p. 165) and the overlapping horizons bias (i.e., cross-sectional dependence of stocks in 
contemporaneous event windows; see, e.g., Cowan and Sergeant, 1997, p. 6). 
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problems by making several adjustments to the parametric tests.126 Additional 
problems include differences in post-merger book values depending on the 
chosen accounting method,127 the expected negative abnormal return in event 
studies with a small sample,128 the “hot market” issue,129 and the 
appropriateness of the benchmark130 and the estimation period.131 Moreover, 
there are various problems in the application of the CAPM mode (e.g., the lack 
of consideration of risk and insolvency), which are especially troublesome when 
analyzing the success of M&A transactions in an insurance context.132 
 
Table 4 presents a summary on these aforementioned and other strengths and 
weaknesses. For a considerable discourse on the individual strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach when analyzing the success of insurance M&A, 
see also, Gerpott (1993, p. 197), Bamberger (1994, p. 93), and Settnik (2006, p. 
205). 
 
                                            
 
126 They propose to successive select single control firms that have not undertaken any M&A 
activity or to employ a reference portfolio composed of comparable firms. 
127 Until the issuance of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 141 in 
2001 in the US, mergers were accounted for using either the purchase or the pooling method 
resulting in differences in post-merger values (see, e.g., Antoniou, Arbour, & Zhao, 2011, p. 
11; Erhardt & Koerstein, 2007, p. 2). 
128 Viswanathan and Wei (2004) provide mathematical proof that the usual abnormal return 
calculated in event studies with any finite sample results in a negative expectation. 
129 For the problem in the calculation of weighted abnormal returns in the calendar-time 
approach, see discussion in Mußhoff (2007, p. 149). 
130 Gregory (1997). 
131 Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986). 
132 E.g., Oletzky (1998, p. 140), Zweifel and Eisen (2000, p. 249), and Settnik (2006, p. 212). 
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Table 4: Strengths and weaknesses capital market-based approach 
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2.3.2.3 Retention/Divestment Approach 
2.3.2.3.1 Basic Procedure 
A third and relatively small body of previous literature on the success of M&A 
transactions concentrated on the role of retention and divestiture of acquired 
companies as an indicator of M&A success. Proponents of this approach, such 
as Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), argue that a subsequent 
divestment of the acquired firm is equivalent to the failure of the previous 
acquisition. “The underlying assumption is that a company will generally not 
divest or close down a successful business except in a comparatively few 
special cases.”133 Simultaneously, if previously acquired entities are not 
divested in a specified timeframe, the M&A transaction is labeled successful. In 
general, timeframes employed in these studies vary from six years (e.g., Porter, 
1987; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992) to 13 years (Schoenberg, 2006) after the 
transaction year.  
2.3.2.3.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Measure 
Strengths and weaknesses of the retention/divestment measure that have been 
mentioned in the extant M&A research are presented in Table 5 below. We will 
discuss a few of these points, especially those that are of particular relevance 
for analyzing the success of insurance M&A, briefly.  
 
Even though the retention/divestment approach is a fast and simple method for 
assessing the success of (insurance) M&A, its results are not sufficiently 
accurate and hence not a reliable guide to M&A success. Porter (1987) solely 
bases the success evaluation on whether the previously acquired firm is 
subsequently divested or not. As stated above, the elementary assumption 
underlying the approach is that “a company will generally not divest or close 
down a successful business except in a comparatively few special cases.”134 
However, there are more than just a few special cases in which a successful 
acquisition is divested. It has regularly been argued that there are various other 
reasons for divestiture, which consequently pose a serious threat to the validity 
                                            
 
133 Porter (1987, p. 47). 
134 Porter (1987, p. 47). 
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of this approach. These various other reasons, for example, might include profit 
taking following successful restructure (Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992) and 
appropriate resource reconfiguration in response to environmental change 
(Capron et al., 2001), as well as tax reasons, regulatory constraints, and 
protection against takeover attempts from raiders, as enumerated by Markides 
and Berg (1992, p. 13). Furthermore, serious concerns have to be raised with 
respect to the conclusion that transactions in which the target has not been 
divested (in a specified post-M&A period) ultimately indicate a successful M&A 
transaction. Especially in the insurance industry, this conclusion is often not true 
as pointed out by Settnik (2006) and Farny (2011). The authors argue that due 
to specifics of the insurance business, the liquidation of an insurance company 
is a long-term process and happens very rarely in practice.135 For a more 
detailed discussion on the merits and limitations of this approach, the reader is 
referred to Bamberger (1994, p. 118) and Settnik (2006, p. 237). In summary, 
when analyzing the success of M&A transactions, the retention/divestment 
approach has to be rejected for theoretical reasons, especially when analyzing 
the success of insurance M&A.  
 
Table 5: Strengths and weaknesses retention/divestment approach 
 
                                            
 
135 See Settnik (2006, p. 239) as well as Farny (2011, p. 203). 
  
42 
2.3.2.4 Interview and Survey Approach 
2.3.2.4.1 Basic Procedure 
The fourth major methodology for investigating the success of M&A is based on 
the subjective assessment of executives and managers involved in the 
transaction (and in a very few cases, it is based on expert informants’ 
subjective assessment).136 While in the case of corporate managers’ and 
executives’ ex post assessment, the perspective from which success is 
measured is obvious, but the success perspective in interviews and surveys of 
external industry experts is far from clear.137 Restricting the discussion to 
interviews and surveys of executives and managers, we can note that the 
majority of these interrogations evaluate the post-M&A performance from the 
viewpoint of the acquiring firm management (e.g., Kitching, 1967, 1974; Datta & 
Grant, 1990; Datta, 1991; Beatty, 1999), whereas only a small number of 
interviews and surveys are conducted addressing the target firm management 
(e.g., Very et. al, 1997; Brock, 2005). As discussed thoroughly by Nakamura 
(2005), interviews and surveys can be conducted in manifold ways, ranging 
from open and flexible in-depth interviews (also known as unstructured 
personal interviews) and other detailed semi-structured interviews to structured 
interviews such as questionnaires and standardized surveys. Under the former 
two interview procedures, “the actual content of the interview is decided by the 
conversation during the interview itself”138 and hence is far less standardized 
and structured than surveys in which a series of pre-specified questions 
assessing the specific topic are asked. Frequently asked questions in these 
studies are about the original objectives and motives for making the transaction 
and the various factors of M&A success (for example in the studies of Kitching, 
1967, 1974; Datta & Grant, 1990; Datta, 1991; Beatty, 1999) or about the 
satisfaction of the management with the deal and the overall success of the 
transaction (for example in the studies of Kitching 1967; Dess & Robinson, 
1984; Datta, 1991; Beatty, 1999). After discussing the general mechanics of the 
                                            
 
136 Due to the limited dissemination of expert informant surveys in the extant M&A literature, this 
method is not further discussed and evaluated here. Instead, we focus solely on surveys of 
executives and managers.  
137 Bamberger (1994, p. 120). 
138 Nakamura (2005, p. 78). 
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interview and survey method, we will next outline its benefits and limitations for 
analyzing the success of insurance M&A. 
2.3.2.4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Measure 
Table 6: Strengths and weaknesses of the interview and survey approach 
 
 
As shown in the above table, previous academic literature identifies a large 
number of strengths and weaknesses of interview and survey-based measures 
of success. In short, the advantages of this approach can be summarized as its 
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broad applicability as well as its potential to extract a large amount of qualitative 
data. As to the former advantage, it is clear that this approach can also be 
utilized where objective measures are not available, for example, in cases of 
divisions of private or listed companies.139 As to the latter advantage, in the 
case of interviews, the interviewer is not only able to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the underlying M&A motives and the transaction as a whole, 
but also might reveal something that is beyond the scope of quantitative 
methods.140 However, the downside of such a qualitative approach is the 
difficulty of generating a large volume of interviews due to the time-consuming 
interview process.141 Consequently, serious concerns have been raised about 
the generalizability from inferences drawn from such a limited sample.142  
 
A further critical aspect is the quality of such an approach, as highlighted by 
Nakamura (2005). Even if the difficulties in identifying the "right" person to 
interview, as referred to by Nakamura (2005), can be overcome, the approach 
is prone to subjective biases, and its results are often too optimistic. This 
positive bias can be attributed to two factors: First, the evaluation of managers 
involved in the respective transaction is often too positive (Kerler, 1999), and 
second, companies engaged in unsuccessful M&A are not likely to participate in 
these interviews and surveys (Picken, 2003). For a further discussion on the 
strengths and weaknesses of this approach when analyzing the success of 
M&A, see for example, Bamberger (1994, p. 120) and Nakamura (2005, p. 78). 
In addition, Settnik (2006, p. 235) adapts and extends these arguments to the 
insurance context.  
2.3.2.5 Concluding Evaluation of the Approaches 
From the above discussion, it should be clear that each approach has its own 
particular strengths and weaknesses and can be better suited for a specific 
purpose or situation.  
 
                                            
 
139 See, e.g., Dess and Robinson (1984) and Sudarsanam (2010). 
140 See also the discussion in Nakamura (2005, p. 77). 
141 Nakamura (2005, p. 79). 
142 See, e.g., Eisenhardt (1989), Beatty (1999), and Nakamura (2005).  
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In general, the use of the financial statement-based approach (and hence 
accounting data) to evaluate the outcome and success of M&A transactions 
between insurance firms has one major advantage: as opposed to companies 
from other industries, all insurance companies, independent of their size and 
legal form, are required to compile annual financial statements, and thus the 
essential requirement for its application can be fulfilled by all insurers.143 
However, as highlighted by Baete (2009), an insurance-specific problem arises 
when comparing insurers operating in different insurance segments such as life 
and non-life. Due to various differences in balance sheet characteristics 
between, for example, a life and a non-life insurance company, a comparison 
between such two insurers on the basis of accounting figures and ratios is not 
meaningful. Moreover, there is also the potential for managerial manipulation of 
accounting figures and differences in accounting standards and practices 
across countries that lead to a lack of cross-country comparability of accounting 
information. Accordingly, accounting-based analyses should be used with great 
caution in the context of cross-country samples.144 However, taking these 
shortcomings into account, the financial statement-based approach offers a 
powerful tool for evaluating the success of M&A and in particular for M&A 
transactions between insurance firms. 
 
When analyzing the success of M&A from the viewpoint of firms' shareholders, 
the capital market-based approach, however, is the most suitable approach.145 
Similar to the financial statement-based approach, this methodology has also 
the ability to handle and process a large quantity of data and therefore also 
guarantees the generalizability of the results.146 Moreover, the use of capital 
market data offers an objective success measure that cannot be manipulated 
and that primarily focuses on the financial and market strategic aspects of 
success.147 Despite various points of criticism that have been raised against this 
approach (see Section 2.3.2.2.2), it is the most commonly applied method for 
                                            
 
143 Settnik (2006, p. 224). 
144 Bradshaw and Miller (2002, p. 7). 
145 See Spiss (2008, p. 105) and Boesecke (2009, p. 87), who both reach the same conclusion. 
146 E.g., Eisenhardt (1989, p. 544) and Datta (1991, p. 294). 
147 E.g., Picken (2003, p. 61). 
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M&A performance and success evaluation in the extant literature.148 In addition, 
a small minority of researchers concentrate on the role of retention and 
divestiture of acquired companies as an indicator of M&A success However, 
considering the weaknesses of the retention/divestment approach (see Section 
2.3.2.3.2), one has to conclude that this approach has to be rejected as a 
measure of M&A success in general and for the analysis of success of M&A 
transactions in the insurance industry in particular. 
 
In contrast to the foregoing approaches, the major advantage of the interview 
and survey approach is the richness and depth of qualitative responses, which 
provide a much fuller understanding of the individual transactions and their 
underlying motives. But here again we have to recognize the potential perils 
and downside of such an approach, such as quality concerns, lack of objectivity 
in the assessment, and the small-sample problem (see Table 6 in Section 
2.3.2.4.2). These are major limitations, especially the latter two, because 
serious concerns about the objectivity and generalizability of the results are 
raised due to subjective assessment and the relatively small number of 
companies surveyed. Accordingly, there is broad consensus in the literature149 
that the interview and survey approach is only useful either as a complementary 
tool in addition to one of the two aforementioned methodologies (i.e., financial 
statement-based approach and capital market-based approach) for analyzing 
the financial performance and success of M&A or as an alternative method for 
investigating the “soft”150 non-financial factors of M&A transactions. 
 
Overall, this concluding evaluation should emphasize that only the capital 
market-based approach and financial statement-based approach (when 
conducted properly) allow for general conclusions about the success of M&A 
transactions as well as the success factors. This finding serves as a basis for 
the following chapters, which review the extant literature on the success of 
insurance M&A and examine M&A success in the European insurance industry.  
                                            
 
148 Wirtz (2006, p. 300). 
149 E.g., Kirchner (1991, p. 99), Bamberger (1994, p. 120), Wirtz (2003, p. 406), and Settnik 
(2006, p. 234). 
150 See also section 3.2 for an extended description of “soft” and “hard” factors. 
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3 Literature Review: Prior Research on the Success of 
Insurance M&A and its Determinants  
3.1 Overview 
The following sections provide an in-depth overview of research on the 
influences of M&A activities on the involved insurance companies. First, we give 
a broad overview of the most important academic publications examining the 
success of M&A transactions in the insurance industry (Section 3.2). Second, 
we describe the selection criteria and the selection process (Section 3.3) and 
the literature review method (Section 3.4) for identifying all relevant studies on 
the relationship between insurance M&A activity and firms’ financial 
performance. Thereafter, we develop a research cluster that aims to organize 
and classify previous insurance M&A literature by assembling the identified 
studies into homogenous research clusters (Section 3.5). This procedure shall 
provide information on how previous researchers have tackled the investigated 
research questions of this work and thereby help to better understand the 
various research findings. Accordingly, on the basis of this classification 
scheme, a review of all published empirical studies on the overall success of 
insurance transactions and their respective findings is presented in Section 3.6.  
 
As our descriptive analysis in Chapter 4 examines the success of insurance 
M&A from a capital market perspective, Sections 3.7 and 3.8 place special 
attention to these academic publications, utilizing capital market data to analyze 
the influence of insurance M&A activity on firms’ overall performance and the 
determinants of M&A performance. Eventually, this specific focus on prior 
capital market research will provide consistent results on the impact of M&A 
activity on insurers’ financial success. 
 
3.2 Overview of Recent Studies 
In general, there is a bulk of academic literature that investigates the success of 
major organizational decisions, such as the decision to undertake an M&A, the 
importance and influence of various determinants of success, and the role of 
post-merger integration in influencing the success of these undertakings. 
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However, in the insurance industry, this area of research has been far less 
investigated compared to other industries, such as manufacturing, 
chemical/pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and even the banking industry.  
 
When looking at the academic literature on insurance M&A, a clear separation 
between studies focusing mainly on strategic and financial aspects of insurance 
M&A and studies addressing primarily organizational behavior and human 
resources aspects of transactions can be observed.151 The former strand of 
research, to which our study also belongs, highlights the importance of strategic 
and financial factors in explaining the value effects of insurance M&A 
transactions. In particular, strategy and finance research has put its emphasis 
on strategic and financial factors that are quantitatively measurable, such as 
transaction experience, relative size of the target company, shareholding 
details, mode of acquisition, method of payment, and percentage acquired.152 
These are also called “hard” factors and further include the M&A strategy, 
financing alternatives, legal issues, and due diligence; they have received 
significant attention in the extant literature.153 In this general overview, only a 
small selection of studies dealing with “hard” factors will be outlined, since most 
of the studies will be discussed more thoroughly in the following sections. In 
their closely related studies on bank/insurance combinations, Fields, Fraser, 
and Kolari (2005, 2007) cover financial and strategic factors such as acquirers’ 
size, previous acquirers’ performance, relative size of the target, previous 
targets’ performance, geographic and industry focus, and the method of 
payment. Kitching (1974) performed a great number of personal interviews with 
top executives of the involved companies. Analyzing 407 acquisitions between 
1965 and 1970, he outlined how important numerous hard factors—such as the 
country and industry chosen, the kind of diversification attempted, the purchase 
method, and various characteristics of the acquired company (e.g., profitability, 
size, and market share)—are in determining the success of these M&A 
                                            
 
151 E.g., Jemison and Sitkin (1986, p. 145), Javidan et al. (2004, p. 247), and Schoenberg and 
Bowman (2010, p. 154). 
152 See, e.g., studies by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2005, 2007), 
Schertzinger (2008), and Cummins and Xie (2009). 
153 E.g., Jung (1993, p. 253 and p. 263) and Bertoncelj and Kovac (2008, p. 215). 
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transactions. Further studies (e.g., Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Boubakri, 
Dionne, & Triki, 2006; Klumpes, 2006; Schertzinger, 2008; Cummins & Xie, 
2009) analyze the strategic and financial determinants and will be discussed in 
greater detail in Sections 3.7 and 3.8. 
 
In contrast, another strand of research has shifted the attention toward the 
human side of these transactions by considering non-financial factors related to 
people and process management.154 The majority of these qualitative “soft” 
elements (mostly related to the post-merger integration process), which range 
from various employee problems and communication issues to cultural 
differences within the two companies,155 cannot be measured accurately in real 
numbers. Accordingly, these factors are very complex to grasp and quantify and 
hence are most often only available through small “case-study-like” 
investigations.156 The problem with such case study research is in its lack of 
generalizability, meaning that the findings might only be restricted to the specific 
case that is under investigation. Nevertheless, there is a fast-growing body of 
literature that integrates these softer non-financial elements of an M&A 
transaction process into their focus of research.157 In the mid ’80s, Jemison and 
Sitkin (1986) spotlighted the crucial role of organizational factors in contributing 
to the success of corporate M&A activity. Later on, Datta (1991) worked out the 
significant impact of organizational differences between the involved companies 
on the success or failure of these transactions. However, his study is limited to 
US manufacturing firms. Also, in a survey of large public Canadian companies, 
Beatty (1999) expressly underlines the essential need for managers to pay 
much attention to the human side of these M&A deals. In a similar research 
                                            
 
154 See, e.g., studies by Datta (1991), Cartwright and Cooper (1995), Nguyen and Kleiner 
(2003), and Fustec and Faroult (2011). 
155 Jung (1993, p. 253 and p. 263), Bauch (2004, p. 82), Greenberg and Guinan (2004, p. 137), 
Hartog (2004, p. 213), Sitkin and Pablo (2004, p. 182), and Bertoncelj and Kovac (2008, p. 
217) enumerate various “soft” factors, including the transfer of strategic capabilities, 
effectiveness of M&A implementation, creation of M&A oversight committees, selection of 
advisors, management expertise, managerial compensation, and communication, to name a 
few. 
156 See also Bower (2004, p. 241) and Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 19). 
157 See, e.g., Jemison and Sitkin (1986), Datta (1991), Beatty (1999), Nguyen and Kleiner 
(2003), Schumacher (2003), Carey and Ogden (2004), Riad (2005), Lin and Wei (2006), The 
Boston Consulting Group (2008a), and Fustec and Faroult (2011). 
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work, Nguyen and Kleiner (2003) investigate several organizational factors 
responsible for achieving post-acquisition success. In contrast to the study by 
Beatty (1999), their study is based on empirical findings of previous literature 
and case studies. Last but not least, with an exclusive focus on the insurance 
industry, Fustec and Faroult (2011) highlight the important role of various 
intangible assets in explaining why almost 50% of all insurance M&A deals 
destroy value.  
 
A further differentiation of studies analyzing the wealth effects of M&A deals in 
the insurance industry is closely related to this separation of financial and non-
financial literature. According to Jemison and Sitkin (1986), academic literature 
on the effects of M&A transactions can be divided into studies dealing mainly 
with the selection process and others focusing primarily on the integration 
process of such transactions. Adopting Jemison and Sitkin’s definition, Erez-
Rein, Erez, and Maital (2004) use the phrases “making an M&A decision” and 
“doing the deal” to refer to various pre-merger processes from determining the 
growth strategy to the closing of the transaction and “making an M&A work” to 
describe all tasks related to the integration of the two or more companies. 
Empirical studies with a specific focus on the selection process often also have 
components that concentrate on “hard” strategic and financial aspects of an 
M&A transaction. Likewise, studies that deal with the post-acquisition 
integration phase mainly direct their attention to “soft” human factors. Similar to 
the dominance of strategic and financial literature, most scholars dealing with 
the topic of value creation in insurance transactions have limited their studies to 
activities in the pre-merger phase of organizational integration. Numerous 
studies investigate various aspects related to the pre-merger phase of the 
transaction process.158 Since most of these studies are discussed in Sections 
3.7 and 3.8, a detailed discussion on them is not provided herein. 
 
                                            
 
158 See, e.g., Kruse et al. (2002), King et al. (2004), Cummins and Xie (2005), Martynova, 
Oosting and Renneboog (2006), Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2005, 2007), Schertzinger (2008), 
The Boston Consulting Group (2009a), Cummins and Xie (2009), and Shim (2011a and 
2011b). 
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Issues related to post-merger integration are mostly neglected by previous 
academic literature. Once again, however, more and more studies shift the 
center of their attention toward the complex challenges of implementation and 
integration.159 Chakrabarti and Mitchell (2004) place their main emphasis on the 
corporate level integration process, while others, such as Beatty (1999), focus 
on the integration issues of individual business units. In a first report on post-
merger integration, published in 2007, The Boston Consulting Group (2007) 
focuses on general strategic and tactical aspects relevant to all acquirers facing 
significant challenges of post-merger integration and organizational change. 
Similarly, in the 2008, 2009, and 2010 studies by The Boston Consulting Group 
(2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), a range of more specific topics 
dealing with the post-merger integration of the target’s business into the 
acquirer’s organization are considered. DeNoble, Gustafson, and Hegert (1988) 
describe several acquisition pitfalls and how to avoid them. The authors explain 
how neglecting the post-merger integration process can undermine the 
performance of a strategically sound acquisition. They additionally offer 
guidelines to improve the quality of this crucial acquisition planning and 
implementation phase. Pautler (2003) presents a review of business consulting 
literature on the effects of mergers and post-merger integration, answering the 
questions of whether mergers achieve the goals of the executives involved and 
whether these deals enhance shareholder value relative to industry benchmarks 
and explaining what characteristics the more successful deals have compared 
to the less successful ones.  
 
Regarding the methodology for assessing the valuation effects of insurance 
M&A activity, the most significant difference lies in the way the data was 
collected. By far, most of the previous studies rely on quantitative (i.e., 
objective) metrics by using either market or accounting data to analyze the 
effects of M&A transactions. The group of studies using market data conducts 
short- or long-term event studies, while the latter group relies on financial 
statements for analysis, as discussed in detail in Section 3.6. A further objective 
                                            
 
159 See, e.g., DeNoble, Gustafson, and Hegert (1988), Habeck, Kroeger, and Traem (2000), 
Carleton (2004), Epstein (2004), Homburg and Bucerius (2006), Puranam, Singh, and Zollo 
(2003, 2006), and Puranam and Srikanth (2007). 
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methodology for evaluating the success of M&A includes the analysis of 
subsequent divestitures of acquired companies. Additional sources of data 
collection include questionnaires or interviews with personnel from the involved 
firms that form the basis for investigations based on surveys of executives and 
managers and subjective performance assessments obtained from external 
expert informants. For a detailed discussion on the mechanics of these different 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies and an evaluation of their application 
to the insurance industry, refer to Section 2.3.2.  
 
In addition to several studies specified in the following sections,160 The Boston 
Consulting Group (2009a) conducts a short-term event study on 1,100 
insurance transactions. As explained in Section 2.3.2.1.1, a traditional event 
study measures the effect of an M&A transaction on the value of each sample 
firm using financial market data. The same event study research methodology is 
applied by Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2005, 2007) in investigating short-term 
announcement effects of 129 bank/insurance transactions. Others, such as 
Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Loderer and Martin (1992), Loughran and 
Vijh (1997), Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2003), Andre, Kooli, and L’Her (2004), and Lee and Mansor (2008), examine 
post-M&A performance over a longer period of time (i.e., several years following 
the transaction) by using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), buy-and hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs), or calendar-time returns (CTRs). Also using 
financial market data, Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006) employ an alternate 
approach to investigating the effects of M&A on acquiring firms’ long-run stock 
performance. Using a sample of 305 public mergers by UK firms in the period 
from 1985 to 2000, the authors analyze whether there is evidence of a first- or 
second-order stochastic dominance relationship between acquirers and their 
benchmark portfolios.  
 
Accounting data is used by a wide variety of researchers, who generally 
perform accounting ratio analyses or efficiency studies. The former group of 
                                            
 
160 BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), 
Cummins and Weiss (2004), Cummins and Xie (2005), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), 
Elango (2006), Schertzinger (2008), Cummins and Xie (2009), and Staikouras (2009). 
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studies evaluates operating performance of the involved companies by using 
publicly available standard accounting information (performance) ratios (e.g., 
Chamberlain & Tennyson, 1998; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2006; 
Settnik, 2006; Shim, 2011b). The latter prolific group of researchers (e.g., 
Cummins & Weiss, 2000; Klumpes, 2006; Cummins & Xie, 2008; Shim, 2011a) 
specifically focuses on efficiency effects of M&A among (insurance) company 
acquirers. In particular, these efficiency studies, in which researchers also 
employ financial accounting data, focus on various dimensions such as 
production efficiency, cost efficiency, technical efficiency, and revenue 
efficiency. For example, using a Bayesian stochastic frontier, Anderson, 
Ensfeller, and Lewis (2004) explore the production efficiency change of the 
Austrian insurance market from 1994 to 1999. Nakamura (2005), in contrast, 
employs a stochastic frontier production function model to assess technical 
efficiency effects of Japanese M&A deals.  
 
While the use of market- and accounting-based data is quite common in 
academic studies analyzing insurance M&A, only a few studies rely on 
subjective performance evaluations of the management. These so-called 
management surveys and interviews have been carried out in the academic 
studies of Datta (1991), Schoenberg (2006), and The Boston Consulting Group 
(2009c). Additionally, to investigate whether Japanese firms create value 
through M&A transactions, Nakamura (2005) conducts interviews with people 
who had deep insights into Japanese M&A transactions, such as M&A advisors 
and academic scholars. Also, in his doctoral dissertation on Japanese M&A, 
Nakamura (2005) employs several other methodologies, such as case studies 
and efficiency studies, to address the effects of these transactions on the 
behavior and efficiency of acquiring firms’ operations. However, his research is 
restricted to Japanese firms and does not have a special focus on the insurance 
sector. Similarly, Schoenberg (2006) uses various forms of performance 
measures for evaluating the success rate of such corporate acquisitions. 
Besides using stock market and divestment data, the author also bases his 
study on evidence collected from managers’ and expert informants’ 
assessments. The two studies by Nakamura (2005) and Schoenberg (2006) 
represent a new and promising strand of research that combines quantitative 
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and qualitative data to attain a deeper understanding of the effects of M&A. 
Looking at previous insurance M&A literature, Schertzinger (2008) not only 
provides a cross-sectional analysis of 176 insurance transactions between 1990 
and 2005, but also examines two case studies to fully capture the individual 
value drivers of the two transactions under consideration. Thereby, he is able to 
combine the generalizability of the results from the large-sample statistically-
oriented cross-sectional analysis with specific findings from the two case 
studies, which in turn “can offer a potential for exploring new dimensions and for 
raising new research questions.”161  
 
Finally, a last group of studies can be identified that summarize previous 
findings on the success of M&A and the success factors and that further attempt 
to find possible explanations for the partly contradicting results regarding these 
effects. For example, Agrawal and Jaffe (1999) and Lubatkin (1983) provide 
summaries of studies dealing with the performance effects of acquiring firms. 
While Agrawal and Jaffe center their attention on long-run stock returns 
following acquisitions, Lubatkin tries to explain why companies still conduct 
M&A transactions, despite the fact that the vast majority of previous studies 
report negative performance effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders. He 
provides various plausible theoretical reasons for the contradicting findings of 
previous empirical studies and theoretical foundations of strategic management 
literature. Meglio and Risberg (2010), on the other hand, posit that the 
conflicting findings of previous research are merely attributable to differences in 
the methodologies applied to investigate these issues. A further literature 
overview is provided by Nissim (2010); however, it does not exclusively focus 
on M&A deals, but instead on the insurance sector. A similar review of previous 
academic literature on the causes, consequences, and implications of the 
consolidation in the financial services industry is elaborated by Berger, 
Demsetz, and Stahan (1999). 
 
                                            
 
161 Meglio and Risberg (2010, p. 89). Similarly, Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 19) 
propose the use of a case-study-like testing procedure instead of applying large-sample 
statistical tests for estimating the effects of M&A transactions. 
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Since a litany of studies have been conducted to evaluate the effects of insurers 
(and other companies) involved in M&A, it is beyond the scope of this research 
work to identify and survey all these studies. Instead, Table 40 in the appendix 
summarizes the most relevant academic publications on the success of 
insurance M&A transactions.  
 
3.3 Selection of Prior Research 
In our general literature overview, we focused on academic studies that 
examine the success of M&A activities in the financial services sector, 
especially in the insurance industry.162 However, to fulfill the purpose of our 
analysis, which is to identify the financial success of M&A transactions, this 
general overview of the most important studies investigating the influence of 
M&A deals on the performance of financial services firms, that is, banks, 
insurers, and other financial institutions, is insufficient. We have hence 
narrowed down the selection to these academic publications that not only 
consider the insurance industry as one of the many sectors in their sample, but 
have more importantly, predominantly or even exclusively focused on insurance 
acquirers. As a result, academic papers that regarded insurance simply as one 
of many industries and therefore do not have an insurance-specific focus,163 
such as Berger (2005), Nakamura (2005), Schoenberg (2006), and Fields, 
Fraser, and Kolari (2005, 2007), are dropped out of the literature review sample. 
The distinct focus on insurance company acquirers enables us to investigate 
the valuation effects of M&A in this particular industry and thereby to control for 
differences in value creation across different industries. Furthermore, this 
particular focus should shed light on various inconsistencies in previous study 
findings and help to provide evidence for consistent industry-specific patterns in 
insurance M&A. 
 
                                            
 
162 It is important to note that this literature review focuses primarily on insurance M&A literature, 
and due to the high number of studies focusing on the banking and financial services industry, 
it may not be representative for the financial services sector as a whole. 
163 In our thesis, empirical studies are regarded to have an insurance focus if at least 50% of 
the sample acquirer firms come from the insurance industry. 
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We further limit the focus of our literature review to the studies that place their 
main focus on the financial side of M&A transactions and investigate the 
financial success and performance effects of such deals. 
 
In addition, we restrict our review to studies analyzing the overall wealth effects 
of insurance M&A since our major interest is on the overall success of acquiring 
insurance companies. For example, the following academic studies are 
eliminated from the sample since they do not calculate the overall wealth effect 
of such deals: Graves (1981), DeNoble, Gustafson, and Hergert (1988), 
Chakrabarti and Mitchell (2004), Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008), The Boston 
Consulting Group (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), and 
Fustec and Faroult (2011). 
 
By concentrating exclusively on studies with an empirical research design, we 
assure that reliable primary and secondary information was used in order to 
answer a specific research question or to test a hypothesis. As a result of this 
specification, academic work focusing exclusively on thorough case studies that 
analyze individual transactions and studies using analytical models are dropped 
out of our review of prior research.  
 
Furthermore, empirical research makes use of either direct or indirect data.164 
As elaborated in Section 2.3.2.4, studies relying on managerial or expert 
informants’ assessment base their analyses on subjective data and therefore 
suffer from the previously mentioned disadvantages165. As result of the 
fundamental weaknesses of subjective performance indicators and Porter’s 
retention/divestment approach, we confine our general literature review to 
indirect studies that rely on quantitative (i.e., objective) data, such as stock 
prices and accounting values. This includes studies measuring short- and long-
term performance effects of M&A and studies analyzing efficiency changes over 
time.  
                                            
 
164 Baker, Singleton, and Veit (2011, p. 408).  
165 See section 2.3.2.4 for a number of limitations of approaches using subjective data. Often, 
researchers using subjective performance measures argue that the collection of objective data 
is not always easy or even possible (Dess & Robinson, 1984). 
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Moreover, to be included in our final sample, the study must place its main 
attention on the pre-M&A phase. Studies focusing on the role of post-acquisition 
integration in influencing the performance are consequently excluded from the 
review scope (e.g., DeNoble, Gustafson & Hegert, 1988; Beatty, 1999; Pautler, 
2003; Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2004; The Boston Consulting Group, 2007, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009b, 2009c, 2010). 
 
After providing evidence as to the extent to which insurance transactions were 
value enhancing or not, we investigate which factors of the acquiring and target 
companies as well as which transaction characteristics may cause performance 
differences. As argued earlier, our analysis focuses primarily on strategic and 
financial factors. Studies conducted by Jemison and Sitkin (1986), Cartwright 
and Cooper (1995), Nguyen and Kleiner (2003), and Fustec and Faroult (2011), 
which highlight the role of softer elements, do not fulfill this requirement and are 
thus not included in our final literature review. 
 
Summarizing, to be included in our review of previous academic literature on 
the effects of M&A in the insurance industry, the studies have to meet following 
criteria: -­‐ insurance focus (at least 50% of the sample acquirer firms coming from 
the insurance industry); -­‐ financial success; -­‐ calculate the overall wealth effects; -­‐ empirical research design; -­‐ usage of objective data (stock and market data); -­‐ focus on pre-M&A phase; and -­‐ focus on strategic and financial factors. 
 
3.4 Literature Review Method 
The process we applied to identify all relevant studies on the relationship 
between M&A activity and financial performance is as follows:  
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Firstly, we scanned paper titles and examined abstracts of research articles 
released in peer-reviewed journals166 in accounting, economics, finance, and 
management to identify as many relevant studies regarding valuation effects of 
M&A activities.167 We then applied the “ancestry” approach,168 searching 
through all relevant articles that were referred to in the references of previous 
identified papers. Thirdly, studies citing the relevant papers were also scanned 
to identify additional articles (a descendary approach). This process of 
examining reference sections and in-text citations was iterated until no new 
studies were found. Additionally, searches were carried out using the research 
tool Mendeley and the Internet search engines Google and Google Scholar. 
The various articles were sourced from EBSCO, Wiley Interscience, Elsevier 
and LexisNexis Academic, from the University of Cologne library and the 
University of Minnesota library, and personal collections of publications. This 
procedure gives an acceptable guarantee that all relevant studies dealing with 
value creation in insurance M&A were identified.  
 
In total, 19 recent studies on the overall success of insurance M&A have been 
identified that meet the previously described selection criteria, with 17 of them 
having seen print in the 21st century. Table 8 gives an overview of these 
empirical research studies, which will be further clustered and discussed in 
more detail in the following two sections. 
 
                                            
 
166 E.g., Academy of Management Journal, Applied Financial Economics, Financial 
Management, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, Journal of Business, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial Research, Journal of 
Management, Journal of Risk and Insurance, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Journal of Risk 
Finance, Managerial Finance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Strategic Management 
Journal. 
167 Articles published in languages other than English and German were excluded from the 
sample. 
168 See, e.g., Cooper (1998) and King et al. (2004). 
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Table 7: Overview of prior research on the value effects of insurance M&A 
 
 
3.5 Development of Research Clusters 
For the purpose of getting a better overview of the diverse empirical studies, we 
try to develop a research cluster that aims to organize the extant literature on 
insurance M&A to serve as a blueprint for our further analysis. Accordingly, we 
try to assemble the identified studies into homogenous research clusters. This 
classification should help to obtain consistent results concerning the overall 
wealth effects of insurance M&A and their influencing factors. Empirical studies 
focusing on the success of M&A activities can be grouped along various 
dimensions. These dimensions include the research design and methodology, 
region under investigation, time span of the M&A that were studied, sample 
  
60 
characteristics (such as sample size, sample region, and the specific industry 
segment of the involved companies), or whether the results were obtained from 
short-term or long-term analyses. A further categorization divides the group of 
studies on value creation in insurance M&A into four distinct schools of thought: 
the capital markets school, the strategic management school, the organizational 
behavior school, and the process school (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).169 
Financial researchers belonging to the capital markets school of thought focus 
primarily on the wealth effects for the firms’ shareholders. To quantify these 
effects, this school of thought uses the traditional event study methodology; that 
is, financial scholars use stock market measures to estimate the performance of 
the involved companies before and after the M&A transaction.170 The second 
school of thought, the strategic management school, focuses on the motives for 
M&A transactions and on the performance effects of the individual types of 
transactions by utilizing either stock market data or accounting-based 
performance measures. In contrast, rather than providing normative 
descriptions of how to achieve a superior performance, the impact of M&A 
transactions on the people of the involved transaction partners is regularly 
studied by the organizational behavior research literature. Finally, the process 
school, which emerged from a combination of the strategic management and 
organizational behavior school, aims to provide a more thorough understanding 
of the process itself by investigating the influence of the post-M&A integration 
process on the success of M&A transactions. Thereby, this stream of research 
may provide an alternative picture of value creation in these transactions and its 
influencing factors.  
 
For the purpose of our analysis, however, we chose to categorize the 19 
different studies according to their research methodology. Since the research 
methodology simultaneously determines the measure of success that is used to 
evaluate the outcome of an M&A transaction, this category might seem to be 
                                            
 
169 For a comprehensive discourse on the various schools of thought, see for example, Javidan 
et al. (2004, p. 247). 
170 Therefore, research papers belonging to the capital market stream are most likely to be also 
placed in the methodology cluster 4 - “event analysis” (see below for an explanation of the 
different clusters of our study). 
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the most important dimension.171 Accordingly, the problem of differences in 
performance measures that may cause inconsistent findings resulting from 
these different estimation methodologies is often highlighted in the extant 
literature.172 Meglio and Risberg (2010), who refer to Corvellec (1997), put this 
problem in a nutshell by stating: “It does not make sense, in the name of a 
generic performance, to compare CAR—which is a prediction of possible future 
company performance—with accounting measures—which are measures of 
historical performance—with management perceptions—which, besides being 
historical, usually depict non-measurable aspects. The different measures all 
say something about the performance of the M&A, but they are different stories 
told for different audiences, often by different narrators.”173 Consequently, we 
divide the previously identified studies from our final sample into several 
streams of research using different methodologies to assess valuation effects of 
insurance M&A. Table 9 gives an overview of the identified studies on value 
creation in insurance transactions by methodology employed. Besides the 
different methodologies used in each of the studies, they differ with regard to 
their sample characteristics, the time span over which the M&A occur, and the 
specific industry segment of targets and acquirers. 
 
                                            
 
171 See, e.g., Buehner (1990b), who divides previous investigations according to their 
methodology. 
172 See, e.g., Corvellec (1997), Jansen (2004), King et al. (2004), Stahl and Voigt (2004), 
Schoenberg (2006), and Meglio and Risberg (2010). Meglio and Risberg (2010, p. 88) state 
that “[w]hat M&A scholars seem to overlook is that contradictory results arise from the 
adoption of different performance measures embedded in different research methods,” and 
Schoenberg (2006, p. 3) further assumes that “some of the conflicting conclusions within the 
acquisitions literature may be due, in part, to the adoption of different performance metrics.” 
173 Meglio and Risberg (2010, p. 91). Some empirical support for this conclusion is provided in 
the results reported by Schoenberg (2006), who examined the comparability of four measures 
of M&A performance, namely cumulative abnormal returns, managers’ assessment, 
divestment data, and expert informants’ subjective assessments). The author concludes that 
“with the exception of a positive relationship between managers’ and expert informants’ 
subjective assessments, there was no comparability between the performance data generated 
by the alternative metrics” (p. 11). 
  
62 
Table 8: Prior research on the value effects of insurance M&A by cluster 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 9, the 19 academic papers can be clustered into a 
broad group of studies relying on financial accounting data (cluster I studies) 
and a group of studies using financial market data (papers belonging to cluster 
II).  
 
The first-mentioned group of studies further consists of two subgroups, namely 
accounting performance studies based on various accounting ratios (cluster 1 
studies), and efficiency studies, which apply data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
to measure the relative efficiency (cluster 2 studies). The two related studies 
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belonging to the third research cluster rely on both accounting and stock price 
data for estimates of firm performance following M&A activity. In contrast, the 
most dominant group, accounting for more than 40% of the studies in our final 
sample, address the issue of value creation for insurance acquirers by 
conducting event studies.  
 
In the following section, we will discuss these major strands of literature and the 
related studies in more detail. 
 
3.6 Review of Individual Studies on the Overall Success of 
Insurance M&A by Cluster  
Due to the fact that there is no single authoritative source for information on 
M&A in the insurance industry, the reviewed papers use various sources for 
collecting capital market and accounting data. Moreover, different criteria174 are 
used to identify the relevant M&A transactions, resulting in varying samples. 
The individual sample characteristics, most of which will be mentioned 
throughout this section, as well as the various data sources used in the 
reviewed studies, are summarized in Tables 10 and 11, respectively.  
 
Looking at Table 11, we can see that the event study methodology is the most 
dominant type of study, with more than 50%175 of the identified studies applying 
this approach. The majority of studies investigate insurance M&A activity in the 
fifth and sixth M&A wave and put the focus of their investigation on the US 
insurance market. Fourteen studies investigate the effects of M&A activities 
either exclusively or partly in the US, while eight studies consider acquirers from 
European countries (double counts for international samples). Almost half of the 
reviewed studies (nine out of 19) require a change of control176 that occurred 
                                            
 
174 Industry and geography of acquirer and target, sample period, transaction volume, and so 
on. 
175 Including the two studies of Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009), which also apply the event 
approach besides applying an additional efficiency technique. 
176 The initial stake of the acquirer in the target before transaction was smaller than 50%, and 
the final stake after transaction is higher than 50%. 
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through the transaction, and five out of the total number of studies necessitate a 
minimum transaction volume.  
 
Table 9: Data sources of the reviewed studies 
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Table 10: Criteria and sample characteristics of the reviewed studies 
 
 
Author
Chamberlain 
and Tennyson 
(1998)
Settnik (2006)
Shim (2010)
Cummins and 
Rubio-Misas 
(2003)
Cummins and 
Weiss (2000)
Cummins and 
Xie (2008)
Cummins, 
Tennyson, and 
Weiss (1998)
Klumpes 
(2006)
Shim (2011)
Cummins and 
Xie (2005)
Cummins and 
Xie (2009)
Akhigbe and 
Madura (2001)
BarNiv and 
Hathorn (1997)
Boubakri, 
Dionne, and 
Triki (2006)
Cummins and 
Weiss (2004)
Elango (2006)
Floreani and 
Rigamonti 
(2001)
Schertzinger 
(2008)
Staikouras 
(2009)
Type of Study
Accounting 
ratio analysis
1980-1990
Accounting 
ratio analysis
1990-1998
Accounting 
ratio analysis
1989-2004
Efficiency study 1989-1998
Efficiency study 1992-1998
Efficiency study 1994-2003
Efficiency study 1988-1995
Efficiency study 1997-2001
Efficiency study 1990-2004
Efficiency and 
event study
1997-2003
Efficiency and 
event study
1997-2003
Event study 1985-1996
Event study 1984-1992
Event study 1995-2000
Event study 1990-2002
Event study 1997-2003
Event study 1996-2000
Event study 1990-2005
Event study 1990-2006
Time Span 
(From - To) Sample Size
84 transactions
25 transactions,                 
21 acquirers,       
26 targets
190 acquirers
548 insurers
130 reinsurers
588 transactions
137 targets
1680 
observations
348 transactions,                   
190 acquirers
285 transactions,                
180 acquirers,     
46 targets
285 transactions,                
180 acquirers,     
46 targets
88 transactions
124 transactions
177 transactions
499 transactions,                   
535 acquirers, 
165 targets
52 transactions
56 transactions
176 transactions
51 transactions
Acquirer 
global;           
target US
DE
US
ES
Global
US
US
EU (major 
markets)
US
US
US
US
US
Acquirer US; 
target global
Western
Europe
Acquirer US; 
target global 
(except US)
US, EU, AU
Acquirer EU-
25, CH or NO; 
target global
Global
Sample 
Region Acquirer
Insurer
Insurer
P/L insurer
Insurer
Reinsurer
Insurer
Life insurer
Insurer
P/L insurer
Insurer
P/L insurer
P/L insurer
Insurer
Pure 
insurer
Insurer
Insurer or 
bank
Either acquirer or target 
is P/L insurer (at least 
one of them)
Either acquirer or target 
is insurer (at least one 
of them)
Industry
Either acquirer or target 
is P/L insurer (at least 
one of them)
Target
P/L insurer Change of 
control required
Insurer Relative size of 
target ! 1%; 
Purchase price > 
$1 mn; Change 
of control 
required and at 
the end 100% 
ownership
P/L insurer Transactions > 
$100 mn; 
Change of 
control required
Insurer
Reinsurer
P/L insurer
Life insurer Change of 
control required
Insurer
P/L insurer
Change of 
control required
Change of 
control required
Insurer Purchase price > 
$50 mn
P/L insurer
Insurer Percentage of 
shares acquired 
> 10%
Acquisition of 
value stake; 
Change in 
control required
Insurer
Pure 
insurer
Ratio between 
deal value and 
bidder market 
value > 2%; 
Change of 
control required
Insurer or 
asset 
manager
Transaction 
volume ! $100 
mn; Change of 
control required
Insurer or 
bank
Further Details
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3.6.1 Accounting Ratio Analysis 
The first strand of past empirical research, namely accounting-ratio-based 
research (cluster 1), argues that the effects of M&A activity can be best 
assessed from a perspective of company fundamentals by relying on financial 
accounting data. Academic papers belonging to this stream make use of 
various accounting ratios, such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), and the Z-score (see the study of Shim, 2011b), as well as figures for 
growth, profit performance, and solvency (see Settnik, 2006). In the third study 
of this group, Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) employ a matched-pair 
research design to compare pre-merger and post-merger accounting ratios of 
successfully acquired property-liability insurance targets with those of non-
acquired property-liability insurers. In the three identified studies, the sample 
region of the acquiring insurance company is equally split between the United 
States, Europe, and a worldwide sample, with one study analyzing US acquirers 
(Shim, 2011b), one study concentrating on German insurers (Settnik, 2006), 
and a third analyzing a global sample (Chamberlain & Tennyson, 1998).  
 
While the sample of Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) consists of insurance 
acquirers from all over the world, the acquisition targets must however belong to 
the US property-liability sector. Eighty-four transactions have been identified 
that fulfill these criteria in the 11-year time span from 1980 to the end of 1990. 
The authors use a matched-pair research design to analyze merger activity 
following capital market shocks. The major focus of their study is on financial 
synergies as a motive for insurance M&A transactions by testing two 
hypotheses: (i) Financial synergies are a main motive for insurance mergers in 
general, and (ii) mergers motivated by financial synergies are particularly 
important in the years following the negative industry capital shock in the years 
1984 and 1985. Only the second hypothesis receives strong support from the 
work of Chamberlain and Tennyson. They come to the conclusion that firms 
acquired following a capital market shock suffered from lower pre-merger 
solvency and liquidity, higher pre-merger underwriting leverage, and greater 
declines in total capital compared to their benchmark groups. These poorly 
capitalized targets are likely to be affiliated firms, which have a higher 
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benchmarked expense ratio and lower investment income relative to invested 
assets in the pre-merger period. 
 
In contrast, Settnik (2006) employs accounting data to a purely German sample 
in order to investigate the extent to which the performance of German insurance 
companies is influenced by M&A transactions. Using a sample of 25 German 
insurance transactions involving 47 different insurers, Settnik assesses the 
overall success of these deals by calculating figures for growth, profit 
performance, and solvency. Overall, the author’s results indicate that in the 
period between 1990 and 1998, only 8% of all acquiring insurance firms 
successfully achieved a favorable change in all three key figures for growth, 
profit performance, and solvency. Nevertheless, in every single transaction, at 
least one of the three ratios experiences an improvement three years after 
announcement of the deal. Looking at the figures for growth, Settnik draws an 
entirely positive conclusion since the results indicate that acquirers exhibited 
positive long-term growth in terms of new business and recurring premium 
income in more than 90% of the transactions. Furthermore, the author finds that 
the majority of M&A transactions (56%) resulted in improvements in profit 
performance of the combined German entity. Most of the acquiring insurance 
companies (64%), however, suffered from a decline in profitability, while only 
eight of 21 acquirers (38%) showed an increase in profitability three years after 
the M&A deal. The economic risk of the involved insurance firms (as proxied by 
the solvency ratio) predominantly does not seem to decrease subsequent to 
M&A transactions. These findings indicate a trade-off between profit growth and 
market share as well as between profit growth and economic risk, which is also 
in line with previous research.177 Moreover, the results support the hypothesis 
that managers conducting M&A transactions predominantly pursue their own 
selfish interests instead of focusing on shareholders’ interests. Therefore, these 
deals are in general perceived as non-value-enhancing events for shareholders 
of both insurers involved. 
 
                                            
 
177 Farny (2011, p. 540). 
  
68 
Shim (2011b) also uses accounting data to investigate the financial 
performance effects of US property-liability insurance acquisitions in the years 
1989 to 2004. More specifically, Shim combines various measures, such as the 
Z-score and total risk measured by earnings volatility, as well as the profitability 
ratios risk-adjusted return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), to proxy 
firms’ performance. Investigating a final sample of 190 US property-liability 
insurance acquirers, the author’s regression analysis provides strong support 
for a negative relationship between M&A activity in the US property-liability 
insurance industry and acquirers’ financial performance. Three years after an 
M&A transaction was completed, not only did the overall financial performance 
decrease, but also the earnings volatility and hence the risk of the acquiring firm 
increased. The author further finds evidence that focused insurance companies 
outperform product-diversified ones and that insurers’ capitalization, the share 
of commercial line, and the use of a direct marketing system have a positive 
impact on insurers’ profits. The proportion of stock investment, geographical 
diversification, and a variable for mutual insurers, however, are significantly 
negative related to the post-M&A performance of the involved insurers. Lastly, 
the relationship between firm size and performance is found to have a parabolic 
shape. “[U]p to certain values of asset, an additional asset has an increasing 
effect on performance and beyond some critical value of asset, the effect might 
become decreasing, outweighing any potential scale efficiency benefits.”178 
 
Summing up, evidence from accounting ratio research points toward a negative 
relationship between M&A transactions in the insurance industry and 
subsequent accounting performance of insurance acquirers. Insurance firms 
tend to acquire poorly capitalized firms, which means that these transactions 
can increase earnings volatility and risk subsequent to the M&A deal. 
Accordingly, managers of acquiring insurance firms predominantly do not 
enhance the value of their company and hence do not focus on shareholders’ 
interests. 
                                            
 
178 Shim (2011b, p. 133). 
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3.6.2 Efficiency Analysis 
As stated above, efficiency studies (cluster 2) use data envelopment analysis 
methodology as a tool for evaluating the comparative efficiency of insurance 
firms. To be more specific, this strand of the insurance M&A literature measures 
the efficiency of firms relative to the “best practice” frontier179 or compares pre-
merger and post-merger accounting ratios and thus examines efficiency 
changes over time.180 If M&A transactions are efficiency-increasing, acquirers 
and targets combined efficiency post-M&A should be higher either than their 
own pre-M&A efficiency or in relation to the post-M&A efficiency of a control 
group of non-merging and non-acquiring insurers. This research strand, 
accounting for almost one-third of the studies in the final sample, has gained 
importance in the last 20 years and hence has resulted in several publications 
analyzing efficiency changes in various industries. We identified six efficiency 
studies that focus on pure insurance M&A transactions and two further studies 
by Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) in which the efficiency approach is used in 
combination with a standard event study approach. All eight181 efficiency studies 
apply a non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology, and 
only Cummins and Weiss’ (2000) study uses an additional parametric approach. 
Further on, with the exception of Cummins and Weiss (2000) and Shim (2011a), 
all event studies in our sample employ Malmquist indices to measure changes 
in efficiency and productivity of firms over time. Geographically, the efficiency 
studies concentrate on transactions in the United States (three studies) or in 
Europe (two studies) or evaluate global transactions (one study). All studies 
belonging to this cluster have a particular focus on the efficiency effects of 
insurance M&A in the 1990s.  
 
Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2003) analyze the effects of deregulation and 
consolidation on 548 Spanish insurance companies covering the period from 
                                            
 
179 The “best practice” frontier consists of a dominant firm. 
180 For more information on the efficiency concept, see for example, Jarraya and Bouri (2013). 
181 Including the two related studies of Cummins and Xie (2009). The authors use a book-value 
sample to estimate efficiency scores and a market-value sample to conduct an event study. 
Subsequently, they regress the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from the event study 
analysis on the efficiency scores to measure the relationship between stock market returns 
and efficiency.  
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1989 to 1998. The authors make use of modern frontier efficiency analysis for 
calculating cost, technical, and allocative efficiency. Moreover, they identify 
changes in total factor productivity by using DEA-based Malmquist productivity 
index measures. Testing various hypotheses on efficiency, productivity, and 
insurance prices, the authors found that consolidation significantly reduced the 
number of firms in the Spanish insurance market, insurance prices declined, 
and efficiency of the involved insurance firms increased over the 10-year 
sample period. In addition, their results suggested that relatively inefficient and 
financially underperforming insurance companies were eliminated from the 
market, not because they were acquired, but simply because they were 
liquidated or filed for insolvency. On the question of whether a company should 
conduct an M&A transaction or not, the authors suggest that “many large firms 
should focus on improving efficiency by adopting best practices rather than on 
further growth.” 
 
Cummins and Weiss (2000), who perform an efficiency analysis of the 130 
largest global reinsurance companies over the period 1992–1998, not only 
estimate a non-parametric frontier using data envelopment analysis (DEA) but 
also employ an econometric frontier model using a parametric stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). Based on both estimation methods, the authors show 
that the consolidation wave has, firstly, increased the capacity of the global 
reinsurance industry to respond to catastrophic losses, and secondly, had a 
positive impact on the levels of efficiency in the reinsurance market by 
increasing average firm size and thereby providing risk-reduction benefits of 
diversification. In contrast to the findings of Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2003), 
however, global reinsurance companies predominantly acquired inefficient and 
under-capitalized insurance firms,182 since efficiency gains could be primarily 
achieved from replacing the acquired firm’s management with that of the buying 
reinsurance firm. Essentially, the same finding (i.e., size of a firm is negatively 
related to being a target because small firms are easier to acquire and 
integrate) and support for the corporate control hypothesis is reported by a 
                                            
 
182 But, as noted by the authors, within this set of firms, those targets with relatively good 
underwriting and investment results and/or relatively low ROE risk are preferred. 
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study by Cummins and Xie (2008), who examine firm characteristics that are 
associated with becoming an acquirer or a target in a US setting. Furthermore, 
Cummins and Xie (2008) explore the impact of M&A transactions on the 
efficiency and productivity of acquiring insurance firms, acquisition targets, and 
non-M&A insurance firms in the US property-liability insurance market by 
employing DEA models to calculate efficiency scores and the Malmquist 
productivity indices. Identifying 588 insurance transactions in the years 1994 to 
2003, the authors conclude that these transactions were value enhancing in 
general. Besides significant gains in cost and allocative efficiency for US 
property-liability insurance targets (in relation to non-targets), acquiring insurers’ 
revenue efficiency is found to be positively related to M&A activity. US 
insurance acquirers experience greater efficiency three years after an M&A 
transaction, and acquisition targets also did significantly better than non-targets 
in terms of cost efficiency, revenue efficiency, and total factor productivity 
growth. 
 
Also investigating a US sample, Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998) were 
the first to attempt to assess the relationship between efficiency and M&A 
activity in the insurance industry. As almost every study of this kind, a DEA 
model was developed to compare the technical, cost, and revenue efficiency of 
acquiring and non-acquiring and acquired and non-acquired US life insurance 
companies. Additionally, the authors use a Malmquist index approach to gauge 
changes in efficiency and productivity over time. According to the authors’ 
results, M&A transactions involving US life insurance companies led to long-
term efficiency improvements during the period 1988 to 1995. Besides 
significant efficiency improvements of the target insurance firms, acquiring 
insurers also showed greater efficiency gains than their non-acquiring 
counterparts. These efficiency enhancements are possible through the 
acquisition of typically inefficient, financially vulnerable, and affiliated targets by 
large insurance acquirers, which restructure these inefficient target firms. 
A similar approach is used by Klumpes (2006), who conducts a frontier 
efficiency analysis of 1,680 M&A transactions in the major European insurance 
markets from 1997 to 2001. Non-parametric DEA is used to assess cost and 
revenue efficiency, and Malmquist indices are calculated to identify changes in 
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efficiency over time. Similar to the findings of studies of Cummins, Tennyson, 
and Weiss (1998), and Cummins and Xie (2008), the author provides evidence 
of efficiency gains for acquiring insurance firms. According to Klumpes’ results, 
M&A activity in the major European insurance markets had a positive effect on 
efficiency of the target firm and on the efficiency of the acquiring insurance firm. 
Acquirers not only achieve greater efficiency gains than their non-acquiring 
counterparts, but also outperform target firms. Once again, financially 
vulnerable firms are found to be preferred acquisition targets. 
 
Shim (2011a) also makes use of the commonly applied DEA model to estimate 
cost, revenue, technical, scale, and allocative efficiency of a sample of 348 
transactions between US property-liability insurance companies over the period 
1990–2004. Testing several hypotheses on the efficiency effects of insurance 
M&A, the main findings of this academic paper are: (i) overall, acquiring 
insurance firms’ cost and revenue efficiency declined following M&A 
transactions; (ii) geographically focused insurance firms achieved greater cost 
and revenue efficiency than geographically diversified ones; (iii) insurance firms 
using an independent agency distribution system were less cost and revenue 
efficient than insurance firms using a direct marketing distribution system; (iv) 
mutual insurance firms were more cost efficient than stock firms; and (v) 
unaffiliated single firms were more cost and revenue efficient than insurance 
groups. 
 
In summary, the quintessential finding of the efficiency studies reviewed is that 
M&A in the insurance industry are primarily driven by value-enhancing 
motivations183 such as achieving economies of scope184 and financial 
synergies.185 Consequently, consolidation in the insurance industry has led to 
significant improvements in economic efficiency for targets and for acquirers. 
The extant literature also finds that acquirers, in general, are not significantly 
different from non-acquirers in terms of efficiency in the years prior to an 
                                            
 
183 See, e.g., Cummins and Weiss (2000, p. 193), Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2003, p. 340), 
Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 49), and Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 150). 
184 See, e.g., Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 48). 
185 See, e.g., Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 31). 
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acquisition.186 In contrast, financially vulnerable firms are much more likely to be 
acquisition targets than stronger firms. Targets typically consist of inefficient and 
undercapitalized firms, but at the same time, these financially weak insurers still 
have relatively good underwriting and investment results.187 Acquiring 
managers believe that they are able to improve a target’s efficiency after an 
acquisition and by these means create value for their shareholders. In fact, the 
reviewed efficiency studies support the view that insurance M&A lead to 
synergies, since the majority of studies detect higher cost and revenue 
efficiency gains for targets than for non-targets.188 Moreover, M&A in the 
insurance industry have also yielded higher cost and revenue efficiency gains 
for the acquiring insurers.189 Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 45) and Cummins and 
Xie (2009, p. 150) further discover that more efficient acquirers in terms of cost 
and revenue efficiency experience higher abnormal returns after the 
announcement of acquisitions. Nevertheless, Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2003, 
p. 350) and Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 48) provide evidence that acquiring 
insurance companies that become too large suffer from substantial declines in 
scale efficiency. In the authors’ opinion, these companies should rather 
concentrate on improving efficiency instead of seeking further external growth 
possibilities. 
3.6.3 Linkage of Event and Efficiency Analysis 
Another fairly new strand has recently emerged in the literature on the success 
of insurance M&A transactions (cluster 3 studies). By linking frontier efficiency 
with market values, this approach measures the relationship between stock 
market returns and efficiency and therefore combines the two most popular 
                                            
 
186 E.g., Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998, p. 351) and Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 41). 
187 See, e.g., Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998, p. 346), Cummins and Weiss (2000, p. 
190), Klumpes (2006, p. 24), and Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 53). 
188 E.g., Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998, p. 347), Cummins and Xie (2008, p. 43), and 
Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 149).  
189 See, e.g., Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998, p. 351), Klumpes (2006, p. 25), Cummins 
and Xie (2008, p. 49), and Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 150). In contrast, the paper by Shim 
(2011a) reveals that acquiring insurer’s cost and revenue efficiency declined following the 
announcement of an M&A transaction. 
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methodologies.190 Due to the novelty of this research design, just a few studies 
analyze the linkage between efficiency and market-value performance in any 
industry,191 and only two related studies, both covering the US market, 
investigate this relationship in the insurance industry (Cummins and Xie, 2005, 
2009).  
 
Based on an investigation of 285 insurance M&A deals involving 180 different 
US acquirers during the years 1997 to 2003,192 the two related papers by 
Cummins and Xie (2005) and Cummins and Xie (2009) assess the efficiency 
and market performance effects of these deals. To do this, the authors firstly 
calculate a firm’s short-term CAR, which is obtained using the standard market 
model, and then apply a non-parametric DEA approach to calculate a measure 
of the firm’s cost and revenue efficiency. Afterwards, they link these two 
measures by conducting a multivariate regression analysis193 (as well as a 
univariate analysis in the 2005 version of the paper) to examine the relationship 
between the abnormal announcement return measures based on stock market 
data (event study) and the frontier efficiency scores based on accounting data 
(efficiency study). Assuming that a stock insurance company’s primary objective 
lies in maximizing shareholders wealth, accounting-based frontier efficiency 
measures are only relevant if they meaningfully reflect the underlying market 
value (of the company’s common shares).194 Hence, Cummins and Xie test for 
this supposed relationship between a firm’s pre-acquisition cost and revenue 
efficiency and its abnormal returns around the announcement date of an M&A 
transaction. As in all efficiency studies reported in cluster 2, the DEA technique 
is used to measure cost and revenue efficiency of buying insurers, target 
                                            
 
190 More than 75% of the studies in our final literature review on the overall success of M&A 
transactions in the insurance industry belong to either the group of efficiency studies or the 
group of event studies. 
191 Prior studies employing this research approach focus on manufacturing firms (e.g., Wu & 
Ray, 2005) and the banking industry (e.g., Chu & Lim, 1998: Kohers, Huang, & Kohers, 2000; 
Kirkwood & Nahm, 2006; Beccalli, Casu, & Girardone, 2006; Pasiouras, Liadaki, & Zopounidis, 
2007; Sufian & Majid, 2007).  
192 In order for a US transaction to be included in the sample, at least one of the involved 
transaction partners—buyer, target or seller—had to be a property-liability insurance company. 
193 In this regression analysis, cumulative abnormal returns serve as dependent variables, and 
the control variables are taken as regressors. 
194 Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 129). 
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insurers, and divesting insurers over the period 1997–2003. Additionally, a 
traditional event study methodology is applied to measure whether and to what 
extent stock markets respond to the announcement of such deals. The authors 
calculate announcement-period returns for each insurance firm in the sample by 
using the standard market model procedure with parameters estimated for a 
150 trading day period starting from 31 days before announcement of the deal. 
Using the M&A announcement date as the event date and the event period 
being the 30 days before and after the announcement of the deal, they find 
evidence of small but statistically significant positive abnormal returns for 
acquirers [CARs of 0.94% in (-1;+1) and 1.19 in (-5;+5) at 5%, respectively, at 
the 10% level], targets [24.33% in (-1;+1) and 25.51% in (-5;+5), both at the 
0.1% level] and divesting insurers [1.31% in (-1;+1) at the 10% level].195 In 
addition, in their 2005 paper, Cummins and Xie detect that the US insurance 
transactions enhance combined-firm shareholder wealth, as they find significant 
positive CERs of 2.17%, 3.36%, and 3.71% in the event periods (0;0), (0;+1), 
and (-1;+1), respectively. The authors also provide evidence for the corporate 
control theory by detecting higher abnormal returns for acquirers with higher 
cost and revenue efficiency, suggesting that the market expects more efficient 
insurers to be more likely to realize gains and successfully operate the 
combined entity. Consequently, insurance M&A are primarily driven by value 
maximization motives of acquiring firms’ management, and hence the efficiency 
of acquirers improves significantly following a transaction. The findings by 
Cummins and Xie (2005) and Cummins and Xie (2009) further suggest that 
relative larger acquisitions result in higher value gains for the acquiring firm, and 
acquirers that engage in multiple transactions per year experience significantly 
lower value gains, respectively. 
3.6.4 Event Analysis 
A last strand of the insurance M&A literature is comprised of event studies, 
which investigate post-merger stock market reactions of acquirers, targets, or 
the combined entity (cluster 4 studies) to the announcement of M&A deals. 
                                            
 
195 Note that the individual results of this event study will be presented in more detail in Section 
3.7, which exclusively deals with previous event study findings on the overall success of 
insurance M&A. 
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Hence, these studies use market data to evaluate the short-, medium-, and 
long-run effects of M&A activities on firm performance. The purpose of such 
event studies is to determine whether or not M&A transactions induce abnormal 
stock-return patterns.196 With eight studies applying this approach [plus two 
additional studies by Cummins and Xie, (2005, 2009) in which an event study is 
linked to an efficiency study], the event study methodology is the most 
commonly used approach in our sample as well as in the extant M&A 
literature.197 As a result of the predominance of this approach, as well as the 
fact that we also base our own analysis on capital market data, we will put 
special focus on studies that apply event study methodology.  
 
Most event studies in (insurance) M&A research conduct short-term analyses 
focusing on abnormal stock returns around the announcement of an M&A 
transaction. Six out of the eight event studies in our final sample investigate the 
short-term stock market reaction following the announcement of an M&A deal 
(Akhigbe & Madura, 2001; Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Cummins & Weiss, 
2004; Elango, 2006; Schertzinger, 2008; Staikouras, 2009). In particular, all the 
short-term studies employ the cumulative abnormal return model, with the 
majority of these publications198 using the standard market model as a 
benchmark. The significance of abnormal return measures, as well as the 
significance of the difference between abnormal returns, is assessed using 
either parametric (Akhigbe & Madura, 2001; Cummins & Xie, 2005; Elango, 
2006; Staikouras, 2009; Cummins & Xie, 2009), or both parametric and non-
parametric statistical tests (Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Cummins & Weiss, 
2004; Schertzinger, 2008). The short-term event studies in our final sample 
assess the influence of acquisitions on acquiring, target, and merged firms’ 
stock prices around the announcement day and also until several days after the 
acquisition. The event window of the investigated studies reaches from a 
minimum of the day of announcement (see, e.g., Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; 
Schertzinger, 2008; Staikouras, 2009) to a maximum of 40 days before to 40 
                                            
 
196 Peterson (1989, p. 36), McWilliams and Siegel (1996, p. 626), and Boesecke (2009, p. 88). 
197 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1988, p. 36). 
198 BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), 
Elango (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009).  
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days after the announcement of the transaction (see Floreani & Rigamonti, 
2001). Typically, however, the event horizon is between one and10 days before 
and one and 10 days after the announcement (see, e.g., Floreani & Rigamonti, 
2001; Cummins & Weiss, 2004; Schertzinger, 2008; Staikouras, 2009). In 
contrast to the numerical superiority of short-term studies, medium-term effects 
are only estimated in the research paper of BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), and 
long-term value creation is analyzed in two studies (Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 
2006; Schertzinger, 2006). All three studies perform event analyses, though 
similar to the procedure in short-term event studies, only BarNiv and Hathorn 
(1997) rely on the cumulative abnormal return methodology for estimating the 
medium-term effects of insurance M&A.  
 
Furthermore, as in short-term studies, they also estimate abnormal returns (in 
the interval –250 through +250 days around the day of acquisition) by using the 
standard market model procedure with parameters estimated for the period 500 
days to 251 days before the effective day of the M&A deal. On the contrary, 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) and Schertzinger (2008) employ a buy-and-
hold abnormal return measurement metric to gauge long-run performance 
effects (up to three years) of insurance M&A. Refer to Table 12 for a brief 
summary on the different specifications of the event study methodology in 
previous studies. With the exception of a few empirical studies in our sample, 
most of the authors199 use the announcement date of the M&A deal, which is 
defined as the day the M&A transaction is officially released to the general 
public, as the relevant event date for conducting their study. Only the two 
papers by BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) on medium-term effects and the short-
term study of Cummins and Weiss (2004) define the event date as the effective 
merger and acquisition date, respectively. It is clear, especially in short-term 
studies, that the choice of the event date has a strong impact on the results and 
hence should be carefully determined. Differences in the determination of the 
event date could, accordingly, cause differences in the findings regarding the 
                                            
 
199 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Elango (2006), Schertzinger 
(2008), and Staikouras (2009). Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) use the year in which the 
transaction was announced as their reference date. 
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effects on M&A deals.200 With respect to benchmark construction, Schertzinger 
(2008) applies the control firm approach,201 whereas Boubakri, Dionne, and 
Triki (2006) make use of a simple S&P 500 index as the benchmark.  
 
Additionally, Schertzinger (2008) also uses the calendar-time portfolio 
regression approach based on the Fama-French-Three-Factor model to test the 
three-year stock price performance of European insurance firms involved in 
M&A activities. The statistical significance of the abnormal returns associated 
with the announcement of these M&A activities, as well as the significance of 
difference between abnormal returns, is tested by Schertzinger (2008) using a 
conventional t-statistic, while Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) unfortunately 
do not provide sufficient information on the test statistic that is used in their 
paper to evaluate statistical significance. All the event studies also conduct 
empirical investigations on the several factors that determine the success of 
insurance transactions. The individual research papers evaluate the influence of 
each of the various determinants by either conducting univariate tests202 or 
multivariate analyses203 or by adopting both approaches.204 Similar to the 
efficiency studies in our analysis, the geographical foci of the various event 
studies include the United States (four studies) and Europe (two studies) and a 
global sample (two studies). Hence, half the event studies in our final sample 
center their attention on US acquirers (and targets, e.g., Akhigbe & Madura, 
2001; BarNiv & Hathorn, 1997),205 while others such as Cummins and Weiss 
(2004) and Schertzinger (2008) place their focus on the European insurance 
market. The two remaining studies in this group (Floreani & Rigamonti, 2006; 
Staikouras, 2009) investigate the overall wealth effects of M&A in an 
international context by also including European and Australian insurers as well 
as insurers from other countries.  
                                            
 
200 See, e.g., Kerler (1999, p. 101). 
201 Schertzinger (2008) selects control firms based on their firm size (the market value of 
common equity) and book-to-market ratio (defined as book value of common equity divided by 
the market value of common equity). 
202 See, e.g., Cummins and Weiss (2004). 
203 See, e.g., Elango (2006). 
204 See, e.g., Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006).  
205 BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), 
and Elango (2006). 
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The sample sizes differ substantially between event studies, varying from just 
over 50 transactions206 to over 175 transactions207 and to a maximum of 499 
transactions in Cummins and Weiss (2004). Differences between the studies 
also exist in relation to the specific time span of investigation, that is, the years 
in which the sample transactions were obtained. Two of the academic papers in 
this strand of the literature (BarNiv & Hathorn, 1997; Akhigbe & Madura, 2001) 
include transactions conducted as early as in the fourth M&A wave, which 
started in the early 1980s an ended in the late 1980s. While the study of BarNiv 
and Hathorn (1997)208 only includes transactions that took place in the fourth 
M&A wave and in the aftermath of it, Akhigbe and Madura’s (2001)209 sample 
comprises M&A deals conducted during the fourth (1981–1989) and also the 
fifth M&A wave (1993–2000). The bulk of the event studies, however, include 
transactions that occurred either during the fifth210 or during the fifth and sixth 
M&A wave (2003–2008)211. As explained earlier in Section 2.2.5, each M&A 
wave is characterized by unique and different motives, which might result in 
inconsistent estimates of the relationship between insurance M&A activity and 
firms’ performance.212 
 
In summary, it can be stated that even though the basic event study 
methodology is somewhat standardized across studies, there are various 
                                            
 
206 With a minimum of 51 transactions analyzed in the study by Staikouras (2009); Elango 
(2006) investigates 52 transactions, and Floreani and Rigamonti (2008) 56 transactions. 
207 The sample sizes in the studies by Schertzinger (2008) and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki 
(2006) are 176 and 177, respectively. 
208 The time span of the study by BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) reaches from the year 1984 up to 
1992. 
209 Akhigbe and Madura (2001) regard transactions conducted between 1985 and 1996. 
210 Studies by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), and Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006). 
211 Studies by Elango (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009). 
212 See, e.g., Martynova and Renneboog (2005, p. 7), Wuebben (2007, p. 28), and Picot (2012, 
p. 50). 
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differences with regard to event window length,213 tests for significance,214 
benchmark construction,215 sample characteristics,216 and so on. 
Table 11: Methodology of prior event study research on the value effects of 
insurance M&A 
 
                                            
 
213 It is unclear what event period is most preferred. Event windows vary substantially from a 
 low of (0;0) (Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Cummins & Xie, 2005; Schertzinger, 2008; 
Staikouras, 2009) to a high of (0;+750) days (Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 2006; Schertzinger, 
2008), and the selected window might often influence the results in a strong way. 
214 Various parametric as well as non-parametric tests evaluate the significance of the 
calculated abnormal returns. 
215 Even though benchmarks, against which the abnormal returns are evaluated, range from 
single firms, reference portfolios, to multi-factor regression models, the standard market model 
is the most commonly used benchmark model in our sample (in six out of eight event studies). 
216 Sample sizes range from 51 (Staikouras, 2009) to 177 transactions (Boubakri, Dionne, & 
Triki, 2006). 
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Investigating a sample of 88 transactions involving US insurance companies in 
the period 1985–1996, Akhigbe and Madura (2001) evaluate the short-term 
stock market reaction of acquiring, target, and rival insurance companies 
subsequent to the announcement of an M&A transaction. Their results indicate 
that not only the companies directly involved in the transaction (i.e., acquirers 
and target insurance firms) but also rival insurance firms experience positive 
price reactions to acquisition announcements.217 These positive intra-industry 
effects are stronger for rival firms that have similar size and are located in the 
same region, which provides evidence for the signaling hypothesis (i.e., that 
rival insurance companies could also be undervalued or that rival insurance 
companies could create additional value through future M&A initiatives). Also, 
rival insurance firms show small positive returns—with a CAR of 0.40% in (-1;0) 
with a significance level of 5%—in response to acquisitions of their rivals, and 
insurance acquirers and their targets earn a positive and significant CAR of 
2.21% and 20.78%, respectively, in (-1;0), with both significance levels at 5%. 
Consequently, the combined announcement return of acquirer and target is also 
significant positive, with a CAR of 13.11% in (-1;0), once again significant at the 
5% level. An additional multivariate analysis revealed that acquirers’ CARs are 
higher for non-life acquirers compared to life acquirers. Furthermore, the 
authors find that the market perceives acquisitions of publicly traded targets 
less favorable, whereas the form of payment and relative size of the target are 
not significantly related to the post-M&A performance.  
 
In an earlier study, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) investigate whether accounting 
and financial information can explain M&A or insolvency decisions in the US 
property-liability insurance industry during the years 1984–1992. Considering a 
medium-term horizon, they detect that acquirers in distressed insurers’ earnings 
are significantly negative [with an outlier-driven CAR of -138.63% in (-250;+250) 
at the 10% level] or insignificantly positive CARs [CAR of 4.57% in (-250;+250)] 
in the year following the acquisition. Hence, the authors conclude that these 
deals are primarily motivated by the self-interest of the acquirer management or 
                                            
 
217 Note that the individual results of this as well as all other event studies will be presented in 
more detail in section 3.7, which exclusively deals with previous event study findings on the 
overall success of insurance M&A. 
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by managerial hubris and are particularly promoted by regulators. Acquirers of 
financially sound insurers are found to have insignificantly positive CARs of 
8.26%, 7.95%, or 15.23% in (-250;+250), depending on the methodology 
chosen. Regarding the performance effects of target firms, the authors detect a 
positive and significant CAR of 42.61% in (-250;+250) at the 1% level for 
distressed targets, while financially sound targets experience only insignificantly 
positive or negative CARs (of 6.04%, -7.44%, or -2.10%, depending on the 
model used). Even though typical targets are less distressed companies, small 
in size, and therefore less risky, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) emphasize that for 
some insurers who experience financial problems, M&A takeovers may serve 
as a better alternative than potential insolvency, especially in the insurance 
industry. 
 
Boubakri, Dionne and Triki (2006) also concentrate on M&A transactions in 
the US property-liability insurance sector by investigating a large sample of 177 
transactions between 1995 and 2000. Being one of the few studies investigating 
the long-term performance of insurance M&A, they primarily focus on the wealth 
effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders. Their results show that acquirers 
experience positive and significant long-term BHARs of 57.3% after three years, 
and thus M&A activities involving only insurers create value for the acquiring 
firm in the long run. Univariate and multivariate regression analyses showed 
that these positive BHARs are positively related to countries with higher investor 
protection and number of board independents, greater CEO independence, 
longer CEO tenure, and more newly nominated directors on the board, focusing 
transactions, tender offers, and frequent acquirers. Some other determinants 
are found to be negatively related to the performance, namely CEO and block-
holders’ ownership. 
 
Cummins and Weiss (2004) use data from 535 Western European acquirers 
and 165 targets in the 1990–2002 period to address the question of whether or 
not European insurance M&A activity is beneficial to acquiring and target firms’ 
shareholders. To answer this question, the authors study acquiring and target 
firms’ short-term CARs around M&A announcement. Even though their study is 
not strictly confined to insurance acquirers, the major focus lies on insurance 
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acquisitions, with 1,492 out of 1,669 transactions undertaken by insurance 
corporations.218 The results show that these deals result in small and mostly 
insignificant negative returns (not larger than -0.4%) for acquiring firms. 
Cummins and Weiss (2004) do not perform a multivariate regression; however, 
an additional univariate analysis of a subsample of transactions resulting in a 
change in control created significant negative CARs for acquiring firms with up 
to -1.02% in the period (-15;+15) at the 0.1% level. Dividing into cross-border 
and domestic (within-country) M&A, the univariate cross-sectional model 
showed that cross-border transactions were value neutral for acquirers, while 
within-border deals led to small but statistically significant value losses (of 
approximately -0.5%). Targets, however, generated positive and significant 
CARs, with a maximum of 8.85% in (-15;+15) at a 1% significance level.219 
Targets’ value gains from domestic transactions are generally greater than 
those for cross-border deals. Even though not explicitly tested in their paper, 
positive CERs are therefore most likely to occur especially for cross-border 
deals (which are value neutral to acquirers and value enhancing for target 
firms).  
 
Elango (2006) also puts acquirers’ reaction to M&A activities into the focus of 
his academic work. In his 2006 paper, Elango provides evidence on whether 52 
international acquisitions undertaken by US insurance firms between 1997 and 
2003 created value for acquiring companies’ shareholders by analyzing the 
stock price impact of these events on acquiring firms’ stock prices. The results 
of his traditional event study indicate that these transactions in general do not 
lead to any change in shareholder wealth. Analyzing the share prices of 
acquiring firms during several different announcement periods (with a maximum 
period of one day prior to and 20 days after the announcement), the author 
finds that insignificant negative short-term market returns vary between -0.43% 
and -1.27%. Hence, he draws the conclusion that international acquisitions by 
                                            
 
218 According to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes, the various 
insurance corporations can be classified into the broad categories “life direct (524113),” “P&C 
direct (524126),” “insurance agents (525190),” and “other direct insurance (524128).”  
219 A further investigation of a subsample of transactions resulting in a change in control even 
showed more positive CARs for target firms (in the range of 10% to 17%). 
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US insurance companies, on average, were value neutral during the period 
1997–2003. Furthermore, using a multivariate regression model, the paper 
investigates how these returns are affected by the location of the target 
insurers. It is found that short-term abnormal returns are positively related to the 
two country characteristics, degree of wealth of the target country and the 
amount of trade relationship between the target and acquirer country. On the 
other hand, acquiring insurers suffer negative returns when acquisitions are 
made in countries with greater differences in culture, environment, economics, 
legal systems, politics, and geographic distance.220 
 
Floreani and Rigamonti’s (2001) paper investigates the financial 
consequences of 56 insurance M&A transactions taking place in Europe, the 
US and Australia over the five-year period 1996–2000. The authors compute 
abnormal returns as buy-and-hold market excess returns and use various 
indices, including subindustry indices, for life and non-life as a benchmark for 
performance assessment. The results show that insurance M&A create value in 
the short run as acquirers [CAR of 3.65% in (-20;+2) significant at the 1% level], 
target firms [CAR of 18.22% in (-20;+2) at the 0.1% level and with a maximum 
CAR of 18.80% in (-40;+40) at the 0.1% level], and as combined firms [CER of 
5.27% in (-20;+2) at the 0.1% level], and all show positive and mostly significant 
abnormal returns, regardless of the event window over which they are 
measured. With respect to determinants of value creation, the authors draw 
several conclusions based on univariate and multivariate regression analyses. 
In their event study of pure insurance companies, they outline that acquirers’ 
performance is positively related to the relative size of the deal. This result is 
obvious since M&A are found to be value-enhancing events and the positive 
effect will be greater the larger the relative size of the target to the acquirer. 
Cross-border transactions within Europe, which are probably perceived as a 
defensive strategy and thereby not rewarded by the market, are found to be 
value destructing for the acquirer, whereas cross-border world deals by 
European acquirers are value enhancing. Regarding the industry segment in 
                                            
 
220 These various differences can be summarized under the generic term “liability of 
foreignness” (see, e.g., Zaheer, 1995, p. 341; Calhoun, 2002, p. 301; Elango 2006, p. 406). 
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which the acquirer does business, the authors suggest focusing mergers on 
average yield in higher returns compared to deals in which bidder and target 
operate in different businesses. This may be due to the fact that insurance 
companies are able to gain from the benefits of diversification even “when their 
merging partners operate in the same business segment, since actuarial risks 
are predominantly diversifiable.”221 One last finding in this paper is that stock 
payment, which is found to be primarily used in acquisitions of large targets, did 
not lead to a decrease in value for the acquiring insurance firm. 
 
While Schertzinger (2008) (just like the majority of the insurance M&A 
literature) investigates the short-term announcement effects of M&A 
transactions in the insurance sector by calculating cumulative abnormal returns, 
he also performs a long-term analysis using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
methodology and the calendar-time approach. In his analysis of 176 
transactions by European insurance companies in the period 1990–2005, 
Schertzinger (2008) provides statistically reliable evidence for short-term 
shareholder value creation in insurance M&A. Target CARs are not only found 
to be positive and significant in all analyzed event windows, with a maximum 
CAR of 14.02% in (-20;+20) at the 1% significance level, but also the combined 
short-term CERs of target and acquirer are positive and significant on most 
analyzed event windows [CARs of 1.22% in (-5;0) at the 10% level, 1.45% in 
(0;+10) at the 5% level, and a maximum CER of 2.06% in (-10;+10) at the 10% 
level]. Acquirers’ abnormal returns, however, are insignificant in all event 
windows except for the period (- 2;+2), in which the author finds a small 
negative and significant CAR of -0.93% (significant at the 10% level). The 
analysis of long-term value creation, however, does not draw such a positive 
picture of the success of insurance M&A. In the long-term window, the author 
finds negative and significant BHARs of -4.73% and -9.98% on a one- and two-
year horizon, respectively. Also, the acquirer BHAR three years after conducting 
an M&A underperformed a control firm benchmark matched by size and book-
to-market ratio by -6.57%. Similarly, when applying the calendar-time abnormal 
return (CTAR) approach, the relationship between acquirers’ financial 
                                            
 
221 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 13). 
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performance and M&A activity is negative but insignificant, with a CTAR 
estimate of about -0.40% per month. Schertzinger additionally computes the 
total value generation of the considered transactions. Interestingly, despite 
negative BHARs in all analyzed long-term event windows, these M&A deals 
generated a total net value of over USD 20 billion for investors of the involved 
acquirers, which is equivalent to a value creation of about USD 130 million per 
deal. Since only 49% of the deals resulted in value improvements, the author 
consequently concludes that “the overall positive effect is mostly driven by a 
slightly higher average value generation of successful deals (USD 4.6 bn) 
compared to unsuccessful deals (USD -4.1 bn).”222 In a following multivariate 
analysis on the determinants of abnormal returns four determinants—namely 
acquirers’ transaction experience, timing of transaction, geographical and 
industry focus, and acquirers’ growth—are found to have significant influence 
on the combined entity performance. The variable for acquirers’ transaction 
experience is only positive related to long-term performance for acquirers 
without any transaction experience and for most experienced acquirers. Hence, 
successful acquirers have either not been active in the M&A market at all or 
have been specializing on external growth. On the other hand, acquirers 
conducting only a few transactions perform significant worse than the former 
two groups of acquirers. The determinant for geographical and industry focus is 
found to be negatively related to acquirers’ stock market performance in the 
short run. In the long-term analysis, however, a full-focusing or full-diversifying 
strategy is expected to result in better performance. A further determinant 
having a significant influence on the long-term performance is growth of the 
acquirer. The author detects significant positive long-term BHARs for strongly 
growing insurance acquirers than for weaker growing acquirers. With respect to 
the timing of the transaction, the authors find acquisitions during upswing, peak, 
or downturn phases of the M&A cycle to be more value generating in the short 
run, while in the long run, only downturn and bottom phase mergers generated 
value. BHARs during the market upswing (-15.3% after one year) and the peak 
                                            
 
222 Schertzinger (2008, p. 132).  
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(-13% after two years) are significant negative.223 
 
Staikouras (2009) also investigates the effects of M&A transactions on 
shareholder wealth in a relatively small global sample of 51 transactions 
conducted during 1990 and 2006. Nevertheless, this study differs from the 
above-mentioned papers in the sense that the author does not include pure 
insurance transactions. His analysis is instead confined to investigating bank-
insurance combinations.224 Staikouras (2009), who solely focuses his analysis 
on short-term value effects of acquiring firms’ shareholders, detects positive and 
significant CARs225 for the overall global sample of bank–insurance 
combinations, but when the sample is separated into insurance and bank 
bidders, a clearer picture is provided. Bank bidders are found to earn significant 
positive returns,226 while their insurance counterparts experience significant 
losses227 in the short run when buying a bank. Consequently, when insurance 
companies engage in M&A activities, there will most likely be a negative stock 
price impact on insurance bidders’ shares. Moreover, the results of the author’s 
multivariate analysis indicate that the size of the deal—that is, the relative value 
of the target as well as the profitability—when measured as return on equity 
(ROE), is positively related to the abnormal returns, while diversifying deals do 
not create value for shareholders. 
3.6.5 Summary 
After providing a detailed review of previous empirical studies investigating the 
overall short-term, medium-term, and long-term performance of insurance M&A 
                                            
 
223 The author receives these results in a univariate descriptive analysis on major cross-
sections, which is conducted following the multivariate analysis. 
224 This includes the case of banks acquiring insurers (bancassurance transactions) and 
insurers acquiring banks (assurancebank transactions). 
225 For example, positive significant excess returns via the market index of 1.01%, 1.03%, 
0.83%, 1.23%, and 0.97% in the event periods (-5;0), (-3;+1), (0;+1), (-1;+1), and (-2;+2), 
respectively, are reported by the author. Some positive excess returns via the industry index of 
0.74%, 0.62%, 0.55%, and 0.73% are found in the periods (-5;0), (-2;+1), (0;+1), and (-3;+3), 
respectively. Even for all other periods, excess returns via the market and industry index are 
slightly positive, however insignificant. 
226 With a maximum excess return of 2.11% in (-1;+1) at the significance 2% level. 
227 E.g., significant negative excess returns via the market index of -2.29%, -2.20%, -2.37, and -
1.97% in (-4;+1), (0;+1), (0;+5), and (-1;+1) and significant negative excess returns via the 
industry index of -2.10%, -1.87%, -1.72%, -2.20%, and -2.03% in (-5;+1), (0;+1), (0;+5), (-
1;+1), and (-4;+4). 
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transactions, and their respective findings, it becomes clear that there is 
considerable variation, not only in the findings of these various studies, but also 
in the research design (i.e., in the measurement of performance and efficiency, 
benchmark construction, sample selection and size, time span under 
investigation, and duration of the event window). These differences in the 
research design are very likely to be major influencing factors in determining the 
success of the individual M&A transactions. Based on our review, together with 
the identical findings of Schoenberg (2006)228 and Meglio and Risberg 
(2010),229 we can postulate that inconsistent and contradictory findings in the 
available insurance M&A research might be due to differences in the research 
design and hence success metrics. This hypothesis will be examined in the 
following. 
 
3.7 Review and Results of Prior Capital Market Research on 
the Overall Success of Insurance M&A 
To test the above-formulated hypothesis, we will narrow the focus of our further 
analysis exclusively to academic papers relying on capital market data, that is, 
event studies, and thereby analyze the success of insurance M&A from the 
viewpoint of insurance firms’ shareholders. We chose to concentrate on 
insurance M&A literature that applies the capital market approach rather than 
on any of the other previously described approaches for three reasons: 1) as 
described in Section 2.3.2, from a theoretical point of view, the financial 
statement-based approach and the capital market-based approach can be 
                                            
 
228 Schoenberg (2006) investigates the comparability of four measures of M&A performance, 
namely cumulative abnormal returns, divestment data, and managers’ and expert informants’ 
subjective assessments. The author concludes his comparison with the following assessment 
“[W]ith the exception of a positive relationship between managers’ and expert informants’ 
subjective assessments, there was no comparability between the performance data generated 
by the alternative metrics. These results highlight the dangers inherent in comparing studies 
that have employed different performance measures. This may help to explain some of the 
conflicting conclusions reported in the literature examining the antecedents of acquisition 
performance” (p. 11). 
229 “It does not make sense, in the name of a generic performance, to compare CAR—which is 
a prediction of possible future company performance—with accounting measures—which are 
measures of historical performance—with management perceptions—which, besides being 
historical, usually depict non-measurable aspects. The different measures all say something 
about the performance of the M&A, but they are different stories told for different audiences, 
often by different narrators” (cf. Corvellec, 1997; Meglio & Risberg, 2010, p. 91). 
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regarded as the only appropriate methods for analyzing the success of M&A as 
well as for drawing reliable and general conclusions and recommendations; 2) 
as discussed in Section 2.3.2.5, when analyzing the success of M&A conducted 
by insurers operating in different lines of business and by insurers from different 
countries (and hence differing national accounting standards), the capital 
market-based approach is the only suitable approach for comparing these 
diverse insurance acquirers; and 3) the majority230 of studies in our final sample 
utilize capital market data. 
 
In order to obtain as accurate a picture as possible, the various findings of prior 
academic research are differentiated by the main parties involved in the 
transaction and the time horizon of analysis. The separation into short-term, 
medium-term, and long-term results enables us to identify whether the effects of 
insurance M&A depend on the time horizon of the analysis. Moreover, based on 
the insurance-specific observations of Schertzinger (2008), as well as on recent 
findings from other industries231 that value creation from M&A differs 
substantially across the various continents of the world (and even from one 
country to another, as specified by Boesecke, 2009), the results are presented 
by geographic region, that is, in the United States and Europe and worldwide.  
 
In brief, all reviewed event studies in our final sample analyze the effect of M&A 
transactions on the returns to the acquirer. The effect to the target232 or 
specifically to the combined entity,233 in contrast, is only examined by some of 
the studies.234 A definite answer to the question of whether an M&A deal is 
value enhancing or not, however, can only accurately be given when the effect 
to the combined entity, that is, the total change in shareholder wealth, is 
calculated. Hence, this overall economic effect of an M&A transaction, which is 
the result of the value-weighted235 sum of acquirer and target abnormal returns, 
                                            
 
230 10 out of the 19 reviewed studies. 
231 E.g., the utility industry, which is analyzed in the dissertation of Boesecke (2009). 
232 Target wealth effects are examined by six out of nine event studies reviewed. 
233 Only four event studies analyze the combined effects of target and acquirer. 
234 This shortcoming is due to the need to be listed for both acquirers and targets to calculate 
the total return for the combined entity. 
235 Measured either by total assets, equity capital, or market capitalization. 
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has to be examined from an aggregate perspective. By this procedure, the 
investigator is able to mitigate a possible wealth transfer effect from the acquirer 
shareholders to the acquired ones, which cannot be measured by studies 
conducting only separate analyses of the merged firms. Nevertheless, one 
might argue that the performance effect of M&A deals to acquirer shareholders 
might be of particular interest, since such transactions should be primarily 
motivated by the desire to increase the acquiring firm’s shareholder wealth.236 
Moreover, Bamberger (1994, p. 109) explains that target firms’ share price 
increases in response to M&A announcements ultimately conflict with the 
interests of acquiring firms’ shareholders, as they will have to pay higher prices 
for buying the target firms. Based on this argumentation, financial success of 
such deals has to be assessed from the perspective of acquiring firms’ 
shareholders and hence is solely determined by the value creation for 
shareholders of the acquiring firms.237 
 
The results of previous event studies concerning the overall wealth effects of 
M&A transactions in the insurance industry are summarized In Table 13. 
 
                                            
 
236 See Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 2). 
237 See also Section 2.3.2.2.1 and the annotations therein. 
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Table 12: Findings of prior event study research on the value effects of 
insurance M&A 
 
Author
Sample 
Region
Measure-
ment of AR
Time 
Horizon
Event 
Window
Acquirers'          
Wealth Effects
Targets' 
Wealth 
Effects
Combined 
Wealth 
Effects
Cummins and 
Xie (2005)
US CAR (s-t),     
CER (s-t)
Various in            
(-30;+30)
(-1;+1)            
(-5;+5)            
(-10;+10)           
(-15;+15)           
(0;0)                 
(0;+1)          
0.94%**               
1.19%*            
0.27%              
0.50%               
0.15%             
0.87%***        
24.33%*** 
25.51%***    
27.15%***    
30.21%***           
8.57%***    
23.35%***    
3.71%***                 
.                                
.                             
.                         
2.17%$               
3.36%*       
Cummins and 
Xie (2009)
US CAR (s-t),     
CER (s-t)
Various in            
(-30;+30)
(-1;+1)            
(-5;+5)            
(-10;+10)           
(-15;+15)           
(0;0)                 
(0;+1)          
0.94%**               
1.19%*            
0.27%              
0.50%               
0.15%             
0.87%***        
24.33%*** 
25.51%***    
27.15%***    
30.21%***           
8.57%***    
23.35%***    
Akhigbe and 
Madura (2001)
US CAR (s-t),     
CER (s-t)
Various in              
(-11;+10)
(-1;0)             
(+1;+10)
2.21%*                   
-0.23%
20.78%*                    
2.28%
13.11%*                   
2.00%   
BarNiv and 
Hathorn (1997)
US CAR (m-t)  (-250;+250) (-250;+250) Distr. targets: 
4.57%, 4.57%,          
-138.63%$;                              
Fin. sound       
targets: 8.26%, 
7.95%, 15.23%
Boubakri, 
Dionne, and 
Triki (2006)
Acquirer US; 
target global
BHAR (l-t) (0;+750) (0;+750) 57.3%
Cummins and 
Weiss (2004)
Western 
Europe
CAR (s-t) Various in              
(-15;+15)
(-1;+1)           
(-10;+10)                 
(-15;+15)              
(0;+1)                
(0;+2)                    
(0;+5)                                 
(0;+15)
-0.14%                       
-0.29%                                                    
-0.38%                          
-0.17%*                           
-0.31%*                           
-0.30%                                   
-0.20%
3.88%***           
6.87%***
8.85%***                 
2.96%***                                         
2.80%***                        
2.48%***             
3.94%***
Elango (2006) Acquirer US; 
target global 
(except US)
CAR (s-t) Various in                 
(-1;+20)
(-1;+1)             
(-1;+2)                     
(-1;+5)           
(-1;+10)           
(-1;+20)          
-0.51%                           
-0.41%                       
-0.28%                   
-0.22%                     
-0.30%
Floreani and 
Rigamonti 
(2001)
US, EU, AU CAR (s-t),    
CER (s-t),      
BHAR (s-t)
Various in              
(-40;+40)
(-1;-1)            
(-10;+10)        
(-20;+20)              
(-40;+40)          
(-20;+2)          
(0;0)       
0.68%*            
2.27%$                   
2.64%$                  
3.40%                               
3.65%**                 
0.65%                         
2.26%                   
16.07%***               
17.42%***                 
18.80%***                  
18.22%***            
3.97%               
1.21%*                 
3.75%**              
4.26%**             
5.06%$               
5.27%***             
0.18%                 
Schertzinger 
(2008)
Acquirer       
EU-25, CH 
or NO;    
target global
CAR (s-t),     
CER (s-t),    
BHAR (l-t),     
CTAR (l-t)
Various in             
(-20;+20);      
Various in     
(0;+750)
(-1;+1)               
(-10;+10)           
(-20;+20)      
(0;0)             
(0;+1)                    
(0;+2)                       
(0;+5)                       
(0;+20);         
(0;+250)          
(0;+500)      
(0;+750)     
-0.21%                   
0.47%                    
0.25%                     
-0.09%                     
-0.19%                        
-0.68%                         
-0.77%                                
0.24%;                                   
-4.73%$                        
-9.98%*                     
-6.57% (BHAR)                      
-0.39% (pm 
CTAR)
9.38%***      
13.82%***     
14.02%***                    
6.26%***                   
7.80%***                 
8.73%***                        
9.62%***                           
9.92%***   
0.87%***     
2.06%*          
1.69%                  
0.61%***                   
0.64%***             
0.41%*                   
0.46%                 
1.23%*               
 Staikouras 
(2009)
Global CAR (s-t) Various in                 
(-40;+40)
(-1;0)               
(-1;+1)              
(-10;+10)        
(-20;+20)                
(0;0)                 
(0;+1)                
(0;+2)                   
(0;+5)                     
(0;+20) 
-0.78%                     
-2.20%*                   
-0.34%                       
0.77%                                   
-0.45%                       
-1.87%*                     
-1.86%*                               
-1.72%*                               
-1.22%          
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3.7.1 Acquiring Firm Stockholder Returns 
3.7.1.1 Short-Term Results  
In general, short-term event studies that focus on abnormal stock returns 
around the announcement of M&A transactions find varying results concerning 
the effects on acquiring insurers’ stock returns. While some studies238 detect a 
positive reaction of the acquiring firms' stock prices to the acquisition 
announcement, other studies239 find small non-significant or even significant 
negative CARs around the announcement date. Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) 
and Cummins and Xie (2009), for example, detect strong positive CARs of 
0.68% and 0.94% in the event window (-1;+1), respectively, whereas 
Staikouras (2009) finds a significant negative CAR of -2.20% in the same event 
window. However, as already indicated by Schertzinger (2008), the “findings of 
US-focused studies may not apply for European markets.”240 Therefore, to get 
a more consistent view of acquirers’ short-term valuation effects, we further 
subdivide these research papers into event studies analyzing European, US, 
and global M&A transactions.  
 
Only the two studies by Cummins and Weiss (2004) and Schertzinger (2008) 
exclusively focus on bidders from Europe. Both papers predominantly detect 
small negative short-term abnormal returns for insurance firms conducting 
M&A transactions.241 This almost uniformly negative relationship between 
insurance transactions and acquiring firms’ short-term stock performance 
suggests that insurance M&A activity, on average, is not perceived by the 
market as a value-enhancing event for acquiring insurance firms in the short 
                                            
 
238 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonto (2001), Schertzinger (2008), Cummins 
and Xie (2005, 2009), and Staikouras (2009). 
239 Cummins and Xie (2004), Elango (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009). 
240 Schertzinger (2008, p. 50). The author explains these variable and also contradictory 
findings by disparities in capital markets as well as structural differences in the insurance 
markets that lead to lower potentials for creating value and higher hurdles for realizing these 
potentials. 
241 In Cummins and Weiss’ (2004) study, acquirers average abnormal returns after M&A 
announcements were invariably negative in all tested event windows. Schertzinger (2008) also 
finds that M&A transactions led to decreased returns for acquiring insurance firms in the 
majority of tested event windows. However, the author also detects small positive, albeit 
insignificant, abnormal acquirer returns in six out of 16 tested event periods, all of them over a 
longer event horizon (spanning at least five days prior to the announcement day or 10 days 
following the announcement). 
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run. However, as the only significant abnormal returns to acquirers of -0.35%, -
0.18%, -0.17%, and -0.31% are found by Cummins and Weiss (2004) during 
the event windows (-2;+2), (-15;0), (0;+1), and (0;+2), respectively, it can be 
concluded that European insurance M&A definitely do not create short-term 
value, but also do not destroy significant value for acquiring firms’ shareholders 
around the time of M&A announcement.242 This conclusion is further supported 
by the findings of Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), which showed that short-term 
abnormal returns were not significantly different between acquiring European 
insurers and their non-acquiring European peers.  
 
In contrast, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) also detect significant positive short-
term abnormal returns of 5.89% for acquiring US insurance companies. 
Moreover, three out of the four short-term event studies that confine their 
analyses to US insurance bidders detect significant positive acquirer CARs in 
response to insurance transactions. Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) observe 
significant positive acquirer CARs of 0.87%, 0.94%, and 1.19% in the event 
period (0;+1), (-1;+1), and (-5;+5), respectively. Even in all other event 
windows, their results show a consistently positive yet insignificant relationship 
between acquirer returns and M&A activity. In an earlier study, Akhigbe and 
Madura (2001) also find strong positive abnormal returns of 2.21% in (-1;0) at 
the 5% level. Only the results of Elango (2006), on average, do not indicate 
that US insurance acquirers create short-term value through M&A, since in 
Elango’s sample, acquiring insurers exhibit small negative returns, however, 
with insignificant short-term CARs around the time of the announcement. It has 
to be emphasized that in contrast to the studies of Akhigbe and Madura (2001) 
and Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) who only include US acquirers and targets, 
Elango (2006) does not fully confine his analysis to US firms. This may account 
for the discrepant findings between Elango’s study and the other two US-based 
research papers.243 Accordingly, we conclude that the review of the previous 
                                            
 
242 Insignificant acquirer CARs range from -0.38% in (-15;+15) to 0.02% in (-1;0) in Cummins 
and Weiss’ study and -0.93% in (-2;+2) to 0.47% in (-10;+10) in Schertzinger’s paper. 
243 Hayward and Shimizu (2006) mention various “confounding factors such as country risk and 
different institutional arrangements (e.g., legal and regulatory issues related to M&A)” that may 
cause differences in the results if a study is not restricted to the US companies only (p. 545). 
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empirical literature provides some evidence that acquiring US insurance firms 
experience a positive market reaction to the announcement of an M&A 
transaction (especially a within-country transaction).244  
 
The two remaining short-term event studies employ an international sample of 
acquiring firms from various countries, including the United States, Germany, 
England, and Australia. In the first study, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) 
provide strong support for a positive relationship between insurance M&A and 
acquiring-firm shareholder wealth even in an international setting. With one 
exception,245 acquirer CARs in their research study are strong positive in all 
analyzed event windows and mostly statistically significant. The event window 
(-20;+2) shows the highest cumulative abnormal return of the various time 
intervals tested, with a statistically significant CAR of 3.65%.246 In the second 
research paper, Staikouras (2009) finds that acquiring insurers either earn 
small and insignificant positive abnormal returns of 0.77% in the event window 
(-20;+20) or significant negative abnormal returns of -2.20% in the event 
window (-1;+1). However, these ambiguous results only refer to transactions in 
which an insurance company acquires a bank and must therefore be regarded 
with caution, as they do not refer to the full spectrum of insurance M&A.  
 
Overall, findings of previous US-focused event research suggest that M&A 
transactions between US insurance companies have increased the value of the 
acquirers in the short run. While the evidence for global insurance M&A is less 
conclusive, studies analyzing the short-term effect of European transactions 
detect a small negative market reaction of acquiring insurance firms to the 
announcement of such deals. 
                                                                                                                                
 
Also, Schertzinger (2008, p. 50) picks up these reasons for explaining inconsistent patterns in 
findings across studies from different sample regions. 
244 To further examine whether US transactions in general or only US within-country 
transactions create value, we will investigate this relationship more thoroughly in the next 
section when addressing several determinants of value creation in insurance M&A. 
245 The only negative yet insignificant acquirer CAR of -0.76% is found in the event window 
(+3;+40). 
246 Over the periods (-1;-1), (-5;+5), (-10;+10), and (-20;+20), the authors also find statistically 
significant positive CARs of 0.68%, 2.63%, 2.27%, and 2.64%, respectively. 
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3.7.1.2 Medium- and Long-Term Results 
In contrast to short-term capital market reactions, the majority of shareholders 
are more interested in medium- and long-term value creation through M&A 
activities. The ultimate success of an M&A transaction is furthermore highly 
depending on the pre-merger and post-merger integration strategy of the 
acquiring company and will be only noticeable after several years. It is 
unfortunate that most academic studies only conduct short-term analyses, 
which causes the problem of valuations based on the expectations of unrealized 
events, as discussed above.  
 
With regard to our sample, this general shortfall is confirmed because only 
three247 out of the nine event studies analyze medium- or long-term 
performance of insurance M&A. Moreover, only Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki 
(2006) and Schertzinger (2008) focus their analyses on a long-term horizon of 
up to three years after the transaction. While Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) 
calculate three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) relative to the 
S&P 500 index, Schertzinger (2008) adopts two different methodologies to 
measure abnormal returns: the calendar-time approach (CTA) and the buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach.  
 
As already highlighted above, a serious concern about long-term event 
methodology was raised by Roll in 1978. He “argued that [not only] the 
measures of abnormal performance can be sensitive to the choice of 
benchmark … [but also] that estimates generated with inefficient benchmarks 
are not generally meaningful.”248 Basically the same argumentation is given by 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998, p. 224): “In contrast to event studies over short 
horizons, long-term event studies are sensitive to the model used for computing 
normal returns, which may partially explain the conflicting conclusions of past 
research.” Long-term studies also suffer from the hindrance of calculated long-
term abnormal returns being partially attributable to several other unrelated 
                                            
 
247 BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), and Schertzinger (2008). 
248 Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991, p. 86). The authors show in their study that with the 
appropriate benchmark, a previously negative post-acquisition performance disappears and 
even turns positive. 
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events that take place simultaneously. Still, as several authors point out, these 
distorting effects should diminish with an appropriate and theoretical sound 
benchmark against which the returns are evaluated.249 In the case of Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki’s (2006) study, however, the appropriateness of the 
benchmark for judging performance of US insurance companies has to be 
questioned, as the study reverts to the S&P 500 index, which not only consists 
of insurance companies but which also comprises a variety of other 
representative US companies from totally different industries. The coherence 
between the applied benchmark index and the share price of the respective US 
insurance company, as postulated by some scholars,250 is hence not 
guaranteed. Additionally, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999) describe three problems related to the use of BHARs in long-term event 
studies, that is, the new listing, the rebalancing, and the skewness bias.251 As 
pointed out by Gur-Gershgoren, Hughson, and Zender (2008, p. 2), the 
skewness bias is an especially serious concern associated with the use of a 
simple index as a benchmark. Comparing the long-run return of an individual 
asset/stock (which is highly skewed) with the long-run return of a broad 
portfolio/index (which is more stable due to diversification) will result in a 
skewed BHAR, since this value is the difference between the two before-
mentioned returns. After careful evaluation, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, 
Barber, and Tsai (1999) come to the conclusion that a control firm approach 
should be more favorably considered than the use of a reference portfolio (e.g., 
the S&P 500 market index, which is employed by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki, 
2006).252 The more favorable control firm approach, on the other hand, is 
applied by the Schertzinger study (2008). The author examines how acquiring 
                                            
 
249 Peng and Isa (2008, p. 4). For a summary of the different approaches to constructing a 
benchmark, see Barber and Lyon (1997, p. 360).  
250 E.g., Spiss (2008). 
251 See also Peng and Isa (2008, p. 4). For more information on the bad-model problem and its 
solution, refer to Barber and Lyon (1997) as well as Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). 
252 Barber and Lyon (1997) find that using the reference portfolio approach and employing the 
three-factor model cannot overcome the skewness bias since their sample provides evidence 
that BHARs with the reference portfolio display negatively bias statistics and that CARs are 
either positively (with the reference portfolio approach) or negatively skewed (with the Fama 
and French three-factor model).  
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insurance firms perform relative to selected control firms with similar firm size253 
and book-to-market ratio254 and thereby is able to overcome the before-
mentioned biases caused by the use of a broad index. Even in an additional 
calendar-time approach, Schertzinger does not use a simple index as the 
benchmark for his analysis. Instead, the Fama and French three-factor 
regression model serves as the benchmark for comparison purpose. 
 
Also in this section, we will proceed by first subdividing all identified medium- 
and long-term event studies into papers that analyze the performance effects of 
insurance M&A transactions in a European and in an American sample and 
then discussing the individual results.  
 
In recent academic literature, Schertzinger (2008) is the only one who analyzes 
long-term value creation of insurance transactions in a European setting. 
Conducting an event time and a calendar-time analysis, the author draws the 
overall conclusion that European acquiring insurance firms underperform their 
benchmark returns in the post-M&A period of up to three years. In more detail, 
this study finds that European insurance acquirers experienced either significant 
negative BHARs of -4.73% and -9.98% on a one- and two-year horizon 
(significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively) or generated an insignificant 
negative BHAR of -6.57% on a three-year event horizon. Also, acquiring 
insurers’ CTARs are insignificant and negative with an average monthly return 
of around -0.40%. The author further reveals that more than 50% of all buyers 
in M&A transactions destroy their own shareholders’ wealth. However, it has to 
be noted that these European insurance deals generated a total net value of 
USD 20.6 bn for shareholders of acquiring insurance firms.255 Schertzinger’s 
results are in line with the prevalent finding of previous empirical research in 
                                            
 
253 Schertzinger (2008) defines firm size as “market value of common equity at 30.6. in year t for 
the period 1.7.t – 30.6.t+1” (p. 127). 
254 “Book-to-market ratio for the period 1.7.t – 30.6.t+1 is defined [by Schertzinger (2008)] as 
book value of common equity end of year t-1, divided by market value of common equity at 
31.12. of year t-1” (p. 127). 
255 This positive value and the fact that the majority of transactions resulted in value destruction 
imply that the value creation of successful deals outweighed the negative effects of the 
unsuccessful deals. Thus, Schertzinger (2008) concludes, “larger acquirers are able to extract 
more value from transactions than small acquirers” (p. 133). 
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other industries suggesting that M&A in general do not enhance—and may 
even destroy—long-term value for bidder firm shareholders.256 This common 
finding of negative long-term effects to acquiring firms following M&A 
transactions is described by Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011) as the “long-run 
merger underperformance anomaly”257 and is often explained by previous M&A 
research as the direct result of a competitive market for M&A, causing 
overpayment for the target firm (“winner’s curse” phenomenon).258 
 
In sharp contrast to the overall disillusioning results of Schertzinger’s European-
focused study (i.e., insignificant negative BHAR of almost -6.6% on a three-year 
horizon and an insignificant negative CTAR of about -0.40% per month), 
however, the long-term findings of US-focused studies draw a much brighter 
picture on the long-run success of insurance transactions. In their US sample of 
177 transactions undertaken by US property-liability insurers, Boubakri, Dionne, 
and Triki (2006) obtain a strong positive market-adjusted BHAR of 57.3% after 
three years following the deal. 
 
The contradicting findings between the two long-term studies by Schertzinger 
(2008) in the European context and Boubarkir, Dionne, and Triki (2006) in the 
US context are, probably, attributable to the different sample regions. However, 
it has to be mentioned that other factors related to the methodological 
specification and the research design (e.g., differences in the performance 
evaluation methodology or in the insurance industry segment of the acquiring 
firm) may have also led to this disparity. In their medium-term event study of US 
insurance companies, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), for instance, receive 
completely different results depending on the financial model used. Overall, 
                                            
 
256 Significant long-run post-M&A underperformance of acquiring firms is found, for example, by 
Limmack (1991), Loderer and Martin (1992), Higson and Elliot (1993), Madura and Wiant 
(1993), Gregory (1997), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Andre, Kooli, and L’Her (2004), and Peng 
and Isa (2008). Some other studies (e.g., Jakobsen and Voetmann, 2003; Abhyankar, Ho and 
Zhao, 2006; Francoeur, 2006) have shown that acquiring companies’ shares neither increase 
nor decrease in value in the long run. 
257 Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 10). 
258 Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006, p. 10) clarify: “In a takeover involving more than one bidder, 
it is likely that the acquirer pays in excess of the expected value of the target. The acquirer (or 
winning bidder) is cursed because its bid exceeds the value of the target." See also Roll (1986, 
p. 200), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1988, p. 38), Black (1989, p. 613 and p. 623), Bruner (2004, 
p. 790), and Ahern and Weston (2007, p. 16).  
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their results show that M&A in the US insurance industry create medium-term 
value for shareholders of the acquiring firms, as CARs are positive in almost all 
cases. Acquirer abnormal returns for acquisitions of financially sound insurance 
companies range from 7.95% and 8.26% to 15.23% depending on the chosen 
financial model. Additionally, acquisitions of distressed targets resulted in 
insignificant but small positive abnormal returns of 4.57% in (-250;+250) in two 
out of three reduced models used in their paper. At the same time, however, the 
authors also attain a significant negative abnormal return for one classification 
of distressed acquirers. Yet this negative CAR of -138.63% from day -250 
throughout day +250, which is statistically significant at the 10% level, is 
attributable to the impact of few outliers and must therefore be regarded with 
caution. Hence, both US studies (i.e. BarNiv and Hathorn, 1997; Boubarkir, 
Dionne, and Triki, 2006), provide some, but not very strong, empirical support 
for value creation for the shareholders of US acquiring firms in the medium and 
long run. Since the only study analyzing the relationship between insurance 
M&A activity and acquirer long-term performance in the European context finds 
the opposite relationship, that is, significant long-run underperformance of 
acquiring European insurance firms following M&A transactions, previous event 
study research does not give a clear and consistent answer to the question of 
whether M&A transactions in the insurance industry create value for the 
acquiring firms’ shareholders in the long run. The evidence on long-term 
performance of acquirers appears to be sensitive to the sample characteristics, 
such as the sample region and specifications of the estimation model, including 
the estimation technique and the benchmark for long-run stock returns. 
3.7.2 Target Firm Stockholder Returns 
3.7.2.1 Short-Term Results 
In theory and in the academic literature on the effects of M&A transactions on 
targets’ stock market performance, there is a broad consensus that targets’ stock 
price reaction to the announcement of an M&A event is almost uniformly 
positive.259 According to many researchers and theorists, these strong favorable 
                                            
 
259 See Mandelker (1974), Dodd and Ruback (1977), Langetieg (1978), Asquith (1983), Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Limmack (1991), Conrad and Niden 
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valuation effects of the target firm can be explained by the fact that “a premium 
over prevailing market prices is usually offered to induce target companies either 
to tender their shares or (for negotiated mergers) to vote in favor of merger.”260 
Our literature review on M&A in the insurance industry also provides 
considerable support for this general finding. All event studies under review 
report substantially positive and significant target CARs, independent from the 
analyzed event window. Following our procedure, we first present the results of 
studies that restrict their sample to European insurance markets and then 
concentrate on US-focused studies and papers employing a global sample.  
 
In their sample of 499 Western European insurance M&A, Cummins and Weiss 
(2004) get positive target CARs between 2.48% in the period (0;+5) and 8.85% 
in (-15;+15), all highly significant at the 99% confidence level. Schertzinger 
(2008) detects significant positive target CARs of around 10%, with a minimum of 
6.26% on the day of announcement and a maximum CAR of 14.02% in the event 
period that begins 20 trading days before the announcement and ends 20 trading 
days after the announcement day (both highly significant at the 0.1% level). 
 
Findings of the subsample comprising studies of US insurance transactions are 
generally consistent with these above-mentioned positive target performance 
effects, even though the positive abnormal returns seem to be inherently higher. 
With an average CAR of above 20%, targets of US acquiring insurance 
companies tend to gain substantial value in acquisitions. While Akhigbe and 
Madura (2001) report that US targets that have been acquired by US insurance 
bidders generated an outperformance of 20.78% in the period one day prior to 
the announcement date to the day of announcement (statistically significant at 
the 5% level), Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) even found significant CARs of up 
                                                                                                                                
 
(1992), Cheung and Shum (1993), Schwert (1996), Glaum, Hommel, and Thomaschewski 
(2002), Seth, Song, and Pettit (2002), Georgen and Renneboog (2004), Martynova and 
Renneboog (2005), Draper and Paudyal (2006), Spiss (2008), Boesecke (2009), and Masulis, 
Swan, and Tobiansky (2011), among many others; see also Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
and Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2007) for findings related exclusively to M&A in the financial 
services industry. 
260 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1988, p. 38). See also Hayes and Garvin (1982, p. 5), Jensen and 
Ruback (1983, p. 43), and Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 2). 
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to 30%261 for US targets of domestic insurance acquirers. Moreover, Cummins 
and Xie (2005, 2009) detect information leakage prior to these deals because 
targets, on average, earn significant positive abnormal returns even before the 
announcement of the M&A deal.262  
 
In a sample of global insurance acquirers from the United States, Europe, and 
Australia, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) also report positive and mostly 
significant target CARs. On the announcement day and on the day prior to 
announcement, the daily abnormal returns are small and positive but not 
significant, while the CARs are highly statistically significant and positive over all 
other pre-announcement and post-announcement periods, with a minimum of 
12.48% in (-5;+5) to a maximum CAR of 18.80% in (-40;+40). These positive 
valuation effects of global transactions (ranging from 12% to 19%) are the mean 
values of the findings obtained in the above-mentioned US-based (CARs of 
around 20% to 30%) and European-based studies (CARs within the 6%–14% 
range). Hence, Floreani and Rigamonti’s (2001) results may further serve as an 
indicator of the finding that US acquirers, on average, gain above 20%, while 
European ones in general experience positive abnormal returns below 15%. 
3.7.2.2 Medium- and Long-Term Results 
The acquired company has to be listed following an acquisition to detect long-run 
abnormal returns of targets. In the majority of cases, this is a problem because 
many targets are delisted following the transactions or have not even been 
publicly traded prior the acquisition. As a result, no study has been performed 
that investigated targets’ medium- or long-term performance effects.  
 
However, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) are the only ones to analyze the financial 
consequences of M&A deals to publicly traded firms that sold these insurers. In 
their US analysis, they found significant positive medium-term CARs for 
companies that sold distressed US property-liability insurance targets in all three 
                                            
 
261 30.21% in (-15;+15) statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Also in other event windows, 
e.g. (-1;+1), (-5;+5), and (-10;+10), CARs are highly statistically significant and positive in the 
range of 24-28%.  
262 The average CAR in the event window that starts 10 trading days before the M&A 
announcement and lasts until one day prior to the announcement date is 2.94% and significant 
at the 95% confidence level. 
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models that were used. Their first model yielded a positive CAR of 37.81% 
(significant at the 10% level), while their second and third model even produced 
CAR estimates of 79.63% and 42.61%, respectively, both of which are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, medium-term CAR results are 
insignificant, and the authors find no consistent pattern in their sample of sellers 
of financial sound US property-liability insurance firms. In all three models under 
analysis, the CARs of these sellers are insignificant, either small and positive 
(CAR of 6.04%) or small and negative (CARs of -7.44% or -2.10%). It can hence 
be concluded that returns to shareholders of firms selling distressed US property-
liability insurance companies are significantly higher than returns to US 
insurance companies acquiring these distressed insurers.  
 
Overall, even though no empirical evidence has been produced that could 
provide support for value creation for shareholders of target insurance firms in 
the years following the transaction, the initial short-term positive effects at the 
time of the transaction are very likely to last for a long period of time. 
3.7.3 Total Stockholder Returns of Combined Firms 
3.7.3.1 Short-Term Results 
Many academic researchers who examine the short-term effects of M&A 
transactions do not restrict their analysis to examining the performance effects 
of the acquirer and target separately.263 Instead, they further measure the 
combined stock market performance of both parties involved and thereby 
estimate the economic gains of insurance transactions from a net aggregate 
perspective.  
 
Of the 10 event studies in our sample, four264 papers particularly quantify the 
net aggregate economic effects of insurance M&A, all of them being short-term 
studies. The studies adopt a weighted-average approach based on firm size, 
                                            
 
263 In the case of strong positive target CARs but small negative acquirer CARs, the simple 
general conclusion of positive combined entity returns (CERs) cannot be drawn based on a 
separate analysis of both the target and the acquirer. As stated by Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1988, p. 39), “[w]hen the acquiring firm is much larger than the acquired company, even small 
negative acquirer returns can swamp the positive returns of the acquired company.”  
264 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Xie (2005), and 
Schertzinger (2008). 
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which is defined as the market value-weighted average of acquiring firm 
abnormal return and target firm abnormal return, to calculate the abnormal 
return of the combined entity. Positive and mostly significant CERs around the 
announcement of an insurance transaction were found in each of the four short-
term event studies, ranging from a minimum of 0.41% in the event window 
(0;+2) in Schertzinger’s (2008) paper to a maximum of 13.11% in the window (-
1;0) in the study by Akhigbe and Madura (2001), both significant at the 5% 
level. The finding of positive abnormal returns for the combined entity 
(calculated as a weighted average of target and acquiring firm returns) is not 
surprising and should be expected, as the studies detect either small negative 
or even small positive acquirer returns and strong positive target returns around 
the announcement date of a transaction.265 Hence, the positive short-term 
returns of the combined entity are primarily driven by strong positive 
announcement returns of the target, which on the other hand, primarily resulted 
from the substantial deal premiums offered to target firm shareholders.266 In 
many cases, these enormous deal premiums are due to factors such as agency 
problems (Jensen, 1986, 1988, 2005), self-interest, and managerial hubris (Roll, 
1986), which induce bidders to overpay for their targets. Consequently, as 
argued by Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 4), the combined entity returns 
are biased, and this positive short-term market reaction of the combined firm 
may not ultimately tell us whether or not the combining of target and acquirer 
was a value-creating corporate event that yielded net positive economic gains. 
Despite this criticism on the weighted average approach to determine CERs, 
almost half of the event studies performed this analysis. 
 
In his empirical work on the European insurance market, Schertzinger (2008) 
finds small positive (and mostly significant) CERs in all 16 tested event 
windows. The positive CER estimates range from a low of 0.41% in (0;+2) to a 
high of 2.06% in (-10;+10), both being significant at the 5% level. Even though 
                                            
 
265 The same finding is reported by Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011), who affirm that 
“weighted average calculations are almost guaranteed to generate a positive result upon the 
inclusion of target firm returns” (p. 5). 
266 See previous section 3.7.2.1 and references listed for proof of this statement. 
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not explicitly tested in the paper by Cummins and Weiss (2004), combined 
firms’ wealth effects in their study on 499 Western European M&A should also 
be small and positive, as acquirers, experience small and insignificant short-
term losses on average, while returns to target firms are statistically significant 
and uniformly strong and positive.  
 
Studies analyzing the combined valuation effects for US insurance company 
M&A report significantly positive abnormal returns, which are considerably 
higher than those found in European studies. The US-based academic paper by 
Akhigbe and Madura (2001) reveals that the combined insurance companies 
generally earn a 13.11% gain over the (-1;0) event window (statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level). Again, this positive combined entity 
return is mainly driven by the strong positive effect on the target (20.78%) rather 
than by the positive response of the acquiring insurance firm (2.21%). More 
evidence on the US insurance market comes from the study by Cummins and 
Xie (2005), who report significantly positive abnormal CERs between 2% and 
4% around the announcement date.267 
 
Based on a global sample of 24 matched pairs of international insurance target-
acquirer deals, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) provide evidence for a positive 
post-acquisition performance of combined entities in the short run. The highest 
CER of 5.27% (significant at the 0.1% level) is found in the event period from 20 
trading days prior to the announcement of the transaction to two trading days 
after the announcement date. With the exception of a statistically insignificant 
announcement-day return of 0.18%, CERs in all other event windows are also 
positive and significantly different from zero.268 
 
In summary, every single short-term event study of transactions between 
insurance players shows positive and significant CERs around the 
announcement of such deals.  
                                            
 
267 The authors find significant and positive and CERs of 2.52%, 2.17%, 3.36%, and 3.71% in (-
1;0), (0;0), (0;+1), and (-1;+1), respectively. 
268 Average CERs of 1.21% in (-1;+1), 2.75% in (-5;+5), 3.75% in (-10;+10), 4.26% in (-20;+20), 
and 5.06% in (-40;+40). 
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3.7.3.2 Medium- and Long-Term Results  
The combined wealth effects of acquirers and targets are not analyzed in any 
medium- or long-term study.  
3.7.4 Comparison of Short-Term and Medium- and Long-Term 
Results  
Overall, previous insurance M&A literature suggests that deals in the insurance 
industry are economically viable. However, a great variety in the individual 
outcomes is detected, as some insurance companies achieved high value 
gains while others obviously destroyed substantial shareholder value through 
M&A. In the light of these differing overall results, a comparison of the short-
term and medium- and long-term performance results of acquiring insurance 
firms shall outline some of the reasons for these conflicting findings. 
 
Comparing the results from short-term and medium- and long-term studies that 
focus on the European market, we can conclude that while the available 
evidence on a short-term basis only suggests a small and predominantly non-
significant negative relationship,269 the findings in the medium- and long- term 
studies reveal a significant negative abnormal stock performance over one to 
three years following the transaction.270  
 
Previous studies dedicated to determining the short-term value effect of US 
insurance transactions predominantly come to the conclusion that these 
transactions are beneficial to the acquiring insurance firm’s market value.271 
                                            
 
269 Cummins and Weiss (2004): insignificant CARs ranging from -0.38% in the event period (-
15;+15) to 0.02% in (-1;0) and only a few (small) significant CARs ranging from -0.35% in (-
2;+2) to -0.17% in (0;+1). 
   Schertzinger (2008): only insignificant CARs ranging from -0.93% in the period (-2;+2) to 
0.47% in (-10;+10). 
270 However, it has to be noted that this negative long-term relationship is solely derived from 
the findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) investigation. The author detects either significant 
negative BHARs of -4.73% and -9.98% on a one- and two-year horizon (significant at the 10% 
and 5% level, respectively) or insignificant negative BHAR of -6.57% on a three-year event 
horizon. Also, average monthly returns are insignificant and negative: equally weighted CTAR 
of -0.37% and value-weighted CTARs of -0.39%. 
271 Akhigbe and Madura (2001): strong positive CAR of 2.21% in (-1;0) significant at the 5% 
level.  
Elango (2006): small negative insignificant short-term CARs in all 14 event periods tested 
[between -1.27% and -0.22% in (-1;+20) and (-1;+10), respectively]. 
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The same conclusion is drawn from US-based studies that look into the long-
term performance of acquiring insurers. US insurance M&A, especially in-
country deals, create positive abnormal returns for acquiring insurance 
companies’ shareholders.272 
 
Our review of academic publications examining the stock price performance of 
acquiring firms in a global sample does not provide any further evidence, as 
only two academic papers were identified, both investigating the short-term 
market reaction in response to the announcement of an insurance 
transaction.273 
 
Looking at the influence of insurance M&A on the value of target firms, former 
empirical research uniformly indicates a strong positive correlation. Even though 
none of the reviewed capital market studies has directly investigated long-term 
value effects of insurance M&A on target firm shareholder wealth, strong positive 
short-term returns around the announcement date allow the assumption of 
wealth creation in the long run. 
 
The combined wealth effects of acquirers and targets are not analyzed in any 
medium- or long-term study; consequently, we are not able to perform a 
comparison. 
                                                                                                                                
 
Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009): significant positive acquirer CARs of 0.87%, 0.94%, and 
1.19% in the event period (0;+1), (-1;+1), and (-5;+5), respectively. In all other event windows, 
their results show consistently positive yet insignificant CARs. 
272 BarNiv and Hathorn (1997): positive but insignificant CARs of 7.95%, 8.26% and 15.23% for 
acquisitions of financially sound insurance (in the interval from -250 through +250 days 
around the effective day of the transaction). Acquisitions of distressed targets also resulted in 
insignificant but small positive abnormal returns of 4.57% in (-250;+250) in two out of three 
reduced models used in their paper. The CAR for one classification of distressed acquirers is, 
however, negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (attributable to the impact of few 
outliers). 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006): strong positive market-adjusted BHAR of 57.3% after 
three years following the M&A transaction. 
273 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001): all significant or at least insignificant positive CARs, with the 
highest statistical significant return being 3.65% in the event period (-20;+2). The only negative 
yet insignificant acquirer CAR of -0.76% is found in the event window (+3;+40). 
 Staikouras (2009): Excess returns via the industry index are mostly negative and statistically 
significant (e.g., CARs of -2.27%, -2.28%, -2.20%, and -2.38% in (-2;+1), (-4;+1), (-1;+1), and 
(-3;+3), respectively). The few insignificant positive CARs of 0.23%, 1.54%, 0.13%, and 0.77% 
are attained in the periods (-10;0), (-20;0), (-20;+1), and (-20;+20), respectively. 
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3.7.5 Summary of the Evidence on the Overall Success of Insurance 
M&A 
In the previous event study research on the effects of M&A, considerable effort 
was made to ascertain the desirability of insurance transactions on an ex post 
basis. Overall, empirical studies on this topic have consistently documented that 
insurance M&A are beneficial to target firms’ shareholders independent from the 
sample region and the time horizon of analysis. The positive market reaction 
during the few days surrounding the announcement of an M&A deal is more 
pronounced for US insurance targets being acquired by US insurance bidders 
(average target CAR of above 20%) than for international transactions (average 
target CAR between 15% to 20%) and for European deals (average target CAR 
in transactions involving a European acquirer of below 15%). 
 
Evidence on the effect of insurance transactions to the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm, however, is not that conclusive. The empirical evidence on 
acquirers’ wealth effects from insurance M&A seems to strongly depend on the 
geographic nature of the sample and the time horizon of analysis. Event studies 
with a particular focus on the European insurance market fail to provide 
consistent proof of the positive impact of insurance M&A on the acquiring firms’ 
stock returns. Even though short-term results indicate neither a consistent 
significant positive stock price impact nor a consistent significant negative 
market reaction for shareholders of European acquirers, abnormal returns to 
their shareholders are negative in almost all analyzed short-term event 
windows, and a strong negative abnormal stock price performance of acquiring 
European insurance companies is found over a long-term event horizon of one 
to three years following the transaction.274 On the contrary, US insurance 
transactions are found to enhance acquiring insurance firms short-term and 
medium- and long-term shareholder value. This positive market reaction is 
primarily attributed to large wealth gains in transactions between a US acquirer 
and a US target. Previous short-term event studies using an international data 
                                            
 
274 In previous literature, it is often argued that the negative price effect of the acquiring firm’s 
share price is due to the competitive market for M&A, which results in the “winner’s curse” 
phenomena (see, e.g., Roll, 1986, p. 200; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1988, p. 38; Bruner, 2004, 
p. 790; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2006, p. 10; Ahern & Weston, 2007, p. 16).   
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set that includes both European and US insurance companies have yielded 
mixed results on the question of whether these deals have a positive short-term 
impact on acquiring firm shareholder wealth. However, since the only study that 
fully concentrates on pure insurance transactions275 shows small positive but 
mostly significant acquirer CARs276 regardless of the event window over which 
they are measured, we conclude that insurance transactions, in general, 
enhance acquiring-firm shareholder wealth. Nevertheless, acquirer shareholder 
wealth gains in insurance M&A are significantly smaller than wealth gains to 
target shareholders. 
 
The few academic papers that explicitly investigate the combined entity 
abnormal returns in the context of M&A in the insurance industry provide 
further strong evidence for beneficial effects of insurance M&A deals. Each 
single short-term event study finds these transactions to result in significant 
positive short-term combined entity returns. The positive and significant 
CERs277 observed around the announcement of such deals are primarily driven 
by the positive announcement effect to target firms. In addition, although 
Cummins and Weiss (2004) do not analyze the accumulated wealth of both 
acquirer and target company in their Western European insurance study, small 
negative or positive returns for European acquirers and strong positive returns 
for European targets suggest that combined entity returns are likely to be 
significantly positive. Their study also suggests that there is a wealth transfer 
from an acquirer’s shareholders to a target’s shareholders, which is particularly 
large in domestic transactions. However, Cummins and Weiss’ (2004) results 
for cross-border European deals, as well as the findings of all other studies, do 
not support this conjecture, and the papers show evidence that the wealth 
transfer does not simply occur from acquirers to targets. These insurance 
                                            
 
275 The study by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001). Staikouras (2009), on the other hand, 
considers transactions of insurance players acquiring banks. 
276 Floreani and Rigamonti (2008) detect positive abnormal returns for the sample of 56 
acquiring insurance firms, ranging from 0.65% at the day of announcement to 3.65% in the 
period (-20;+2).  
277 The highest significant positive CER of 13.11% in the event period (-1;0) is found by Akhigbe 
and Madura (2001). Further studies by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Schertzinger (2008), 
and Cummins and Xie (2009) also document significant positive CERs of up to 5.27% in (-
20;+2), 2.06% in (-10;+10), and 3.71% in (-1;+1), respectively. 
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transactions seem to produce synergies between the involving partners, which 
might be a result of the unique characteristics of insurance company 
operations, as argued by Akhigbe and Madura (2001).278 Accordingly, 
insurance M&A are primarily driven by “value-maximizing motivations rather 
than managerial rent-seeking,”279 which is consistent with corporate control and 
production theory. All in all, M&A deals in the insurance industry, especially in 
the US, appear to be economically viable since they are wealth-creating events 
for the target and for the combined entity (and in many cases even for the 
acquirer), which distinguishes insurance transactions from M&A in many other 
industries.280  
 
3.8 Review and Results of Prior Capital Market Research on 
the Determinants of M&A Success in the Insurance 
Industry 
3.8.1 Overview 
Although in the previous section our work outlined the average overall effect of 
insurance transactions, there was a high variation in the performance of 
individual insurance transactions. Several empirical papers have outlined that 
subgroups of insurance firms experience significant positive abnormal returns 
following the announcement of an M&A transaction, while others suffer 
significant negative stock price reactions.281 Studies primarily belonging to the 
                                            
 
278 “The merging of standardized insurance products may be viewed more favorably by the 
market than the merging of manufacturing facilities between industrial firms” (Akhigbe and 
Madura, 2001, p. 504). 
279 Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 150). 
280 Although the majority of analyses concerning the success of M&A in other industries yield 
overall positive wealth effects for the combined entity (e.g., Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; 
Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001), the phenomena that both 
acquiring and target firm significantly outperform their benchmark in the post-M&A period (as 
found in the studies of Akhigbe & Madura, 2001; Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Cummins & Xie, 
2009) does not very often occur in previous literature (e.g., studies by Roll, 1986; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1988; Limmack, 1991; Servaes, 1991; Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Kaplan & 
Weisbach, 1992; Highson & Elliot, 1993; Gregory, 1997; Mulherin & Boone, 2000; King et al., 
2004; Darkow, Kaup, & Schiereck, 2008; and Boesecke, 2009 detect positive combined entity 
returns; however, the acquiring firm earns small negative abnormal returns). 
281 For example, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) found that a subgroup of US acquiring firms 
achieved a significant outperformance when conducting M&A within the US, while another 
subgroup of European insurers experienced significant performance declines when conducting 
domestic M&A transactions. Another example is provided by Schertzinger (2008), who detects 
  
110 
strategic management literature have hence attempted to answer the question: 
“Why are firms different?”282 According to their findings, the variation in the M&A 
outcomes are not only due to differences in the sample selection, the time 
horizon of analysis, and methodology used, they are also attributed to various 
qualitative differences in the characteristics and factors of the acquisition 
process and in the acquisition process itself. These various factors, which 
essentially influence and drive the direction and the extent of the overall 
success of an M&A transaction, will be analyzed in this section. In order to gain 
a complete understanding of this relationship, we will not only explain these 
various factors identified by previous insurance M&A research but also examine 
their influences depending on the time horizon of the analysis.283  
 
The majority of reviewed event studies conduct univariate cross-sectional 
analyses on the various determinants of value creation by dividing the 
examined transactions into several subsamples in order to explain the 
discovered short- and long-run valuation effects.284 Mostly, this procedure is 
accompanied by multivariate cross-sectional regression analyses, which are 
necessary for precisely separating simultaneous effects of the various factors of 
value creation.285 A few other studies in our sample did not use simple 
univariate approaches for the identification of influencing success factors but 
instead conducted only the more complex multivariate analyses.286 
 
In general, numerous factors have been identified by the extant M&A literature 
that influence and moderate the post-M&A financial performance of the involved 
                                                                                                                                
 
significant positive returns only for a subgroup of the most experienced acquirers, while less 
experienced acquirers generate negative abnormal returns following an M&A deal. 
282 Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1994, p. 43). 
283 The previous work of Schertzinger (2008) has already pointed out that factors that affect the 
short-term market reaction of the acquiring firm in a positive way do not automatically enhance 
firm’s shareholder value on a long-term basis (e.g., the growth of an acquirer is found to have 
a negative short-term relationship with acquiring firms’ performance, while the effect on 
acquirers’ firm performance in the long run is strong and positive). 
284 See, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss 
(2004), Cummins and Xie (2005), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and 
Staikouras (2009). 
285 See, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Xie (2005), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki 
(2006), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009). 
286 See, Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Elango (2006), and Cummins and Xie (2009). 
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insurance companies. Among those various determinants are the size and 
strategic direction of the transaction (e.g., industry relatedness and geographic 
area), method of payment, transaction premium of the deal, financial condition, 
ownership structure, changes in the organizational structure and cultural 
compatibility of the companies involved, the degree of post-merger integration 
of the target, and economic factors such as the economic growth of the 
economy. Due to the focus of this thesis on financial and strategic aspects of 
mergers and acquisitions, the reviewed academic papers come from two major 
groups of scholars: financial economics and strategic management scholars. In 
contrast to academic publications from the organizational behavior fields, which 
investigate the acquisition’s impact on the organization and the people and thus 
center their attention on the cultural, human, and organizational elements of the 
M&A process,287 publications belonging to the two previously mentioned groups 
assume that financial characteristics and strategic rationales of the firms mainly 
influence the success of M&A. These influencing factors of M&A success 
comprise managerially controllable endogenous factors and managerially 
uncontrollable exogenous factors.288 Endogenous factors, which can be directly 
or indirectly influenced by the management of the acquiring firm, are further 
divided into company-specific factors of the acquiring firm and the target firm 
and features of the transaction structuring and management process (see 
Figure 5).289 Factors related to the acquiring firm regularly consist of an 
acquirer’s transaction experience, financial condition (i.e., level of excess cash), 
line of business, and various firm level corporate governance characteristics 
(e.g. ownership structure, CEO tenure, and CEO independence). Furthermore, 
the impact of variables such as target company’s ownership, the relative size to 
the acquirer, the financial condition of the target prior to the M&A transaction, 
the target’s pre-merger performance, and its line of business seem to greatly 
                                            
 
287 These elements range from changes in the organizational structure and working 
relationships, status changes of employees in the organization, and employee and top 
management turnover of the acquired firm to organizational and cultural incompatibility (See, 
e.g., Marks, 1982; Lubatkin, 1983; Datta, 1991; Beatty, 1999; Javidan et al., 2004). 
288 See, e.g., Merchant and Schendel (2000, p. 724), Beitel (2002, p. 130), and Wuebben (2007, 
p. 151). Cooper and Finkelstein (2010) use the terms “internal” and “external variables” 
instead of “endogenous” and “exogenous factors,” respectively. 
289 See, e.g., Beitel (2002, p. 131), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005, p. 208), and 
Wuebben (2007, p. 152). 
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influence the M&A success. The analyzed features of the transaction structuring 
and management phase are also manifold, ranging for example from 
determinants of the pre-merger planning phase such as the strategic direction 
of the transaction, pre-merger participation in the target, and the attitude of the 
offer (hostile versus friendly) to determinants of the transaction process such as 
the transaction premium, the method of payment (cash versus equity), and the 
percentage acquired to features of the integration phase (e.g., the retention of 
the target’s key employees and the degree of post-merger integration of the 
target).  
 
Researchers from the disciplines of strategy and finance have also commonly 
examined the impact of following external (i.e., exogenous) factors related to 
the field and environment: the industry sector, the relative strength of a 
country’s economic growth, capital markets, and foreign currency exchange 
rates. Even though the management of the acquiring firm has minimal influence 
on these mostly macroeconomic factors, the success of an insurance 
transaction, that is, the creation of shareholder value, is likely to be dependent 
on them. As these endogenous determinants make value creation easier or 
more difficult in specific circumstances, they have to be included as part of the 
model. 
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Figure 5: Overview of potential determinants of success of insurance M&A 
 
After providing a general overview of all those determinants included in previous 
M&A research from the fields of financial economics and strategic management, 
we outline which specific determinants have been analyzed by the individual 
studies under review. 
 
All in all, 24 determinants of value creation have been identified by the recent 
capital market research on the effects of insurance M&A, which we then 
classified into four groups (“ex ante features of the acquiring firm,” “ex ante 
features of the target firm,” “ex ante features of the transaction structuring and 
management phase,” and “influences of the economic environment”) to allow for 
a better overview (See Table 14).  
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Table 13: Overview of determinants of success analyzed in recent studies 
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In the following paragraphs, we give an answer to the fourth research question 
by determining which factors induce a positive/negative short-term capital 
market reaction and which factors lead to long-term value creation/destruction. 
To do this, we will first give a brief overview of the four groups and the related 
determinants that are analyzed by the individual capital market studies, and 
then we will describe each group and its determinants more thoroughly. Finally, 
the findings of the various studies will be presented according to the four-group 
classification scheme and discussed in detail (see Table 15). The observed 
directional correlation between the individual determinants and the M&A 
success is used to derive testable hypotheses for the empirical investigation of 
our research proposition. 
3.8.2 Characteristics of Acquiring Companies 
In recent capital market research, several variables related to the acquirer have 
been examined in the context of wealth gains from mergers and acquisitions. A 
first classification scheme for insurance M&A is the grouping of these deals by 
the absolute size of the acquiring insurance firm. From a theoretical standpoint, 
as an acquirer, there is a significant advantage in being a large company by 
providing greater flexibility and the option to potentially finance sizeable 
deals.290 Empirical studies by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Xie 
(2005), Schertzinger (2008), and Cummins and Xie (2009) include an 
acquirer’s size291 as a variable to assess whether a large insurance firm is 
more capable in identifying and realizing synergy potentials and thereby 
benefits from M&A. All capital market-based studies in our sample, however, 
confirm that the size of an acquirer is (either non-significantly292 or 
significantly293) negatively related to acquirers’ abnormal returns in the short 
                                            
 
290 See Cummins and Xie (2005) and Cummins and Xie (2008). 
291 Measured by the logarithm of company’s market value of equity at announcement date (see 
Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001, p. 10; Cummins & Xie 2005, p. 58; Schertzinger, 2008, p. 88; 
Cummins & Xie, 2009, p. 146). Alternatively, company’s size can be defined by total assets 
(see, e.g., Klumpes, 2006; Cummins & Xie, 2008), sales (see, e.g., Chang & Chen, 2002; 
Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2004), or number of employees (see, e.g., McKinley, 1987; 
Merchant & Schendel, 2000). 
292 See Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Schertzinger (2008), and Cummins and Xie (2009).  
293 See Cummins and Xie (2005). 
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run.294 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Schertzinger (2008), and Cummins and 
Xie (2009) find that short-term acquirer CARs insignificantly decrease with 
increasing size (.e. market value, of the acquirer). A significant negative 
relationship between an acquirer’s size and financial post-M&A performance is 
found in the study by Cummins and Xie (2005). In the long run, however, an 
acquirer’s size showed no significant correlation with an acquirer’s post-M&A 
performance, as pointed out by Schertzinger (2008).  
 
Despite the negative short-term and insignificant long-term correlation, former 
investigations have revealed that acquiring insurers, on average, tend to be 
larger in size than average.295 As previous studies found out, the size of an 
acquirer may not only have an influence on the success of an insurance 
transaction, but it also might have a dependency relationship with the growth of 
the acquiring firm. For example, Cosh and Hughes (1989, p. 78) report that 
acquiring firms typically are both large in size and fast growing. Moreover, 
Nissim (2010, p. 134) cites existing research from the fields of marketing and 
industrial organization that has shown empirical evidence of a negative 
relationship between an acquirer’s size and an acquirer’s subsequent growth 
and envisages this negative correlation also for the insurance industry.296 
Consequently, an acquirer’s growth may also be an influencing factor for 
value creation in such transactions and is hence included in the empirical 
analysis by Schertzinger (2008). According to the author’s findings, fastest-
growing acquirers insignificantly underperformed their benchmark in the 
                                            
 
294 This negative relationship is also the predominant finding in recent insurance efficiency 
research (e.g., Cummins, Tennyson, & Weiss, 1998; Cummins & Xie, 2008) as well as in 
event studies on M&A in other industries. For example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2003), who base their event study on data from 12,023 transactions of various listed US 
companies, differentiate between small and large acquirers. They find a positive and 
significant equally weighted CAR of 1.1%, but at the same time the value-weighted CAR of -
1.18% is significantly negative [both in (-1;+1) at the 1% level]. This disparity suggests a size 
effect, which is defined by the authors as “the difference between the abnormal returns of 
small and large acquirers.” The authors further verify these findings by dividing the sample into 
small and large acquirers. Small firms have a significant positive equally weighted CAR of 
2.32% and a value-weighted CAR of 1.27%, while large firms show an insignificant equally 
weighted CAR of 0.08% and a value-weighted CAR of -1.25%.  
295 E.g., Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 11), Klumpes (2006, p. 28), Cummins and Xie (2008, 
p. 42). 
296 The literature attributes this negative relationship mainly to: 1) diminishing returns to scale 
and finite demand, 2) life cycle effects, and 3) diminishing returns to learning (see Nissim, 
2010, p. 137).  
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announcement period [mean acquirer CARs of up to -6.11% in the (-20;+20) 
event period]. On a long-term horizon however, fast-growing acquirers perform 
significantly better than weaker growing acquirers, suggesting that strong 
growth does not ultimately lead to difficulties in integrating the respective targets 
and/or that the integration of targets is not dependent on acquirers’ growth.  
 
Finally, the expected dependency relationship between insurance M&A 
success, size of the acquirer, and the acquirer’s growth is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Dependency between M&A success, an acquirer’s size and growth 
 
As frequent acquirers may most likely benefit from their knowledge and 
experience of previous M&A transactions, a variable for acquirers’ transaction 
experience is included in four studies297 to gauge if transaction experience has 
a positive impact on acquirers’ post-M&A performance. The long-term findings 
of Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) support this positive correlation between 
M&A success and transaction experience, as frequent acquirers in their US 
sample are found to outperform their less experienced US counterparts. As 
argued by the authors, the positive long-run returns of frequent acquirers 
suggest “that bidders involved in several acquisitions acquire the necessary 
                                            
 
297 Cummins and Xie (2005), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and 
Cummins and Xie (2009). 
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experience to integrate successfully the target’s activities into their own 
businesses.”298 Moreover, proponents of this point of view argue that with each 
transaction conducted, up to a certain point, more active acquirers may benefit 
from these advantages in terms of experience in all phases of the transaction 
process (before, during, and after).299 More precisely, acquiring firms’ 
management teams may obtain additional expertise in identifying and choosing 
potential targets (e.g., Hitt et al., 1998, p. 108; Wuebben, 2007, p. 153), 
negotiating deals (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, p. 50), finding the 
necessary structure (e.g., Chandler, 1962, p. 3; Kitching, 1967, p. 94; Lubatkin, 
1983, p. 223; Paine & Power, 1984, p. 108), and as stated above, in conducting 
post-merger integration (e.g., King et al., 2004, p. 190; Boubakri, Dionne, & Tiki, 
2006, p. 15 and p. 23; Wuebben, 2007, p. 154).300 Evidence contrary to this 
view comes from several short-term investigations. Besides others,301 Cummins 
and Xie (2005) and Cummins and Xie (2009) detect a negative relationship 
between an acquirer’s transaction experience and its post-acquisition 
performance on a short-term horizon. The authors justify these negative 
announcement returns as evidence that “the market thinks that the 'frequent 
buyers’ have a problem of promptly and efficiently integrating the target firms 
into their existing business”302 and that “the market doubts the value-maximizing 
motives of these ‛acquisition lovers.’”303 This dichotomous relationship of both 
positive and negative effects is also outlined by the theoretical work of 
Bamberger (1994, p. 223) and the empirical results of Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1999) and Schertzinger (2008). In their investigation of 449 acquisitions in the 
manufacturing sector, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) provide an answer to 
this dichotomous relationship by revealing an overall U-shaped relationship 
between acquirers’ transaction experience and post-M&A financial 
                                            
 
298 Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 23). 
299 See, e.g., Buehner (1990a, p. 209). For further information on the organizational learning 
theory and related topics, such as “learning curve,” “knowledge acquisition,” and “knowledge 
management” see, for example, Ellsworth (1999) as well as Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). 
300 As pointed out by Singh and Zollo (1998, p. 30), it is important to note that conducting a 
series of homogenous transactions is a prerequisite for benefiting from these learning curve 
effects. 
301 E.g., Kusewitt (1985) and Fuller et al. (2002). 
302 Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 37). See also Wuebben (2007, p. 154) and the references there. 
303 Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 38). 
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performance, which is further confirmed by Schertzinger’s (2004) academic 
work for the insurance industry. In his dissertation research, Schertzinger 
(2008) provides a more detailed picture of the influence of the variable for an 
acquirer’s transaction experience in the insurance industry. Independent from 
the time horizon under analysis, Schertzinger documents a positive yet 
insignificant valuation effect for acquirers without any acquisition experience 
and for acquirers with an extensive acquisition record. On the contrary, 
acquirers with medium transaction experience yield significantly smaller CARs 
than acquirers following the previous mentioned strategies. Thus, companies 
should either pursue a strategy of organic growth or strongly depend on M&A 
activities for business growth (Schertzinger 2008, p. 137). 
 
Last but not least, Bamberger (1994), among others, points out that an 
acquirer’s acquisition experience is not only related to the acquisition success, it 
is also positively correlated to the size of the acquirer, as larger firms usually 
have a longer history of M&A activities. Summarizing, the expected dependency 
relationship between insurance M&A success, size of the acquirer, and the 
acquirer’s transaction experience is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: Dependency between M&A success, an acquirer’s size, and transaction 
experience 
 
Previous acquirer performance, that is, its profitability, might be a further 
determinant of value creation in insurance transactions and is also related to the 
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above discussed growth variable. In Nissim’s (2010) work on the insurance 
business and the valuation of insurance companies, the author offers several 
explanations for a positive relationship between the profitability of an insurance 
firm and its subsequent growth potential. These various explanations can be 
divided into five quintessential value drivers for future growth of more profitable 
insurance firms: (1) positive effect on the solvency capital requirements, (2) 
increased availability of internal funds, (3) better access to operating credits (4) 
better access to capital markets, and (5) better investment opportunities 
(Nissim, 2010, p. 137). Figure 8 summarizes this dependency relationship 
between an acquirer’s previous performance and its subsequent growth. 
 
The relationship between pre-merger and post-merger performance is analyzed 
in two studies by Cummins and Xie (2005) and Staikouras (2009). Cummins 
and Xie (2005) relate acquirers’ performance before announcement, measured 
by Tobin’s Q value, to its post-acquisition performance. In their US study, the 
authors detect a significant negative relationship between these two variables. 
The negative correlation indicates that the market favors bad performing US 
insurance companies to participate in M&A activities, while better performing 
insurers should pursue organic growth instead. This finding contrasts with the 
one by Staikouras (2009), who identifies insurance acquirers with a higher 
profitability, defined as return on equity (ROE), to perform better. Based on a 
global sample, the author argues that the market expects acquirers who have 
performed better in the past to be more capable of managing a target’s assets 
well in the future and thus be able to improve the target’s performance more 
effectively. Further support for Staikouras’ (2008) findings is provided by the 
empirical work of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), who conclude that “firms 
with bad managers (identified by poor performance relative to its industry) do 
much worse in making acquisitions than firms with good managers” (p. 47).  
 
Nevertheless, as implied by Roll’s hubris theory (1986), management of well-
performing acquiring firms might be prone to overconfidence and might suffer 
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from managerial hubris, leading them to undertake unprofitable transactions 
that result in an unfavorable post-M&A performance.304  
All in all, the former insurance literature indicates a positive correlation between 
a previous acquirer’s performance and its growth, while there is no consistent 
and reliable evidence on the relationship between pre-M&A performance and 
M&A success of an acquiring firm (see Figure 8).  
     
 
Figure 8: Dependency between M&A success, an acquirer’s size, and transaction 
experience 
 
In addition to the above discussed acquirer variables, Akhigbe and Madura 
(2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), and Schertzinger (2008) distinguish 
between different lines of business in their analyses. While the former authors 
only subdivide insurers into “life” and “non-life,” the latter two academic studies 
separate transactions into “life,” “reinsurance,” and “others,” and “P&C,” “life,” 
“re,” “agents/brokers,” and “others,” respectively. Akhigbe and Madura (2001) 
report that transactions undertaken by US non-life insurers create significantly 
more value for the acquiring US insurance company and the combined entity 
than M&A transactions undertaken by US life insurers. This result stands in 
                                            
 
304 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) provide empirical evidence supporting this argumentation. 
In their sample of successful tender offers, shareholders of acquirers who engage actively in 
M&A transactions receive reduced returns. However, empirical findings by Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1990) provide evidence for the contrary. In their US sample, bad M&A 
transactions are primarily driven by managerial objectives and not by managerial hubris.  
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sharp contrast to the findings of the latter two studies. According to 
Schertzinger’s (2008) European data, life insurance companies were not only 
the most active acquirers but also the most preferred targets. The author 
observes higher CARs and CERs (however, not statistically significant) for 
European acquirers operating in life business than for P&C insurance acquirers. 
Similarly, in a global context, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) also consider pure 
life insurance deals to be more value enhancing than business-diversifying non-
life deals. In addition, shareholders of reinsurance companies engaging in M&A 
activity are found to experience the highest abnormal stock returns around the 
announcement of the deal. 
 
In summary, the direction of the relationship between an acquirer’s line of 
business and its M&A success cannot be completely determined by a review of 
the extent literature on the effects of insurance M&A. There is no significant 
evidence from the insurance M&A literature, and evidence from other industries 
suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between these two 
variables,305 the findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) European sample and from 
Floreani and Rigamonti’s (2001) global study suggest that M&A transactions by 
European life insurance companies yield small positive short- and long-term 
abnormal returns. 
 
Additionally, several firm level corporate governance characteristics—which 
comprise percentage of shares held by the CEO, percentage of shares held 
by institutions, percentage of shares held by blockholders, CEO tenure, 
CEO independence from the chief of the board position, proportion of 
independent directors within the board of directors, and percentage of 
newly nominated board members—are analyzed by Boubakri, Dionne, and 
Triki (2006). CEO share ownership is also studied in the paper by Cummins and 
Xie (2005). 
 
Concentrating first on the ownership structure of the acquiring insurance firms, 
on the one hand, the authors expect that the higher financial performance the 
                                            
 
305 See, e.g., Bamberger (1994, p. 199). 
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higher the CEO, institutional, and blockholder ownership level is, since personal 
interests of managers are aligned to the organizational objective of maximizing 
the value for company shareholders, and thereby agency conflicts are 
diminished (i.e., interest alignment hypothesis).306 On the other hand, however, 
major shareholder ownership may cause managerial entrenchment problems, 
that is, problems resulting from situations in which “managers gain so much 
power that they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than 
the interest of their shareholders.”307, 308 Empirical evidence for the latter 
argument comes from Cummins and Xie (2005). The authors show in their 
study that the coefficient of insider ownership on an acquirer’s post-merger 
performance is negative, although insignificant. Moreover, in the study of 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), the two variables, CEO share ownership 
and blockholder share ownership, are estimated to have significantly negative 
effects on acquiring firm’s valuation, and institutional ownership is found to be 
insignificantly negative related to an acquirer’s M&A success.309 Consequently, 
the more shares the CEO, blockholders, and/or institutional investors hold, the 
lower the value creation for the acquirer’s shareholders. Accordingly, the 
combined findings of both studies provide strong support for the agency 
theory’s argument that entrenchment problems could arise as a result of major 
shareholders.310  
 
Following the results from previous research from other industries, the CEO 
experience and CEO independence from the chief of the board position are 
                                            
 
306 Past studies supporting this view include that of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Hart and 
Holmstrom (1987). 
307 Weisbach (1988, p. 435). A further definition of entrenchment is provided by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989, p. 123): "By making manager-specific investments [e.g., conducting specific 
M&A transactions], managers can reduce the probability of being replaced, extract higher 
wages and larger prerequisites from shareholders, and obtain more latitude in determining 
corporate strategy."  
308 Previous studies supporting this hypothesis include the works by Fama and Jensen (1983a, 
1983b) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). See Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006) for a 
comprehensive analysis on internal agency conflicts, e.g., entrenchment problems, in the 
context of M&A activity. Additionally, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) as well as Jun (2007) 
investigate the entrenchment effect on corporate valuation. 
309 CEO ownership: Cummins and Xie (2005) find an insignificant relationship. A significant 
negative relationship is detected by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006).  
    Blockholder ownership: Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) observe a significant negative 
impact. 
310 See, e.g., Morck and Vishny (1988, p. 301) and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 59). 
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expected to have a small positive influence on the success of mergers.311 Even 
though both variables (CEO tenure and CEO independence), which have been 
exclusively studied by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) in an insurance 
context, indicate some relationship in the expected direction, they are not 
significantly related to the CAR of the acquirer, and thus these factors do not 
result in a different reaction by the market on average. 
The proportion of independent directors within the board of directors and the 
percentage of newly nominated board members, however, both show a 
significantly positive long-term effect on the stock price change, as outlined by 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006). As a result, board independence leads to 
value gains for the acquirer if the number of independent board directors is 
large enough to make a difference.  
 
Table 15 summarizes the above findings of previous capital market research on 
the various acquirer determinants of value creation in insurance transactions 
and their findings on the effects of several target features, features of the 
transaction structuring and management phase, and influences of the economic 
environment.  
 
                                            
 
311 For example, see findings reported by Denis and McConnell (2003) and Walters, Kroll, and 
Wright (2007). 
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Table 14: Results of determinants of value creation analyzed in recent studies 
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3.8.3 Characteristics of the Target Companies 
A large number of target firm characteristics have also been considered in the 
reviewed capital market studies. Various studies312 analyze the influence of the 
relative size of the target to the acquiring insurer and thereby try to derive 
an optimal relative size of an M&A transaction. While the two related studies by 
Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) base their measure on the relative equity value 
of the two firms, Akhigbe and Madura (2001) set the relative size of the target 
(measured by its market capitalization) in proportion to the size of the industry 
median size. Instead of using the size of the target, Floreani and Rigamonti 
(2001), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009) apply a different measure 
that indicates the relative importance of the deal: transaction volume divided by 
market value of the acquiring firm, which gives us the relative transaction 
value.313 In contrast, Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) only include a dummy 
variable that allows them to differentiate between insurance agencies/brokers 
and larger insurance companies.  
 
In general, the larger the target relative to the acquirer, the greater the effect of 
the M&A transaction on the acquiring firm’s valuation314 and vice versa.315 
Moreover, it is argued that large targets are more difficult to integrate, but at the 
same time, a successful integration will most likely lead to substantial value 
gains. Proponents of this view point out that even though a successful 
integration of a large target might lead to substantial value gains,316 its 
                                            
 
312 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Xie (2005), 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), Schertzinger (2008), Cummins and Xie (2009), and 
Staikouras (2009), 
313 See, e.g., Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 12) and Schertzinger (2008, p. 88). 
314 See, e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991, p. 324), Jarrell and Poulsen (1994, p. 292), 
Sawjer Jr. and Shrieves (1994, p. 45), and Sirower (1997, p. 134). The former authors state 
that “the gain will be more noticeable if the target is large in relation to the bidder” (Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling, 1991, p. 324). 
315 In contrast, the lower the relative size of the target to the acquirer, the lower the expected 
impact of the transaction on the acquiring firm’s stock price. In an extreme case, the relative 
size of the target would be so small that its acquisition would not have any wealth effect on the 
acquirer (see, e.g., Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1988, p. 38; Eckardt, 1999, p. 112). 
316 For example, Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2007, p. 6) state that “takeovers of 
relatively large targets are more likely to achieve sizeable operating and financial synergies 
and economies of scale than small acquisitions, therefore leading to stronger post-acquisition 
operating performance.” 
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integration becomes more difficult the bigger the size of the target,317 since the 
size acts as an indicator of a firm’s complexity. 
 
Although the relative size variable fails to exhibit any significance in four out of 
seven short-term event studies (Cummins & Xie, 2005; Akhigbe & Madura, 
2006; Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 2006; Schertzinger, 2008), all these non-
significant estimates have a uniformly positive sign. Furthermore, in the 
remaining three studies (Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Staikouras, 2009; 
Cummins & Xie, 2009) a positive and statistically significant short-term 
relationship is observed, independently from the sample region.318 The 
relationship between relative deal size and post-M&A performance over a long 
time horizon is also positive, however, statistical insignificant. In conclusion, 
short-term abnormal returns for acquiring insurance firms are strongly positively 
correlated with the relative size of the deal, which indicates that wealth increase 
through an M&A transaction is higher the greater the relative importance of the 
deal.  
 
Similar to the properties of acquirers, certain studies might distinguish between 
targets on the basis of their pre-merger performance. In the reviewed sample 
of capital market studies, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) investigate whether 
acquisitions of good performing targets or poor performing targets create more 
shareholder value for the acquiring insurance firm. In particular, their paper 
focuses on mergers of either financially sound targets or distressed insurance 
targets. The authors find that the difference in one-year post-merger 
performance of acquirers of financially sound targets and acquirers of 
distressed targets is statistically insignificant in most of their models used. 
However, in all three models tested, acquirers buying financially sound 
                                            
 
317 For example, Clark and Ofek (1994) hypothesize that potential difficulties that result from 
managing a large combined operation may outweigh the operating and financial synergies of 
such an M&A deal and hence result in a deterioration of operating performance, as cited by 
Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2007, p. 6).  
In addition, Berger and Ofek (1995, p. 55), as well as Lamont and Polk (2001, p. 1718), present 
arguments for the existence of the conglomerate discount (e.g., over investments, inefficient 
cross-subsidization, and market valuation problems). 
318 In addition, this positive short-term market reaction is confirmed by the two event studies of 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003), as well as Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2007), in which 
the insurance industry is analyzed as one of many others. 
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insurance companies experience higher medium-term CARs as compared to 
acquirers of distressed insurers. Accounting studies dealing with this topic give 
an additional insight into the influence of profitability on the probability of being 
an acquisition target in insurance transactions. The first group of studies, 
consisting of works by Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998), Cummins, 
Tennyson, and Weiss (1998), and Cummins and Xie (2009), indicate a positive 
correlation of targets’ pre-M&A efficiency and the probability of being a target 
firm. According to their findings, more efficient insurers—and hence most likely 
also better performing firms—might be preferred because of their ability to 
generate higher synergies when integrated into the acquiring firm’s 
operations.319 Findings from a second group of accounting studies320 do not 
confirm these results because these studies find that less efficient and 
underperforming insurance companies are significantly more likely to become 
acquisition targets. It is argued by these authors that vulnerable and inefficient 
insurance targets offer a remarkable opportunity to considerably improve a 
target firm’s efficiency. 
 
Finally, the direction of the relationship between a target’s pre-merger 
performance and an acquirer’s post-merger success cannot be asserted 
unequivocally; however, the capital market study by BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) 
provides some evidence that insurance companies acquiring financially sound 
targets outperform acquirers of distressed targets. 
 
Schertzinger (2008) examines the relationship between M&A performance and 
targets’ line of business by separating transactions into “P&C,” “life,” “re,” 
“agents/brokers,” and others.321 In the period 1990–2005, acquisitions of life 
insurance companies are found to be more value enhancing than acquisitions of 
                                            
 
319 See, e.g., Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998, p. 328) and Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 
149). 
320 Cummins and Weiss (2000) as well as Cummins and Xie (2008). 
321 Also, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) form subsamples where acquirer and target are both life 
insurance companies, both reinsurance companies, and a third subsample in which all other 
transactions are included. However, since the authors primarily test the conglomeration versus 
the strategic focus hypothesis, their study is not listed here. 
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non-life companies both on a short-term and long-term horizon.322 This result is 
consistent with Floreani and Rigamonti’s (2001) findings that focusing deals 
involving pure life insurance companies result in higher abnormal returns than 
diversifying non-life deals.323 
 
In their US-focused studies, Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and Cummins and Xie 
(2009) control for target ownership by differentiating between publicly traded 
and privately held targets. Both studies come to the conclusion that the 
acquisition of a privately held US insurance company is more favorable than the 
acquisition of a publicly traded US target. More precisely, Cummins and Xie 
(2009) find that private ownership is significant and positively related to 
acquirers’ performance, whereas the cross-sectional regression analysis of 
Akhigbe and Madura (2001) yield a significant negative coefficient for the 
acquisition of a publicly traded insurance target. Akhigbe and Madura (2001, p. 
496) explain their results by highlighting that privately held targets are more 
easily to acquire at lower prices because their shares are not continuously 
valued by the capital markets.  
 
In summary, previous capital market research undoubtedly documents 
favorable valuation effects for acquirers of privately held insurance targets upon 
the announcement of M&A transactions.324  
3.8.4 Characteristics of Transaction Structuring and Management 
Features of the transaction structuring and management phase can be divided 
into factors related to the pre-transaction phase, to the transaction phase, and 
to the post-transaction phase. As a first step of the transaction process, the 
transaction strategy, that is, the strategic direction, has to be chosen by the 
acquiring insurance firm. Geographic location and industry relatedness appear 
                                            
 
322 While positive abnormal returns of life targets are significant in the long run, short-term 
abnormal returns are statistically not significant. 
323 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) detect that “[s]hareholders of reinsurance companies gain 
most from merger activity”, while “[a]bnormal returns for mergers of life insurance partners are 
also significantly positive” (p. 10). 
324 Even though both studies that investigate the effects of target ownership on an acquiring 
firm’s performance employ a US-only sample.  
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to be the two most important factors in determining the success of an M&A 
transaction. This conjecture is supported by the fact that a large number of 
academic studies include variables for the geographic area and the industry 
relatedness of the merging partners in their models or even place this strategic 
direction dimension at the center of their analyses. Also, in our sample of 
reviewed studies, geographic and industry diversification versus geographic and 
industry focus have also been the most commonly analyzed cross-sections, 
which both have been included in the empirical studies of Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), Cummins and Xie (2005), 
Boubakri, Dionne ,and Triki (2006), and Schertzinger (2008).325 In addition, 
Staikouras (2009) only examines the influence of industry relatedness on M&A 
success, while Elango (2006) restricts his empirical analysis to investigating 
solely the geographical dimension.  
In general, it is argued that an expansion into a new field, on the one hand, will 
offer considerable opportunities for the respective firm to defend and even 
enhance its competitive position, but on the other hand, acquiring a company in 
a different market and/or a different business segment will ultimately increase 
the degree of unfamiliarity and risk.326  
 
Looking at the geographical dimension, transactions can be divided into 
geographically focusing (or domestic) deals, involving an acquirer and a target 
from the same country, and geographically diversifying (or cross-border) deals, 
which involve an acquiring firm and a target from different countries.327 Each of 
the two main geographical directions has its advantages and limitations 
simultaneously. For example, Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2007, p. 6) 
                                            
 
325 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) and Cummins and Weiss (2004) analyze geographic and 
industry focus in two univariate cross-sections; Cummins and Xie (2005) investigate 
geographic and industry focus in their multi- and univariate analyses; Boubakri, Dionne, and 
Triki (2006) examine geographic and industry focus in their multivariate analysis; and 
Schertzinger (2008) evaluates geographic and industry focus through cross-sectional 
analyses. Furthermore, various efficiency studies test the impact of the strategic direction on 
firms’ performance: Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) include both variables for geographic area 
and industry relatedness in their multi- and univariate analyses; Fields, Fraser, and Kolari 
(2005) include a geographic diversification measure in their univariate comparison; and Fields, 
Fraser, and Kolari (2007) conduct a multi- and univariate analyses to investigate the 
geographic dimension. 
326 E.g., Beatty (1999, p. 3, p. 5). 
327 E.g., Spiss (2008, p. 19). 
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enumerate multiple arguments given by previous authors why cross-border 
deals should be value enhancing for the involved firms. These arguments range 
from advantages resulting from imperfections in international capital, factor, and 
product markets (Hymer, 1976), and from geographic diversification (Erez-Rein, 
Erez & Maital, 2004; Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2008) to strategic considerations, 
such as expanding the business into new and lucrative markets (Hitt, Ireland & 
Hoskisson, 2003; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007; Focarelli & 
Pozzolo, 2008).328 However, at the same time, acquiring firms face additional 
risk and numerous significant challenges when conducting these complex 
overseas M&A transactions. Besides the already formidable task of integrating 
the target into the acquiring company’s operations, an acquisition of a foreign 
company may provoke additional difficulties resulting from regulatory, political, 
cultural, and managerial differences between the two companies.329 These 
complex issues increase the likelihood of M&A failure and might possibly offset 
the benefits of international expansion.330 Concentrating on the findings of the 
reviewed capital market studies, the results show a clear pattern that can be 
identified by differentiating between European mergers and US ones.  
 
While the short-term influence of geographically focusing mergers in the EU on 
acquirers’ performance is significantly negative, as found by Cummins and Xie 
(2004) and Schertzinger (2008) in their investigations on M&A transactions in 
the European insurance market, geographically diversifying mergers in the EU 
are associated with a significant positive short-term market reaction.331 For 
example, the short-term analysis of Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) indicates 
that European diversifying (cross-border) transactions created substantial value 
for acquiring insurance firms’ shareholders, as their study finds a positive short-
term abnormal return of 4.23% in (-20;+2), which is statistically significant at the 
                                            
 
328 For further advantages and opportunities of cross-border M&A, see for example, Erez-Rein, 
Erez, and Maital (2004, p. 20) and Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2007, p. 6). 
329 E.g., Erez-Rein, Erez, and Maital (2004, p. 21), Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2007, 
p. 6), and Spiss (2008, p. 21). 
330 E.g., Schoenberg (1999, p. 294) and Spiss (2008, p. 21). 
331 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001): EU domestic deals insignificantly negative abnormal return of 
-0.21% in (-20;+2), EU international deals significant positive abnormal return of 4.23% in (-
20;+2); Cummins and Weiss (2004): Focusing deals are negative (e.g., mean CAAR of -0.40% 
in (0;+1) significant at 1% level), and diversifying value is neutral; Schertzinger (2008): 
Focusing transactions are negative, and cross-border deals experience highest CERs. 
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10% level. Moreover, Cummins and Weiss (2004) show that geographically 
focusing (within-border) deals led to significant value losses for acquirers.332 In 
contrast, in the US insurance market, a positive and statistical significant short-
term relationship between geographical focus and post-M&A performance is 
found by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), whereas US insurance firms who 
diversify geographically face abnormal decreases in stock prices.333 This initial 
negative stock price reaction to US transactions also seems to be an unbiased 
estimate of the long-term valuation effect, inasmuch as Boubakri, Dionne, and 
Triki (2006) also detect small negative long-run performance effects for US 
insurance firms that diversify geographically. 
 
Varying M&A outcomes might not only result from differences in the 
geographical dimension of the transaction but might also vary depending on the 
degree of business overlap between acquirer and target. According to the 
industry relatedness of the target to the acquiring insurance firm, M&A 
transactions are most commonly divided into focusing (or related) transactions 
and diversifying (or unrelated) transactions. The latter group comprises deals in 
which two (or more) companies merge or affiliate that do not operate in the 
same industry segment.334 Focused transactions, on the contrary, describe 
M&A deals in which the acquirer and the target firm both operate in the same 
industry segment. These related transactions are expected to generate 
substantially higher synergistic gains as compared to unrelated ones because 
of the higher degree of business overlap.335 Supplementary to synergistic 
effects, numerous other value drivers of related M&A, such as greater expertise 
in managing the target company (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Dickie, Michel, & 
                                            
 
332 Acquirers’ mean and weighted CAAR for cross-border transactions are 0.07% and 0.10%, 
respectively, compared to -0.44% and -0.27% for within-border transactions in (-1;+1) at the 
10% level. 
333 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001): Within US deals significant positive with an abnormal return 
of 5.87% in (-20;+2); Cummins and Xie (2005): Geographically focusing acquisitions have a 
significant positive abnormal return of 4.25% in (-1;+1), diversifying neutral ones have a CAR 
of 0.43% for the (-1;+1) window; Elango (2006): US insurance acquirers face statistically 
insignificant negative CARs when diversifying geographically; the higher the differences 
between target’s and acquirer’s country factors, such as wealth of the countries, amount of 
bilateral trade between the two countries, extent of potential liabilities of foreignness, and 
economies of scope.  
334 See, e.g., Eckardt (1999) and Spiss (2008). 
335 E.g., Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990, p. 4) and Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997, p. 51). 
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Shaked, 1987; Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990; Martin & McConnell, 1991; Healy, 
Palepu, & Ruback, 1997) and an increase in market share that will most likely 
lead to higher profits (KPMG, 2001; Gosh, 2004), have been identified by the 
extant literature.336 In contrast, advantages of unrelated transactions (and, in 
many cases, simultaneously disadvantages of related transactions) range from 
risk-reduction benefits of diversification to the creation of an internal capital 
market that potentially enables cross-subsidization within the firms, as stated by 
Sudarsanam (2010, p. 184). Even though these aforementioned benefits of 
unrelated M&A will have a positive effect on shareholders wealth, former 
studies on this relationship also revealed a broad variety of disadvantages, 
including an increase in agency problems caused by diversification (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1989; Sudarsanam, 2010) and non-value maximizing activities of 
managers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989; Eckardt, 1999; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000), 
which may probably outweigh the potential synergies of diversification. Due to 
these disadvantages of unrelated transactions and the bulk of advantages of 
related M&A, previous studies predominantly expect related transactions to 
result in more favorable outcomes.337 Findings from recent empirical studies on 
the financial services industries have been mixed, depending on the time 
horizon and the particular industry analyzed. For bank-insurance combinations, 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) expect diversification from banks into the 
insurance business to have a positive valuation effect, whereas Lelyveld and 
Knot (2009) have found firm-specific conglomerate discounts for large bank-
insurance conglomerates.  
 
However, empirical evidence from the insurance industry indicates significant 
shareholder value creation for focus-enhancing insurance transactions.338 In 
more detail, the majority of the capital market studies in our sample suggest that 
mergers of similar businesses on average seem more profitable than mergers in 
                                            
 
336 For a detailed overview on the various sources of value creation in focusing transactions, 
please refer to the work of Sudarsanam (2010), Spiss (2008), and the references therein. 
337 E.g., Lubatkin (1983), Bamberger (1994), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997), Eckardt 
(1999), and Heron and Lie (2002). 
338 E.g., Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), and Cummins and Xie 
(2005). Even though Schertzinger (2008) detects a negative announcement effect for industry-
focusing insurance transactions, his long-term results provide strong support for a positive 
long-term wealth effect of these transactions. 
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which acquirer and target engage in different businesses.339 Short-term event 
studies conducted by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss 
(2004), Cummins and Xie (2005), and Schertzinger (2008) all find business 
focus-enhancing transactions to have a positive impact on acquirers’ and 
combined entities’ performance. Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) find insurance 
transactions between life insurers and reinsurers to result in significant positive 
market reactions of 3.13% and 4.66%, respectively. In the paper by Cummins 
and Xie (2005), business-focusing transactions are associated with a significant 
positive acquirer CAR of 1.21% and a positive CER of 5.01% for the (-1;+1) 
window. Additionally, business-diversifying transactions are found to be value 
neutral because of a statistically insignificant abnormal return of 0.37% for the (-
1;+1) event window (Cummins & Xie, 2005). Schertzinger (2008) not only 
presents significant positive short-term CARs and CERs for within-industry M&A 
[e.g., mean acquirer CAR of 2.10% in (-10;+10) significant at the 10% level] but 
also significant negative short-term CARs and CERs for cross-industry 
transactions [e.g., mean acquirer CAR of -2.50% in (-2;+2) significant at the 1% 
level]. In addition to this favorable short-term market reaction of industry-
focusing insurance M&A, Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) confirm the 
positive relationship between within-industry transactions and acquirers’ post-
M&A performance on a long-term horizon.340 
 
To conclude, in contrast to many other industries (e.g., banking), focus-
enhancing M&A transactions in the insurance industry are found to generate 
significantly higher wealth gains than business-diversifying M&A. This 
insurance-specific finding of positive wealth effects in business-focusing 
transactions is explained by the ability of insurance companies to diversify most 
of their risks (e.g., actuarial risks) even when acquiring other insurance players 
that operate in the same business segment.341 Accordingly, insurance 
                                            
 
339 In contrast, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2007), who 
investigate the valuation effects of banks and not insurers, observe significantly positive CARs 
for industry-diversifying transactions of banks into insurance companies. 
340 However, Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2001) fail to provide statistical evidence for this 
positive long-term relationship. 
341 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 13). See also the paper by Babbel and Santomero (1997). 
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companies do not ultimately have to diversify their business operations (e.g., 
products or services) in order to spread their business risks.342  
  
Looking not only independently at the geographic and industry dimension, but 
instead at the firms’ combined product-market mix, Cummins and Xie (2005) 
assess full-focusing US acquirers to generate the highest abnormal return of 
6.27% for the (-1;+1) short-term event window (whereas, geographically 
diversifying/business-focusing transactions experience a CAR of 0.44%, 
geographically focusing/business-diversifying transactions yield a CAR of 
0.22%, and geographically diversifying/business-diversifying transactions 
generate a CAR of 0.40%). In a European context, however, Schertzinger does 
not find a positive short-term market reaction for European full-focusing 
insurance transactions. Instead, these deals lead to insignificant negative 
abnormal returns for acquiring European insurance companies. In contrast, the 
author detects positive, yet also non-significant, short-term abnormal returns for 
European insurance companies diversifying their business and simultaneously 
expanding their geographical presence. Besides this insignificant positive short-
term market reaction for European insurance acquirers pursuing a full 
diversification strategy, Schertzinger (2008) also finds insignificant positive long-
term value creation for these kinds of M&A deals. Over the long horizon of three 
years following the M&A transactions, even fully focusing European insurance 
acquirers created insignificant value, yet significantly less than their fully 
diversifying counterparts.343  
 
Furthermore, the author finds patterns indicating that acquirers who pursue an 
“all-or-nothing” strategy (either full focus or full diversification) perform 
significantly better in the long run as compared to acquirers pursuing other 
strategies. Also, Berger et al. (2000) discover a long-run coexistence of joint 
producers and specialists in the insurance industry. Focusing transactions are 
                                            
 
342 In contrast, banks ultimately have to diversify and expand their business activities into other 
business segments in order to spread and diversify their risks, which predominantly arise from 
changes in interest rates and credit defaults (Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001, p. 13). 
343 Schertzinger (2008) underlines this finding by explicitly stating that “acquirers pursuing a full 
diversification strategy create significantly more value than fully focusing acquirers” (p. 168). 
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beneficial for some types of insurance companies, while diversifying ones are 
the preferable approach for others, depending on firm-specific variables.344  
 
In summary, the empirical US literature in our sample indicates that the level of 
relatedness between US bidder and target firms (which is defined in terms of 
product-market similarity) is positively correlated with M&A success. The 
reviewed studies provide evidence for the “diversification discount” 
phenomenon in the US insurance industry by suggesting that focus-enhancing 
transactions in the US on average appear to be more profitable than diversifying 
ones. US Insurers that increase their geographical and industry focus generally 
dominate insurance acquirers that pursue a diversification strategy in terms of 
short- and long-run post-acquisition performance. These empirical findings 
suggest that regional market power effects or scale economies are more 
important than benefits from risk diversification or economies of scope in the US 
insurance market.345 In contrast, full diversification strategies in the European 
insurance market increase shareholder value in the in the short and in the long 
run. However, as pointed out by Schertzinger (2008), European insurers 
extensively pursuing a full focus strategy may also enhance value for their 
shareholders in the long term. 
 
In addition, two issues that are related to the identification and selection process 
are studied by the three academic papers of Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009), 
and Elango (2006). While the latter author points out the importance of cultural 
compatibility between acquirer and target firm in influencing the success of 
insurance M&A, the two related studies conducted by Cummins and Xie (2005) 
                                            
 
344 See, e.g., Berger et al. (2000, p. 358), Schmid and Walter (2009, p. 208), and Lelyveld and 
Knot (2009, p. 2316). 
345 Akhigbe and Madura (2001, p. 495), Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 28), and Boubakri, Dionne, 
and Triki (2006, p. 58) provide possible explanations for the predominance of focusing deals 
(standardization in services and products, improvement in economies of scale, superior 
expertise, higher service quality, and cost savings). Lelyveld and Knot (2009, p. 2317) outline 
three characteristics that are able to explain the superiority of focus-enhancing transactions: 
size as a proxy for the complexity of a firm (lower valuation for more complex firms because of 
negative effects of diversification and valuation problems for investors), degree of mixedness 
(difficulties in management and evaluation of complex conglomerates), and risk profile 
(transfer of value from shareholders to debt holders by decreasing the riskiness of the 
company through diversification). 
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and (2009) are the only ones to investigate the impact of acquirers’ ownership 
in targets before the transaction.  
 
Deals in which acquirers and targets have a business relationship before the 
transaction, measured by ownership of acquirers in targets before the 
transaction,346 generally outperform deals in which there is no relationship 
between the two companies.347 In their recent short-term event study, Cummins 
and Xie (2009) confirm this positive correlation for the insurance market. In their 
regression analysis, the authors discover a significant positive coefficient for the 
variable representing pre-M&A ownership in the target. However, in an earlier 
study, the present authors found a small and insignificantly negative regression 
coefficient for same variable.348 
 
The other classification scheme for M&A deals, which is exclusively used in the 
cross-sectional regression analysis by Elango (2006), investigates the possible 
relationship between the cultural compatibility of the involved firms. In 
Elango’s paper, cultural comparability between a US acquirer and an 
international target firm is measured as the extent of potential liabilities of 
foreignness (or abbreviated as LOF)349 faced by the acquiring firm. Based on 
the finding of a significant negative coefficient for the variable “LOF,” the author 
concludes that acquiring insurance companies face significant negative returns 
when conducting acquisitions “in countries which are characterized by greater 
differences in culture, environment, legal systems, and geographic distance” 
(Elango, 2006, p. 402). Consequently, the market rewards cultural comparability 
                                            
 
346 In general, a business relationship between the two parties may manifest itself in several 
different ways, including cooperation, a reinsurance arrangement, or an asset ownership. The 
two reviewed studies by Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) base their analysis on the decision 
criterion whether or not the acquirer partially owns assets of its target before the 
announcement of the transaction (toehold interest), since information on other forms of 
business relationships is not available. 
347 See, e.g., Grossmann and Hart (1980), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), and Franks and Harris (1989). 
348 Cummins and Xie (2005). 
349 “Liabilities of foreignness” is a term introduced by Zaheer (1995) that captures the additional 
costs that firms face when operating abroad. These additional costs primarily arise “from the 
unfamiliarity of the environment, from cultural, political, and economic differences, and from 
the need for coordination across geographic distance” (Zaheer, 1995, p. 341). 
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between the merging partners with a positive announcement return for the 
acquirer. 
 
According to the studies in our sample, some transaction characteristics could 
be responsible for the market’s reaction to the transaction. Consequently, some 
of the studies reviewed control for certain deal characteristics, namely mode of 
acquisition, method of payment, and percentage of shares acquired. The mode 
of acquisition is examined by the long-term study of Boubakri, Dionne, and 
Triki (2006). The authors investigate whether tender offers or mergers result in 
a more favorable valuation effect for acquiring firms’ shareholders. Mergers 
typically are friendly, negotiated deals that are conducted with the full 
cooperation of the target firm’s management. In contrast, tender offers are 
mostly hostile and directly addressed to target firm shareholders (via public 
offer), bypassing a target firm’s management.350 As intuitively argued in the 
extant M&A literature, acquiring managers in friendly mergers have better 
access to internal company data, which reduces the information asymmetry, 
enhances the quality of the due diligence process, and reduces the acquirer’s 
uncertainty in the valuation of a target’s assets.351 Besides, Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback (1997) add that “friendly takeovers are less likely to experience 
disrupted operations after the takeover that may destroy the target firm's 
intangible assets” (p. 45). In contrast, unfriendly tender offers are expected to 
increase acquirer value by replacing inefficient management of the target firm 
and reducing agency costs (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1997, p. 45). In addition 
to that, acquirers in hostile takeovers (which regularly are more expensive for 
the bidding firm) indicate their confidence in being able to generate substantial 
value gains from these M&A deals (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Burkart & Panunzi, 
2006; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007). Some empirical evidence on 
this relationship in the insurance industry is provided by Boubakri, Dionne, and 
Triki (2006). The authors consider tender offers to be more profitable than 
                                            
 
350 E.g. Morck and Shleifer (1988, p. 101), Loughran and Vijh (1997, p. 1767), Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987, p. 147), Boeckli (2003, p. 25), and Weston, Chung, and Hoag (2007, p. 534 
and p. 747). 
351 Sudarsanam (2010, p. 420), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997, p. 45) and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003, p. 305). 
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mergers since they detect higher long-term returns for tender offers than for 
friendly mergers. 
 
The only capital market studies that consider the relationship between the 
percentage of shares acquired and firms’ post-merger financial performance 
are the ones conducted by Cummins and Weiss (2004) and Boubakri, Dionne, 
and Triki (2006). In theory, it is argued that a positive relationship, on the one 
hand, is expected since obtaining control of the target enables the acquiring 
company to gain more flexibility in imposing its way of doing business and to 
reduce the problems resulting from differing understandings about the future 
strategic direction of the combined company.352 On the other hand, a negative 
influence of the percentage acquired on the M&A success is also conceivable, 
such that the price paid for the ownership stake in the target firm outweighs 
their benefits, as illustrated by Bamberger (1994, p. 294). However, the 
combined empirical evidence from the two studies in our sample indicates that 
the variable percentage of shares acquired has no explanatory power of the 
acquirers’ returns in the insurance industry. Cummins and Weiss (2004) receive 
identical results for M&A deals involving the acquisition of a value stake and 
deals involving a change in control, and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) also 
detect an insignificant yet small positive relationship. 
 
Last but not least, the effect of the payment method on abnormal stock returns 
around the announcement date is analyzed by the short-term event studies by 
Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamoti (2001), and Cummins and 
Xie (2005, 2009). Previous M&A literature on this issue outlines that the 
decision on the specific form of the payment in M&A deals (e.g., payment 
entirely in stocks, in cash, or in a mix of cash and stocks) is always a trade-off 
between various factors and implications (e.g., size of the M&A transaction, the 
acquirer’s pre-merger participation in the target, the acquirer’s pre-merger stock 
market valuation, the acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, speed 
and extent of the planned integration process, and regulatory obligations).353 In 
                                            
 
352 E.g., Bamberger (1994) and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 13). 
353 For additional information on these influencing factors and their particular influence on the 
method of payment in M&A, see, for example, Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 187), Sudarsanam 
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addition to these influencing factors, the method of payment might also be a 
result of the negotiation process between the acquirer and the target and hence 
might not necessarily be fully in the hands of the acquiring firm.  
 
In all four short-term event studies tested, the method of payment fails to exhibit 
any significance.354 Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and Floreani and Rigamonti 
(2001) report statistically non-significant higher returns at the announcement for 
transactions financed exclusively with stocks than for deals financed with cash 
or with a mix of cash and stocks. However, these small positive abnormal 
returns of stock financed transactions might also be attributable to a size effect 
rather than the method of payment. Predominantly smaller deals are financed 
with cash, whereas stock payment is far more prevalent in deals with a larger 
relative size of the target.355 Those are the deals that have a distinctive positive 
impact on acquirers’ performance. By comparison, even though Cummins and 
Xie (2005, 2009) also find acquirers’ abnormal returns to be unrelated to the 
form of payment, their statistically insignificant results for cash as a means of 
payment are positive in nature. Consequently, the method of payment does not 
seem to have a significant impact on the performance of acquiring insurance 
firms in general. 
3.8.5 Influences of the Economic Environment 
Almost all the reviewed academic papers do not include any exogenous factors 
in their analyses. The timing of a transaction, with respect to the phase in the 
M&A cycle, is however exclusively investigated in the work of Schertzinger 
(2008).356 The author differentiates between bottom, upswing, peak, and 
                                                                                                                                
 
(2010, p. 482), and Spiss (2008, p. 14). Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 7) present a 
theoretical motivation for the relevance of the method of payment, while Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Travlos (1987), Martin (1996), and Houston and Ryngaert (1997) conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of the method of payment on abnormal returns. 
354 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), and Cummins and Xie (2005, 
2009).  
355 For a proof of this statement, see for example, the summary statistic of our empirical study 
(Table 26 in section 4.3.10).  
356 The Boston Consulting Group (2003, 2009a) studies compare the success of strong- and 
weak-economy transactions to assess the impact of economic cycles. 
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downturn phases to test the “bandwagon effect,”357 which might lead to the 
overpayment by acquiring companies in “hot” M&A markets.358 While 
transactions conducted during the bottom phase of the M&A cycle experienced, 
on average, a negative CER of -3.10% in the estimation period from five days 
prior to five days after the announcement (significant at the 5% level), 
Schertzinger (2008) identifies overall short-term positive valuation effects for 
deals conducted during the upswing [insignificant positive CER of 5.99% in (-
5;+5)], peak [insignificant positive CER of 0.97% in (-5;+5)], and downturn 
phase [CER of 3.47% in (-5;+5) significant at 1% level] of the M&A cycle. 
Moreover, transactions conducted during the latter three phases (upswing, 
peak, and downturn) also generate significantly higher short-term returns for the 
acquiring insurance companies compared to transactions in the bottom phase. 
Acquirer CARs of transactions during the bottom phase of the M&A cycle are 
mostly significantly negative, with the highest significant value being -3.33% [in 
(-5;+5) at the 5% level], whereas CARs for acquirers that announced an M&A 
transaction during the peak phase are found to be insignificantly positive in 
most of the tested short-term event windows, with a maximum 0.89% in the 
event period (-10;+10). Schertzinger (2008) further reveals that latter deals 
created significant value for acquiring firm shareholders (total value creation of 
$17 billion), while bottom phase M&A resulted in a total value destruction of $80 
billion. Consequently, based on the short-term results, Schertzinger does not 
find empirical support for a “bandwagon effect” in the European insurance M&A 
market in the period from 1990 to 2005. On the contrary, insurance firms that 
engage in M&A activity in the strong phases of the M&A cycle are rewarded by 
investors with higher short-term valuations. 
                                            
 
357 Many firms enter a rising acquisition wave motivated by previous merger activities of other 
firms or by pressure from investors rather than fully undertaking a comprehensive analysis of 
strategic opportunities (see, e.g., McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008, p. 116). 
358 Literature in the field of IPOs regularly investigates the effect of the economic cycle on the 
performance of corporate IPOs (e.g., Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh, 2006; Yung, Colak, & Wang, 
2008; Boulton, 2010). In these studies, the terms hot market and cold market are understood 
in terms of IPO activity. In general, “hot” (“cold”) IPO periods can be defined as “those where 
the number of firms in the portfolio is greater (lower) than the median” (Gregory & Matatko, 
2005, p. 28). Accordingly, these “hot” (“cold”) periods of high (low) IPO volume can only be 
defined ex post (e.g., Gregory & Matatko, 2005, p. 12). Schertzinger (2008), among others, 
adopts this term and refers to the level M&A undertaken. If the M&A activity is above (below) 
the sample median, the respective period is referred to as “hot” (“cold”).  
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By comparison, analyzing also the long-term effects of insurance M&A, 
Schertzinger’s study produced inconclusive results. On the one hand, results 
drawn from a calendar-time analysis provide further evidence for the non-
existence of the “bandwagon effect,” as insurance acquirers in his sample 
achieve highest, yet insignificant CTARs in the strong phases of the M&A cycle, 
that is, in the upswing and peak phase. Long-term CTARs to acquiring insurers 
that carry out M&A deals during the downturn or bottom phase suffer small 
negative CTARs. Furthermore, transactions conducted during the upswing (or 
peak) of the M&A cycle yield significantly (or insignificantly) higher acquirer 
CTARs in the three-year period following the announcement. On the other 
hand, Schertzinger draws an opposing conclusion from an event analysis using 
BHARs. In this case, long-term value creation is only detected for deals 
conducted during the bottom (total value creation of $51.2 bn) and downturn 
phase (total value creation of $56.8 bn) of the M&A cycle,359 while BHARs 
during the market upswing (-15.34% after one year) and peak (-13.45% after 
two years) are significantly negative at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.360 
These results, on the other hand, give weak support for the “bandwagon effect”. 
Schertzinger’s (2008) findings of positive long-run returns to acquirers 
conducting deals in the downturn phase of the M&A cycle and negative long-run 
returns of acquirers in upswing transactions are in line with results reported by 
The Boston Consulting Group. The Boston Consulting Group (2003, 2009a) 
studies compare the success of strong- and weak-economy361 transactions to 
assess the impact of economic cycles. In their study, they also come to the 
                                            
 
359 Positive, yet insignificant, cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring insurers are, however, 
only detected for downturn mergers (insignificant positive acquirer CAR of 6.23% after three 
years following the M&A announcement). In contrast, M&A transactions in the bottom phase of 
the M&A cycle, though increasing total shareholder value, exhibit insignificant negative 
acquirer returns on average. Even though negative, returns to acquirers carrying out 
transactions in the bottom phase are still significantly higher than returns to acquirers 
conducting transactions in the upswing phase. 
360 In addition to these negative long-run BHARs, value destruction of $17.8 billion in 
transactions during the upswing phase of the M&A cycle and $69.6 billion value destruction in 
transactions in the M&A peak are observed. Note that these significant results are based on 
the descriptive analysis. In addition, Schertzinger (2008) performs a multivariate regression 
model that yields comparable results (even though not statistically significant in the long term).   
361 Depending on whether GDP growth is above or below the long-term average growth of 3.0%. 
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conclusion that deals done during economic downturns362 have a higher 
probability of success, produce higher long-run returns (on average 14.5% 
higher as compared to deals done during phases of strong economic growth 
over a two-year post-M&A period), and most importantly these deals are more 
likely to create long-term value (mainly through operational improvement and 
industry consolidation) than deals conducted during upswings. Furthermore, 
The Boston Consulting Group (2009a) outlines that downturn acquisitions 
usually suffer an adverse market reaction shortly after the announcement of the 
transaction.  
 
Even though the influence of the timing of transactions seems to depend on the 
time horizon chosen and the long-term performance measure employed, the 
findings overall suggest that M&A transactions conducted in the upswing and 
peak phase of the M&A cycle experience a more favorable short-term market 
reaction than transactions during the downturn and/or bottom phase. 
Transactions in the two latter phases (downturn and bottom), however, might 
lead to higher shareholder wealth in the long run. 
3.8.6 Comparison of Short-Term and Medium- and Long-Term 
Results 
As outlined in the previous sections, the various factors influence the success 
of an insurance transaction in manifold ways, primarily depending on the time 
horizon and the geographic region of the sample. A comparison of the short-
term and medium- and long-term performance results on the several 
determinants of M&A success shall finally help to shed light on the reasons for 
the conflicting results of previous insurance M&A literature. Accordingly, in 
Figure 9, the available empirical findings are classified on the basis of their 
time horizon and valuation effect. 
 
                                            
 
362 The Boston Consulting Group (2003) defines an economic downturn as a period of below-
average GDP growth. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of the influence of determinants of success of insurance 
M&A depending on time horizon363 
 
As it can be seen from the figure above, while a specific factor might result in a 
significant negative abnormal stock market reaction around the time of M&A 
announcement, this factor could simultaneously help to increase shareholder 
wealth in the long term (e.g., transactions conducted by US insurance acquirers 
with considerable M&A experience or by fast-growing acquirers). Similarly, 
other factors might positively influence the stock market price after the 
announcement of the transaction, but with time, these same factors may lead to 
value destruction in the long run (e.g., M&A transactions conducted in the 
                                            
 
363 Source: Schertzinger (2008, p. 174), own research. 
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upswing and peak phase of the M&A cycle). As result, the hypothesis of a 
correlation between the initial stock market response to a deal announcement 
and the long-term success of the combined entity has to be rejected for these 
specific influencing factors.  
3.8.7 Summary of the Evidence on the Determinants of M&A in the 
Insurance Industry 
Former insurance M&A research has undoubtedly made some considerable 
contributions to the knowledge of the effects of insurance transactions on the 
involved firms’ financial performance. However, the combined findings of 
previous capital market research on the performance effects of insurance M&A 
also indicate the need for additional research in this particular area. Even 
though the overall wealth effect of these transactions tends to be positive on 
average (especially in US transactions), it is highly determined by several 
factors that influence post-M&A performance. As outlined above, these various 
factors comprise not only features of the acquiring and target firm but also 
factors of the transaction process and influences of the economic environment. 
The expected directional influence of each factor upon the M&A success may 
differ depending primarily on the specific strategic direction (i.e., geographic 
area and industry relatedness), the time horizon, and geographic region and is 
hence only partly generalizable across various types of M&A transactions. 
Managers and investors should be well aware of these situation-specific 
obstacles and time interdependencies. Investors could use the information 
derived from the pattern in Figure 9 to improve their long-term investment 
strategy and optimize their investment portfolio. Managers should primarily 
concentrate on factors that improve long-term value of the company instead of 
focusing exclusively on short-term gains. For the sake of the company and its 
shareholders, it is crucial only to undertake acquisitions that contribute to firms’ 
long-term financial success and thereby create sustainable long-term value. 
Further on, the results may support management in improving its capital market 
communication. 
 
Overall, a significant short-term relationship between acquiring insurers’ 
financial performance and the following determinants is found in the extant 
insurance literature: 
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(i) Significant positive short-term effect: 
• Global transactions by strong performing acquirers  
• Non-life insurance acquirers in the US 
• M&A of relatively large targets 
• M&A of privately held targets 
• Geographically diversifying European M&A deals 
• Geographically focusing US transactions 
• Industry-focusing M&A deals 
• Transactions by acquirers with pre-M&A participation in the target 
• Deals with a high degree of cultural compatibility between M&A partners 
• M&A conducted during the upswing phase of the M&A cycle 
• Transactions during the peak of the M&A cycle 
 (ii) Significant negative short-term effect: 
• Acquisitions by large insurance acquirers 
• M&A by European insurance acquirers with medium M&A experience 
• M&A deals conducted by US acquirers with extensive M&A experience 
• Transactions conducted by strong performing US acquirers 
• M&A transactions of public targets 
• Geographically focusing deals in Europe 
• Geographically diversifying M&A transactions by US acquirers 
• Industry-diversifying M&A 
• Transactions during the bottom phase of the M&A cycle  
 
In the long run, the following determinants are found to have a significant wealth 
impact on acquiring firms’ stock market value: 
(i) Significant positive long-term effect: 
• M&A conducted by US acquirers with extensive M&A experience 
• M&A transactions by fast-growing acquirers 
• Transactions by insurance acquirers with a high percentage of newly 
nominated board members 
• Acquisitions of life insurance targets 
(ii) Significant negative long-term effect: 
• M&A conducted by European acquirers with medium M&A experience 
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• Deals by acquirers with high percentage of CEO share ownership 
• Transactions of insurers with a high percentage of blockholder 
ownership 
• M&A deals conducted by acquirers with a high board independence 
• Mergers 
 
In summary, based on the evidence of earlier M&A research, it can be said that 
M&A transactions are more likely to create value if insurance companies follow 
these general findings of the influence of the various determinants.  
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4 Evidence from the European Insurance Sector: 
Empirical Analysis of the Success of M&A and its 
Determinants 
4.1 Overview 
We concluded our literature review on prior capital market research on the 
performance effects of insurance M&A by highlighting that these deals on 
average tend to create value not only for shareholders of the target firms but 
also for the combined entity of acquirer and target. Moreover, shareholders of 
acquiring US insurance companies, on average, also benefit from these 
corporate undertakings. However, negative wealth effects for acquiring insurers’ 
shareholders are the common finding in capital market studies analyzing the 
effects of M&A transactions in the European insurance industry. Based on the 
argumentation of Lubatkin (1983), the finding of negative wealth effects for 
shareholders of European insurance acquirers only leads to the following two 
conclusions: Either European insurance M&A transactions do not provide real 
benefits to the acquiring insurance company,364 or else these deals do provide 
real benefits,365 which however, have not been detected by earlier research. We 
                                            
 
364 The author mentions two possible reasons for this: either hubris, i.e., managers make 
mistakes, or empire building, i.e., managers focus on their own utility/wealth maximization 
rather than on a maximization of firm value (see Lubatkin, 1983, p. 221). For further motives 
related to the empire-building theory of Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989), see for 
instance, Albrecht (1994b), Schertzinger (2008), Boesecke (2009), and Cooper and 
Finkelstein (2010). 
365 In previous M&A literature, various benefits of M&A activity, such as financial, managerial, 
and operational synergies stemming from lower capital costs, the replacement of inefficient 
management, and economies of scale or scope, respectively (Weidenbaum & Chilton, 1988; 
Kerler, 1999; Berger, DeYoung, & Udell, 2001; Settnik, 2006; Boesecke, 2009; Farny, 2011; 
Shim, 2011a), market power effects (Berger, DeYoung, & Udell, 2001; Weston, Mitchell, & 
Mulherin, 2004; Boesecke, 2009), tax advantages (Weidenbaum & Chilton, 1988; Weston, 
Mitchell, & Mulherin, 1998; Kerler, 1999), managerial efficiencies (Berger, DeYoung, & Udell, 
2001; Weston, Mitchell, & Mulherin, 2004), and risk and earnings diversification (Cummins & 
Weiss, 2004; Cummins & Xie, 2005, 2008; Cummins et al., 2010), have been regularly pointed 
out. The first and the latter benefits, i.e., synergies and earnings diversification, are of 
particular importance in the insurance business, as pointed out by Settnik (2006) and 
Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998), respectively. Settnik (2006) highlights that the 
realization of synergy potentials is the most prevalent motive for conducting insurance 
transactions and backs up this assertion by citing a statement of AXA Colonia in an annual 
report as well as the results of a management survey conducted in 1999 by Meyer. Moreover, 
Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998) emphasize that M&A activity is an important source of 
earnings diversification in the insurance industry. Instead of repeating their material, we quote: 
“By increasing the breadth of the policyholder pool, losses become more predictable and 
earnings volatility due to underwriting income is reduced. This gives the insurer the opportunity 
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will test Lubatkin’s (1983) proposition in the following section by investigating 
whether insurance transactions in general are able to generate real benefits to 
acquiring firm shareholders (in the form of higher shareholder returns), and if 
so, whether these benefits are offset by additional costs arising from 
inefficiencies and scale diseconomies366 as well as increased complexity and 
coordination needs.367 Besides, there is considerable variation in the outcomes 
of the individual transactions, as some insurance M&A create substantial 
shareholder value, while other transactions result in significant wealth losses. 
As pointed out in the former sections, investigations analyzing the effects of 
insurance M&A, especially in an US context, do not ultimately permit 
conclusions concerning the effects of European insurance deals.  
 
Similarly, the results obtained from analyzing short-term market returns around 
the M&A announcement dates do not need to hold for the wealth effects of 
these transactions in the long run. The same applies for the numerous factors 
that influence M&A performance. For some factors, as for instance the growth 
of acquirers and/or acquiring life insurance companies in the US or Europe, 
recent insurance research produces inconclusive and widely differing results 
depending on the time horizon under consideration and sample characteristics 
(primarily the geographic area of the involved firms), or the extant literature 
even provides no results at all (e.g., the influence of a pre-M&A participation in 
the target in European insurance transactions and/or the influence of the 
method of payment in European insurance deals). Given this unsatisfactory 
state of affairs, previous authors postulate the need for further research on this 
topic, as well as alternative approaches and methods for measuring the 
success of insurance M&A (see, e.g., Schoenberg, 2006, p. 1; Antoniou, 
Arbour, & Zhao, 2011, p. 19). The extant capital market research on the effects 
of insurance M&A, however, has exclusively relied on standard event study 
                                                                                                                                
 
to take on more risky, higher yielding investments, thus increasing revenues for a given level 
of overall risk” (Cummins, Tennyson, & Weiss, 1998, p. 328). 
 366 E.g., Katrishen and Scordis (1998) as well as Schim (2011a, 2011b). The latter author 
mentions cost inefficiencies resulting from integrational costs as well as “operating and 
managerial inefficiencies due to the organizational diseconomies of operating larger 
institutions, aggravated agency problems, and managerial hubris” (Shim, 2011a, p. 80). 
367 For example, increased cost of governance (i.e., monitoring and controlling) in larger and 
more complex firms (Shim, 2011a, p. 80). 
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methodology. In addition, the vast majority of the research has offered short-
term event studies analyzing only the initial market reaction around the 
announcement date of the specific M&A deal instead of focusing on the long-
term stock development. Only the two studies by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki 
(2006) and Schertzinger (2008) focus on the long-term value effects of 
insurance M&A. Moreover, these two studies come to different conclusions 
regarding the overall wealth effects of insurance transactions. While the former 
authors detect an outperformance of 57.3% for acquiring US insurance firms in 
the three-year period after the M&A transaction, Schertzinger (2008) finds that 
European insurance transactions result in significant negative acquirer returns 
one and two years after the deal announcement and an insignificant 
underperformance of -6.57% after three years. To investigate whether or not 
these contradictory long-term results are attributable to differences in the 
geographic location from which the samples were collected368 and whether it is 
possible to draw some general conclusions about the overall wealth effects of 
insurance M&A that are true for all types or at least for specific groups of 
transactions, this academic work performs an empirical capital market analysis 
on the effects of M&A transactions in the European insurance market. As seen 
in the literature review above, it is not only essential to restrict the analysis to 
those transactions where the acquirer is an insurance company, but it is also 
essential to limit the sample to a specific geographic area in order to get 
meaningful results. Based on the contradictory findings of the two long-term 
studies by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) and Schertzinger (2008) 
concerning the overall wealth effect of US and European insurance M&A, 
transactions from a diverse sample that includes business combinations from 
more than one continent or market may not provide much insight into the 
specific wealth effects of these deals and their determinants.369 Consequently, 
the following empirical investigation will focus solely on M&A transactions 
involving European insurance acquirers. 
 
                                            
 
368 Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006): Sample of US acquiring firms; Schertzinger (2008): 
Acquiring firms from EU-25 countries. 
369 The same conclusion is drawn by Boesecke (2009) with regard to M&A transactions in the 
utility industry. 
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Going back to the statement of Corvellec, our objective is to tell the story on the 
performance of insurance M&A transactions from the perspective of the 
acquiring firms’ shareholders. Therefore, we decide to evaluate the effects of 
M&A activities of the major European insurance companies using stock market 
data instead of adopting an accounting method and measure value creation by 
changes in acquiring firms’ market value (see Figure 10 below). Besides being 
widely available and easily accessible, stock market data is an objective 
measure of M&A success. By comparing stock price movements of acquirers to 
movements of the market, related industry portfolios, or benchmark firms, it is 
possible to make inferences about the desirability of these corporate deals. 
 
In contrast to the extant capital market research on insurance M&A, which has 
exclusively used the standard event study procedure to investigate short-term 
and medium- and long-term effects of such insurance combinations, our study 
presents an alternative and fairly new approach that is based on stochastic 
dominance (For more information on the stochastic dominance approach and 
on how this methodology can be applied to measuring the success of insurance 
M&A, see the following sections). It must be noted here, however, that the 
stochastic dominance approach should not fully replace the standard event 
study methodology but rather complete it and offer an alternative approach for 
the evaluation of success of insurance M&A. 
 
Even though acquirers’ short-term capital market reactions shortly after 
announcement of insurance transactions will be analyzed, the main focus of this 
dissertation work is on the long-term wealth effects of these deals. In the long-
term analysis, we examine the stock returns of acquiring insurers for up to three 
years after M&A announcement.  
 
However, the extant literature outlines that the overall wealth effect of insurance 
transactions does not say much about the success on an individual level. It has 
been well documented that certain M&A transactions perform significantly better 
or worse than other deals based on several M&A characteristics. Yet the 
influence of these individual determinants on the overall success of a 
transaction also seems to heavily depend on the time horizon under 
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consideration and the geographic area of the involved firms. Accordingly, the 
other goal of this academic work is to detect the key characteristics of M&A 
success and failure in the European insurance industry. In the following 
sections, we will investigate which determinants positively or negatively 
influence the short-term share price performance of the acquiring firm and 
which factors lead to value creation or destruction in the long run. 
 
Figure 10 shows an overview of the criteria for differentiating the success of 
insurance M&A that are taken into account in this empirical study.  
 
 
Figure 10: Applied criteria for differentiating success of M&A370 
 
All in all, this academic work differs from previous insurance M&A research in 
two important respects: 
First, previous capital market research on the effects of insurance M&A on 
firms’ financial performance primarily concentrates on the short-term effects 
around the date of announcement. While our study also investigates these 
                                            
 
370 Source: Adapted from Wuebben (2007, p. 12), own research. 
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short-term market reactions, we additionally put special attention on the long-
term wealth effects of these combinations. Only two other studies have 
measured long-term stock market performance of acquiring insurance 
companies until now, yielding opposing results. 
 
The second difference between previous studies and our work lies in the 
methodology applied to this specific problem. Former capital market studies 
limit their methodology to a conventional event study approach, measuring the 
abnormal stock returns either in various trading day windows surrounding the 
M&A announcement or exactly one, two, or three years after announcement of 
the transaction. This empirical study, on the other hand, applies an alternative 
approach, namely a stochastic dominance method, to the measurement of the 
effects of insurance M&A on acquiring insurers’ share price performance. This 
methodology, in general, provides a broad framework for decision making under 
uncertainty and has so far not been applied to the analysis of wealth effects of 
insurance M&A. 
 
The empirical investigation is based on several hypotheses that are derived 
from the theoretical and practical implications of Chapter 2 and from the 
available body of empirical evidence from earlier insurance M&A research, 
which has been presented in detail in Chapter 3. After deriving the hypotheses 
on the value effects of insurance M&A and the influences of the various factors 
of M&A failure and success, this chapter defines the methodological approach 
and the specifications of the empirical investigation of this dissertation. Finally, 
the results of the empirical study on the overall wealth effect of insurance 
combinations and the individual determinants that influence acquiring insurers’ 
share prices in the short and long run are presented.  
 
4.2 Formulation of Hypotheses 
Various hypotheses on the overall success of insurance M&A and its 
determinants are established and tested in this section. The hypotheses are 
primarily based on the accumulated evidence from past empirical research 
summarized in Chapter 3 and—in cases where no general conclusions can be 
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drawn from this literature review—on theoretical considerations and practical 
observations from the M&A market discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
 
Figure 11: Approach for derivation of hypotheses371 
 
4.2.1 Success of M&A in the European Insurance Industry 
In a first step, the hypothesis on the overall performance effect of European 
insurance transactions is formulated. From the above accumulation of empirical 
evidence on the relationship between M&A transactions and acquiring 
insurance firms’ subsequent financial performance (see Section 3.7), we 
hypothesize that the direction of this relationship crucially depends on the time 
horizon under examination and the specific sample region being analyzed. As 
concluded in Section 3.7.5, while researchers analyzing the relationship 
between M&A activity and acquirers announcement returns in the United States 
confirm a positive relationship, academic researchers find an opposing 
relationship in the European insurance market. More precisely, previous event 
studies document largely consistent (partly significant and partly non-significant) 
negative short-term abnormal returns for acquiring European insurance firms 
                                            
 
371 Source: Adapted from Boesecke (2009, p. 71), own research. 
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around the M&A announcement.372 Accordingly, one can hypothesize that the 
overall short-term effect of insurance M&A transactions differs substantially 
between transactions undertaken by US insurance acquirers and those 
conducted by European insurers. Also in a medium- and long-term event 
horizon, transactions conducted by European insurance companies, on 
average, destroy373 shareholder value, as found by Schertzinger (2008), 
whereas US insurance acquirers seem to create374 value for their 
shareholders.375 Accordingly, we enunciate our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: European insurance acquirers are not only stochastically dominated by 
their non-acquiring counterparts in the short run, but also underperform their 
benchmark over a long-term horizon.  
4.2.2 Determinants of M&A Success in the European Insurance 
Industry 
In a second step, we formulate several hypotheses on the various determinants 
that potentially influence the outcome of an insurance transaction. As pointed 
out in our literature review, substantial and significant differences exist between 
the specific effects of the individual M&A transactions. This great variety of 
individual M&A outcomes is mainly attributed to differences in the underlying 
                                            
 
372 Significant negative acquirer abnormal returns of -0.17%, -0.31%, and -0.35% are found by 
Cummins and Weiss (2004) in the short-term event windows (0;+1), (0;+2), and (-2;+2), 
respectively. In the remaining short-term event windows (0;+5), (-1;+1), and (-5;+5), the 
authors detect insignificant negative acquirer abnormal returns of -0.30%, -0.14%, and -0.35%. 
In addition, Schertzinger (2008) also detects small and insignificant negative short-term 
abnormal returns for acquiring insurance firms ranging from -0.93% to -0.09% in the various 
event windows from (0;0) to (-5;+5). 
373 According to Schertzinger’s (2008) study on European insurance transactions, these deals 
result in either significant negative BHARs of -4.73% and -9.98% on a one- and two-year event 
horizon (significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively) or generate a non-significant 
negative BHAR of -6.57% on a three-year horizon. 
374 The two medium- and long-term studies by BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) and Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006), which analyze M&A transactions undertaken by US insurance 
acquirers, both found a positive, yet statistically insignificant, relationship between M&A 
activity and acquiring firms’ post-M&A performance (BarNiv & Hathorn, 1997: acquirer 
abnormal returns for acquisitions of financially sound insurance companies of 7.95%, 8.26%, 
and 15.23% in the event period that begins 250 trading days before the effective day of the 
M&A deal and ends 250 trading days after the effective M&A transaction; Boubakri, Dionne, & 
Triki, 2006: market-adjusted BHAR of 57.3% after three years following an M&A transaction). 
375 However, it has to be kept in mind that these conclusions about the long-term effects of 
insurance transactions are solely based on the available empirical observations from a small 
sample of only three medium- and long-term event studies, two of which analyze the effect in 
the US insurance industry and a single study on the European insurance market. 
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M&A structure and strategy. In order to test the impact of the various 
characteristics of the acquiring insurance firm, the target firm, the transaction 
structure, and the economic environment on acquirers’ post-M&A performance, 
we investigate the influence of following determinants.  
 
As outlined earlier, the first group of determinants, namely ex ante features of 
the acquiring firm, comprises acquirer’s absolute size, acquirer’s growth, 
acquirer’s transaction experience, acquirer’s line of business, and others. 
 
First, the acquirer’s absolute size is found to be negatively376 related to an 
acquiring firm’s short-term financial performance. However, this negative 
relationship diminishes over time, as Schertzinger does not detect any 
significant relationship between the acquirer’s absolute size and its three-year 
BHAR. Accordingly, we set our second hypothesis as follows:  
 
H2: Small insurance acquirers stochastically dominate large insurance 
acquirers at the time of M&A announcement, whereas there is no dominance 
relationship between small and large acquirers in the long run. 
 
Second, the acquirer’s growth is found to have a significant377 effect on the 
insurer’s post-M&A performance. As documented by Schertzinger (2008), there 
is a significant positive relationship between the acquirer’s growth and its long-
term financial performance. The fastest-growing insurers consistently 
outperform the slowest-growing insurers in three years following M&A 
transactions. Yet Schertzinger (2008) also asserts that this relationship might 
vary depending on the time horizon under consideration, as the author finds that 
fastest-growing acquirers in his sample slightly underperform their slow-growing 
peers shortly after M&A announcements. Hence, following Schertzinger’s 
(2008) findings, we propose: 
 
                                            
 
376 Either significantly negative as found by Cummins and Xie (2005) or insignificantly negative 
as detected by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Schertzinger (2008), and Cummins and Xie 
(2009).  
377 At least on a long-term horizon. 
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H3: Slow-growing acquirers weakly dominate fast-growing acquirers at M&A 
announcement, whereas there is a strong dominance relationship of fast-
growing acquirers over slow-growing ones in the long term. 
 
In the previous insurance M&A literature, an acquirer’s transactions experience 
is regularly found to have a significant impact on M&A success. The findings of 
US studies provide contrary evidence. In their 2005 and 2009 research papers, 
Cummins and Xie empirically ascertain that an acquirer’s transaction 
experience relates negatively to its subsequent financial performance. The long-
term results of Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), on the other hand, suggest 
that transaction experience has a positive impact on US acquirers’ post-M&A 
performance. Consequently, in the US insurance market, the direction of the 
relationship of transactions experience and acquirers’ performance either 
depends on the time period studied or it is more complex and cannot be 
expressed in terms of a linear relationship. In his European study, Schertzinger 
(2008) discovers such a quadratic relationship between acquisition experience 
and financial performance. European insurance acquirers without any 
acquisition experience and acquirers with an extensive acquisition record 
created substantially more value than acquirers with medium transaction 
experience, in the short term and in the long term. This U-shaped relationship 
should hence be interpreted as advice to insurance managers to either pursue a 
strategy of organic growth or to fully rely on external growth by means of M&A. 
Relying solely on the findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) European investigation, 
we thus hypothesize: 
 
H4: Medium experienced insurance acquirers are stochastically dominated by 
inexperienced and most experienced acquirers.  
 
Moreover, differences in the post-M&A performance of US insurance acquirers 
are found among the various lines of business the acquiring US insurer 
operates in. Looking at the results of previous studies analyzing the effect in the 
European insurance market, it appears that there is some evidence for a 
positive association between life insurance acquirers and their post-M&A 
success. Both Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) and Schertzinger (2008) find that 
short- and long-term abnormal returns are more positive for shareholders of life 
  
159 
insurance acquirers as compared to shareholders of non-life acquirers; 
however, both authors do not find any significance. Hence, this leads us to the 
conclusion: 
 
H5: Independent from the time horizon under investigation, M&A transactions 
by life insurance acquirers either weakly dominate or do not perform 
significantly different from transactions conducted by non-life insurance 
acquirers. 
 
Previous empirical evidence suggests that several characteristics of the target 
companies may significantly affect acquirer’s financial post-M&A performance.  
 
The relative size of the target firm (or rather the deal) with respect to the 
acquirer has been found by a number of previous studies to be an important 
influencing factor in terms of the outcome of a transaction. As intuitively 
assumed, the larger the relative deal size, the greater the effect of the 
respective M&A transaction on the share performance of the acquiring firm. 
Consequently, conducting and completing a large transaction successfully will 
most likely lead to substantial wealth creation for shareholders, but 
simultaneously, the probability of a successful outcome decreases with an 
increase in the relative size of the target, as the integration of a large target is 
more complex and difficult. At the same time, the empirical studies in our review 
allege that the larger the relative deal size, the higher the post-acquisition 
returns to the shareholders of the acquiring firm.378 As this positive relationship 
between relative deal size and post-M&A success is found to be significant only 
on a short-term basis, we expect: 
 
H6: Large insurance M&A transactions stochastically dominate small 
transactions in the short term.  
 
                                            
 
378 Statistically significant positive short-term abnormal returns for bidding insurers are detected 
by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Xie (2009), and Staikouras (2009). 
Moreover, in the studies of Cummins and Xie (2005), Akhigbe and Madura (2006), Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006), and Schertzinger (2008), a positive, yet insignificant, short-term 
relationship is found. 
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A target’s line of business has also been examined in the context of wealth 
gains from insurance M&A. Schertzinger (2008) discovers in his empirical study 
that short-term returns following acquisitions of life and P&C targets are higher 
than short-term returns following acquisitions of agents/brokers and other target 
industries. Furthermore, in the long term, acquisitions of life insurance targets 
create significantly more value than acquisitions in which P&C targets are 
acquired. Based on the findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) European sample, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H7: Acquisitions of life insurance targets stochastically dominate acquisitions of 
non-life insurance targets independent from the time horizon under 
investigation. 
 
In addition to these various firm characteristics, we also propose hypotheses on 
several determinants of the transaction structuring and management. 
 
First of all, the two most commonly studied determinants in the reviewed 
studies, geographic area and industry relatedness, are considered to have a 
significant influence on post-M&A performance. As the extant insurance M&A 
literature has proven, the qualitative effects of these two determinants are 
determined by the region the transaction has been conducted in. For example, 
empirical studies that investigate the short-term effect of geographically 
focusing M&A in the United States unanimously document a positive market 
reaction to acquiring insurers. In sharp contrast, geographically focusing deals 
in Europe relate negatively to the subsequent financial performance of acquiring 
firms. Consequently, as performance effects differ across different geographic 
regions, we base our hypothesis on the findings of the European studies in our 
sample. Besides this significant negative short-term impact of focus-enhancing 
European transactions, geographically diversifying deals, conversely, are 
associated with a significant positive market reaction for European insurance 
acquirers.379 These findings provide strong evidence that the advantages of 
geographical diversification outweigh not only the disadvantages of this 
                                            
 
379 See Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), and Schertzinger (2008). 
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international expansion but also the benefits of geographical concentration. 
Hence, in a further hypothesis we predict: 
 
H8: In the European insurance market, geographically focusing M&A 
transactions are stochastically dominated by geographically diversifying M&A. 
 
In addition to this statistically significant influence of the geographical factor, the 
investigated European studies showed a positive relation between industry 
relatedness and acquirers’ post-M&A performance. A statistically significant 
positive short-term relationship is detected by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), 
Cummins and Weiss (2004), Cummins and Xie (2005), and Schertzinger 
(2008). Furthermore, Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) and Schertzinger 
(2008) confirm this positive relationship on a long-term horizon (with, however, 
only insignificant evidence), which leads us to the conclusion: 
 
H9: Returns from industry-related transactions stochastically dominate those 
from unrelated deals.  
 
Instead of only investigating these two factors separately, we additionally follow 
Schertzinger’s (2008) approach and combine these two variables into a single 
construct, analyzing the geographic and industry dimensions simultaneously. 
Schertzinger’s (2008) evidence suggests that a full diversification strategy 
increases short-term and long-term shareholder value and is not only superior 
to a mixed strategy but also to a full-focus strategy. Since the latter 
geographical and industry focus strategy at least has a small and insignificant 
positive value creation effect in the long run, the author concludes that acquirers 
that pursue an “all-or-nothing” strategy (either full focus or full diversification) 
perform significantly better in the long run as compared to acquirers pursuing 
other strategies. Based on this finding, we hypothesize: 
 
H10: Insurers pursuing a full diversification strategy stochastically dominate 
their competitors that follow other strategies. 
 
According to the findings of Cummins and Xie (2009), acquirers’ ownership in 
targets before announcing transactions has a significant positive short-term 
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relation with success in such M&A transactions. Since this positive correlation is 
also the common finding in former non-insurance literature,380 we conclude that 
there is strong empirical evidence for a favorable dependency relationship 
between an acquirer’s pre-merger participation in the target and an acquirer’s 
subsequent M&A success. Accordingly, our hypothesis predicts: 
 
H11: On a short-term basis, transactions where the acquiring insurer has a pre-
M&A participation in the target firm stochastically dominate transactions in 
which there is no pre-M&A business relationship between acquirer and target. 
 
An additional potential influence factor on the success of insurance M&A is the 
method of payment. However, as this determinant fails to attain a significant 
effect in all four tested short-term event studies,381 we enunciate: 
 
H12: No stochastic dominance relationship exists between the various methods 
of payment in the short run. 
 
Last but not least, we further investigate the influence of the economic 
environment. According to the academic paper by Schertzinger (2008), the 
timing of the transaction appears to be an influencing factor for the success of 
an M&A transaction. The author finds significant positive abnormal 
announcement returns for European acquirers that conduct transactions in 
strong phases of the M&A cycle (i.e., the upswing and peak phase). In addition, 
these strong phase M&A deals produce significantly higher returns than 
downturn and especially bottom-phase M&A. However, as shown by 
Schertzinger’s (2008) event study, after a couple of years following the 
transaction, these weak-phase M&A transactions might possibly lead to small 
positive long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns and to substantial value 
creation for the shareholders of the acquiring insurers. Upswing and peak 
phase deals, on the contrary, resulted in significant negative acquirer BHARs 
and value destruction. However, in a second analysis, which is based on 
                                            
 
380 See, e.g., Grossmann and Hart (1980), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), and Franks and Harris (1989). 
381 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamoti (2001), and Cummins and Xie (2005, 
2009). 
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calendar-time abnormal returns, the author finds small positive CTARs for deals 
during the strong phase of the M&A cycle, whereas transactions in the weak 
phase of the M&A cycle triggered a small underperformance in the three-year 
period after the announcement. Based on these findings, we hypothesize:  
 
H13: In the short term, M&A transactions announced in the strong phase of the 
M&A market stochastically dominate transactions during the weak phase, but 
over a long-term horizon, transactions conducted during strong-phase years 
either dominate or are dominated by weak-phase transactions. 
 
Hypotheses 1 through 13 will be tested in this work by simple partitioning of the 
sample by the various factors, using not only short-term daily returns but also 
long-term buy-and-hold returns. We compare the respective return distributions 
using stochastic dominance techniques. In the following, we will explain this 
stochastic dominance concept and the specifications of the study. 
 
4.3 Specification of the Empirical Study 
This section begins with a description of the estimation methodology, followed 
by detailed information on the selection process, variable operationalization, 
and generation of the data sample for conducting the empirical study. We 
conclude with a summary of statistics on the characteristics of the identified 
M&A transactions in our sample. 
4.3.1 Estimation Methodology 
4.3.1.1 Overview 
As seen in the previous sections, various attempts have been made to assess 
the valuation effects of M&A transactions in the insurance industry. However, a 
consistent pattern has not yet been identified. Some researchers provide 
evidence of significant underperformance of acquiring insurance firms following 
an M&A transaction,382 while others find the opposite.383 Hence, general 
                                            
 
382 E.g., Schertzinger (2008) on a long-term basis and Staikouras (2009) measuring the 
relationship on a short-term horizon. 
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conclusions regarding the overall effect of insurance M&A on acquirers’ 
performance, as well as the influencing variables, cannot simply be drawn 
based on these investigations.  
 
As outlined earlier, most of the existing empirical and all of the extant capital 
market literature on value creation in insurance M&A is based on the traditional 
event study methodology. These well-known event studies calculate the 
difference between the mean returns of an acquiring firm portfolio and a 
matched-firm portfolio or an index. Short-term event studies rely on short-term 
stock market returns at the M&A announcement as indicators of the success of 
the respective transaction. Accordingly, the initial stock market response to the 
news of an M&A deal is predominantly based on the expectations of investors 
about potential future wealth gains resulting from the deal. However, as stated 
by Loughran and Vijh (1997), “whether the wealth gains materialize is another 
matter” (p. 1782), and hence an acquirer’s short-term market reaction may not 
always be a good indicator for the actual wealth effect of this deal. As explained 
in Section 2.3.2.2, the short-term event study approach is based on the 
underlying assumption of efficient capital markets, in which market prices fully 
reflect all publicly available information, and market participants are able to 
assess correctly the expected wealth effects of the respective transaction. While 
the latter might be true for target company shareholders, who subsequently 
receive financial benefits in proportion to their investment, the benefits to 
shareholders of the acquiring company will not ultimately become clear shortly 
after the announcement.384 Long-term event studies, on the other hand, 
measure the relative performance of the involved firms over a period of several 
years following the M&A transaction. During this period of time, the expected 
benefits and consequences of a transaction will most likely be visible. However, 
estimates of long-term abnormal returns suffer from the hindrance of being 
partly attributable to the overlay of various other events occurring in the same 
                                                                                                                                
 
383 A significant positive short-term abnormal performance of acquiring insurers is found by 
Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Xie (2005), Fields, 
Fraser, and Kolari (2007), and Cummins and Xie (2009). In addition, BarNiv and Hathorn 
(1997) and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) find positive effects on a longer horizon. 
384 E.g., Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997, p. 53) and Loughran and Vijh (1997, p. 1782). 
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event window. Furthermore, as outlined by Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama 
(1998), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), and many others, it is well known that 
“long-run abnormal return distributions are positively skewed and non-normal 
leading to various biases in statistical inference about the sample mean,”385 
which might lead to varying results depending on the methodologies used to 
assess the impacts of M&A. Due to the research design, the long-term event 
study approach therefore may produce biased and unreliable results and hence 
may not be the measure that best evaluates the performance effects of 
corporate events.386 Furthermore, several academics critically note that the 
long-term event methodology does not capture the impact of the entire 
distribution of acquiring and benchmark firms’ returns.387 As a consequence to 
this, the adoption of an alternative approach to measuring these effects is 
required to allow comparison of the entire distribution of returns. In addition, the 
application of a different approach would help to shed light on the question of 
the non-existence of homogeneous industry-specific patterns in insurance M&A 
or whether the inconsistent findings of previous capital market studies are 
simply resulting from problems in the methodology used. 
 
In their paper, Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006) lay the foundation for such an 
alternate approach to measuring firm’s abnormal performance following 
corporate takeovers by introducing the stochastic dominance (SD) methodology 
into the M&A literature. To the best of our knowledge, they are the first and so 
far only ones to evaluate the effects of M&A transactions on acquiring firms’ 
performance from the perspective of stochastic dominance. Analyzing a sample 
of UK-based acquiring firms in the period from 1985 to 2000, the authors find 
persuasive evidence that acquiring firms388 in the UK do not significantly 
underperform their benchmark over a three-year period following an M&A deal. 
We adopt the SD approach, which has never been used in the context of 
insurance M&A, and investigate the relationship between transactions in the 
                                            
 
385 Ho (2003, p. 15).  
386 E.g., Barber and Lyon (1997, p. 342), Kothari and Warner (1997, p. 302), and Antoniou, 
Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 16).  
387 E.g., Ho (2003, p. 15). 
388 In their study, the authors exclude financial services as well as utility firms. 
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insurance industry and acquiring firms’ short- and long-run post-acquisition 
performance. More precisely, we analyze whether investors in acquiring 
insurance companies benefit from M&A undertakings by comparing short-term 
daily return distributions and long-term buy-and-hold return distributions of 
acquiring firm portfolios with benchmark portfolios using the first two orders of 
stochastic dominance. 
 
Following its introduction by Lehmann in 1955, the idea of stochastic dominance 
has been widely used in various areas, such as medicine, statistics, risk 
management, insurance, finance, and multiple fields of economics, by providing 
a general framework for studying economic behavior and decision making 
under uncertainty.389 In a recent paper, Guo (2012) classifies studies applying 
the SD methodology according to their main object of investigation.390 In 
medicine, the SD approach is primarily a tool for comparing medical and 
surgical treatments.391 In another area, namely statistics, stochastic dominance 
is utilized to estimate and evaluate parameters.392 SD application in risk 
management is regularly applied to quantify and rank risks and to measure 
investors’ and involved parties’ risk appetite.393 Accordingly, in these studies, 
the SD methodology competes with alternative risk measurement approaches 
such as variance and Value-at-Risk (VaR). As outlined by various authors,394 
especially in the fields of economics and finance, there are wide and extensive 
arrays of empirical applications, ranging from crop insurance selections395 to the 
measurement of poverty and inequality,396 and from performance evaluation397 
                                            
 
389 See, e.g., Levy (1992, 1998, 2006), Sriboonchitta et al. (2010), and Guo (2012). We do not 
cover the basics of decision making under uncertainty. For a thorough discussion on this 
subject, see Sriboonchitta et al. (2010, p. 1)  
390 Note that the following paragraph is primarily based on Guo (2012) and his earlier version 
from 2011. 
391 E.g., Stinnett and Mullahy (1998) and Leshno and Levy (2004). 
392 E.g., Ben-Horim and Levy (1982, 1984). 
393 E.g., Levy and Levy (2001), Giorgi (2002), Giorgi and Post (2004), and Fong, Lean, and 
Wong (2006). 
394 E.g., Ho (2003), Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006, 2008), and Guo (2012). 
395 E.g., Williams (1988) and Wilson, Gustafson, and Dahl (2009). 
396 E.g., Anderson (1996), Foster and Sen (1997), and Davidson and Duclos (2000). 
397 E.g., Joy and Porter (1974), Meyer (1977), Li and Linton (2007), and Annaert, Osselaer, and 
Verstraete (2009). 
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to momentum effect identifications.398 The most relevant papers in the context 
of welfare economics use SD as a measure of wealth,399 whereas the SD 
approach when used in agricultural economics is applied in manifold ways.400 In 
finance, or more precisely, in portfolio management, numerous researchers 
have investigated the performance of portfolios relying on stochastic dominance 
techniques as a supplement for the well-established mean-variance (M-V) 
approach401 to portfolio selection, which overcomes the main drawbacks402 of 
the M-V decision rule by looking at the full distribution of the returns.403 Hence, 
especially in cases in which the distribution of returns is skewed and non-
normal, the SD approach produces superior results compared to the M-V 
approach.404 A further advantage of the SD methodology is that the approach 
requires only minimal assumptions regarding investors’ utility functions and no 
assumptions on the form of the distribution of the random variables, thereby 
                                            
 
398 E.g., Fong, Wong, and Lean (2003). 
399 E.g., Atkinson (1970), Anderson (1996), Foster and Sen (1997), Davidson and Duclos 
(2000), and Davidson (2006). 
400 “SD is applied to crop insurance selections (Williams, 1988; Wilson, Gustafson, & Dahl, 
2009), production risk analyses (Lee, Lacewell, & Ellis, 1987), production management 
(Bezuneh, 1992), stocking rate strategy evaluations (Riechers, Lee, & Heitschmidt, 1988), 
export earnings analyses (Gan, Wharton, & Zacharias, 1988), irrigation strategy comparisons 
(Harris & Mapp, 1986), marketing tactic analyses (Anaman & Boggess, 1986; Moss, Ford, & 
Castejon, 1991), crop or production alternative selections (Moss & Livanis, 2009; Griffith, 
2009), farmland control (Gustafson, 1989), and fertilizer treatment comparisons (Ndjeunga & 
Bationo, 2005).” (Guo 2011, p. 40) 
401 For a detailed but critical discussion of the M-V rule proposed by Markowitz (1952, 1959, 
1987), see for example, Klaever (2006, p. 20), Levy (2006, p. 1), Sriboonchitta et al. (2010, p. 
89), and Guo (2012, p. 43). 
402 The M-V approach evaluates two alternatives by looking only at the parameters mean and 
variance and thereby, in some cases, leads to questionable and not economically meaningful 
decisions (Klaever 2006, p. 21). Levy (2006, p. 2) reveals one of the drawbacks of the M-V 
approach by providing a trivial example in which the M-V decision rule is not able to rank two 
alternative investment prospects: “x providing $1 or $2 with equal probability and y providing 
$2 or $4 with equal probability, with an identical initial investment of […] $1.1. […] [B]oth the 
mean and the variance of y are greater than the corresponding parameters of x; hence the 
mean-variance rule remains silent regarding the choice between x and y. Yet any rational 
investor would (and should) select y because the lowest return on y is equal to the largest 
return on x (this is only a trivial case in which the mean-variance rule fails to show the 
superiority of one investment over another).” For further examples, see, e.g., Hanoch and Levy 
(1969, p. 335) and Klaever (2006, p. 20). 
403 E.g., Barrett and Donald (2003, p. 2), Abhyankar and Ho (2003, p. 2), Li and Linton (2007, p. 
3), Post and Versijp (2007, p. 489), Annaert, Osselaer, and Verstraete (2009, p. 272), 
Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2009, p. 223), and Yezegel (2009, p. 8). 
404 E.g., Klaever (2006, p. 20), Phoon, Wong, and Lean (2008, p. 222), and Guo (2012, p. 2). 
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being able to better model reality.405 An additional strength of the SD approach, 
as pointed out by various authors,406 is that investigators do not have to 
construct an asset pricing model for calculating the expected returns. Last but 
not least, as concluded by Guo (2012, p. 2), the stochastic dominance criteria 
are consistent with the principle of expected utility maximization. As a result of 
these advantages, the use of the SD framework has gained great popularity in 
portfolio management. Early studies of Joy and Porter (1974) and Meyer (1977) 
evaluate mutual fund performance, Li and Linton (2007) and Phoon, Wong, and 
Lean (2008) both focus on hedge funds, while Brooks, Levy, and Yoder (1987) 
assess the performance of portfolios with options, and Ho (2002) analyzes the 
long-run stock price performance after IPOs, to name a few. As outlined by Guo 
(2011, p. 40), further applications in finance comprise determination of default 
and bankruptcy probabilities,407 quantification of operational synergies in 
M&A,408 bond term premium analyses,409 examination of stock 
recommendations,410 investigation of value versus growth investment 
strategies,411 and international momentum strategy assessment.412 Looking at 
its application in the area of insurance, Guo (2011, p. 38) subdivides the 
application of SD in insurance into three broad topics, namely portfolio 
insurance, insurance premium valuation, and indemnity determination. In 
previous studies focusing on portfolio insurance,413 an optimal portfolio 
insurance strategy is determined, while in the two latter cases, acceptable 
premiums414 and indemnities415 are calculated using the SD approach. Only a 
few other applications of SD in insurance have been published so far, as 
                                            
 
405 E.g., Abhyankar and Ho (2003, p. 2), Li and Linton (2007, p. 3), Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao 
(2009, p. 223), Yezegel (2009, p. 8), Chan et al. (2012, p. 167), Chou and Chang (2012, p. 
73), and Guo (2012, p. 2). 
406 E.g., Abhyanka and Ho (2003, p. 2), Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2009, p. 223), and Chou and 
Chang (2012, p. 73). 
407 Broske and Levy (1989). 
408 Gupta and Gerchak (2001). 
409 Levy and Brooks (1989) and Fisher, Willson, and Xu (1998). 
410 Yezegel (2009). 
411 Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006, 2009). 
412 Fong, Wong, and Lean (2003). 
413 Gandhi, Saunders, and Sugars (1981), Clarke (1988), Levy (1985, 1988), Brooks and Levy 
(1993), Bertrand and Prigent (2002), Zagst and Kraus (2008), and Annaert, Osselaer, and 
Verstraete (2009). 
414 E.g., Doherty (1977) and Kroll (1983a, 1983b). 
415 E.g., Gollier and Schlesinger (1996). 
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highlighted by Guo (2011, p. 38). In an early paper, Cummins and Weiss (1993) 
put the focus on automobile insurance policies, elaborating on the stochastic 
dominance of no-fault automobile insurance. In another paper, Heyer (2001) 
explores the relationship between differing reinsurance alternatives from the 
perspective of SD, while Borglin and Keiding (2002) apply this method in the 
context of partial insurance contracts. However, the relationship between M&A 
activity and financial performance of the involved insurance companies has not 
been investigated yet from the perspective of stochastic dominance. In this 
paper, we make a first attempt to eliminate this drawback and fill this gap. 
 
In order to achieve this goal, we first review some basic concepts of stochastic 
dominance. In a next step, the most important stochastic dominance models, 
namely the first two degrees of stochastic dominance decision rules, are looked 
at more closely. After that, we describe the various approaches and tests for 
detecting stochastic dominance and then explain how short-term and medium- 
and long-term returns are calculated in this work. 
4.3.1.2 The Stochastic Dominance Model 
In short, stochastic dominance gives us a general framework for decision 
making under uncertainty.416 Even though utility functions and risk-taking 
attitudes vary between individuals, the concept of stochastic dominance is 
suitable in most cases, since hardly any assumptions about the form of an 
investor’s preferences and no assumptions on the form of distributions are 
needed.417 By using various degrees of stochastic dominance ranking rules it is 
possible to order pairs of random variables (e.g.,  and ), given that they 
meet specific criteria like non-satiation or risk aversion. More specifically, 
economists and researchers are able to compare and rank cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) of utility, such as wealth or investment income, for 
                                            
 
416 E.g., Joy and Porter (1974, p. 26), Fong, Wong, and Lean (2003, p. 4), Abhyankar, Ho, and 
Zhao (2006, p. 8), Klaever (2006, p. 19), Levy (2006, p. 1), and Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao 
(2008, p. 225). 
417 In contrast, the mean-variance analysis as proposed by Markowitz (1952), in which mean 
and variance of investment alternatives are compared, may lead to dissatisfying results, as 
pointed out by Klaever (2006, p. 20) (see discussion above). 
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first, second, or higher orders of stochastic dominance.418 In finance, for 
example, researchers typically investigate whether an investment portfolio  
with random return  stochastically dominates an investment portfolio  with 
random return . If investment portfolio  dominates investment portfolio  by 
first-order stochastic dominance, all investors who prefer more wealth to less419 
will invest in alternative , regardless of their attitude toward risk (i.e., if they 
are risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking.). However, under second-order 
stochastic dominance, investors who prefer investing in portfolio  are required 
to be risk averse. In our context, first- and second-order stochastic dominance 
rules420 are applied to investigate whether the cumulative distribution function of 
daily and monthly returns to an investment in a merger portfolio stochastically 
dominates an investment in a size and book-to-market matched benchmark 
portfolio. Or, to put it differently, we examine whether a portfolio of acquiring 
insurance companies is preferred by a group of investors with specific 
preferences over a benchmark portfolio. The advantage of the SD criteria when 
applied to the distributions of returns of the two portfolios is that a comparison of 
these objects is made at all points instead of focusing only on a limited subset 
of measures, such as the mean and the variance, and thereby it is more 
consistent with the principle of expected utility maximization.421 
 
In the following, we will more thoroughly define the first two orders of stochastic 
dominance. 
4.3.1.3 Orders of Stochastic Dominance 
To test for first- and second-order stochastic dominance (abbreviated by SD1 
and SD2), let us start by considering two investments  and  with future 
returns  and , respectively, which are characterized by cumulative 
                                            
 
418 For some early work in investment decision making under uncertainty and risk, see, e.g., 
Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), and Whitmore (1970). Besides defining 
stochastic dominance by cumulative distribution functions, as done in our study, the Neumann 
Morgenstern utility functions and quantile distributions can be used, as pointed out by Guo 
(2012, p. 3). 
419 Investors with a utility function that is non-decreasing in the first order. 
420 According to Klaever (2006, p. 7), first- and second-order stochastic dominance are the most 
important stochastic dominance decision rules. 
421 E.g., Porter and Gaumnitz (1972, p. 445), Tehranian (1980, p. 160), and Barrett and Donald 
(2003, p. 2). 
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distribution functions  and . As depicted by Klaever (2006, p. 12), a 
comparison of these two investment alternatives would be simple and 
uncomplicated if the distribution functions of returns were known, but 
unfortunately in most practical applications, the conditions to achieve this are 
not fulfilled. Hence, to investigate whether one investment prospect is 
dominated by the other, the underlying distributions have to be derived from the 
empirical data. The SD approach, however, does not require any assumptions 
about the underlying return distribution, while making only minimal assumptions 
about the form of investors’ utility functions, as seen in the following sections. 
4.3.1.3.1 First-Order Stochastic Dominance 
If the return for investment  is always higher than that for investment , then 
under the first SD ranking procedure, investment alternative  is preferred over 
alternative  by all investors favoring more over less wealth (in our case, 
returns to an investment).422 Hence, it is the weakest assumption on preference, 
only requiring that investors’ utility functions have a non-negative first derivative 
( ), that is,  is an increasing monotonic utility function.423 
Accordingly, we define:424 
 first-order stochastic dominates , denoted as ,425 if and only if: 
 
for all , with strict inequality for some ;  
where  is the utility function, and  is defined as the set of all non-decreasing 
(von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility functions, namely that ; Or: 
 
for all , with strict inequality for some , 
                                            
 
422 This also includes the case in which the return for prospect  is at least as large as that for 
prospect . 
423 See, e.g., Levy (2006, p. 55). 
424 See also Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang (2005, p. 737), Maasoumi and Heshmati (2005, p. 
3), Klaever (2006, p. 21) 
425 According to the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms that build the basis for the 
expected utility theory, the symbol  denotes the binary preference relation “is weakly 
preferred to” (see von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). See, e.g., Klaever (2006, p. 19) for 
a detailed description of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms. It is important to note 
that during this work, preference is understood in terms of the weak form. This is consistent 
with many other studies, e.g., Tehranian (1980, p. 160), Barrett and Donald (2003, p. 4), and 
Levy (2006, p. 64). The subscript 1 denotes first-order preference relation. 
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and which can be more conveniently written as 
.426 
 
From the above equation, it becomes clear that cumulative distribution function 
 has to be everywhere to the left of distribution function . Or, to put it 
differently, while the two distribution functions are allowed to touch, distribution 
function  must not exceed .427 Graphically, this (weak) stochastic 
dominance relationship is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: First-order stochastic dominance of  over  
After discussing the conditions under which investment alternative  first-order 
stochastically dominates alternative , for reasons of symmetry, we now turn to 
the opposite case. Investment prospect  is accordingly said to first-order 
stochastically dominate investment alternative  if: 
 
for all , with strict inequality for at least one . 
 
                                            
 
426 For proof, see the early work of Quirk and Saposnik (1962), Hadar and Russell (1969), and 
Hanoch and Levy (1969). For a graphical and mathematical exposition as well as an intuitive 
explanation of the SD1 decision rule, see Levy (2006, p. 59). 
427 The area in which distribution function  is above distribution function  is denoted by “+”. 
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If we fail to provide evidence for first-order stochastic dominance of one 
alternative over another, we should consider weaker orderings such as the 
second-order analysis, which generally provides a broader set of efficient 
investments.428 
4.3.1.3.2 Second-Order Stochastic Dominance 
Under second-order stochastic dominance, all investors display risk aversion in 
addition to non-satiation, which both form the basis for testing SD2. Accordingly, 
second-order stochastic dominance, which was developed by Hadar and 
Russell in 1969, is less restrictive and thereby potentially increases the size of 
the set of efficient investment alternatives.  
It is defined as follows: 
 second-order stochastic dominates , denoted as , if and only if: 
 
for all , with strict inequality for some ;  
where  is defined as the set of all non-decreasing and concave (von 
Neumann-Morgenstern type) utility functions (standing for risk aversion of the 
investors, which is commonly assumed in literature429), namely that  and 
 ( ); Or: 
  
for all  with strict inequality for some ,  
which is equivalent to  
.430 
 
To illustrate this dominance criterion, Figure 13 gives an example of two CDFs 
in which second-order but not first-order stochastic dominance exists between 
the two investment alternatives. 
                                            
 
428 Joy and Porter (1974, p. 24). 
429 E.g., Levy (2006, p. 75) and Post and Versijp (2007, p. 491). 
430 Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), and 
Fishburn (1974) present a mathematical proof for this relationship. See Levy (2006, p. 59) for 
a graphical exposition, a numerical example, and an intuitive explanation of the SD2 decision 
rule. 
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Figure 13: Second-order, but not first-order stochastic dominance of  over  
 
As can be seen from the above figure, investment alternative  second-order 
stochastic dominates alternative  because the area under the distribution 
function  is everywhere, that is, for every value of x smaller than that of 
distribution function .  
Once again, we denote the area enclosed between the two distributions by “+” 
in cases where CDF  exceeds CDF  and whenever  is above  by “–“. 
In order for second-order stochastic dominance of  over  to hold, the 
cumulative areas enclosed between the corresponding distribution functions 
have to be positive or at least non-negative for every possible value of . Since 
in our case, the first area is positive and also greater than the following negative 
area (which is once again followed by a positive area), we can assert SD2 of  
over . 
4.3.1.3.3 Kth-Order Stochastic Dominance 
More generally, we can write the stochastic dominance criteria for any positive 
integer degree (k) in following way: 
 stochastically dominates  by kth-order, denoted as , if and only if: 
 
for all , with strict inequality for some ; Or: 
! 
FX
! 
FY
! 
A
! 
B
! 
FX
! 
FY
! 
FY
! 
FX
! 
FX
! 
FY
! 
A
! 
B
! 
x
! 
A
! 
B
! 
X
! 
Y   
! 
X!kY
! 
E u(X)[ ] " E u(Y )[ ]
! 
u"Uk
! 
u
  
175 
 
for all  with strict inequality for some , With  . 
Note that this is equivalent to 
. 
 
Finally, as illustrated by Klaever (2006, p. 21), using the general definition of 
stochastic dominance of the kth order, it can be proved that stochastic 
dominance of the first order implies second-order stochastic dominance, which 
in turn implies stochastic dominance ordering of any higher order. 
4.3.1.4 Testing for Stochastic Dominance 
4.3.1.4.1 Descriptive Approach 
There are various approaches to assessing a stochastic dominance relationship 
between the two investments  and  with their respective returns  and . A 
first approach, which is used by Schmid and Trede (2000) and which is also 
applied in our following empirical investigation, is a purely descriptive one. This 
approach makes use of the empirical distribution functions (EDFs), which gives 
a nonparametric minimum variance unbiased estimate of the cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs).431 Accordingly, this nonparametric method relies 
solely on the observations  and  of  and , respectively, 
without making any special assumptions on the particular distribution of the 
returns.432 Essentially, the idea here is to let the data speak for itself. 
The EDFs corresponding to these observations are 
  
and 
 
                                            
 
431 Nelson and Pope (1991, p. 1183). 
432 E.g., Schmid and Trede (2000), Klaever (2006), and Sriboonchitta et al. (2010). Note that 
this and the upcoming paragraphs on descriptive stochastic dominance are in large parts 
based on the work of Schmid and Trede (2000). 
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respectively, where the indicator function  has the value 1 if  is true and the 
value 0 if  is not true: 
 
 
For testing if investment alternative  first-order (descriptively) dominates 
alternative , that is, if         , one has to check whether 
 
for all , with strict inequality for some , 
with the empirical analogue of 
. 
 
To test for second-order (descriptive) dominance, the empirical distribution 
functions are replaced by the pertinent integrated empirical distribution functions 
, 
and 
. 
Accordingly, the empirical analogues to the antiderivatives of the empirical 
distribution functions are 
 
and 
 
Alternative  is said to second-order (descriptively) dominate alternative , that 
is,         , if  
 
for all , with strict inequality for some ,  
with the empirical analogue of 
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Obviously, the major advantage of this approach is that the descriptive 
comparison relies solely on the observations without making any restrictive 
assumptions concerning the data, in particular concerning the independence of 
the observations. This benefit is especially important when analyzing financial 
data such as stock returns.433 Contrarily, as empirically shown by Klaever 
(2006), the downside of this approach is that the standard error has a strong 
influence on the results of the descriptive comparison, hence leading to a high 
rate of wrong rejection of stochastic dominance. This influence, and thus, the 
rate of wrong rejection, is particularly pronounced for a first-order descriptive 
analysis, in which stochastic dominance of the first order is rejected far too 
often.434 In an empirical analysis of daily returns of 30 stocks listed in the 
German stock index DAX, Klaever (2006) could not establish any first-order 
stochastic dominance relationship in a descriptive sense between any pair of 
stock return series. This particular drawback is further confirmed by the paper of 
Schmid and Trede (2000), who also did not find a dominance relationship in the 
sense of SD1 in their empirical investigation on 32 German assets during the 
1990s. However, looking at stochastic dominance of the second order, findings 
from the descriptive analyses of Schmid and Trede (2000) and Klaever (2006) 
provide evidence for the reliability and validity of this approach. Testing for 
second-order stochastic dominance with a descriptive comparison, Schmid and 
Trede (2000) receive an adequate set of efficient firms, and so does Klaever 
(2006), who receives an almost identical set of efficient firms using either a 
descriptive or a statistical testing procedure for SD2.435 Nevertheless, Klaever 
(2006) expresses the need for statistical inference and supports the use of 
statistical tests for stochastic dominance in order to obtain significant and 
reliable results. These statistical tests will be presented in the following section. 
                                            
 
433 For further information on the importance of the independence of the data when investigating 
financial returns, see the next section, or see for example, Funke (1994), Luetkepohl (1997), 
Lim, Maasoumi, and Martin (2004) and Klaever (2006). 
434 See Klaever (2006). 
435 See Table 41 in the appendix for an overview of Klaever’s (2006) efficiency results 
concerning the application of the considered tests on stochastic dominance. 
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4.3.1.4.2 Statistical Tests 
As discussed earlier, since the distribution functions of future returns, FX and FY, 
are not know in most real-world cases, they need to be obtained from their 
empirical estimators in order to establish or reject stochastic dominance. 
Instead of investigating stochastic dominance with a descriptive comparison, a 
second, large group of SD papers bases their approaches for obtaining the 
distribution functions of returns on statistical inference. In recent years, various 
papers have developed a huge number of differing statistical tests for detecting 
stochastic dominance.436 These tests differ in multiple respects, including the 
formulation of the null hypothesis, the orders of stochastic dominance tested, 
the specific type of the test statistic, the underlying assumptions of the 
respective statistical test, and the method for verification of statistical 
significance.  
 
In general, for testing stochastic dominance, two different kinds of statistical 
tests can be carried out, depending on the formulation of the null and alternative 
hypothesis. The first posits a null hypothesis (H0) of dominance and an 
alternative (H1) of non-dominance. Accordingly, the hypotheses for any positive 
integer degree (k) are  
 
for all ; against the alternative  
 
for some , where  and  are any two real numbers satisfying 
. 
 
This testing procedure is applied by the majority of researchers to test whether 
or not stochastic dominance exists between two investment alternatives;437 
                                            
 
436 See, e.g., Klaever (2006) and Guo (2012) for a comprehensive overview on the different 
strands of SD literature. 
437 E.g., McFadden (1989), Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden (1991), Xu, Fisher, and Wilson 
(1995, 1995, 1997), Schmid and Trede (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1998), Barrett and Donald 
(2003), Lim, Maasoumi, and Martin (2004), Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang (2005), Maasoumi 
and Heshmati (2000, 2005), Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006), and Linton, Song, and Whang 
(2010). 
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however, “this is arguably a matter of convention and convenience,”438 as 
described by Davidson and Duclos (2009). Formulating the null hypothesis in 
this way enables the researcher to relatively easily determine the appropriate 
rejection regions for the test statistic; however, as criticized by several 
researchers,439 significant statistical evidence for stochastic dominance cannot 
be deduced from such a testing procedure.440 Davidson and Duclos summarize 
this issue by stating: “Positing a null of dominance cannot be used to infer 
dominance; it can however serve to infer non-dominance” (p. 2). On the other 
hand, the authors further note that “[p]ositing a null of non-dominance cannot 
serve to infer non-dominance; it can however lead to inferring dominance” (p. 
2), which in the majority of cases is the point of interest.  
 
Consequently, a second, less common strand of research seeks to find 
statistical evidence for a dominance relationship by postulating the null 
hypothesis (H0) of non-dominance and the alternative (H1) of dominance.441 
Under this testing procedure, the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-
dominance ultimately leads to acceptance of a dominance relationship. As 
stated by Davidson and Duclos (2009), Kaur, Rao, and Singh (1994) are the 
first ones to come up with such a test method that formulates the null 
hypothesis of a zero difference against its negation hypothesis of nonzero 
difference. They test the null hypothesis for second-order stochastic dominance 
 
for some ; against the alternative  
 
for all , where  and  are any two real numbers satisfying 
.  
                                            
 
438 Davidson and Duclos (2009, p. 1). The authors further elucidate their statement by 
explaining: “convention in the sense that it follows the usual practice of making the theory of 
interest the null and seeking evidence contrary to it, and convenience in that the null is then 
relatively easy to formulate” (Davidson and Duclos, p. 1). 
439 E.g., Klaever (2006) and Davidson and Duclos (2009). 
440 For a thorough elaboration on this point, please refer to the work of Klaever (2006), or see 
the paper by Davidson and Duclos (2009, p. 1 and p. 36), which graphically depicts this 
problem. 
441 E.g., Eubank, Schechtman, and Yitzhaki (1993), Kaur, Rao, and Singh (1994), Anderson 
(1996), Herring (1996), and Davidson and Duclos (2006, 2009). 
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By specifying the testing procedure in this way, the authors are able to provide 
statistical evidence for SD if the null hypothesis (of non-dominance) can be 
rejected. However, the Kaur, Rao, and Singh test, as well as the testing 
procedure in general, have their own drawbacks. Most importantly, as explained 
in the work of Klaever (2006), tests with the null hypothesis of non-dominance 
suffer from the mathematical complexity (and thereby difficulty) that arises from 
the existence of multiple possible combinations of distribution pairs that do not 
dominate each other.442 Accordingly, “the boundary of the non-dominance 
hypothesis cannot be expressed in closed form,”443 and thus its construction is 
a very complex undertaking.  
 
As has been pointed out earlier in this chapter,444 return distributions can be 
compared using first, second, or even higher orders of stochastic dominance. 
While some test are only applicable to first-order stochastic dominance (e.g., 
Schmid & Trede, 1995, 1996a; Davidson & Duclos, 2006, 2009), second-order 
stochastic dominance (e.g., Eubank, Schechtman, & Yitzhaki, 1993; Kaur, Rao, 
& Singh, 1994; Schmid & Trede, 1998; Abhyankar, Ho, & Zhao, 2009), or both 
of the before-mentioned orders (e.g., McFadden, 1989, Klecan, McFadden, & 
McFadden, 1991; Schmid & Trede, 1996b, 1997; Xu, Fisher, & Wilson, 1995, 
1996, 1997; Maasoumi & Heshmati, 2000, 2005), others can be applied to 
various orders of stochastic dominance (e.g. Davidson & Duclos, 2000; Barrett 
& Donald, 2003; Lim, Maasoumi, & Whang, 2004; Linton, Maasoumi, & Whang, 
2005; Bennett, 2008, 2010; Linton, Song, & Whang, 2010).  
 
According to Guo (2012), the extant SD literature can also be categorized into 
three broad groups of studies based on their respective test statistic features. 
The largest group of papers by far employs statistical tests for identifying 
stochastic dominance that are based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistics.445 
This most popular group is followed by a group of studies applying t-statistic 
                                            
 
442 See Klaever (2006, p. 13 and 38).  
443 Klaever (2006, p. 13). 
444 See section 4.3.1.3 for the various orders of stochastic dominance. 
445 E.g., Schmid and Trede (1998), Barrett and Donald (2003), Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang 
(2005), Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2009), Bennett (2010), and Linton, Song, and Whang 
(2010), 
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stochastic dominance tests,446 which in general are computationally simpler 
than KS-type tests. A third and very small group of studies, comprising for 
example, the papers by Eubank, Schechtman, and Yitzhaki (1993), Schmid and 
Trede (1995, 1996b, 1997), Hall and Yatchew (2005), and Bennett (2008), 
applies integral-type tests for detecting stochastic dominance.447 
 
A serious drawback of every statistical test, which has been regularly pointed 
out in the past, concerns the assumptions regarding the data employed, in 
particular regarding the independence of the data.448 The vast majority of 
statistical tests applied in previous SD studies are designed for independent 
data, and hence these studies assume their observations to be independent.449 
In reality, however, this might often not be the case.450 For example, financial 
time series exhibit considerable dependencies, both within (serial dependence) 
and between (contemporaneous dependence) time series, as outlined by 
various authors.451 Consequently, Schmid and Trede (2000) infer that 
“conclusions drawn from these tests are unreliable,”452 especially when 
analyzing financial data such as stock returns, as noted by Klaever (2006, p. 
67). A promising attempt to redress this problem is presented by Klaever (2006) 
in his dissertation. The author modifies existing statistical tests, for example, the 
Kaur, Rao, and Singh (1994) and the Schmid and Trede (1997) test, and 
thereby develops several new tests for SD that are also applicable to financial 
data, as they are robust to time series properties. Accordingly, these new 
statistical tests can also be used in cases where serial and contemporaneous 
dependence in the data set is present. 
                                            
 
446 E.g., Kaur, Rao, and Singh (1994), Anderson (1996), Crawford (2005), Davidson and Duclos 
(2000, 2006, 2007), and Knight and Satchell (2008). 
447 See Guo (2012, p. 27). In order to get a deeper understanding on the different statistical 
testing procedures, please refer to the work of Klaever (2006), Sriboonchitta et al. (2010), or 
Guo (2012). 
448 E.g., Schmid and Trede (2000, p. 316) and Klaever (2006, p. 7, 13, 46, and 67). 
449 E.g., Nelson and Pope (1991), Eubank, Schechtman, and Yitzhaki (1993), Kaur, Rao, and 
Singh (1994), Barrett and Donald (2003), Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2009), Bennett (2010), 
Linton, Song, and Whang (2010), Chou and Chang (2012), and many others. 
450 Klaever (2006, p. 46). 
451 E.g., Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992), Funke (1994), Harvey and Siddique (2000), and 
Klaever (2006). 
452 Schmid and Trede (2000, p. 316). 
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4.3.1.5 Calculation of Returns 
This empirical work not only investigates the effect of insurance transactions in 
the short run, but also in the long run. As explained later in this chapter, we 
collect the short-term and long-term stock market data by Bloomberg (See 
Table 18 in Section 4.3.8). 
4.3.1.5.1 Short-Term Returns 
In the short-term study, we use daily stock returns of all reviewed insurance 
companies in order to compare the return distributions of an acquiring firm 
portfolio with a portfolio of benchmark control firms.  
Following common practice,453 the dividend-adjusted daily stock return for the 
acquirer company i at time t has been computed as  
 
where  is called the daily simple total return to shareholders (TRS) adjusted 
for dividends,  is the asset price at the end of trading day t,  is the asset 
price at the end of one day prior to the trading day, and  denotes the amount 
of the cash dividend per share, which is added to the share price on the ex-
dividend date.  is referred to as the capital gain, whereas  is 
referred to as the dividend yield. Benchmark firm daily returns (TRS) are 
calculated in the same manner as described above. Both acquirer and 
benchmark firm TRS are estimated over a period ranging from the publication 
date of M&A announcement ( ) up to five trading days after the day of 
announcement (  or ).454 The majority of the reviewed event 
                                            
 
453 Elango (2006), Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009), for example, also use simple 
daily returns to shareholders in their recent empirical studies. In contrast, Schmid and Trede 
(2000), Cummins and Weiss (2004), and Klaever (2006) compute continuously compounded 
rates of returns. Following their approach, we perform a second calculation, this time using 
continuously compounded total returns to shareholders as a basis for the calculation. The 
dividend-adjusted daily stock return for company i at time t becomes 
 where  is called the continuously compounded return adjusted 
for dividends and  is the natural log function.
 
 
454 Note that if an asset is not traded on a particular trading day within the estimation period, we 
use the asset price on the following trading day for calculating the daily return. 
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studies455 analyzing the market response to insurance transactions also utilize 
(at least some of) these various short-term post-announcement windows. 
 
In an additional analysis, we also calculate short-term acquirer CARs to enable 
an easy comparison with the results of previous event studies that rely on the 
traditional event study approach and hence on CARs. In a first step, daily stock 
returns of the acquirer and benchmark are used in order to compute daily 
abnormal returns relative to a benchmark. The abnormal return  on day t for 
insurer i is measured as the difference between the daily total return to 
shareholders  of insurer i and the benchmark daily return  for this 
particular insurer i,  
 
with  and where  denotes the realized daily return of 
benchmark company m during time period t. 
In a second step, the cumulative abnormal return for a particular insurer i across 
a specified time interval from time  to time  is calculated as 
 
where  is the announcement day (day 0) and  is a particular day within the 
announcement period (announcement day +1 to +5).  
In a last step, the CARs of each individual company i are aggregated across all 
companies in the sample and hence the equally weighted average cumulative 
abnormal return is provided by 
 
where N is the number of transactions in the sample. 
4.3.1.5.2 Long-Term Returns 
In general, no consensus exists among researchers and practitioners on the 
particular time period in which the effects of transactions can accurately be 
                                            
 
455 E.g., Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), Schertzinger (2008), 
Cummins and Xie (2009), and Staikouras (2009). 
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assessed. As described earlier, the choice of the estimation period is always a 
trade-off between being long enough to capture the full performance effect of 
the particular transaction under analysis and the overlay of other factors that are 
not related to the respective transaction when extending the event period. 
Following the hypothesis that the valuation effects of M&A transactions may be 
spread over several years following the deal announcement,456 we place further 
attention to the long term. Accordingly, in addition to those previously described 
short-term event windows, our study also looks at several longer post-M&A 
periods in order to evaluate long-term performance effects of these insurance 
transactions. In this work, long-term returns to acquiring firm shareholders are 
calculated over three periods extending from the month prior to the 
announcement month ( ) to the announcement month plus one year, plus two 
years, and plus three years ( ).  
 
This long-term event window of up to three years after the announcement has 
been chosen in accordance with previous long-term event studies in which the 
maximum event window setting was also three years after the M&A 
announcement year.457 In addition, some empirical evidence supports such a 
particular long-term event window, as a survey conducted on US managers by 
the American Management Association shows that the full synergy potential of 
a transaction is achieved during a three-year post-M&A period in more than half 
of all M&A transactions.458 Based on these findings, Settnik (2006) also uses a 
post-event window of up to three years in his accounting-based study on the 
effects of M&A transactions in the insurance industry. 
 
First of all, monthly simple returns to shareholders of each company has to be 
computed as 
                                            
 
456 See, e.g., Fama (1998, p. 292). 
457 See both long-term event studies by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), and Schertzinger 
(2008). 
458 In 28% of the transactions, the full synergy potential was achieved in one to two years after 
deal announcement, in 30% after two to three years, and in 29% after three to five years after 
the deal; see Perin (1996, p. 70). 
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459 
where  denotes the monthly simple net return to shareholders of the 
acquiring insurance firm i at time t,  is the average asset price in month t, and
 is the average asset price one month earlier. Monthly simple returns to 
shareholders of the respective benchmark firm, , are computed 
similarly. 
Monthly simple returns are then compounded to calculate buy-and-hold returns 
(BHRs) of company i over several holding periods as shown below: 
 
where  is the buy-and-hold return for company i over the time period from 
 to  where  1, 2, and 3 year(s). Benchmark company buy-and-hold 
returns in period TY are calculated analogously using their respective monthly 
simple returns .  
 
Once again, for comparison purpose with previous empirical studies applying 
the traditional event study approach, we also calculate long-term buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns. Following the advice of Barber and Lyon (1997) that 
“researchers should calculate abnormal returns as the simple buy-and-hold 
return on a sample firm less the simple buy-and-hold return on a reference 
portfolio or control firm,”460 we calculate long-term abnormal returns as  
 
                                            
 
459 Note that because of the negligible effect of dividend payments in calculating long-term 
abnormal returns, we do not adjust for dividends in the long-term study. 
460 Barber and Lyon (1997, p. 342). The authors justify their claim for this calculation procedure 
by the fact that this procedure for estimating long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns takes 
the monthly compounding into account and thereby eliminates the measurement bias 
stemming from cumulating abnormal returns and hence produces accurate long-term results 
(For further information, see also Higson & Elliott, 1998; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999; Arikan, 
2004; Spiss, 2008). This procedure has also been applied by most recent researchers 
investigating the long-term effects of corporate events, including Higson and Elliott (1998), 
Schertzinger (2008), and Spiss (2008). 
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where  is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for insurer i over the 
respective time period from  to . 
Subsequently, the equally weighted average BHAR across all transactions in 
the sample is determined as follows  
  
where N is the number of transactions in the sample. 
4.3.2 Operationalization of Determinants of M&A Success 
After specifying the methodology used to determine short-term and medium- 
and long-term effects of M&A deals, it is necessary to operationalize the various 
determinants that are likely to influence the overall performance of acquiring 
insurers.  
 
First of all, an acquirer’s absolute size, growth, transaction experience, and line 
of business have to be operationalized as the influence of these features of the 
acquiring insurance firm is investigated. 
Consistent with previous event study research on the effect of insurance M&A, 
an acquirer’s absolute size is measured as the market value of equity of the 
respective acquirer at the day of announcement.461 Acquirers are then sorted 
into the groups “large” and “small” according to the respective market value at 
announcement. Acquirers with a market value above the median are classified 
as large acquirers, whereas acquirers with below median market value are 
classified as small acquirers.  
Similar to the specification used by Schertzinger (2008), an acquirer’s pre-M&A 
growth is computed by taking the relative change in the acquirer’s market value 
in the period from one year prior to announcement to the day of 
announcement.462 We split acquirers into a group of acquirers with a negative 
                                            
 
461 More precisely, the price on the announcement day is defined as the closing price at the end 
of the day prior to the announcement day. See Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and 
Xie (2005), Schertzinger (2008), and Cummins and Xie (2009). 
462 In the few cases in which no market value could be estimated on the exact announcement 
day or exact day one year prior to the announcement day, we used the respective market 
value on 01/01 of the respective year. 
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growth rate over this one-year estimation window and a group of acquirers with 
a positive growth rate. 
Analogously, insurance acquirers are divided into groups of M&A-experienced, 
medium experienced, and inexperienced acquirers. Acquirers announcing more 
than four transactions463 in the announcement year464 are classified as M&A-
experienced acquirers, while announcing two to four transactions and 
announcing only one transaction resulted in a categorization into the groups 
medium M&A experienced and inexperienced, respectively. 
Hypothesis 5 tests whether differences in the outcome of insurance transactions 
can be attributed to the acquirer’s line of business. Accordingly, we split the 
sample of acquiring firms into life/health acquirers, property/casualty acquirers, 
and a subset consisting of multi-line and other insurers.465   
 
In addition to these acquirer characteristics, two features of the target company 
need to be specified: first, the relative size of the target, and second, the 
target’s line of business. 
The relative size of the target firm is defined in this work as the deal value 
relative to the acquirer market value at M&A announcement.466 We have 
classified the transactions in the following subsamples: A subsample where all 
transactions have a relative deal size of above 50% are characterized as large, 
between 11% and 50% as medium, and transactions below 11% of an 
acquirer’s market value as small.  
To investigate the performance effect of targets’ line of business, target firms 
are categorized in multiple groups in accordance to their respective GICS 
subindustry (i.e., line of business). We distinguish between life/health insurance 
                                            
 
463 No value limit. 
464 Number of transactions conducted in the announcement year is the most common 
operationalization of transaction success in previous insurance M&A literature (see for 
example, Cummins & Xie, 2005; Boubakri, Dionne, &Triki, 2006; Cummins & Xie, 2009). 
465 Other insurers comprise insurance companies belonging to the subindustries reinsurance 
and insurance brokers. 
466 Our definition is in accordance with the event studies by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), 
Schertzinger (2008), and Staikouras (2009). Other reviewed event studies define this variable 
as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the target’s market capitalization to acquirer’s market 
capitalization (Cummins & Xie, 2005, 2009), the ratio of the market capitalization of the target 
to the industry median market capitalization (Akhigbe & Madura, 2001), and as a dummy 
variable to indicate whether the target is an insurance agency or broker (Boubakri, Dionne, & 
Triki, 2006). 
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targets, property/casualty insurers, multi-line and other insurance targets, and a 
group of banks and other financial services targets. 
 
Moreover, differences in the post-M&A performance of acquiring insurance 
firms are attributed to the impact of various features of the transaction 
structuring and management phase. Consequently, our empirical study 
investigates the impact of geographic area, industry relatedness, strategic 
direction, and the influence of a pre-M&A participation in the target and the 
method of payment. 
First, we form subsamples according to the geographic region of acquirer and 
target firm, which is defined as the country of incorporation, to investigate if 
insurance acquirers involved in geographically focusing (within-border467) 
transactions outperform or underperform insurance acquirers that conduct 
geographically diversifying (cross-border) M&A deals.468  
Similarly, we divide transactions based on the industry relatedness between 
acquirers’ and targets’ businesses. Once again, GICS subindustry codes469 are 
used in order to differentiate between industry-focusing (within-industry) and 
industry-diversifying (cross-industry) M&A. Industry-focusing M&A are defined 
as transactions where the acquirer and target have identical GICS industry 
codes; they are industry-diversifying transactions if not. 
Combining the geographic and industry dimension, we test in a further 
hypothesis whether insurance acquirers exhibit different performances 
depending on the chosen strategic direction. All transactions are subdivided into 
three groups, labeled full focusing (within-country and within-industry 
                                            
 
467 In accordance to Spiss (2008), we define within-border M&A as “transactions where the 
acquirer and the target [both] are headquartered in the same country” and cross-border M&A 
as “transactions where the acquirer and the target are headquartered in two separate 
countries” (p. 118). 
468 This formation of subsamples is consistent with the procedure most authors adopt (see, e.g., 
Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Cummins & Weiss, 2004; Cummins & Xie, 2005; Boubakri, 
Dionne, & Triki, 2006; Schertzinger, 2008). 
469 Using Bloomberg as a primary source of data, Staikouras (2009) also identifies insurance 
firms and banks according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Two or four 
digit SIC codes are used by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) and Schertzinger (2008) to 
identify the particular lines of business of acquiring and target firms. Cummins and Weiss 
(2004) categorize industries according to North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) codes, whereas Cummins and Xie (2005) obtain the primary insurance sectors from 
the SNL DataSource. 
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transactions), full diversifying (cross-country and cross-industry transactions), 
and mixed (either within-country and cross-industry or cross-country and within-
industry transaction). 
A further influencing factor of success in insurance M&A is the acquirer’s 
participation in the target before M&A announcement. Like Cummins and Weiss 
(2005, 2009), we test this relationship by classifying M&A transactions into two 
groups based on whether the acquirer has an ownership in its target before 
announcing the specific deal.     
To gauge whether there are differences in acquirers’ post-M&A performance 
related to the method of payment, we split the final sample of M&A transactions 
into three groups, depending on the particular payment structure. The first 
group consists of all transactions paid exclusively with cash, whereas the 
second group includes all pure stock-financed transactions. A third group, called 
“mixed,” covers all M&A in which a mixture of cash and stock is used as the 
payment method.470 
 
In our last hypothesis, we test the effect of the economic environment 
determinant. The timing of the transaction with respect to the M&A cycle is 
tested in the recent academic work of Schertzinger (2008) and found to be 
significantly related to the outcome of M&A in the European insurance market. 
Consequently, we also test the performance effect of the timing of transactions. 
We make use of a typical two-phase classification scheme471 by differentiating 
between phases of weak and strong M&A activity. In accordance to 
Schertzinger’s (2008) classification, phases of strong M&A activity (upswing and 
peak phase) comprise the years 1996–1999 and 2006–2007, whereas phases 
of weak M&A activity (bottom and downturn phase) include the years 
1993”1995, 2000–2005, and 2008–2009.472 However, as the M&A cycle is 
found to be highly correlated with the economic cycle,473 we also follow the 
                                            
 
470 The identical classification scheme is also used by Floreani and Rigamonti (2001). Akhigbe 
and Madura (2001) and Cummins and Xie (2005, 2009) split their samples only into two 
groups, namely “cash payment” and “others/otherwise.” 
471 See, e.g., Hamilton (1989). 
472 See also section 2.2.5 for a detailed picture on the various M&A waves. 
473 Liu and Wen (2010) compare the M&A and the economic cycle and empirically reveal a 
synchronic relation between the two cycles. Moreover, the authors combine the results of 
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approach by Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), Wuebben (2007), and The 
Boston Consulting Group (2009a) and focus additionally on the economic cycle. 
We obtain the annual real GDP growth for the period 1993–2009 from Eurostat 
and then divide our sample into two groups based on the euro area annual real 
GDP growth by expenditure. The first group is called strong economy M&A and 
includes all transactions that were announced in periods of above-average 
annual GDP growth.474 The second group is called weak economy M&A and 
includes all transactions that were announced in a period of below-average 
annual GDP growth. Considering whether the transaction was announced in a 
year of below-average economic growth or in a year of above average 
economic growth allows us to test the potential influence of the economic cycle 
on the success of insurance M&A. 
In summary, Table 16 gives a brief summary on the various tested influencing 
factors, their respective definitions in our work, and the formation of subsamples 
for testing. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
previous studies examining this relationship (e.g., Markham, 1955; Nelson, 1959; Melicher, 
Ledolter, & Antonio, 1983; Wang Junhua, Pan Yonghui, & Han Shikun, 2004) and conclude, 
based on a literature overview, that the M&A cycle is associated with the economic cycle.  
474 The average annual real GDP growth by expenditure in the euro area in the time period 
1992–2011 is 1.61% (see Table 42 in the appendix). Accordingly, transactions that were 
announced in years with real GDP growth of above 1.61% are classified into the subset 
“strong economy M&A” (years 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, & 2010), while deals announced in years with real GDP growth below 1.61% are 
classified into the subset “weak economy M&A” (years 1992, 1993, 1996, 2002, 2003, 2008, 
2009, & 2011). In addition, the average annual real GDP growth in the period studied (1993–
2009) is 1.60% and hence yields an identical partitioning of the transactions studied. 
  
191 
Table 15: Variable operationalization and formation of subsamples 
 
 
4.3.3 Selection of Investigated Time Periods 
As illustrated in Section 2.2.5, the various M&A waves differ substantially with 
regard to the underlying characteristics and motivations of the involved parties. 
According to various researchers,475 these differences might be responsible for 
inconsistent findings of prior academic research on the topic of value creation in 
insurance M&A. Consequently, in order to get meaningful results, we have to 
                                            
 
475 E.g., Kerler (1999), Martynova and Renneboog (2005), and Wuebben (2007). 
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restrict our investigation to only analyzing specific M&A transactions that took 
place during a comparable time period defined by similar underlying motives 
and characteristics. Based on our review of the consolidation process and the 
M&A waves (Sections 1.1 and 2.2.5), we choose to confine our study to 
analyzing insurance transactions during the years 1993 through 2009. This time 
frame not only includes the two most recent M&A waves, the fifth (1993–2000) 
and the sixth (2003–2007), which are characterized by similar characteristics 
and motivational factors, it also includes the most up-to-date data set available 
when considering the three-year post-M&A performance of acquiring insurers. 
4.3.4 Selection of Geographic Areas 
Based on the findings of previous insurance M&A literature on the effects of 
M&A deals on acquiring insurers’ post-M&A performance (Chapter 3), it 
becomes clear that these effects may differ considerably between geographical 
areas. Consequently, it does not make sense to investigate the effects of US, 
European, and/or global deals in one joint sample. We hence geographically 
restrict the empirical analysis to transactions involving Western European476 
insurance acquirers. Target firms, however, may come from all over the world, 
as we exclusively assess the performance effects of acquiring insurance firms 
and do not evaluate the financial benefits occurring to target firm shareholders. 
4.3.5 Selection of Firms 
4.3.5.1 Acquiring Insurance Firms 
In order to identify all relevant insurance company acquirers, we first have to 
compile a list of all stock-listed Western European companies that 
predominantly engage in the insurance business. Due to the regional focus of 
our empirical study, we only include insurance companies that are 
                                            
 
476 Western European countries, as defined by Bloomberg, comprise Andorra (AD), Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Faroe Island (FO), Finland (FI), France 
(FR), Germany (DE), Gibraltar (GI), Greece (GR), Guernsey (GG), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), 
Isle of Man (IM), Italy (IT), Jersey (JE), Lichtenstein (LI), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), 
Monaco (MC), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Reunion (RE), San Marino 
(SM), Spain (ES), Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands (SJ), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), and 
the United Kingdom (GB). 
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headquartered477 in one of the previously enumerated Western European 
countries. The STOXX Europe 600 Insurance index (ISIN EU0009658822), 
which is derived from the STOXX Europe 600 index that consists of 600 
components of different listed companies across 18 European countries,478 
serves as an ideal starting point. In general, all listed companies can be 
categorized into various Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) groups 
ranging from 10 broad industry groups through 19 more detailed supersectors 
to 41 sectors, which again are subdivided into 114 very detailed subsectors.479 
Based on this ICB classification scheme, every single stock and hence each of 
the 600 companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600 is uniquely allocated to one 
of the 114 fine-grained subsectors and consequently also to one of the 41 
sectors, to one of the 19 supersectors, and to one of the 10 industries according 
to their primary revenue source.480 The STOXX Europe 600 Insurance index 
includes all companies belonging to the broad industry “Financials,” as well as 
the more detailed supersector “Insurance,” and comprises hence all listed 
insurance companies included in the STOXX Europe 600. In addition to all 
constituents of the STOXX Euro 600 Insurance index, further insurance firms 
obtained from a Bloomberg search are also added. Restricting the Bloomberg 
search to all actively traded primary securities that belong to the insurance 
industry481 and that are located in Western Europe,482 we identified numerous 
other potential insurance acquirers. In order to produce a reasonably 
homogenous final sample of similarly sized insurance acquirers and to obtain 
                                            
 
477 Earlier empirical studies regularly use the headquarters of the respective firm as the 
definition of the firm’s country of origin, see, e.g., Hitt and Hoskisson (1994), Ruigrok and 
Wagner (2003), Cummins and Xie (2005), Pindur (2006), Schertzinger (2008), Spiss (2008), 
and Boesecke (2009). 
478 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 
479 www.icbenchmark.com. Figure 21 in the appendix visualizes this ICB structure and the later 
discussed GICS structure. 
480 www.stoxx.com  
481 Bloomberg also uses a classification scheme for categorizing listed companies that is similar 
to the ICB one, namely the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), which was 
developed by Morgan Stanley and Standard & Poor's in 1999. Instead of using the group 
names “Industry,” “Supersectors,” “Sectors,” and “Subsectors,” GICS names these respective 
groups “Sector,” “Industry Group,” “Industry,” and “Subindustry.” Currently, the GICS structure 
consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries, and 154 subindustries; see 
www.msci.com. 
482 For a list of all countries belonging to the Western European region, see above. 
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meaningful results in the empirical investigation, we use a cut-off threshold of 
1% market value of the insurance company with the highest market value at the 
beginning of the respective year.483 This search, in combination with the 
previously identified STOXX Europe 600 Insurance companies, provided a 
preliminary sample size of 89 potential insurance acquirers.484 In order to 
conduct a capital market study and to obtain stock market data, each insurance 
company in the sample has to be stock listed. However, we do not require the 
respective insurers to be listed over the full sample period of 1993–2009. Yet 
the insurer has to be listed and hence publicly traded before the end of the 
sample period, in December 2009. As two insurance companies485 were listed 
after 12/31/2009, these two potential acquirers had to be eliminated from the 
sample. Moreover, besides the general requirement of being stock listed before 
12/31/2009, insurers must not be delisted before 12/31/2012486 and 
consequently survive the full period from the first day of being listed to the end 
of the year 2012. This exclusion of non-surviving (or delisted) companies may 
possibly generate a small bias in the final performance estimates (i.e., 
survivorship bias487). Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003, p. 310) give an example 
of a positive survivorship bias that would arise if unsuccessful non-surviving 
acquirers with negative returns would be eliminated from the sample, for 
example, due to bankruptcy or liquidation. In this case, the exclusion would lead 
to upward-biased estimates of the M&A test sample performance and hence 
more positive overall BHARs. Conversely, the authors argue that an exclusion 
of non-surviving insurers with negative returns from the control sample would 
positively influence the benchmark group performance estimates.  
Consequently, this exclusion would result in a negative shift in the overall 
BHARs of acquirers. However, as this potential bias would probably affect both 
                                            
 
483 Such an absolute cut-off point for very small insurance companies is also used by Cummins 
and Xie (2009). The authors justify this restriction by noting that “extremely small firms are 
atypical and may bias the estimation” (p. 135). 
484 Due to restrictions in data availability, only constituents of the STOXX Euro 600 Insurance 
index in the years between 01/01/2008 and 12/31/2012 can be included. Furthermore, data 
provided by Bloomberg was only available for the time period 01/01/2003 to 31/12/2012. 
485 Direct Line Insurance Group PLC (DLG LN) and Talanx AG (TLX GR).  
486 12/31/2009 plus the maximum investigation period of three years. 
487 I.e., the performance difference between a portfolio of all companies and a portfolio of only 
surviving companies. For a detailed discussion and evidence on the survivorship bias, see for 
example, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003, p. 310). 
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the acquirer and the control firm sample in a similar way, Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) conclude that “the effects may cancel out and abnormal returns 
may be relatively unbiased” (p. 310). In addition, previous empirical research 
has shown that results of tests including only survivors and tests including both 
survivors and non-survivors do not significantly differ.488 Accordingly, we 
consider this potential survivorship bias (especially in our case, when analyzing 
the success of M&A transactions in the insurance industry)489 to be the lesser 
evil as compared with the expected stronger bias when including these non-
survivors in our final sample. To explain this assumption, we have to 
concentrate on the distinct reasons for companies being delisted, as we expect 
them to significantly influence the direction of the potential bias. The scenarios 
include companies that voluntarily delist to reduce compliance and regulatory 
costs and the chance of bankruptcy/liquidation, public companies that become 
private, and companies that are transformed by mergers and acquisitions.490 As 
in the example of Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), an elimination of non-
survivors with negative returns (e.g., unsuccessful companies that have been 
delisted due to bankruptcy or financial distress) from the test sample of 
acquirers would ultimately bias returns upwards, whereas an elimination of non-
survivors with positive returns (e.g., successful companies that have been 
delisted due to merger or acquisition) from the test sample of acquirers would 
ultimately bias returns upwards (and vice versa in the case of exclusion of non-
survivors from the benchmark sample). Accordingly, these two opposing effects 
are also likely to cancel out, and hence the exclusion of successful and 
unsuccessful non-survivors should not have a significant impact on the results 
of a study. Besides this relatively harmless bias when excluding non-survivors, 
including them could even be more harmful and distort the results more 
seriously. To illustrate such a severe bias resulting from the inclusion of non-
survivors, we provide an example of an acquirer that is being acquired during 
the event window. First, we consider an insurance company that carries out an 
M&A transaction in t0. We further assume that the acquiring insurer makes 
                                            
 
488 See, Higson and Elliott (1998) and Baker and Limmack (2001). 
489 In the insurance industry, liquidation is less likely to occur as compared to other industries. 
For a detailed explanation on this, see Farny (2011, p. 203).  
490 Thomsen and Vinten (2007, p. 7). 
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severe mistakes in the acquisition process (e.g., poor due diligence leading to 
valuation mistakes, overestimating the benefits of the deal, and consequently 
incurring an excessive deal premium, and underestimating the challenges and 
risks associated with the deal) and hence that this acquisition is deemed value 
destroying, and the acquirer experiences a declining performance in the 
aftermath.  
 
Consequently, this transaction shows a substantial negative buy-and-hold 
abnormal return of, say, -15% over the 11-month period after the 
announcement. However, due to financial problems and a low valuation 
resulting from the failed M&A transaction, the initial acquirer is becoming a 
preferred acquisition target,491 which we then assume to be acquired in t1 (i.e., 
12 months after the initial M&A announcement). As outlined in Section 3.7.2, 
acquired insurance firms regularly experience a strong positive market reaction 
and outperform the market or their non-acquired counterparts. In our example, 
we suppose the initial acquirer experiences a strong positive abnormal return of 
25% on the announcement of being acquired. Accordingly, the overall one-year 
BHAR of the initial acquirer is positive, which leads to the conclusion that the 
previously conducted M&A transaction is branded successful. However, as 
seen in the example, the positive outperformance is solely attributable to being 
an acquisition target and not to being a successful acquirer. Consequently, the 
above example illustrates how the inclusion of a non-survivor in the final sample 
would distort the results of the capital market-based analysis on the effects of 
insurance M&A. We therefore excluded insurance companies that did not 
survive the full investigation period (01/01/1993 to 12/31/2012) from the sample 
of potential acquirer firms. This constraint resulted in a reduction of 25 
insurance companies, which ultimately left 62 insurance companies for analysis, 
shown in Table 17. 
 
                                            
 
491 The assumption that financial vulnerability of insurers increases the likelihood of being 
acquired is based on the findings of Klumpes (2006, p. 29). 
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Table 16: Overview of insurance companies in the final sample 
  
 
Bloomberg ISIN Company Name Subindustry CoI
1 ABB LN GB00B293ZK84 Abbey Protection PLC Ins. Services & Other GB
2 ACE US CH0044318745 ACE Limited Property/Casualty CH
3 ADM LN GB00B02J6398 Admiral Group PLC Property/Casualty GB
4 AGN NA NL0000303709 Aegon NV Life/Health NL
5 AGS BB BE0974264930 Ageas Life/Health BE
6 ALMB DC DK0015250344 Alm. Brand A/S Property/Casualty DK
7 ALV GR DE0008404005 Allianz SE Multi-line DE
8 AML LN GB00B2988H17 Amlin PLC Property/Casualty GB
9 AON US GB00B5BT0K07 Aon PLC Insurance Brokers GB
10 APR FP FR0004037125 April Life/Health FR
11 AV/ LN GB0002162385 Aviva PLC Life/Health GB
12 AWH US CH0121032772 Allied World Ass. Company Holding AG Property/Casualty CH
13 BALN VX CH0012410517 Baloise Holding AG Multi-line CH
14 BEZ LN JE00B64G9089 Beazley PLC Property/Casualty GB
15 CASS IM IT0000784154 Societa Cattolica di Assicurazioni Life/Health IT
16 CGL LN BMG196F11004 Catlin Group Ltd Property/Casualty GB
17 CNP FP FR0000120222 CNP Assurances Life/Health FR
18 CS FP FR0000120628 AXA SA Life/Health FR
19 DL NA NL0009294552 Delta Llyod NV Life/Health NL
20 ELE FP FR0004254035 Euler Hermes SA Property/Casualty FR
21 FBD ID IE0003290289 FBD Holdings PLC Property/Casualty IE
22 FOY LX LU0112960504 Foyer SA Property/Casualty LU
23 FSA IM IT0001463071 Fondiaria-Sai SpA Property/Casualty IT
24 G IM IT0000062072 Assicuranzioni Generali SpA Life/Health IT
25 GBLI US IE00B5NH3H04 Global Indemnity PLC Property/Casualty IE
26 GCO SM ES0116920333 Grupo Catalane Occidente SA Property/Casualty ES
27 GE1 GR DE0008400029 Generali Deutschland Holding AG Life/Health DE
28 GJF NO NO0010582521 Gjensidige Forsikring ASA Property/Casualty NO
29 HELN SE CH0012271687 Helvetia Holding AG Life/Health CH
30 HNR1 GR DE0008402215 Hannover Rueckversicherung AG Reinsurance DE
31 HSX LN BMG000FD8G46 Hiscox Ltd Property/Casualty GB
32 INGA NA NL0000303600 ING Groep NV Life/Health NL
33 JLT LN GB0005203376 Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group PLC Insurance Brokers GB
34 LGEN LN GB0005603997 Legal & General Group PLC Life/Health GB
35 LRE LN BMG5361W1047 Lancashire Holdings Ltd Property/Casualty GB
36 MAP SM ES0124244E34 Mapfre SA Multi-line ES
37 MED IM IT0001279501 Mediolanum SpA Life/Health IT
38 MI IM IT0000062221 Milano Assicurazioni SpA Property/Casualty IT
39 MUV2 GR DE0008430026 Muenchener Rueckvers. AG / MunichRe Reinsurance DE
40 NATN SW CH0100699641 Schweizer. Nat.-Vers.-Gesellschaft AG Property/Casualty CH
41 NBG6 GR DE0008435967 Nuernberger Beteiligungs-AG Life/Health DE
42 NVA LN GB00B40SF849 Novae Group PLC Property/Casualty GB
43 OML LN GB00B77J0862 Old Mutual PLC Life/Health GB
44 PF IM IT0001475109 Premafin Finanziaria SpA Multi-line IT
45 PHNX LN KYG7091M1096 Phoenix Group Holdings Life/Health JE
46 PRU LN GB0007099541 Prudential PLC Life/Health GB
47 RSA LN GB0006616899 RSA Insurance Group PLC Property/Casualty GB
48 RUKN VX / SREN VX CH0126881561 Swiss Reins. Co Ltd  / Swiss Re AG Reinsurance CH
49 SAMAS FH FI0009003305 Sampo Property/Casualty FI
50 SCR FP FR0010411983 SCOR SE Reinsurance FR
51 SL/ LN GB00B16KPT44 Standard Life PLC Life/Health GB
52 SLHN VX CH0014852781 Swiss Life Holding AG Life/Health CH
53 STB NO NO0003053605 Storebrand ASA Life/Health NO
54 STJ LN GB0007669376 St James's Place PLC Life/Health GB
55 TOP DC DK0010259530 Topdanmark A/S Property/Casualty DK
56 TRYG DC DK0060013274 Tryg A/S Property/Casualty DK
57 UNI IM IT0001074589 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario SpA Multi-line IT
58 UQA AV AT0000821103 Uniqua Versicherungen AG Multi-line AT
59 VAHN SW CH0021545667 Vaudoise Assurances Holding SA Life/Health CH
60 VIG AV AT0000908504 Vienna Insurance Group AG Multi-line AT
61 XL US IE00B5LRLL25 XL Group PLC Life/Health IE
62 ZURN VX CH0011075394 Zurich Insurance Group AG Multi-line CH
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4.3.5.2 Control Firms 
In order to measure the financial performance effects of M&A transactions, one 
has to compare the realized financial performance after announcing the M&A 
transaction with the hypothetical performance that would have occurred without 
conducting the M&A transaction.492 However, as this hypothetical performance 
cannot be observed, it has to be derived from a particular benchmark model, 
which is always problematic, especially over a long study horizon.493 Problems 
and biases when analyzing the effect of corporate events such as M&A 
announcements, for example, bad-model problems, sampling biases, and new 
listing and rebalancing biases, might arise from an inadequate benchmarking 
procedure.494 Previous capital market studies apply various different benchmark 
models, ranging from single- and multi-factor regression models to size, book-
to-market, and/or size and book-to-market matched control firm or reference 
portfolio approaches.495 One of the main advantages of the SD approach is that 
it does not require asset pricing benchmarks. In our empirical study, we hence 
use a book-to-market adjusted control firm benchmark, as this approach is the 
most suitable for our estimation methodology and is hence also the most 
commonly used benchmark in previous studies496 applying the same estimation 
methodology. Similar to the sample of acquiring firms, control firms have to be 
stock listed and publicly traded before 12/31/2009 and not delisted before 
12/31/2012.  
 
Moreover, they have to be headquartered in one of the previously mentioned 
Western European countries and predominantly engage in the insurance 
business. We also restrict the control firm sample to firms with at least 1% of the 
market value of the insurer with the highest market value at the beginning of the 
respective year. Consequently, the list of control firms comprises the same 62 
companies that are also included in the sample of potential acquirers, and 
                                            
 
492 E.g., Fairburn and Kay (1989, p. 32). 
493 See, e.g., Barber and Lyon (1997, p. 342) and Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2011, p. 10). 
494 E.g., Barber and Lyon (1997, p. 354), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999, p. 165), and 
Schertzinger (2006, p. 73), 
495 E.g., Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 5), Cummins and Xie (2005, p. 18), Schertzinger 
(2008, p. 56, p. 66, p. 91 and p. 127), and Cummins and Xie (2009, p. 136). 
496 E.g., Ang and Zhang (2002), Abhyankar and Ho (2003), and Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao 
(2006). 
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hence it is guaranteed that each acquiring insurer is matched only to a control 
firm also belonging to the insurance industry,497 which in turn “control[s] for 
changes in performance attributable to industry or economy-wide factors,” as 
outlined by Kruse et al. (2002, p. 7). As a further matching requirement, the 
respective benchmark firm has to belong to the same subindustry (i.e., line of 
business) as the acquiring insurer. This restriction prevents not only the 
matching of insurance companies of dramatically different sizes498 (e.g., large 
insurance companies with multiple lines of business are not matched with much 
smaller single-line insurance companies), but also biases resulting from an 
incorrect matching of insurance firms with largely differing lines of business and 
hence differing insurance exposures (e.g., life/health insurers and companies 
operating only in the non-life sector, such as property/casualty insurers). In 
addition to matching acquirer and control firms by industry and subindustry, 
following the proposal of Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999), benchmark companies are ranked by their book-to-market ratio499 and 
selected based on the lowest difference between the acquirer’s and benchmark 
firm’s ratio at the end of the year preceding the transaction year.500 By this 
method, we match the sample of acquiring firms with non-acquiring insurance 
companies, not only based on industry and subindustry, but also on the market-
to-book performance ratio. Similar to previous studies,501 the respective 
benchmark company must not engage in M&A activity over a period of three 
years surrounding the M&A announcement date of the particular transaction 
                                            
 
497 Here and in the following, we use the GICS industry classification system, which is also 
adapted by the main data source of our empirical study, namely Bloomberg. 
498 Other authors, such as Ang and Zhang (2002), Kruse et al. (2002), and Schertzinger (2008), 
directly use the size of companies as matching criteria (e.g., the book value of the control firm 
has to be in the range of 70% to 130% of the acquirer). We consider the respective line of 
business to be a good approximation for firms’ size and moreover to be a more meaningful 
matching criterion, especially for the insurance sector.  
499 The book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of common equity divided by the 
market value of common equity; see, e.g., Schertzinger (2008, p. 127) and Yezegel (2009, p. 
120). “[B]ook-to-market is an important issue in takeovers, either as a measure of growth 
opportunities or distress risk, or as an indicator of over or under valuation,” as supposed by 
Gregory (1997, p. 982), and is consequently a crucial standard for comparing competing firms 
in the same industry. 
500 Earlier academic papers that match their sample of acquirer and benchmark firms by the 
book-to-market ratio include Loughran and Vijh (1997), Mitchell and Stafford (1997), Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), Francouer (2006), Peng and Isa (2008), and Schertzinger (2008), to name 
a few. 
501 E.g., Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2007). 
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being investigated. According to Lubatkin (1983, p. 122), this is a further 
requirement in order to ensure a proper benchmarking of acquiring and non-
acquiring insurance firms. 
4.3.6 Selection of Investigated M&A Transactions 
To be included in the final sample, the transactions must meet the following 
criteria: 
First of all, the transaction has to be conducted by one of the previously 
identified 62 stock-listed Western European insurance companies. Secondly, 
this empirical work focuses on insurance transactions that were announced 
between 01/01/1993 and 12/31/2009 and completed by 12/31/2012. The 
respective announcement502 and completion dates are obtained from the two 
financial data and information providers Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters and 
afterwards cross-checked using press releases and/or the financial statements 
of the involved companies. Identifying the exact date on which the transaction is 
first publicly announced is essential for the proper execution, in particular, of 
short-term, capital market-based event studies.503 Moreover, the acquisition 
price, also known as the transaction value,504 has to be known to ensure a 
minimum level of relative importance of the deal with respect to the value of the 
acquiring insurance firm. Given that small acquisitions are less likely to result in 
any abnormal post-acquisition performance, previous studies either make use 
of the relative505 size of the acquisition or they utilize an absolute506 transaction 
                                            
 
502 I.e., the day of the initial announcement of the intention to merge. Floreani and Rigamonti 
(2001) provide a more thorough description of this day by stating that “[t]he announcement 
date is the date the merger is officially released to the general public. For a takeover, the 
announcement date is the date the management of the target firm accepts the proposal. For 
a merger the announcement date is the date of the agreement between the two parties. 
Mergers in the financial industry are subject to the approval of the regulating and the 
antitrust authorities. We then include in our sample all events that received the approval by 
the authorities” (p. 5). 
503 See Entrup (1995, p. 143) and Spiss (2008, p. 106). 
504The transaction value is defined by the SDC as “the total consideration that the acquirer paid 
for the % of the target they are acquiring plus any liabilities assumed if publicly closed.” 
505 Relative size is the transaction value divided by the market value of the acquiring firm’s 
common stock prior to the announcement of the acquisition (see, e.g., Loderer & Martin 1992, 
p. 73; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz 2003, p. 209). In our sample of reviewed studies, 
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) adopt the relative transaction value method. In their study, the 
authors require the ratio between deal value and acquirer market value to be greater than 2%. 
In recent accounting-based work, Settnik (2006) restricts the analysis to transactions in which 
the deal value is in excess of 5% of the acquiring firm’s gross premium income.  
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value. In our empirical analysis, the transaction value has to be equal or larger 
than 8% of the acquiring firm’s current market capitalization507 at the beginning 
of the transaction year.508 While inevitably somewhat arbitrary, this 8% cut-off 
point was chosen because hardly no deals were conducted that had a relative 
size of 6% to 8%, and furthermore the sample size remained adequate for the 
analyses conducted.509 Simultaneously, this cut-off point guarantees that all 
transactions included were sufficiently large to have a significant influence on 
the acquirer’s market value and thereby improve the quality of the data used.510 
Moreover, to focus on deals involving financial services firms, we further require 
targets to include insurers, banks, and other financial services firms. Once 
again, we utilize the GICS classification codes, which are also used by 
Bloomberg to identify acquired firms that belong to the “Financials” sector, and 
we subsequently classify them into their particular financial-services activity 
areas (i.e., their respective subindustry). According to the argumentation and 
theoretical considerations of previous research,511 friendly M&A transactions 
involve different strategic reasons and underlying motives of the respective 
acquirer in comparison to hostile deals.512 As the mood of the M&A deal (i.e., 
friendly or hostile) is additionally found to be an important determinant in the 
success of M&A transactions,513 transactions should be divided according to the 
mood. Based on this knowledge, we only include friendly M&A deals and 
remove hostile ones from the final sample. Furthermore, it is a common practice 
                                                                                                                                
 
506 Akhigbe and Madura (2001), Schertzinger (2008), and Shim (2011a) make use of a minimum 
absolute transaction value ($50 million, $100 million, and $2 million, respectively).  
507 The current market capitalization is measured on the day prior to the announcement day, as 
reported by Bloomberg. If this current market value could not be determined, we used the 
book value from the balance sheet date preceding the announcement date. 
508 See for example, Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) and Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2002), 
who employ a similar methodology in order to eliminate small and insignificant M&A 
transactions from the final sample. 
509 Previous empirical studies use relative cut-off points ranging from 2% (e.g., Floreani & 
Rigamonti, 2001) to 5% (e.g., Megginson, Morgan, & Nail, 2002; Settnik, 2006; Wuebben, 
2007; Spiss, 2008) to 10% (e.g., Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, 1983). We also conducted an 
additional test with a minimum deal value of 10% of acquirer’s market value in order to check 
the robustness of our findings. Overall, our conclusions remained unchanged. 
510 See, e.g., Ravenscraft and Scherer (1988, p. 38), Wuebben (2007, p. 168), and Spiss (2008, 
p. 115). 
511 E.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). 
512 E.g., hostile M&A deals: Acquirers take over the control of an underperforming target and 
subsequently replace or discipline targets’ incumbent management and consequently improve 
its profitability; friendly: operational and strategic synergistic gains. 
513 See, e.g., Franks and Mayer (1996) and Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996). 
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in the extant M&A literature514 to restrict the sample to transactions that lead to 
a change in control.515 To be consistent with takeover theories, we run a first 
analysis using a subsample in which we exclusively cover acquisitions of 
majority stakes, defined by Best’s Insurance Reports as “transactions that 
involve a change in control over targets.” In a second analysis, however, we 
include acquisitions of minority stakes (i.e., transactions that do not represent a 
change in ownership of the target) and acquisitions of majority stakes in which 
the majority of share ownership is attained. By including all of these 
transactions, we are able to investigate the effects of M&A on the entire 
portfolio. Consistent with Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), Schertzinger 
(2008), and Cummins and Xie (2009), we do not exclude transactions with 
multiple bidder activity. As already proved by Schertzinger’s (2008) similar study 
on European insurance M&A, performance effects do not significantly differ 
between a sample of only single bidders, a sample of multiple bidders, and an 
entire sample. Based on this finding, we do not exclude M&A transactions with 
multiple-bidder activity in order to keep an adequate M&A sample size. Last, but 
not least, acquiring an insurer’s stock price must be available for up to three 
years following the initial M&A announcement. This last requirement permits the 
calculation of short-term and long-term abnormal returns and hence the 
analysis of the stock market impact of insurance M&A. Based on stock price 
data availability on Bloomberg, we are able to conduct a capital market-based 
event study. 
 
In summary, the following criteria are used to identify the relevant M&A 
transactions that satisfy our sample requirements: 
• Acquirer is one of the 62 identified publicly traded Western European 
insurance companies (in Section 4.3.5.1). 
• The deal was announced between 01/01/1993 and 12/31/2009. 
• The transaction was completed by 12/31/2012. 
                                            
 
514 E.g., Schertzinger (2008) and Spiss (2008),  
515 This means the acquirer does not own a controlling interest in the target prior to the deal 
announcement, and the transaction results in a change of control of the target. The SDC 
defines a transaction that involves a change in control as “an acquisition that increases the 
stake of the acquiring institution from less than 50% to 50% or more of the ownership shares 
of the target institution.” 
  
203 
• The transaction value is equal to or larger than 8 percent of the acquiring 
insurer’s market value on the day prior to announcement. 
• The target belongs to the “Financials” sector. 
• The transaction is friendly. 
• The acquiring insurer’s stock price must be available for three years after 
M&A announcement. 
4.3.7 Procedure for Testing Stochastic Dominance 
In this section, the testing procedure for comparing return distributions of two 
portfolios, for example, a first portfolio consisting of acquiring insurance firms 
and a second portfolio including the respective benchmark insurance firms, will 
be explained in detail. As it has been outlined in Section 4.3.1.4, stochastic 
dominance between two distributions can either be assessed through a 
descriptive comparison or through a variety of statistical tests. For the purpose 
of this study, a descriptive comparison is considered to be more appropriate 
than a statistical testing procedure. 
First, when trying to establish stochastic dominance of one alternative over the 
other, applying a statistical test in which stochastic dominance is the null 
hypothesis does not offer significant advantages over a descriptive comparison. 
On the one hand, rejection of the null of dominance is not considered a very 
meaningful result, as it does not provide a ranking of the two alternatives. On 
the other hand, non-rejection of the null of dominance cannot ultimately be 
interpreted as the acceptance of stochastic dominance, as it fails to provide 
statistical significant proof of this dominance relationship.516 Employing a 
statistical test in which the null hypothesis is formulated as non-dominance and 
the alternative as dominance would be more advisable for establishing 
significant evidence of a dominance relationship of one alternative over the 
other. This testing procedure, however, is mathematically complex, since the 
boundary of the null hypothesis of non-dominance cannot be expressed in 
closed form.517 Another major disadvantage of statistical tests, which has also 
been pointed out in Section 4.3.1.4.2, lies in the several requirements and 
                                            
 
516 Davidson and Duclos (2009, p. 1). See also section 4.3.1.4.2. 
517 See section 4.3.1.4.2 and the references therein. 
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restrictive assumptions concerning the data employed. In many fields of 
empirical application, these constraints might not be satisfied, and hence 
neither correct results nor reliable conclusions can be drawn from these tests.518 
Klaever’s (2006) modified statistical tests are a promising path for reliable SD 
tests for time series data. However, these new developed tests for stochastic 
dominance are computationally quite complicated, and their proper application 
requires a thorough understanding of the particular methodology and its 
implementation in order to guarantee accurate results concerning a SD 
relationship. Hence, these new developed statistical tests, although promising, 
go beyond the aim and scope of this present analysis. Our work should 
introduce the stochastic dominance concept for analyzing the effects of 
corporate events such as M&A transactions into the M&A literature and promote 
its use as an alternative performance measure to the well-established traditional 
event study approach. Besides being simpler and more convenient in 
calculation, the descriptive approach has another advantage that makes it 
potentially more suitable for our investigation. The used data sample of 102 
transactions between 1993 and 2009 with a maximum estimation period of 
three years is regarded as an adequate size for a descriptive comparison. In 
contrast, a much larger sample size and a longer period would necessitate the 
use of a statistical testing procedure, as in this case, “a descriptive dominance 
relationship is harder to establish.”519 Addressing the disadvantages of a 
descriptive SD approach, we are well aware of the fact that the tendency of 
rejecting first-order stochastic dominance in a descriptive comparison occurs 
too often (because if the empirical distribution functions of returns cross at least 
once, a stochastic dominance relationship of the first order has to be rejected; 
analyzing return distributions of comparable firms over the same event period 
will most likely result in a crossing of the respective return distributions). We will 
keep this in mind when interpreting the results of our descriptive comparison. 
 
                                            
 
518 Schmid and Trede (2000, p. 316), Lim, Maasoumi, and Martin (2004, p. 10), and Klaever 
(2006, p. 49). 
519 Klaever (2006, p. 135). Klaever (2006) also refers to the investigations of Nelson and Pope 
(1991) and Stein, Pfaffenberger, and Kumar (1983), which also mention this problem.  
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In order to establish a dominance relationship between two different groups, for 
example, a group of acquirers and a non-acquiring benchmark group, we 
descriptively compare the empirical cumulative distribution functions at all points 
in the sample. In the short-term investigation, empirical distribution curves (step 
curves) of daily returns are compared with respect to first- and second-order 
stochastic dominance, whereas buy-and-hold return distributions are compared 
in the long-term investigation. 
 
First of all, for each of the 102 transactions and the respective acquiring 
insurance company, we assemble a particular benchmark company. Following 
the previously described selection process,520 benchmark companies are 
chosen on the basis of their respective subindustry (as defined by its GICS 
classification code), book-to-market ratio, and M&A activity surrounding the 
particular M&A deal. Second, for each M&A transaction, acquiring and 
benchmark companies’ dividend-adjusted daily stock returns (for the short-term 
analysis) and buy-and-hold-abnormal returns (for the long-term analysis) are 
calculated as described under “Calculation of Returns” (Section 4.3.1.5). Third, 
all returns—either daily returns in case of the short-term analysis or buy-and-
hold abnormal returns in case of the long-term analysis—of the acquiring 
insurers and their respective benchmark insurers are partitioned into equally 
weighted portfolios based on various characteristics, including acquiring or 
benchmark company, form of payment, relative deal size, line of business, 
percentage acquired, and many others. Subsequently, the empirical distribution 
functions of returns,  and , which are step functions with a finite 
number of n and m steps, respectively, are constructed for the individual 
groups. 
 
Based on these portfolios and their corresponding empirical distribution 
functions, we perform a two-step testing procedure that is comparable to the 
one applied in the paper of Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006), which is the only 
work so far that uses the SD procedure to assess the effects of M&A 
transactions. We first illustrate this two-step testing procedure for the overall 
                                            
 
520 See section 4.3.6. 
! 
ˆ F X ,n(k ) x( )
! 
ˆ F Y ,m(k ) y( )
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effect of insurance M&A. Specific features concerning the testing procedure for 
the various M&A characteristics will be addressed below. 
 
In a first step, we test whether the M&A portfolio dominates the benchmark 
portfolio in the sense of first- and/or second-order SD, that is, X SD1 and/or 
SD2 Y, by comparing the respective two distributions of returns. In a second 
step, we test the converse hypothesis, that is, whether the benchmark portfolio 
first- and/or second-order dominates the M&A portfolio (Y SD1 and/or SD2 X); 
this is accomplished by comparing their empirical distribution functions of 
returns. The results can be interpreted as follows: If the first hypothesis that the 
M&A portfolio kth-order dominates the benchmark portfolio is declined and the 
second hypothesis that the benchmark portfolio kth-order dominates the M&A 
portfolio is confirmed, we conclude that there is a kth-order dominance 
relationship of the benchmark portfolio over the benchmark portfolio (with 
).521 In contrast, if we fail to reject the first hypothesis (i.e., M&A portfolio SDk 
benchmark portfolio) and reject the second hypothesis (i.e., benchmark portfolio 
SDk M&A portfolio), we can infer that the M&A portfolio descriptively dominates 
the benchmark portfolio in the sense of kth-order stochastic dominance.522 
However, if the two hypotheses of the first and second step are both rejected or 
are both confirmed in the sense of SDk, we conclude that there is no kth-order 
stochastic dominance relationship between the M&A and the benchmark 
portfolio returns. Graphically, our testing procedure can be presented as 
follows: 
 
                                            
 
521 In addition to that, to ultimately establish Y SDk X, the benchmark portfolio (Y) is required to 
have a larger mean than the M&A portfolio (X). Klaever (2006) explains this requirement by 
stating “[t]he condition concerning the mean is required in order to prevent the paradox result 
that a stock dominates another one with larger mean. A necessary condition for stochastic 
dominance of any degree is that the mean of the dominant random variable has to be at least 
as large as the mean of the dominated one” (p. 132). 
522 Once again, as a necessary condition for X SDk Y, the M&A portfolio (X) mean is required to 
exceed the benchmark portfolio (Y) mean. 
! 
k =1,2
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Figure 14: Testing procedure as applied in this work and interpretation of results 
 
The testing procedure for the several characteristics of insurance M&A 
transactions is carried out in a similar way. However, in addition to the above-
described comparison of the distribution of returns of a specific acquirer group 
and the distribution of returns of their respective benchmark group, we are also 
able to compare the distribution of abnormal returns of a particular first acquirer 
group with the distribution of abnormal returns of a particular second acquirer 
group. We will clarify these two testing procedures for the characteristic 
“acquirer’s absolute size.” In the short-term (long-term) testing procedure 
illustrated above, we compare, for example, the distribution function of simple 
daily returns (buy-and-hold returns) of a group of large acquirers with the 
distribution of simple daily returns (buy-and-hold returns) of a group consisting 
of the respective benchmark firms corresponding to these large acquirers. A 
possible stochastic dominance relation between the portfolio of large acquirer 
and the benchmark firm portfolio can be revealed by this procedure. A second 
testing procedure, however, is able to establish a dominance relation between a 
portfolio of large acquirers and a second portfolio consisting, for example, of all 
small-sized acquirers. In order to investigate such a short-term (long-term) 
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dominance relationship, the distribution of abnormal523 returns (abnormal buy-
and-hold-returns) of the large acquirer portfolio is compared with the distribution 
function of abnormal returns (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) of the small 
acquirer portfolio. Consequently, when assessing stochastic dominance of the 
various determinants, we not only able to compare the relation between 
acquirer and benchmark groups, we are also able to test for stochastic 
dominance within different acquirer subgroups. 
4.3.8 Generation of M&A and Reference Data 
Information on the M&A data that is required for the event analysis is obtained 
from a variety of data sources, since no single authoritative source on M&A 
deals in the insurance industry exists. The principal source of data consists of 
the specialized agency Bloomberg. Not only a plethora of company-specific 
data, such as acquirer, target, and benchmark company name, subindustry, and 
the country of incorporation, but also information on the M&A transaction itself 
(e.g., announcement and completion dates, transaction value, payment method, 
percentage of shares preowned, and percentage of shares acquired) and the 
foreign exchange rate data are extracted from the Bloomberg database. This 
primary data source ensures the quality and reliability of the obtained data, 
which is essential for the success of this empirical work. Additional information 
required to conduct the analysis that is not accessible through Bloomberg is 
collected from the other major financial information provider, Thomson Reuters, 
the two classification systems for stocks, ICB and GICS, and the involved 
insurers’ financial statements and press releases. Moreover, information on 
economic growth rates for euro area member countries is sourced from 
Eurostat. As previously seen in Table 10, these various data sources have been 
commonly used in recent empirical studies to investigate the effects of 
insurance M&A.524 Table 18 provides a comprehensive summary on the 
individual criteria and the respective data sources used here. 
 
                                            
 
523 Abnormal with respect to the corresponding benchmark firm. For the calculation of abnormal 
returns (buy-and-hold abnormal returns), see section 4.3.1.5.2. 
524 See, e.g., Schertzinger (2008), Staikouras (2009), and Shim (2011b).   
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Table 17: Overview of the generation of the data sample525 
 
 
                                            
 
525 Source: Own research. Presentation follows Schertzinger (2008, p. 80) 
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4.3.9 Extraction of Stock Prices 
According to the design of the empirical study of this dissertation, the results are 
based on changes in stock market returns to shareholders of acquiring insurers 
relative to changes in returns to shareholders of benchmark companies. 
Accordingly, stock market prices of each sample insurer have to be obtained. 
As described in the previous section, daily and monthly market closing prices 
throughout the time period 01/01/1993 to 12/31/2012 are collected from the 
Bloomberg system. These various stock price series are mutually dependent 
and dependent over time, as permitted by the specification of our stochastic 
dominance model. However, before using these stock prices in our empirical 
analysis, stock price series have to be checked and several adjustments have 
to be made in order to guarantee causal inferences from our event.526 First, all 
stock market series have to be adjusted for non-trading days in the respective 
periods under investigation. Accordingly, the days considered in this study are 
trading days, not calendar days.527 Second, as far as possible, we control for 
various confounding events that may cause methodological problems and 
consequently may bias the estimates by offsetting the stock price effect of the 
respective M&A announcement. Potential confounding events range from major 
capital structure changes, such as dividend payments, rights issues, and stock 
splits, to significant changes in key executives and other concurrent M&A 
transactions that are announced simultaneously.528 We control for changes in 
the capital structure of the respective insurance acquirers by adjusting all stock 
market series of the involved insurance firms for quotation changes, dividend 
payments,529 and (if not automatically adjusted by Bloomberg) for rights issues 
and stock splits. However, we do not exclude concurrent transactions that 
overlap during the estimation methodology. Nonetheless, we are aware of 
potential biases that may arise from such overlapping transactions and consider 
                                            
 
526 E.g., Sauer (1991, p. 3), Eckardt (1999, p. 1), and Lepone, Leung, and Li (2012, p. 10).  
527 If a particular M&A transaction is announced on a non-trading day, we treat the following 
trading day as the effective event date. 
528 E.g., Borg, Borg, and Leeth (1989, p. 123), Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2002, p. 8), and 
Boesecke (2009, p. 93). 
529 Note that due to the essential role and the high influence of stock dividend payments in 
calculating short-term daily returns and meanwhile their negligible effect on the calculation of 
long-term buy and hold abnormal returns (see Section 4.3.1.5), we only adjust stock market 
series for dividend payments in the short-term study.
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them once the results of this study are evaluated. Similarly, we are also aware 
of another problem that is attributed to the use of the event study approach. As 
described by Spiss (2008), stock price changes may also be a result of other 
company-specific news and information announced in the estimation period or 
even on the same day as the investigated M&A transaction. However, we follow 
the argumentation of Spiss (2008), who declares that “in case of M&A 
announcement one might argue that the weight of the news of such 
transactions has more influence than most other possible company related 
news” (p. 107).  
4.3.10 Characteristics of M&A Transactions 
As a result of our requirements (see Section 4.3.6), the final sample in our study 
consists of 102 M&A deals over a period from 01/01/1993 to 12/31/2009, 
presented in Table 19. As seen in previous sections, sample sizes in the 
previously reviewed event studies range from minimums of 51, 52, and 56 
(Staikouras, 2009; Elango, 2006; Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001) to a maximum of 
499 transactions (Cummins & Weiss, 2004). Accordingly, this final sample of 
102 M&A transactions is comparable to those in previous capital market event 
studies. Moreover, the size of our sample is, on the one hand, large enough to 
guarantee reasonable power for the analysis performed, but on the other hand, 
small enough to establish a dominance relationship by conducting a descriptive 
comparison530 and hence provides a solid foundation for the subsequent 
empirical investigation. Moreover, analyzing 102 transactions announced by 
Europe’s largest insurance companies offers a couple of advantages over the 
analysis of a random sample, as explained by Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
(1997). First, the identification process applied ensures that the sample of 
investigated transactions comprises the majority of all insurance transactions 
conducted in Europe in the period 1993 to 2009. Second, by the criteria used to 
identify the relevant M&A, it is guaranteed that only transactions with relatively 
large targets,531 which are more likely to cause a performance effect, are 
                                            
 
530 Klaever (2005, p. 32; 2006, p. 135). 
531 The relative deal size ranges from a minimum size ratio of 8.02% to a maximum of 
206.88%. Accordingly, our targets are reasonably significant targets for the respective 
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included in the final sample. Third, the applied criteria prevent the inclusion of 
further consecutive transactions by the same acquirer that take place 
simultaneously to the investigated M&A deal.532 
 
Table 18: Overview of M&A transactions investigated in our analysis by 
acquiring insurance company 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
acquiring insurance firms, with a mean size ratio of 32.20% and a median size ratio of 
19.01%. 
532 Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997, p. 46). 
Name Subindustry CoI Name Subindustry CoI
1 08/17/1993 ACE Ltd Property/Casualty CH Corporate Officers & 
Directors Assurance 
Holding Ltd
Property/Casualty BM
2 03/26/1998 ACE Ltd Property/Casualty CH CAT Ltd Reinsurance US
3 06/16/1998 ACE Ltd Property/Casualty CH ACE Tarquin Insurance Services & 
Other
US
4 01/12/1999 ACE Ltd Property/Casualty CH PPTY & Casualty Business Property/Casualty US
5 05/27/1999 ACE Ltd Property/Casualty CH ACE Financial Services Inc Financial Guarantee 
Insurance
US
6 12/17/2007 ACE Ltd Property/Casualty CH Combined Insurance Co of 
America
Life/Health US
7 11/15/1993 Aegon NV Life/Health NL Pensions Operation Div. Life/Health US
8 12/30/1996 Aegon NV Life/Health NL Providian Corporation Multi-line US
9 02/18/1999 Aegon NV Life/Health NL Transamerica Corp Life/Health US
10 05/12/1998 Ageas Life/Health BE General de Banque SA Money Center Banks BE
11 09/27/2001 Ageas Life/Health BE Fortis NL NV Diversified Financial 
Services
NL
12 11/18/1997 Allianz SE Multi-line DE Allianz France SA Multi-line FR
13 04/01/2001 Allianz SE Multi-line DE Dresdner Bank AG Money Center Banks DE
14 09/11/2005 Allianz SE Multi-line DE Allianz SpA Multi-line IT
15 01/18/2007 Allianz SE Multi-line DE Allianz France SA Multi-line FR
16 06/30/2008 Allied World Assurance Co 
Holdings AG
Property/Casualty CH Darwin Professional 
Underwriters Inc
Property/Casualty US
17 03/31/1999 / 
04/16/1999
Alm. Brand A/S Property/Casualty DK Alm Brand A/S Commercial Banks 
Non-US
DK
18 03/02/2002 Alm. Brand A/S Property/Casualty DK Injury claims portfolio Life/Health DK
19 08/01/1995 Amlin PLC Property/Casualty UK Delian Lloyds Investment 
Trust PLC
Closed-end Funds UK
20 07/29/1998 Amlin PLC Property/Casualty UK Murray Lawrence Property/Casualty UK
21 08/02/2002 Amlin PLC Property/Casualty UK Capacity on Syndicate 2001 Property/Casualty UK
22 06/03/2009 Amlin PLC Property/Casualty UK Fortis Corporate Insurance 
NV
Multi-line NL
23 12/11/1996 Aon PLC Insurance Brokers UK Alexander & Alexander 
Services Inc
Insurance Brokers US
24 08/22/2008 Aon PLC Insurance Brokers UK Aon Benfield Group Ltd Insurance Brokers UK
25 06/26/2006 Assicurazioni Generali 
SpA
Life/Health IT Toro Assicurazioni SpA Multi-line IT
26 02/23/2009 Assicurazioni Generali 
SpA
Life/Health IT Alleanza Toro SpA Life/Health IT
27 02/25/1998 Aviva PLC Life/Health UK General Accident PLC Property/Casualty UK
28 02/21/2000 Aviva PLC Life/Health UK Undershaft No 4 Ltd Life/Health UK
29 03/09/2005 Aviva PLC Life/Health UK RAC Ltd. Insurance Services & 
Other
UK
30 07/13/2006 Aviva PLC Life/Health UK AmerUs Group Co Life/Health US
31 05/05/1998 AXA SA Life/Health FR Royale Belge SA Multi-line BE
32 08/30/2000 AXA SA Life/Health FR AXA Financials Inc Diversified Financial 
Services
US
33 04/19/2005 AXA SA Life/Health FR Finaxa Investment 
Companies
FR
34 06/14/2006 AXA SA Life/Health FR AXA Versicherungen AG Multi-line CH
35 01/30/2006 Catlin Group Ltd Property/Casualty UK Catlin Underwriting Property/Casualty UK
36 02/15/2001 CNP Assurances Life/Health FR Caixa Seguradora SA Life/Health BR
37 11/10/2004 CNP Assurances Life/Health FR Fineco Vita SpA Multi-line IT
38 06/06/2006 CNP Assurances Life/Health FR Ecureuil-Vie SA Life/Health FR
Announce-
ment Date
Acquirer Target
  
213 
 
Name Subindustry CoI Name Subindustry CoI
39 01/31/2002 Euler Hermes SA Property/Casualty FR Euler Hermes Deutschland 
AG
Financial Guarantee 
Insurance
DE
40 05/30/2002 Fondiaria-Sai SpA Property/Casualty IT La Fondiaria Assicurazioni 
SpA
Multi-line IT
41 05/31/2007 Fondiaria-Sai SpA Property/Casualty IT BPV Vita SpA Multi-line IT
42 10/15/2004 Global Indemnity PLC Property/Casualty IE Penn-America Group Inc Property/Casualty US
43 10/15/2004 Global Indemnity PLC Property/Casualty IE Penn Independent Corp Property/Casualty US
44 03/09/2001 Grupo Catalane Occidente 
SA
Property/Casualty ES Lepanto SA Multi-line ES
45 08/11/2003 Grupo Catalane Occidente 
SA
Property/Casualty ES Atradius NV Financial Guarantee 
Insurance
DE
46 11/18/2003 Grupo Catalane Occidente 
SA
Property/Casualty ES Seguros Bilbao Multi-line ES
47 09/22/1997 Hannover Rueck-
versicherung AG
Reinsurance DE International Reinsurance 
business of Skandia 
Forsakrings AB
Reinsurance SE
48 08/25/1998 Hannover Rueck-
versicherung AG
Reinsurance DE Clarendon Insurance Group 
Inc
Property/Casualty US
49 06/12/2003 Hannover Rueck-
versicherung AG
Reinsurance DE HDI Reinsurance Ireland Multi-line IE
50 07/08/1997 ING Groep NV Life/Health NL Equitable of Iowa Cos Life/Health US
51 11/11/1997 ING Groep NV Life/Health NL ING Belgium SA/NV Regional Banks Non-
US
BE
52 05/01/2000 ING Groep NV Life/Health NL Reliastar Financial Corp Life/Health US
53 01/14/1999 Jardine Lloyd Thompson 
Group PLC
Insurance Brokers UK Jardine Aboitiz Insurance 
Brokers
Insurance Brokers PH
54 01/25/2000 Mapfre SA Multi-line ES Mapfre Vida Seguros Life/Health ES
55 01/09/2001 Mapfre SA Multi-line ES Cia de Seguros Finisterre Life/Health ES
56 06/27/2003 Mapfre SA Multi-line ES Musini Vida SA de Seguros 
y Reaseguros Sociedad Un
Life/Health ES
57 10/31/2007 Mapfre SA Multi-line ES Mapfre USA Corp/MA Property/Casualty US
58 01/30/2008 Milano Assicurazioni SpA Property/Casualty IT SASA Assicurazioni 
Riassicurazioni SpA
Multi-line IT
59 08/14/1996 Muenchener Rueck-
versicherungs-AG
Reinsurance DE Munich Re America Corp Property/Casualty US
60 07/01/1998 Novae Group Property/Casualty UK SVB Associates Ltd Insurance Services & 
Other
UK
61 09/21/1999 Novae Group Property/Casualty UK CLM Insurance Fund PLC Closed-end Funds UK
62 01/18/2000 Old Mutual PLC Life/Health UK OMFS GGP Ltd Finance-Investment 
Bnkr/Brkr
UK
63 06/19/2000 Old Mutual PLC Life/Health UK Old Mutual US Holdings Inc Investment 
Mmngt/Advisory 
Services
US
64 04/26/2001 Old Mutual PLC Life/Health UK Fidelity & Guaranty Life 
Insurance Co
Life/Health US
65 03/25/1997 Prudential PLC Life/Health UK Scottish Amicable Life PLC Life/Health UK
66 03/11/1999 Prudential PLC Life/Health UK M&G Group PLC Closed-end Funds UK
67 07/12/1999 RSA Insurance Group PLC Property/Casualty UK Orion Capital Corp Property/Casualty US
68 05/24/2007 RSA Insurance Group PLC Property/Casualty UK Codan A/S Multi-line DK
69 10/13/1999 Sampo Property/Casualty FI Leonia PLC Commercial Banks 
Non-US
FI
70 10/13/1999 Sampo Property/Casualty FI Pohjola Insurance Ltd Multi-line FI
71 12/04/2000 Sampo Property/Casualty FI Mandatum Pankki OYJ Commercial Banks 
Non-US
FI
72 02/11/2004 Sampo Property/Casualty FI If Skadefoersaekring 
Holding AB
Insurance Brokers SE
Announce-
ment Date
Acquirer Target
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A detailed list of all transactions by announcement date and their respective 
characteristics can be obtained from the author upon request. 
 
In addition, Table 20 provides a historical overview of the development of 
annual M&A transactions, the absolute, mean and median transaction volume, 
and the average relative transaction value for our final sample, while Figure 15 
Name Subindustry CoI Name Subindustry CoI
73 04/12/2000 SCOR SE Reinsurance FR PartnerRe Life Insurance 
Co
Multi-line BM
74 05/21/2001 SCOR SE Reinsurance FR 2 reinsurance units of 
Groupama SA
Multi-line FR
75 06/22/2005 SCOR SE Reinsurance FR Irish Reinsurance Partners 
Ltd
Reinsurance IE
76 07/05/2006 SCOR SE Reinsurance FR SCOR Global Life 
Rueckversicherung AG
Reinsurance DE
77 02/19/2007 / 
02/26/2007
SCOR SE Reinsurance FR SCOR Holding Switzerland 
AG
Reinsurance CH
78 04/09/1997 St James's Place PLC Life/Health UK J Rothschild Assu-rance 
Holdings PLC
Life/Health UK
79 01/06/1999 Storebrand ASA Life/Health NO Finansbanken ASA Commercial Banks 
Non-US
NO
80 09/03/2007 Storebrand ASA Life/Health NO Multiple targets: 
Handelsbanken Life & 
Pensions Ltd / 
Handelsbanken Varumarkes 
AB / Nordben Life & 
Pension Insurance Co / 
SPP Fonder AB / SPP Liv 
Forsakrings AB
Life/Health, 
Commercial Banks 
Non-US, Life/Health, 
Closed-end Funds, 
Multi-line
IE
81 11/15/1996 Swiss Life Holding AG Life/Health CH GAN Belgium Multi-line BE
82 02/22/1999 Swiss Life Holding AG Life/Health CH Banca del Gottargo Commercial Banks 
Non-US
CH
83 12/03/2007 Swiss Life Holding AG Life/Health CH AWD Holding AG Investment 
Mgmnt/Advisory 
Services
DE
84 08/27/1996 Swiss Reinsurance 
Company Ltd / Swiss Re 
AG (from 12/2011)
Reinsurance CH Mercantile & General 
Reinsurance Co Ltd
Reinsurance UK
85 11/18/2005 Swiss Reinsurance 
Company Ltd / Swiss Re 
AG (from 12/2011)
Reinsurance CH Swiss Re Solutions Holding 
Corp
Reinsurance US
86 11/01/1999 Topdanmark A/S Property/Casualty DK Danica Forsikring As Multi-line DK
87 09/07/1999 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Meie Assicurazioni SpA Multi-line IT
88 04/06/2000 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Multiple targets: Meie 
Assicurazioni / Meie Vita
Multi-line IT
89 04/06/2000 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Multiple targets: Aurora 
Assicurazioni / Navale 
Assicurazioni
Multi-line IT
90 05/11/2000 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Duomo Uni One 
Assicurazioni SpA
Multi-line IT
91 10/11/2000 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT BNL Vita SpA Life/Health IT
92 06/22/2003 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Winterthur Italian operations Multi-line IT
93 12/11/2006 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Aurora Assicurazioni SpA Insurance Brokers IT
94 12/24/2009 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario 
SpA
Multi-line IT Multiple targets: Arca 
Assicurazioni SpA / Arca 
Vita SpA
Life/Health IT
95 07/05/2002 Uniqa Versicherungen AG Multi-line AT MLP Versicherung 
AG/Austria
Life/Health AT
96 12/23/2003 Uniqa Versicherungen AG Multi-line AT Mannheimer AG Holding Multi-line DE
97 03/26/2008 Vienna Insurance Multi-line AT Multiple targets: BCR 
Asigurari / Sparkassen 
Versicherung AG
Multi-line RO
98 05/08/1997 XL Group Life/Health IE GCR Holdings Ltd Property/Casualty BM
99 03/16/1998 XL Group Life/Health IE MID Ocean Ltd Property/Casualty BM
100 02/16/1999 XL Group Life/Health IE NAC Re Corp Property/Casualty US
101 05/03/2000 Zurich Insurance Group 
AG
Multi-line CH Allied Zurich Ltd Multi-line UK
102 04/16/2009 Zurich Insurance Group 
AG
Multi-line CH 21st Century Insurance 
Group
Property/Casualty US
Announce-
ment Date
Acquirer Target
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graphically illustrates this development in the investigation period from 1993 to 
2009.  
 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of the final sample by year 
 
 
Over our time period, the 102 M&A transactions conducted by the largest listed 
European insurance acquirers totaled an absolute transaction value of €245 
billion, which represents an average transaction volume of around €2,395 
million. Comparing these characteristics with previous samples, we do not find 
striking differences between our study and the reviewed capital market studies. 
Even though the average and total deal values of the transactions in our 
European sample are considerably greater than in the reviewed US-American 
studies of Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and Cummins and Xie (2005),533 these 
two values are comparable with earlier event studies analyzing the European or 
global insurance market. In his European sample, Schertzinger (2008) receives 
                                            
 
533 We discover an average deal value of €2,395 million as compared to $221 million in the 
study of Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and $1,423 million in Cummins and Xie (2005). Similarly, 
we obtain a much higher total deal value of almost €245 billion as compared to $19 billion and 
$64 billion in the papers of Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and Cummins and Xie (2005), 
respectively. 
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a comparable total deal value of $253 billion and a mean deal value of $1,400 
million. Floreani and Rigamonti’s (2001) global sample is comprised of 56 
insurance transactions with an average deal value of $3,289 million and a total 
deal volume of $184 billion.534 Our sample of acquiring insurance firms is biased 
towards smaller insurance firms, as the median value of €729 million in our 
sample is substantially below the average transaction value of €2,395 million. 
Accordingly, the high average transaction value at M&A announcement is 
driven heavily by few vary large transactions, and hence the median may be 
regarded as more appropriate to describe the typical transaction in the 
sample.535 
 
Looking at the yearly distribution of M&A transactions (Figure 15), it becomes 
obvious that in our sample, insurance M&A activity also occurred in waves.536 
While a temporary pickup in M&A activity can be observed during the years 
2005–2007, the vast majority of deals occurred during the time period 1998 
through 2000. M&A activity, in terms of number of transactions announced, 
peaked in the years 1999 and 2007 at 15 and eight, respectively, and then 
showed levels in the following years that were considerably lower than those of 
the peaking years. Interestingly, the average transaction volume showed a 
similar pattern. It significantly increased in the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, 
reached its two peaks in the years 2001 and 2005, respectively, and then 
declined, but not to pre-peak levels. Consequently, the total deal value was 
substantially larger from 2000–2001 than in other years, reaching its peak of 
almost €51 billion in 2000.  
                                            
 
534 Even though their total deal value of $184 billion is still below the value in our sample 
(€244.27 billion), it results in a median deal value of $1,400 million, which is considerably 
higher than the value of €728.66 million we get in our study. Clearly, these differences are 
attributed to differences in the sample composition (i.e., Floreani & Rigamonti’s sample 
consists of only 51 transactions, includes also insurance acquirers from the US and Australia, 
and the authors require the transaction to result in a change of control). 
535 The largest transaction in our sample is the German mega-acquisition of Dresdner Bank AG, 
which was one of the largest banks in Germany, by Allianz AG in 2001, with a transaction 
value of €23.5 billion. The second largest transaction in the sample, announced in 2000 
between Switzerland’s Zurich Financial Services and UK’s Allied Zurich p.l.c., amounts to 
almost €19 billion. 
536 Even though this essentially identical development of European M&A activity and M&A 
activity of the insurance transactions in our final sample is not a necessary condition, it gives 
strong evidence for the correctness and representativeness of our sample, which 
consequently should allow a valid and meaningful capital market investigation. 
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Figure 15: Number of M&A transactions and average M&A transaction volume in 
the final sample by year 
 
4.4 Results of the Empirical Study 
4.4.1 Success of M&A in the European Insurance Industry 
This section addresses the third research question by studying the capital 
market effects of M&A transactions undertaken by European insurance 
acquirers on short-term and medium- and long-term performance of the 
respective insurance acquirers. To investigate these effects, we descriptively 
compare the performance of a portfolio consisting of acquirers with that of a 
benchmark portfolio using the entire distribution of short-term and long-term 
returns. In accordance with hypothesis H1, our results indicate that shortly after 
the announcement of an M&A transaction, acquiring insurance companies show 
a negative (relative) performance, as the acquirer portfolio is second-order 
dominated by the benchmark portfolio consisting of non-acquiring peer 
insurance companies in various short-term event windows. However, unlike our 
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expectations, this negative relative performance disappears over a longer event 
horizon, and no stochastic dominance relation between the two portfolios is 
found in the long run. Table 21 presents a detailed overview on the findings of 
our descriptive stochastic dominance analysis. The upcoming two sections 
discuss these results in more depth.   
 
Table 20: SD relation between M&A and benchmark portfolio 
SD OVERALL   
Event Window 
Acquirer (A) 
vs. Benchmark 
(B) Portfolio 
Mean Return 
Acquirer (A) 
Portfolio 
Mean Return 
Benchmark 
(B) Portfolio 
∆                               
(Mean Return A - 
Mean Return B)  
  
Short-term 
(0;0) No SD 0.38% 0.15% 0.23% 
  (0;+1D) No SD 0.24% 0.15% 0.09% 
  (0;+2D) B SD2 A 0.07% 0.08% -0.01% 
  (0;+3D) B SD2 A 0.05% 0.17% -0.12% 
  (0;+4D) B SD2 A 0.01% 0.10% -0.09% 
  (0;+5D) B SD2 A -0.04% 0.08% -0.12% 
  
Long-term 
(0;+1Y) No SD 7.97% 5.25% 2.72% 
  (0;+2Y) No SD 16.84% 5.64% 11.20% 
  (0;+3Y) No SD 21.50% 4.64% 16.86% 
 
4.4.1.1 Results of Short-Term Analysis 
In the short term, first-order and second-order stochastic dominance relations 
between the acquirer and benchmark portfolios are estimated over six different 
announcement-period event windows, ranging from (0;0) (i.e., the 
announcement day) to (0;+5) days (i.e., the announcement day to five days 
after the announcement date). Our results provide evidence for the existence of 
a stochastic dominance relationship between the M&A portfolio and the 
benchmark portfolio. More specifically, in four out of the six event windows, that 
is, (0;+2), (0;+3), (0;+4), and (0;+5), the distribution of dividend-adjusted simple 
daily returns of the benchmark portfolio second-order dominates the distribution 
of dividend-adjusted simple daily returns of the M&A portfolio.537 For the event 
window (0;+2), the corresponding empirical CDF and the integrated empirical 
CDF are plotted in Figures 16 and 17.  
                                            
 
537 The results of an additional analysis, in which continuously compounded TRS were used, did 
not bring any changes to the above-stated findings.  
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Figure 16: Empirical CDFs of daily returns (0;+2D) – M&A versus benchmark 
portfolios 
 
 
Figure 17: Integrated empirical CDFs of daily returns (0;+2D) – M&A versus 
benchmark portfolios 
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As seen in Figure 16, the two CDFs cross (and hence no first-order SD 
relationship is found), yet the integrated CDFs do not cross (Figure 17).538 
Consequently, we are able to establish second-order dominance of the 
benchmark portfolio distribution over the acquirer portfolio distribution. 
Furthermore, in these four cases, the mean return of the benchmark portfolio is 
above the mean return of the dominated acquirer portfolio, which is required to 
infer stochastic dominance. Examining the distribution of transactions with a 
negative market effect and transactions with a positive market effect, only on 
the announcement day and the period from the announcement day to one day 
after the announcement, more than half of transactions led to a higher stock 
market value of the acquiring insurer. In the remaining four short-term event 
windows, the majority of transactions led to a decrease in acquiring firm’s 
market value, as acquirers experienced a negative market reaction. In contrast, 
for benchmark insurers, we identify an almost equal split between value 
increases and value decreases over the several short-term event windows. In 
addition, acquiring European insurance firms, on average, suffer a small 
negative market reaction in the time period from announcing the deal to five 
days after M&A announcement, as the average daily return in this period is -
0.04%, whereas average benchmark returns in all tested short-term periods are 
positive (ranging from 0.08% to 0.17%).539 In an attempt to test the robustness 
of our results, we perform two further analyses in which we either exclude 13 
transactions that did not lead to a change in control or exclude 17 transactions 
that had a relative deal volume of below 10% from the sample of observations. 
The results of these additional descriptive comparisons (we do not show these 
results due to space limitations) support our previous findings concerning the 
short-term effects of insurance M&A, as we do not find any difference between 
the estimates of the full sample and the estimates of the two subsamples. 
Consistent with hypothesis H1, we therefore declare that European insurance 
acquirers are dominated by their non-acquiring European insurance competitors 
shortly after announcing an M&A transaction.  
 
                                            
 
538 The same relationship was observed in the other three event windows, i.e., (0;+3), (0;+4), 
and (0;+5), hence leading to the same conclusions also in these three cases.   
539 See Table 21 above or Table 22 below. 
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Table 21: Overall short-term results of SD approach 
SD APPROACH 
Event 
Window 
A vs B  
A      
Mean 
B         
Mean   
A       
Median 
B       
Median 
A              
SD 
B              
SD 
Portfolio R  R  R  R  Rs Rs 
  (0;0) No SD 0.38% 0.15% 0.40% 0.20% 4.35% 1.91% 
  (0;+1D) No SD 0.24% 0.15% 0.15% 0.08% 3.70% 2.17% 
  (0;+2D) B SD2 A 0.07% 0.08% -0.23% 0.10% 3.30% 2.14% 
  (0;+3D) B SD2 A 0.05% 0.17% -0.13% 0.13% 3.03% 2.33% 
  (0;+4D) B SD2 A 0.01% 0.10% -0.12% 0.10% 0.08% 0.06% 
  (0;+5D) B SD2 A -0.04% 0.08% -0.14% -0.08% 2.73% 2.34% 
Event 
Window 
A Rs  B Rs 
A % 
Positive 
B % 
Positive 
Min Max Min Max Rs Rs 
  (0;0) -11.72% 16.25% -5.13% 4.99% 56% 53% 
  (0;+1D) -11,72% 16.25% -7.62% 6.44% 52% 50% 
  (0;+2D) -11,72% 16.25% -7.62% 6.44% 47% 51% 
  (0;+3D) -11,72% 16.25% -7.62% 14.88% 48% 52% 
  (0;+4D) -11.72% 16.25% -8.03% 14.88% 49% 51% 
  (0;+5D) -11.72% 16.25% -8.03% 14.88% 48% 49% 
  
 
            
 
 
As described in Section 4.3.1.5, we also conduct a traditional event study in 
order to enable a better comparison with previous capital market studies. The 
computed average CARs are negative in the same four event windows (with a 
maximum negative CAR of -0.70% in the estimation period from the 
announcement day to five trading days following the M&A announcement) and 
mean CARs are negative in five out of the six short-term event windows (see 
Table 23). As seen in the literature review (Chapter 3), the two previous event 
studies that focus on the performance effects of European insurance M&A both 
show negative CARs for acquiring European insurers in the period shortly after 
announcing a transaction. Cummins and Weiss (2004) report insignificant 
negative valuation effects of -0.17%, -0.31%, and -0.30% in (0;+1), (0;+2), and 
(0;+5), and also Schertzinger (2008) presents negative acquirer CARs of -
0.09%, -0.19%, -0.68%, and -0.77% in (0;0), (0;+1), (0;+2), and (0;+5) for his 
sample of European insurance companies. Hence, the results of this event 
study do not only strongly support the findings of our descriptive dominance 
approach concerning the dominance relation between the M&A and the 
benchmark portfolio, they are also in line with the findings of previous event 
study literature on M&A in the European insurance market.  
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Table 22: Overall short-term results of event study approach 
TRADITIONAL EVENT STUDY APPROACH 
Event 
Window 
Mean 
CAR 
Median 
CAR  
      Sign of CARs % 
Positive 
CARs 
SD 
CARs Min CAR 
Max 
CAR Positive Negative 
  (0;0) 0.22% 0.25% 4.45% -11.79% 13.09% 53 49 52% 
  (0;+1D) 0.18% -0.50% 6.16% -13.53% 22.65% 47 55 46% 
  (0;+2D) -0.05% -0.88% 6.54% -15.20% 21.62% 46 56 45% 
  (0;+3D) -0.49% -1.73% 7.42% -20.95% 21.01% 39 63 38% 
  (0;+4D) -0.49% -1.19% 7.61% -28.23% 20.98% 45 57 44% 
  (0;+5D) -0.70% -0.70% 8.05% -34.33% 21.00% 49 53 48% 
 
4.4.1.2 Results of Medium- and Long-Term Analysis 
The results of our medium- and long-term study, however, paint a much brighter 
picture of the performance effects of insurance transactions.  
 
Table 23: Overall long-term results of SD approach  
SD APPROACH 
Event 
Window 
A vs B 
Portfolio 
A     
Mean 
B     
Mean 
A 
Median 
B       
Median  
A           
STD 
B                
STD 
BHR  BHR  BHR  BHR  BHRs BHRs 
  (0;+1Y) No SD 7.97% 5.25% 3.90% -4.44% 36.47% 34.55% 
  (0;+2Y) No SD 16.84% 5.64% 3.30% -0.18% 67.94% 49.04% 
  (0;+3Y) No SD 21.50% 4.64% 6.84% -10.10% 87.28% 63.11% 
Event 
Window 
A BHRs  B BHRs 
A %  
Positive 
BHRs 
B % 
Positive 
BHRs Min Max Min Max 
  (0;+1Y) -75.61% 121.59% -93.29% 112.20% 57% 47% 
  (0;+2Y) -82.19% 361.13% -87.26% 174.42% 53% 49% 
  (0;+3Y) -91.48% 416.74% -89.78% 318.04% 56% 43% 
 
 
In all three medium- and long-term event periods under consideration, that is, 
from the month prior to the announcement month to the announcement month 
plus one year, plus two years, and plus three years, the portfolio of benchmark 
firms does not descriptively dominate the M&A portfolio in the sense of first- or 
second-order dominance. Even though we also do not find a stochastic 
dominance relation of the acquiring European insurance firm portfolio over the 
non-acquiring benchmark insurer portfolio in any of the investigated event 
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windows, the average buy-and-hold returns of the acquirer portfolio are 
substantially higher than the ones of the benchmark portfolio in every medium- 
and long-term event window considered. For example, over the same three-
year post-M&A period, shareholders of European insurance acquirers on 
average obtained buy-and-hold returns of 21.50%, while shareholders of non-
acquiring insurance peers experienced an increase of only about 5% on 
average (see Table 24). Moreover, in all three medium- and long-term windows 
analyzed, the percentage of positive buy-and-hold returns of insurers in the 
acquirer portfolio540 is always above 50% (i.e., 57%, 53%, and 56%), whereas 
the percentage of positive returns of the benchmark insurers is constantly below 
50% (i.e., 47%, 49%, and 43%). However, despite this clear outperformance of 
the M&A portfolio, we do not find stochastic dominance in our descriptive 
comparison. This is attributable to the higher standard deviation of the M&A 
portfolio as compared with the standard deviation of the benchmark portfolio (for 
example, 87.28% as compared with 63.11% in the three-year period after M&A 
announcement) and the larger number of acquirer firms with a significant 
negative three-year performance of more than -37% (for example, see Figure 
18 for the empirical CDFs and the integrated empirical CDFs of two-year buy-
and-hold returns). Once again, the conclusions drawn from the full sample also 
hold for the two additional SD analyses of both subsamples, that is, “change in 
ownership” subsample and “deal volume of above 10%” subsample.541 The 
confirmation of a lack of a dominant relationship between the buy-and-hold 
return distributions of the M&A portfolio and the benchmark portfolio implies that 
shareholders of European insurance acquirers, on average, will not increase 
their wealth and expected utility by shifting their assets toward a non-acquiring 
insurance company. This conclusion stands in contradiction to the recent 
findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) European investigation and consequently to 
our hypothesis H1 concerning the long-term effects of European insurance 
transactions, which is solely derived from his empirical findings.  
                                            
 
540 Calculated as the number of positive buy-and-hold returns in the M&A portfolio divided by the 
total number of buy-and-hold return observations in the M&A group. The same procedure of 
calculating the percentage of positive observations has been applied for the benchmark group 
and for each subgroup in the sample. 
541 Since no additional insights are obtained from these further comparisons, the respective 
results are not presented herein but are available from the authors upon request.  
  
224 
 
Figure 18: Empirical CDFs of buy-and-hold returns (0;+2Y) – M&A versus 
benchmark portfolios 
 
 
Figure 19: Integrated empirical CDFs of buy-and-hold returns (0;+2Y) – M&A 
versus benchmark portfolios 
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The results of our supplemental event analysis underpin the findings from our 
descriptive SD comparison. The reviewed M&A transactions in the European 
insurance industry are found to have a small positive medium- and long-term 
effect on acquiring insurers’ market value (one-, two-, and three-year 
outperformance of 2.72%, 11.20%, and 16.86% relative to the STOXX 600 
Europe Insurance index).542 Even though in sharp contrast to Schertzingers’ 
(2008) results543 on the European insurance market, findings from the two other 
medium- and long-term studies that analyze M&A transactions undertaken by 
US insurance acquirers, that is, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) and Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006), support our evidence that acquiring insurance firms do 
not underperform their benchmark firms in the long run. Similar to our event 
study estimates, the authors detect positive, yet insignificant, acquirer buy-and-
hold abnormal returns of around 8% to 15% in the event period that begins 250 
trading days before the effective day of the M&A deal and ends 250 trading 
days after the effective M&A transaction (BarNiv & Hathorn, 1997) or a market-
adjusted BHAR of 57.3% after three years following an M&A transaction 
(Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 2006). 
 
 Table 24: Overall long-term results of event study approach 
TRADITIONAL EVENT STUDY APPROACH 
Event 
Window 
Mean 
BHAR  
Median 
BHAR  
      Sign of BHARs 
% 
Positive 
BHARs 
STD 
BHARs 
Min 
BHAR 
Max 
BHAR Positive Negative 
  (0;+1Y) 2.72% 0.72% 32.54% -73.53% 98.16% 53 49 52% 
  (0;+2Y) 11.20% 5.99% 59.82% -181.59% 267.28% 57 45 56% 
  (0;+3Y) 16.86% 8.61% 76.14% -314.38% 310.04% 59 43 58% 
 
 
Concluding, in our sample of 102 transactions by European insurance firms 
from 1993 to 2009, there is no evidence for a first- or second-order dominance 
relationship between a portfolio of insurers announcing an M&A transaction and 
                                            
 
542 For a detailed overview of the results of this study, see Table 25.  
543 Insurance transactions in his European sample either produced significant negative BHARs 
of -4.73% and -9.98% on a one- and two-year event horizon (significant at the 10% and 5% 
level, respectively) or generated a non-significant negative BHAR of -6.57% on a three-year 
event horizon. 
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a portfolio of comparable benchmark insurers that do not engage in M&A 
activity over a medium- and long-term horizon. In other words, contrary to 
Schertzinger’s (2008) earlier findings on European insurance acquirers, yet in 
accordance with both US-focused insurance studies by BarNiv and Hathorn 
(1997) and Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006), we do not find any indication or 
evidence for a superior medium- and long-term performance of the benchmark 
portfolio over the portfolio that contains acquiring European insurance 
companies. 
 
Overall, the findings our SD comparison suggest that M&A transactions in the 
insurance industry, on average, do not destroy shareholder value. Hence, it can 
be concluded that these transactions are primarily motivated by the desire of 
acquiring firms’ managers to maximize shareholder wealth and not by the desire 
to maximize their own wealth at the expense of their firms’ shareholders. Yet 
our SD investigation also shows that insurance firms that engage in M&A 
activity, on average, do not significantly outperform their non-acquiring 
benchmark insurance firms. Accordingly, the desire of shareholder wealth 
creation through M&A transactions is not fulfilled in general.  
4.4.2 Determinants of M&A Success in the European Insurance 
Industry 
After assessing the overall performance effects of European insurance 
transactions between the years 1993 and 2009 across different time periods, 
we try to give an answer to the last research question and test hypotheses H2 
through H13. We perform several subsample analyses in order to examine the 
dominance relationship between the potential factors of short-term and medium- 
and long-term value creation in European insurance M&A. For this reason, we 
divide the 102 transactions in several subgroups according to the previously 
identified determinants (Table 26 reports descriptive statistics by the various 
determinant subgroups). Thereafter, we examine the return distributions of each 
subgroup by applying the testing procedure described earlier in this paper (see 
Section 4.3.7) and hence rank the distributions using the concept of first- and 
second-order stochastic dominance. This testing procedure enables us to 
explain the differences between discovered short- and long-term performance 
effects and differences between the varying effects of individual transactions.  
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Table 25: Descriptive statistics for determinant subsamples 
 
 
Similar to the structure in our literature review, we will first begin with presenting 
the results for the various endogenous factors, which include characteristics of 
the acquiring insurance firm, the target firm, and the transaction structure, and 
then concentrate on an important exogenous factor of the economic 
environment, namely the timing of the transaction with respect to the M&A and 
economic cycle. 
4.4.2.1 Characteristics of Acquiring Companies 
 
According to hypothesis H2, small insurance acquirers are expected to 
stochastically dominate their larger acquiring insurance counterparts. In order to 
test this hypothesis, we split the full sample of 102 transactions into two equally 
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sized subsamples, one consisting of 51 below-median-sized insurance firms 
and another consisting of 51 above-median-sized insurance acquirers. 
Similarly, the respective benchmark companies are split into these two 
subsamples. Following the testing procedure outlined in Section 4.3.7, we first 
investigate whether the subgroup of large acquirers first- and/or second-order 
stochastically dominates its benchmark subgroup shortly after the M&A 
announcement (see *1 in the following Table 27). Subsequently, we test the 
reverse hypothesis, that is, whether the benchmark portfolio shows SD1 and/or 
SD2 over the large-sized acquirer portfolio (see *2 in Table 27). In a next step, 
we analyze whether the daily short-term return distribution of the small acquirer 
portfolio shows SD1 and/or SD2 over the distribution of daily returns of the 
corresponding benchmark firm portfolio (see *3) and the converse hypothesis, 
that is, whether the benchmark portfolio shows SD1 and/or SD2 over the M&A 
portfolio of small acquirers (see *4). After assessing the stochastic dominance 
relations between the daily return distributions of the two acquirer subsamples 
and the daily return distributions of their corresponding benchmark portfolios, 
we determine the dominant relation between the M&A subsample of small 
acquirers and the M&A subsample of large acquirers. Thus, in a further 
descriptive comparison, the two distributions of daily abnormal returns of the 
small acquirer subsample and the large acquirer subsample are compared with 
respect to first- and/or second-order stochastic dominance. Once again, 
dominance of the abnormal return distribution of the small acquirer subsample 
over the abnormal return distribution of the large acquirer subsample is tested 
(see *5), and then it is investigated whether the large acquirer subsample 
dominates the small acquirer subsample in the sense of SD1 and/or SD2 (see 
*5). 
 
Following the short-term SD analysis, the same procedure is applied for the 
medium- and long-term investigation.544 
 
                                            
 
544 Note that the only difference between the short-term analysis and the medium- and long-
term analysis is the replacement of the simple daily return distributions and simple daily 
abnormal return distributions with the respective long-term buy-and-hold return distributions 
and buy-and-hold abnormal return distributions. 
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Table 26: Pairwise SD results: small versus large acquirers 
 
 
The results of our various descriptive comparisons on the testing procedure and 
the interpretation of the results can be interpreted as illustrated in Figure 14. 
The results in the above Table are read based on a row versus column 
comparison. The rows show whether the subsample in the leftmost column 
descriptively dominates any of the subsamples in the top row. In contrast, the 
columns indicate whether the subsample in the top row is stochastically 
dominated by any of the subsamples in the leftmost column. The “X” denotes no 
stochastic dominance, while “SD1” and “SD2” mean stochastic dominance of 
first- and second-order, respectively.545 For example, the first row “Benchmark” 
and the second column “Small” (marked with an X *4) means that the 
benchmark subsample does not first- or second-order dominate the subsample 
consisting of small acquirers. In comparison, examining the second row “Small” 
and the third column “Large” (marked with an SD2 *5), we can conclude that the 
return distribution of the acquirer portfolio consisting of small insurers second-
order stochastically dominates the return distribution of the acquirer portfolio 
consisting of large insurance firms. Reading along the row, the cell “SD2 *5” 
means that the large acquirer subsample is stochastically dominated by the 
small acquirer subsample at the second order.  
In case of the determinant “acquirer’s size,” we do not find a short-term 
stochastic dominance relation between any of the two acquirer size subsamples 
and the corresponding benchmark subsample. However, as expected, small 
                                            
 
545 Note that in every case where we found a potential SD relationship, we additionally checked 
whether the mean of the dominant subsample was larger than the mean of the dominated 
subsample (as required by our testing procedure to establish SDk; see section 4.3.7). 
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insurance acquirers stochastically dominate large insurance acquirers at the 
time of M&A announcement, as the small acquirer subsample is found to be 
second-order dominant over the large acquirer portfolio, and simultaneously, a 
dominance relation of the large acquirer subsample over the small acquirer 
subsample is rejected. Also consistent with hypothesis H2, we do not find a 
dominance relationship between the small and large acquirer sample in the 
medium- and long-term descriptive comparison. Yet the acquirer subsample of 
small acquirers is found to be second-order dominant over its corresponding 
benchmark subsample in the long run. Consequently, our short-term and our 
medium- and long-term findings provide strong support for hypothesis H2 and 
suggest that large acquirers are not better in identifying and realizing synergy 
potentials as compared to small insurance acquirers. 
 
A second feature of the acquiring firm is the acquirer’s pre-M&A growth,546 
which is expected to have an insignificant negative effect on the acquirer’s 
short-term performance, whereas fast-growing acquirers are expected to 
significantly outperform their slower growing competitors over a longer horizon 
(see hypothesis H3). Our SD results support this hypothesis for the long run. 
The subsample of acquirers with a positive pre-M&A growth rate second-order 
stochastically dominates the subsample consisting of acquiring insurance firms 
with a negative growth rate over a one-year post-announcement period and 
hence provide further evidence for a long-run superiority of fast-growing 
insurance acquirers over slow-growing acquirers. Our short-term findings also 
reveal a second-order dominance relation of the fast-growing acquirer portfolio 
over the portfolio of slow-growing insurance acquirers, which stands in contrast 
to the small negative estimate of Schertzinger’s short-term multivariate 
regression analysis, which however falls short of any significance level. In 
addition, our short-term descriptive SD comparison detects that both acquirer 
portfolios are second-order dominated by their respective benchmark portfolio. 
In the case of the slow-growing acquirer subsample, the benchmark 
outperformance is found in all tested short-term event windows, whereas the 
                                            
 
546 Measured as the acquirer’s relative change in market value over a one-year pre-
announcement phase. 
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portfolio consisting of positive growing acquirers is only dominated in half of the 
tested short-term event windows. Overall, our findings suggest that pre-M&A 
growth of an insurance acquirer is positively related with its post-M&A financial 
performance and so rejects the conjecture that fast-growing acquirers are 
unable to manage the integration of the target effectively. 
 
Table 27: Pairwise SD results: negative versus positive growth of acquirers’ 
market values 
 
 
Next, we divide all transactions according to an acquirer’s transaction 
experience into three groups: “Inexperienced,” “Medium Experiences,” and 
“Experienced.” According to our hypothesis H4, which is fully based on 
Schertzinger’s (2008) recent findings, we expect a U-shaped relationship 
between an acquirer’s transaction experience and its post-M&A success, that is, 
inexperienced and experienced acquirers are expected to outperform acquirers 
with medium experience, independent of the time horizon under analysis. The 
results of our descriptive dominance analysis are also qualitatively similar 
across the different event windows. However, as we detect an inverted U-
shaped relationship between M&A experience and financial performance, our 
results are contrary to the earlier findings of Schertzinger and hence our 
hypothesis H4. In our European insurance sample, acquirers with no or 
extensive M&A experience are less likely to produce a positive outperformance 
over their non-acquiring competitors. The subsample of inexperienced acquirers 
is dominated by the benchmark portfolio on a short-term basis, whereas 
experienced acquirers are dominated by their benchmark insurers in the short, 
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medium, and long run. In contrast, transactions where the bidder has medium 
transaction experience second-order stochastically dominate not only their 
benchmark group but also the inexperienced acquirer subgroup over a medium- 
and long-term period (see Table 29). Looking at some descriptive statistics for 
the individual transaction experience subgroups (see Table 26 above), it has to 
be noted that the acquirer’s transaction experience is significantly positive 
related to the size of an acquirer. The average inexperienced acquirer in the 
sample had a market value at M&A announcement of €3 billion, whereas the 
average acquirer with medium M&A experienced had a MV of almost €10 
billion, and most experienced acquirers even had a mean MV of above €25 
billion. However, performance differences between the three subsamples are 
most likely not attributable to these differences in market values of acquirers. 
This is because, first, transaction volumes are also positively related to M&A 
experience (which accordingly results in comparable average relative 
transaction volumes, especially for the medium experienced and the 
experienced subsamples) and, second, our investigation unveiled no 
dominance differences between different size-matched subsamples in the long 
run (see hypothesis H1 above and our conclusion concerning the effect of 
“acquirer’s absolute size”). Nevertheless, our finding of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship contradicts Schertzinger’s (2008) proposition that insurance 
acquirers are more successful when either fully focusing on internal or fully 
focusing on external growth via M&A transactions. From a theoretical 
standpoint, our findings seem to support the idea from the learning curve and 
the closely related experience curve theory that (if transaction experiences are 
homogenous)547 an increased number of M&A transactions might provide 
learning and experience curve benefits for the acquirer with regard to many 
aspects of the transaction process (for example, valuation of the target, 
negotiation of the deal price, and post-merger integration, just to name a 
few).548 This is consistent with our finding of stochastic dominance of the 
                                            
 
547 See Singh and Zollo (1998, p. 30). In addition, the empirical study of Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999) offers statistical evidence of a consistent positive influence of multiple 
homogeneous acquisitions on an acquirer’s post-acquisition success.  
548 See Lubatkin (1983, p. 224), Bamberger (1994, p. 223), Szulanski (2002, p. 69), Weston, 
Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004, p. 132), Wuebben (2007, p. 154), and Boesecke (2009, p. 83). 
As stated in Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 15), a further benefit of carrying out M&A 
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medium experienced M&A subsample over the inexperienced acquirer 
subsample. However, previous literature also points out that pursuing a vast 
number of transactions may prove disadvantageous beyond a certain point 
when negative effects of increased complexity and underestimating the 
challenges (i.e., post-merger integration) exceed the positive effects of 
organization M&A experience.549 In such cases, extensive M&A activity might 
lead to a decreased post-M&A performance, which is consistent with our finding 
of second-order stochastic dominance of the acquirer subsample with medium 
M&A experience over the subsample of frequent acquirers. Accordingly, we 
summarize that, independent of the time scale, medium experienced acquirers 
in our sample, on average, dominate their non-acquiring benchmark firms and 
their inexperienced and experienced acquirer counterparts in the sense of 
second-order stochastic dominance. However, since this stands in conflict with 
earlier findings of Schertzinger (2008) and our hypothesis H4, there is a need 
for further research on the influence of an acquirer’s transactions experience on 
its post-M&A success. 
 
Table 28: Pairwise SD results: M&A inexperienced versus medium experienced 
versus experienced acquirers 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
transactions on a frequent basis consists of the fact that frequent M&A transactions convey a 
positive signal to the market about future prospects of the acquiring firm and should 
consequently result in a higher stock price. 
 For classical references on the learning curve and the experience curve theory in economics, 
see for example, Hirschman (1964) and Henderson (1974), respectively. 
549 See Kusewitt (1995, p. 159 and 166) and Boesecke (2009, p. 120). 
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According to our hypothesis H5, we expect acquisitions of life insurance firms 
either to (weakly) outperform or perform in line with acquiring non-life insurers. 
Our long-term descriptive investigation provides support for the hypothesis of 
outperformance, as we detect a second-order dominance relationship of the 
life/health subsample and the multi-line subsample over the property/casualty 
insurer subsample (see Table 30). Acquirers belonging to the former two 
subsamples are also found to be much larger as compared to property/casualty 
insurers. Yet the typical target of a property/casualty insurer is also much 
smaller, and hence the average relative transaction value between the three 
acquirer subsamples does not differ significantly (see the descriptive statistics in 
Table 26). Moreover, our long-term comparison unveils that each acquirer 
subsample dominates its corresponding benchmark subsample in the sense of 
SD2. In contrast, our short-term findings are inconclusive with respect to the 
influence of an acquirer’s line of business. On the one hand, our short-term 
results indicate that life/health acquirers being dominated by property/casualty 
insurers, but on the other hand, we simultaneously detect SD2 of the 
benchmark subsample over the property/casualty and over the multi-line 
subsample. These inconclusive results, however, are somewhat analogous to 
those found in previous event analyses. As shown in our literature review on the 
various influencing factors, earlier studies do not reach any significance, as they 
detect either insignificant positive (Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Schertzinger, 
2008) or insignificant negative short-term CARs for life insurance acquirers 
(Akhigbe & Madura, 2001).   
In conclusion, while our short-term descriptive comparison does not allow 
definite conclusions, the long-term investigation shows that the subsample of 
property/casualty insurance acquirers is dominated by both the life/health and 
the multi-line subsamples.  
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Table 29: Pairwise SD results: life/health versus property/casualty versus multi-
line acquirers550 
 
  
4.4.2.2 Characteristics of Target Companies 
Hypothesis H6 deals with the relationship between the relative deal size, which 
is defined as the deal volume compared to an acquirer’s market value at 
announcement and the success of an insurance transaction. As expected by 
hypothesis H6, small insurance transactions are found to underperform in the 
short run. Our SD comparison not only detects a second-order SD relationship 
of the benchmark portfolio over the portfolio of small transactions, but also 
reveals that the small transactions subsample is dominated by the other two 
subsamples of relative large and medium-sized transactions at second-order 
(see Table 31). Since our study detected that acquiring insurance firms, on 
average, are dominated by their non-acquiring benchmark firms shortly after 
announcing an M&A transaction (see Section 4.4.1.1), one could expect that 
this negative short-term market reaction is even more pronounced for acquirers 
who conduct transactions with large relative transaction volumes, that is, with 
higher relative importance of the deal, as these deals have a stronger impact on 
acquiring insurer’s market value. However, as we detect the opposite relation, 
our results provide very strong support for a significant positive relationship 
between relative deal size and an acquirer’s market performance in the short 
                                            
 
550 Note that 14 transactions (13.7%) are not included, as they do not fit in any of these 
previously mentioned acquirer categories. 
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term. In sharp contrast to these short-term findings, our long-term results show 
that the subsample of transactions with the largest relative deal volume is 
dominated by both the medium and small transactions subsamples in the sense 
of second-degree stochastic dominance. In addition, our descriptive comparison 
reveals that the medium relative deal size subsample second-order dominates 
its benchmark subsample (See Table 31). Previous event study research on the 
effects of insurance M&A fails to detect any significant long-term relationship 
between the relative deal size and the long-term financial performance of 
acquiring insurers.551 It may be noted from the descriptive statistics in Table 26 
that M&A with a higher relative transaction size are predominantly conducted by 
small insurance acquirers. The average acquirer belonging to the “large relative 
size” subsample has a pre-announcement market value of approximately €4.5 
billion, whereas acquirers pursuing medium-sized or small-sized transactions, 
on average, have a market value of about €11.7 and €14 billion, respectively. In 
summary, consistent with previous insurance M&A literature, our descriptive 
comparison reveals a positive short-term relationship between the relative deal 
size and an acquirer’s subsequent financial performance. However, this positive 
short-term relationship vanishes over time and becomes negative in the long 
run. Long-term findings suggest that insurance acquirers “are better at handling 
M&A transactions with relatively smaller targets”552 over a post-M&A period of 
several years. Possible theoretical explanations for this finding that have been 
put forward include diseconomies of scale and scope,553 agency problems,554 
and organizational, administrative, and integration problems555 arising from the 
large relative size of the target firm. 
 
                                            
 
551 See Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) and Schertzinger (2008). 
552 Schertzinger (2008, p. 91). See also Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 14). 
553 E.g., Katrishen and Scordis (1998) and Schertzinger (2008) and the references therein. 
554 E.g., Boesecke (2009) and Shim (2011a) and the references therein. 
555 E.g., Berger and Ofek (1995, p. 55), Lamont and Polk (2001, p. 1718), and Boubakri, 
Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 14). 
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Table 30: Pairwise SD results: small versus medium versus large relative deal 
size 
 
 
To analyze the effect of another characteristic of target companies’ on 
acquirers’ financial performance, we split the sample of acquiring insurers 
according to their target firm’s line of business. The average insurance 
company acquiring a bank has a market value on the announcement date of 
around €16.7 billion and is much larger than the average insurer that acquirers 
a property/casualty insurer (MV of around €5.5 billion). Yet the relative 
transaction volumes between these two subgroups are almost identical, 
suggesting that target banks/financial services firms are also much bigger than 
target property/casualty insurance firms (see Table 26). As can be further seen 
from Table 26, the average acquirer size and the average transaction volume 
are quite similar between the subsample of acquirers buying life/health targets 
and the subsample of acquirers buying multi-line insurance targets. Previous 
evidence coming only from the evidence in Schertzinger’s (2008) event study 
suggests that acquisitions of life insurance targets, on average, are more 
rewarding than acquisitions of targets operating in the non-life business. As 
illustrated below in Table 32, the results of our short-term and medium- and 
long-term stochastic dominance comparison confirm this hypothesis only 
partially. Using a short-term event window, the subsample of acquirers of multi-
line insurance targets is second-order stochastically dominated by almost all 
other acquirer subsamples, that is, the property/casualty target subsample and 
the subsample consisting of insurers acquiring banks/financial services firms, as 
well as the benchmark subsample. In comparison, the medium- and long-term 
evidence is less conclusive and is heavily dependent on the exact time horizon 
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under analysis. According to the results presented in Table 32, insurance 
acquirers diversifying their business by acquiring a bank second-order 
stochastically dominate their benchmark and all other acquirer subgroups on a 
horizon of one year. However, this dominance relationship holds only for the 
year after the announcement, and after three years, these acquirers of 
banks/financial services firms are second-order stochastically dominated. 
Analyzing the SD relationship of the subsample of insurance acquirers 
announcing transactions of multi-line insurers reveals a similar dominance 
pattern. Measured over a medium-term horizon of one year following M&A 
announcement, acquirers of multi-line targets, on average, dominate acquirers 
of life/health targets and acquirers of property/casualty. Yet this dominance 
relationship is also reversed after three years following the transaction, as the 
subsample of acquirers of multi-line insurance targets is second-order 
stochastically dominated by the two subsamples of acquirers of life/health and 
property/casualty targets in the event window (0;+3Y). In contrast, the 
subsample of acquirers of life/health targets and especially the subsample of 
acquirers of property/casualty insurance targets second-order dominate their 
respective benchmark firm subsamples and (most of) the other acquirer 
subsamples on a long-term horizon of (0;+3Y), whereas they are both second-
order stochastically dominated by the two subsamples of acquirers of bank 
targets and acquirers of multi-line targets on a one-year post-M&A horizon. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the effect of the determinant “relative deal 
size” is heavily depending on the time horizon chosen. Our findings can be 
interpreted as follows: On a short-term horizon, market returns to acquiring 
insurance firms are significantly lower for insurance transactions of multi-line 
insurance targets as compared to returns to non-acquiring benchmark insurers 
and to acquirers of banks/financial services firms and property/casualty targets. 
Examining acquirer returns over a one-year post-M&A period, acquisitions of 
banks/financial services firms and multi-line targets are more profitable than 
acquisitions of life/health and property/casualty insurance targets. From a 
theoretical standpoint, this positive medium-term outperformance might be 
primarily driven by speculation about potential future benefits and synergies 
resulting from an expansion into the multi-line insurance business and the 
banking business. However, as we also find that acquirers of banks/financial 
  
239 
services firms and multi-line targets are dominated by acquirers of life/health 
and property/casualty targets on a three-year post-M&A horizon, we can 
conclude that these potential benefits and synergies could either not be 
achieved or, if achieved, did not exceed the additional costs related to such an 
expansion.556 This assumption will be tested in the next section, where we focus 
on the influence of industry relatedness on M&A success.  
 
                                            
 
556 The epitome of such a performance trend and a well-fitting example is the acquisition 
Dresdner Bank AG, one of Germany’s leading banks, by the German insurer Allianz AG, which 
has been traditionally engaged in the insurance business. However, since the turn of the new 
millennium, Allianz has broadened its business focus through the acquisition of several 
financial services firms (i.e., the acquisition of Nicholas-Applegate in 2001 and the acquisition 
of stakes in PIMCO Advisors in 200, 2003, 2004, 2005, & 2008) and banks (i.e., Dresdner 
Bank AG & Bayerische Versicherungsbank in 2001). The acquisitions of Dresdner Bank AG, 
which was driven by an “illusive optimism” in the booming stock market in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Langenohl & Schmidt-Beck, 2004, p. 1), was by far the largest of these 
transactions by volume (not only for the German insurer itself, but also within our sample) and 
led to an outperformance of Allianz’ benchmark peers in the short and medium term. However, 
after several years, the transaction became a fiasco for the German insurer. Allianz 
experienced an adverse stock market reaction and finally sold Dresdner Bank to 
Commerzbank in 2008 (with a total financial loss of more than €13.5 billion within seven years) 
and thereby shifted its focus back onto its traditional underlying business. Citibank (2008) 
summarized the engagement as follows: “The problem with Dresdner was that this 
represented an investment in an underperforming non-core business that Allianz was doing a 
poor job of managing. Having taken decisive action to exit Dredner, the group now has a fairly 
“clean slate” to focus on the underlying business, and with potential to change perceptions if it 
can deliver on restructuring potential” (p. 1). The sale of Dresdner Bank, as stated by Citibank 
(2008), is viewed as a first step toward “rebuilding credibility, and in addressing the perception 
that Allianz is more interested in “empire building” than delivering shareholder value” (p. 5). 
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Table 31: Pairwise SD results: life/health versus property/casualty versus multi-
line versus banks/financial services targets557 
 
4.4.2.3 Characteristics of Transaction Structuring and Management 
In addition to these various firm characteristics, we now present the results for 
the hypotheses on the various determinants of the transaction structuring and 
management phase. As can be seen from the descriptive statistics in Table 26 
above, predominantly larger insurance acquirers strive for geographical 
diversification through M&A. Moreover, the majority of transactions in our final 
sample conduct cross-border M&A,558 a finding that is not surprising given the 
fact that the “European market is segmented in various countries which 
obviously increases the likelihood of cross-border M&A,” as explained by Spiss 
(2008, p. 138). According to the general agreement of previous studies 
analyzing transactions of European acquirers, we expect geographic 
diversification to have a positive effect on acquirers’ post-merger performance. 
Our SD results strongly indicate that these geographically diversifying insurance 
transactions are significantly positive related to acquirers’ post-transaction 
performance, precisely the relationship to be expected in the European 
insurance market. As hypothesized, geographically diversifying M&A not only 
dominate their geographically focusing counterparts in the short- and medium- 
                                            
 
557 Note that 18 transactions (17.6%) are not included, as they do not fit in any of these 
previously mentioned target categories. 
558 Defined as “transactions where the acquirer and the target are headquartered in two 
separate countries” (Spiss, 2008, p. 118). 
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and long-term, these transactions also lead to a dominant long-term 
performance compared to the corresponding non-acquiring benchmark 
insurance firms (Table 33). The positive market reaction is consistent with 
earlier literature on insurance M&A, suggesting that geographic expansion 
leads to expectations of increasing benefits for European acquirers.559 Beyond 
that, the subsample of geographically focusing transactions is found to be 
second-order dominated by their benchmark firm subsample in the short run, 
which further confirms the validity of hypothesis H8. Based on our findings, one 
can argue that benefits of international diversification, such as synergies arising 
from intangible and information-based assets (Conn et al., 2005) and portfolio 
diversification (Markides & Ittner, 1994), are realized and outweigh potential 
harms and costs560 of geographic expansion. 
 
Table 32: Pairwise SD results: geographically focusing versus geographically 
diversifying transactions 
 
 
Moreover, the transactions in our final sample are subdivided according to the 
industry focus into industry-focusing and industry-diversifying transactions. The 
                                            
 
559 See, e.g., Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Cummins and Weiss (2004), and Schertzinger 
(2008). 
560 Possible drawbacks of cross-border M&A comprise increased governance costs due to 
complexity that may exceed the capacity of the management team (Jones and Hill, 1988), 
financial and political risks from currency fluctuations, and legal and regulatory changes 
(Brewer, 1981), and costs arising from cultural and environmental differences (Spiss, 2008). 
Yet Spiss (2008) somewhat weakens his own argument by stating that “cultural problems are 
becoming less of a problem due to the creation of global markets. Hence, CBAs [cross-border 
acquisitions] are more likely to result in value creation” (p. 112). 
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industry focus of the 102 M&A transactions is almost equally split between the 
subsample of industry-related transactions and the subsample of industry-
unrelated transactions. Furthermore, the average acquirer MV at 
announcement, the average transaction value, and the relative deal value 
between these aforementioned two subsamples are almost identical (see 
descriptive statistics in Table 26). From a theoretical standpoint, there are 
several arguments supporting related M&A transactions and arguments favoring 
industry diversification. On the one hand, synergies are expected to be larger 
and easier to realize in related than in unrelated M&A (see, e.g., Spiss, 2008, p. 
102, who refers to Hazelkorn et al., 2004),561 and cross-industry transactions 
“may aggravate agency problems by allowing cross-subsidization to poor 
subsidiaries” (Shim, 2011b, p. 124; see also the references therein). On the 
other hand, scholars such as Spiss (2008) and Shim (2011b) also present pro-
conglomeration arguments that range from risk reduction due to a broader 
business range to financial synergies and economic benefits from internal 
capital markets and lower capital costs (see also Weidenbaum & Chilton, 1988; 
Gertner, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1994; Stein, 1997; Schertzinger, 2008; Boesecke, 
2009). Yet there is a broad consensus in previous event studies that industry-
focusing transactions lead to a significant positive market reaction shortly 
around M&A announcement (e.g., Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Cummins & 
Weiss, 2004; Schertzinger, 2008) and may even lead to insignificant value 
creation in the long run (Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 2006; Schertzinger, 2008), 
whereas industry diversification, on average, leads to negative short-term 
abnormal returns and destroys value of the acquiring insurer in the long run. 
Consequently, we hypothesized that industry-related transactions stochastically 
dominate industry-diversifying ones. However, contrary to this expectation, our 
descriptive comparison outlines a second-order dominance relationship of the 
subsample of industry-diversifying insurance acquirers over the subsample of 
                                            
 
561 Boesecke (2009, p. 72) specifies this point by highlighting that “[a]ccording to efficiency 
theory, operational synergies that stem from economies of scale and scope may be realized in 
related transactions. Managerial and financial synergies are the primary motive for unrelated 
transactions, but are also achievable in related mergers. Another type of synergy that may be 
realized in related M&A transactions, namely collusive synergy, is explained by the monopoly 
theory. 
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industry-focusing insurance acquirers (Table 34). In addition, our short-term 
comparison reveals second-order dominance of the benchmark subsample over 
the industry-focusing subsample, which further underpins the short-term 
dominance of industry-diversifying transactions in our European sample. The 
long-term SD results, however, are not conclusive and do not allow for any 
directional causal inference. On the one hand, the subsample of industry-
focusing transactions dominates its benchmark subsample, while 
simultaneously being dominated by the subsample of industry-diversifying 
transactions. Our long-term findings, hence, emphasize the need for a more 
differentiated analysis of the influence of this determinant, taking greater 
account to both geographic and industry dimensions. This has been done by 
linking the industry dimension with the geographical dimension (see the next 
paragraph). 
 
Table 33: Pairwise SD results: industry-focusing versus industry-diversifying 
transactions 
 
 
To bring further clarity to the performance effect of the industry and 
geographical dimensions, we combine these two variables into a single 
construct. For this purpose, we divided the sample according to the 
geographical and industrial orientation of each transaction into a subsample of 
full focusing transactions, a subsample of fully diversifying M&A and a third 
subsample of either geographically focusing and industry-diversifying or 
geographically diversifying and industry-focusing transactions, which in the 
following is denoted as the mixed subsample. In general, full-focusing acquirers 
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tend to be significantly smaller than their diversifying counterparts 
(approximately half of the size).562 However, as can also be seen from Table 26, 
the mean relative transaction value of the full-focusing subsample is not 
significantly different from the one of the other two subsamples. Based on the 
earlier findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) European study, hypothesis H10 
suggests that insurers who pursue a full diversification strategy increase short-
term and long-term shareholder value and hence stochastically dominate their 
competitors that follow other strategies. The evidence of our SD comparison is 
clearly supportive of this hypothesis H10. Second-order stochastic dominance 
of the full-diversifying acquirer portfolio over the full-diversifying and mixed 
portfolio is found in the short-term and medium- and long-term SD investigation. 
In addition, full-diversifying acquirers, on average, second-order dominate non-
acquiring benchmark insurers in the medium and long run. Further confirmation 
of the dominance of a full diversification strategy comes from our short-term 
analysis, which uncovers a second-order dominance relationship of the 
benchmark portfolio over both the full-focusing and the mixed portfolios on the 
days after the M&A announcement, whereas no dominance relationship was 
found between the return distributions of the full-focusing portfolio and the 
corresponding benchmark portfolio. An overview of these results can be seen in 
the following Table 35.  
 
                                            
 
562 For example, the average acquirer size of full-focusing insurers is around €6,763 million as 
compared to an average acquirer size of €11,765 million for full-diversifying insurers. 
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Table 34: Pairwise SD results: full-focusing versus full-diversifying versus mixed 
transactions 
 
 
Hypothesis H11 refers to the influence of an acquirer’s pre-merger participation 
in the target before announcement and states that, in the short term, 
transactions where the acquiring insurance company has a pre-M&A 
participation in the target outperform transactions in which there is no pre-M&A 
business relationship between acquirer and target. The evidence herein is also 
clearly supportive of hypothesis H11, as the subsample of acquirers with no 
pre-M&A business relationship is second-order dominated by the subsamples of 
acquirers having a business relationship with the target before announcement 
and the subsample of benchmark insurers subsequent to the M&A 
announcement (see Table 36). In contrast, no dominance relationship between 
any two subgroups was observed in our SD comparison over a medium- and 
long term horizon. Previous event study research does not address this issue. 
Interestingly, only around 20% of all acquirers have a business relationship with 
the target before announcement and these acquirers are mainly large insurance 
companies (see Table 26 above). Overall, if acquirers have a business 
relationship with the target firm before M&A announcement, the acquiring firm is 
expected to experience a positive abnormal market reaction to the 
announcement of such a transaction. This positive market reaction can be 
theoretically justified by lower total cost of the M&A transaction for acquirers 
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and a higher level of success in the transaction and integration process.563 
However, this positive valuation effect disappears over time and, in the long run, 
there are no performance differences between the various subgroups. 
 
Table 35: Pairwise SD results: pre-M&A participation versus no pre-M&A 
participation 
 
 
A further strategic M&A factor that has been commonly studies in previous 
insurance M&A literature is the method of payment. In our final sample, most 
acquisitions are paid either exclusively with cash or with a combination of cash 
and stock (denoted as mixed payment). As argued by Spiss (2008), the 
numerical dominance of cash-financed transactions compared to stock-financed 
transactions might result from the fact that “practitioners have learned that cash-
financed deals tend to outperform stock financed ones” (p. 138). However, as 
further elaborated on by the author, “[t]his number […] might be misleading as it 
does not indicate the volume of the transactions which used cash or equity” 
(Spiss, 2008, p. 138). This is exactly the case in our data sample. Acquirers 
paying solely with cash and acquirers using all-stock payment are almost of 
equal size. Yet the average deal volume and the average relative deal volume 
of the all-stock transactions are more than two times larger than the respective 
values of all-cash transactions. Out of this, we conclude that cash as a means 
                                            
 
563 For a comprehensive elaboration on these arguments, see Sudarsanam (2010, p. 631). 
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of payment is primarily used in smaller deals that are less cash intensive, while 
larger acquisitions are predominantly financed with stock swaps or a mix of 
cash and stocks. A similar conclusion is also reached by Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001) for their global sample of pure insurance transactions. In the 
existing insurance M&A literature, previous short-term event studies so far fail to 
provide any significant results concerning the influence of the form of payment 
on acquirers’ post-M&A performance, and hence hypothesis H12 proposes that 
the form of payment does not have a significant impact on acquirers’ 
subsequent post-M&A performance. Contrary to this hypothesis, a second-order 
dominance relationship of the various subsamples (i.e., all-cash subsample, the 
subsample of transactions financed by a mixture of cash and equity, and the 
subsample of non-acquiring benchmark insurers) over the subsample of all-
stock financed transactions is observed in our European insurance sample, not 
only over the short-term but also over the medium- and long-term follow-up 
period. Short-term and medium- and long-term returns are more pronounced for 
acquisitions paid with cash rather than for stock payment deals. In addition, the 
subsample of cash-financed transactions is second-order dominant of its 
benchmark subsample (in the long-term analysis), and the subsample of 
transactions financed with a mixture of cash and stock is second-order 
dominated by the subsample of benchmark insurers (see Table 37). 
Accordingly, our SD results provide support for the outperformance of all-cash 
financed transactions, independent of the time interval chosen for estimating the 
performance effects. However, it has to be noted that our study is not able to 
prove these results by a statistical correlation analysis. Therefore, there is a risk 
that the determinant “method of payment” has no explanatory power with 
respect to the outcome of M&A transactions at all, and instead the 
outperformance of M&A deals paid by cash might be due to other factors, such 
as the smaller relative deal size of transactions in the “cash-payment” subgroup 
(see the descriptive statistics in Table 26). Assessing the significance of this 
determinant would, however, only be possible by performing a multivariate 
analysis. Yet, despite this possible criticism of our work, the finding of a superior 
performance after the announcement of cash-financed transactions is not 
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uncommon in previous M&A literature in other industries.564 Moreover, there are 
a number of theoretical arguments that lead to similar predictions concerning 
the correlation of the method of payment in an M&A transaction and an 
acquirer’s financial post-M&A performance. For example, financial literature has 
shown that the method of payment is most often interpreted by the market as a 
signal of the financial condition and insiders’ valuation of the acquiring and 
target firms. Due to market imperfections resulting from information 
asymmetries with respect to the true value of the involved firms, acquiring firm’s 
managers “will tend to finance the acquisition with the [cheapest and] most 
convenient mean.”565 Accordingly, they are more likely to choose payment via 
stock if their stock is overvalued (as this is the cheaper method), whereas they 
will prefer cash payment when their company’s shares are undervalued.566 As a 
result of this signaling effect, an acquiring firm’s stock price is expected to 
decline in response to an announcement of a stock-financed M&A and to rise 
after the announcement of a cash-financed M&A transaction. In the M&A 
literature, various authors argue that those transactions that bear significant 
synergy potential are preferably financed by cash because then all potential 
synergy gains from combining the two entities can be reaped solely by the 
acquirer.567 Moreover, as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen 
(1988), if the acquiring company has a substantial amount of excess cash, 
conducting a cash-financed transaction is considered as the lesser evil as 
compared to the investment in other unprofitable projects and will ultimately 
lead to a positive (or at least less negative) financial performance. Thus, despite 
the contrary evidence of previous short-term event studies on M&A in the 
insurance industry, the broader empirical literature (not restricted to the 
insurance sector), as well as theoretical rationales explaining why the 
                                            
 
564 E.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986), Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988), Salami (1994), Dodds 
and Quek (1995), and Loughran and Vijh (1997). See also the meta-analysis of Datta, 
Pinches, and Narayanan (1992), in which the authors conclude that all-stock transactions, on 
average, are wealth-reducing events for both acquiring and target firm shareholders. 
565 Floreani and Rigamonti (2001, p. 7). See also Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 189), Gregory and 
Matatko (2005, p. 9), and Boesecke (2009, p. 35) and the references therein. 
566 See, e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984), Seidel (1995), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), and 
Boesecke (2009). As pointed out by Rigamonti (2001, p. 8), the same logic applies to 
managers of the target firm, which prefer to receive cash in case their firm is being overvalued 
by the market. 
567 E.g., Kerler (1999) and Wuebben (2007). 
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announcement of pure cash M&A might probably lead to a positive abnormal 
market reaction, provide a solid foundation for the assumption that all-cash 
transactions on average outperform all-stock transactions. 
 
Table 36: Pairwise SD results: cash versus stock versus mixed payment 
 
  
4.4.2.4 Influences of the Economic Environment 
Following Schertzinger (2008), this study also divides the sample based on the 
timing of the transaction with regard to the phase in the M&A cycle. Accordingly, 
all transactions are split into a subsample of transactions that were announced 
during a weak phase of the M&A cycle and transactions announced during a 
phase of strong M&A activity.568 We see from the descriptive statistics in Table 
26 that no major differences in terms of the number of transactions conducted, 
mean acquirer size, mean absolute deal size, and relative deal size exist 
between both subsamples. Previous evidence coming from Schertzinger’s 
(2008) event study on the European insurance market suggests that M&A 
transactions in the upswing and peak phase of the M&A cycle produce 
significant positive short-term abnormal returns to acquirer shareholders, 
                                            
 
568 Note that Schertzinger subdivides his data sample into four different phases of the M&A 
cycle, namely upswing, peak, downturn, and bottom. However, in our case, adopting this four-
phase classification scheme would result in two relatively small subsamples (only five 
transactions would fall into the upswing subsample and 17 into the downturn subsample), 
which would not allow for reliable conclusions due to the small sample size. Schertzinger 
(2008) faces the same problem of a set of transactions that is too small (the upswing 
subsample only comprises 16 transactions and the downturn one only 15 transactions), 
however, and still makes use of the four-category scheme. 
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whereas the market reaction to M&A transactions announced in the bottom 
phase of the cycle is significant negative. Hence, we hypothesize that strong 
phase transactions dominate weak phase M&A transactions in the 
announcement period. Our short-term SD comparison, however, provides no 
support for this conjecture, as no dominance relationship between any two 
subsamples, that is, the two M&A-phase subsamples and its respective 
benchmark subsamples, is found (see Table 38). Consequently, there are no 
significant performance differences related to the specific phase of the M&A 
cycle. Over a medium- and long-term horizon, however, our SD results send a 
clear and unmistakable message: Transactions announced in the strong phase 
of an M&A cycle outperform weak phase M&A transactions. As seen in Table 
38, the buy-and-hold return distribution of transactions announced during 
phases of strong M&A activity is first-order stochastic dominant over the buy-
and-hold return distribution of transactions announced during phases of weak 
M&A activity.569 Consequently, with regard to the long-term influence of this 
determinant, the findings of Schertzinger’s (2008) calendar-time approach can 
be confirmed. All in all, there is no empirical evidence for the so-called 
“bandwagon effect” in our European insurance sample.  
  
                                            
 
569 Note that first-order stochastic dominance also implies stochastic dominance of any higher 
order, such as second-order (see section 4.3.1.3 for an elaboration of the first two orders of 
stochastic dominance).  
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Table 37: Pairwise SD results: weak M&A market versus strong M&A market 
transactions 
 
 
In addition to subdividing transactions based on the particular phase of the M&A 
cycle, it is possible to investigate the timing of the transaction with regard to the 
phase of the economic cycle. In general, economic theory suggests that most 
transactions conducted in periods of below-average economic growth create 
more value than their above-average counterparts. For example, the global 
management consulting company Accenture gives three theoretical reasons for 
the superiority of weak-economy mergers over strong-economy ones.570 
Foremost, in times of economic downturn, firms that are in less favorable 
financial positions face capital constraints that hinder them from engaging in 
M&A transactions. Hence, the authors expect lower premiums for M&A 
transactions as a consequence of less competition. However, a recent study 
conducted by The Boston Consulting Group (2009a) documents the contrary: 
Premiums in transactions that were conducted during the weak-economy years 
of 2008 and 2009 have been above those paid in previous strong-economy 
periods. Secondly, because of lower target market values, Accenture suggests 
that acquisitions in downturns can be used to strengthen a company’s 
competitive position as well as to gain market share and leadership in the 
industry. However, looking at the strong market position of some of the 
                                            
 
570 Ficery et al. (2008, p. 2). 
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acquiring insurance companies571 in our sample, this argument is of little 
importance for these large insurance acquirers. Thirdly, since companies’ 
market capitalizations are generally lower in periods of weak economy, targets 
can be acquired at considerably lower purchase prices. While this argument is 
generally true, it may not necessarily apply for all insurers. Value creation does 
not only come from “buying low and selling high,” as stated by The Boston 
Consulting Group (2008c, p. 8). It is rather derived from unlocking hidden 
fundamental value through operational improvements, such as improving cash-
flow margins and asset productivity. The acquisition price paid for the target is 
hence not the most important success factor in deciding the outcome of an M&A 
transaction. The key success factor is to turn relatively unprofitable targets into 
economically successful entities by improving the operational performance of 
the acquired firms. Since the turnaround of financially and operationally weak 
targets is much easier in a strong market environment, as pointed out by The 
Boston Consulting Group (2003), one could also expect dominance of strong-
economy mergers over weak-economy ones. Furthermore, the assumption of 
perfect capital markets does not always hold true in reality. For example, 
Epstein (2005, p. 41) assumes that structural and economic cycle factors distort 
the perception of the acquisition. Consequently, these effects could cause 
favorable weak-economy acquisitions to appear unsuccessful and unfavorable 
strong-economy transactions to result in a positive market reaction. As none of 
the studies in our final sample investigate the timing of the transaction with 
respect to the economic cycle, we did not posit a hypothesis about this 
influence. However, we decide to investigate this issue in a further subanalysis. 
Transactions are hence separated into those announced in years of below-
average GDP growth in the euro area and those announced in years of below-
average GDP growth. 
 
From the total sample, 76 transactions (or around 75% of all transactions in the 
sample) were announced in times of above-average GDP, and 26 transactions 
(equaling 25% of the total sample) were announced in times of below-average 
GDP growth. Also, the average acquirer MV and the average transaction value 
                                            
 
571 E.g., Allianz, AXA, ING, Generali, Zurich, and AVIVA. 
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in the strong phase of the economic cycle exceeded the corresponding values 
of transactions announced in the weak phase of the economic cycle by far.572 
However, differences in these values between the two subsamples are 
obviously attributed to a higher/lower stock market valuation for the involved 
firms, since the average sizes of the acquirer and the target both decrease 
proportionally (this conclusion results from the fact that the average relative deal 
volume between acquirer and target is similar between both GDP growth 
subsamples). Looking at the results of the SD comparison, we do not find any 
first- or second-order stochastic dominance relationships among the two 
acquirer portfolios, that is, the portfolio of acquirers conducting M&A 
transactions in periods of below-average GDP growth and the portfolio of 
above-average GDP growth acquirers, neither in the short-term nor in the long-
term investigation. However, second-order dominance holds in several cases 
when comparing the daily return distribution of either of the two acquirer 
portfolios with the daily return distribution of the corresponding benchmark 
portfolio. In half of the tested short-term event windows, we detect a second-
order dominance relationship of the benchmark subsample over both the below-
average GDP growth portfolio and the above-average GDP growth portfolio, 
whereas in the other half of the tested event windows, we fail to detect any 
dominance relationship. Consequently, there seems to be no difference in the 
return distribution of the below-average GDP growth acquirer portfolio and the 
benchmark portfolio. Moreover, with the exception of the event window (0;+2Y), 
in which the below-average GDP growth subsample second-order dominates its 
corresponding benchmark subsample, we do not find any dominance 
relationship between any two subsample return distributions in the long run. In 
conclusion, our descriptive dominance comparison does not detect significant 
performance differences that are attributed to the economic condition at the 
time of the M&A transaction (see Table 39). 
 
                                            
 
572 Below-average GDP growth deals: 26 announced transactions with an average transaction 
volume of €923 million; average acquirer MV at announcement of €4,363 million. Above-
average GDP growth deals: 76 transactions with an average deal volume of €2,898 million and 
an average acquirer MV at M&A announcement of €12,942 million. 
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Table 38: Pairwise SD results: below-average GDP growth versus above-average 
GDP growth transactions 
 
  
4.5 Summary of the Findings of the Empirical Analysis  
In line with findings of most prior studies, acquisitions in the European 
insurance industry cause a negative market reaction for acquiring insurer’s 
shareholders, as we find stochastic dominance of a benchmark portfolio over 
the acquirer portfolio in various short-term event windows shortly after the 
announcement of the transaction. However, this underperformance diminishes 
over time and we do not find a dominance relationship in one, two, and three 
years following the M&A announcement. Quite contrary to the negative long-
term findings of Schertzinger (2008), long-term BHARs of acquiring firms are 
generally higher than those of their non-acquiring counterparts, independent 
from the long-term time horizon. Hence, our long-term results provide evidence 
for the success of M&A in the insurance industry, as shareholders of acquiring 
insurance companies on average will not suffer any negative impacts from 
engaging in M&A in the long run.  
 
Looking at the various potential influencing factors of M&A success, our findings 
can be summarized as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Comparison of influence of determinants of insurance M&A success 
depending on time horizon 
 
Interestingly, with the exception of the determinant “large relative size of the 
target,” we do not find any other determinant that resulted in a non-negative 
short-term abnormal stock market reaction and simultaneously led to 
underperformance in the long run. Yet, the assumption that a negative relative 
short-term market reaction is a harbinger for long-term wealth destruction would 
be a false conclusion. Even though several determinants are found to 
experience a negative short-term market reaction and simultaneously lead to 
value destruction for the shareholders of the acquiring firm in the long run, this 
general conclusion does not hold true for the majority of investigated 
determinants. A number of determinants such as “multi-line insurance 
acquirers,” “property/casualty acquirers,” and “industry-focusing transactions” 
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showed a negative relative performance in the short run, while their long-term 
relative price performance was positive, leading to a dominance of these 
transactions.  
The following determinants, which did not lead to a short-term 
underperformance of the acquiring firm while leading to an outperformance in 
the long run, were identified as value drivers in European insurance M&A: 
“small acquirers,” “medium M&A experience,” “life/health acquirers,” “life/health 
targets,” “geographic diversification,” “full diversification,” and “cash payment.” 
Conversely, European insurance acquirers that have extensive M&A 
experience, conduct focus-enhancing transactions, or use their stocks as a 
means of payment exhibited an underperformance, not only during the 
announcement period, but also during the years following the announcement. 
 
The most important findings concerning the effect of the various success factors 
in European insurance M&A transactions can be summarized as follows:  
• In line with findings of previous insurance M&A literature, small insurance 
acquirers regularly outperform large insurance acquirers and their non-
acquiring counterparts.  
• Fast-growing acquirers not only dominate slow-growing acquirers in the 
long run, but also shortly after the announcement. 
• While M&A experienced and inexperienced insurance acquirers, on 
average, perform worse than non-acquiring insurers, medium 
experienced acquirers perform significantly better in the years following 
M&A activity. These findings, however, contrast with those obtained by 
Schertzinger (2008) and hence call for further research on this 
determinant. 
• Our empirical study provides further support for the hypothesis that large 
insurance transactions stochastically dominate small transactions in the 
short run. Moreover, we show that this dominance relationship is 
reversed in the long run, as we detect SD2 of all portfolios, that is, the 
benchmark and the small and medium-sized acquirer portfolio over the 
portfolio consisting of large insurance acquirers. 
• In the European insurance industry, geographically diversifying and full-
diversifying acquirers are rewarded by the market. This observation is 
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independent from the time horizon under consideration and has also 
been a consistent finding in previous studies that have investigated the 
influence of this variable in a European insurance context.   
• Consistent with the findings of previous insurance M&A research, 
transactions in which acquirer and target have a business relationship 
before the M&A transaction considerably outperform transactions without 
a pre-M&A participation shortly after M&A announcement. Moreover, the 
finding of SD2 of the benchmark portfolio over the “no pre-M&A 
participation” portfolio provides further empirical support for this 
conclusion. However, this outperformance disappears over time, and 
there are no performance differences between the various subgroups in 
the long run. 
• In contrast to findings of the extant insurance M&A literature, which fails 
to find any significant relationship between M&A success and the method 
of payment, we detect a strong and consistent negative relationship 
between stock payment and acquirers’ M&A success (in the short, 
medium and long term). European insurance acquirers that use stocks 
as a means of payment generally perform significantly worse than non-
acquiring insurance firms and acquirers using other forms of payment. 
• With regard to the timing of transactions, our results clearly show that 
M&A transactions that have been conducted in the strong phase of the 
M&A cycle outperform weak phase M&A transactions over a one- to 
three-year period.  
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary  
While there are numerous papers outlining the theoretical advantages of 
insurance M&A transactions, the empirical literature so far has not corroborated 
the alleged benefits of insurance M&A activity. The ultimate success of 
insurance M&A transactions is either widely unknown or previous studies have 
come up with conflicting results. Hence, the objective of this work is to better 
understand the previous findings concerning the success of insurance M&A. To 
address this issue, we break down the general research purpose into four 
research questions. With respect to the first research question, we discuss and 
evaluate the various ways of defining and measuring M&A success. On the 
basis of this evaluation, we develop a research cluster that enables us to 
categorize earlier studies according to the methodology used. The purpose of 
this division into various streams of research is to examine whether differences 
in the ways of measuring M&A success may (at least partly) account for the 
mixed and contradictory results of previous research. We identify four general 
streams of research. The first stream comprises papers that rely on accounting 
data and make use of different accounting ratios and financial performance 
indicators. The second stream focuses on efficiency changes following 
insurance transactions. Through the analysis of the linkage between frontier 
efficiency and market-value performance, studies from the third research 
stream measure the relationship between stock market returns and efficiency. 
The fourth and last stream of research contains several investigations applying 
the event study approach to evaluate post-merger stock market reactions of the 
involved companies. The third objective of this work is to address the impact of 
M&A transactions on the involved insurance companies. We firstly provide an 
overview of the findings of previous literature regarding the short-term and 
medium- and long-term success and then conduct a capital market analysis that 
is based on the previous scientific findings. Overall, the extant capital market 
literature on the success of insurance M&A transactions suggests that deals are 
economically viable. Yet, evidence suggests that the success of insurance M&A 
transactions might depend on the time horizon of analysis (that is, short-term 
and long-term) and might also be different across regions (that is, across 
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Europe and the United States). In general, insurance acquirers from the United 
States experience small positive abnormal stock returns around the time of an 
M&A announcement, whereas European acquiring insurance companies suffer 
small negative abnormal stock price changes. Given the findings that targets 
(independent from the geographical dimension) simultaneously earn strong 
positive short-term returns, the combined valuation effect of target and acquirer 
is also positive on average. Analyzing the success of 102 transactions 
conducted by publicly traded Western European insurance companies between 
the years 1993 and 2009, our study supports the results of earlier short-term 
event studies, as we detect that the acquirer portfolio is second-order 
dominated by a portfolio consisting of benchmark insurance firms that did not 
engage in M&A. In our European sample, this underperformance, however, 
diminishes over time, and over a medium- and long-term horizon, no dominance 
relationship between these two portfolios is found. Our findings hence neither 
support Schertzinger’s (2008) earlier findings of a significant negative 
relationship between M&A activity and acquiring insurers’ financial performance 
in the European insurance market nor the positive relationship that was found 
by Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) in their sample of US acquiring insurance 
firms. These mixed and inconclusive results, together with the finding of earlier 
studies that suggest that the average M&A effect is not very representative, 
raise the question: Which factors typically influence the outcome of insurance 
M&A transactions? We deliver an answer to this research question by first 
summarizing and organizing findings from the extant literature and then 
performing an empirical study on the influence of these previously identified 
determinants in explaining the success of M&A in the European insurance 
market. Our analysis, which uses the idea of stochastic dominance for 
evaluating insurance M&A, is able to verify many earlier findings. For example, 
the expectation of a positive relationship between the success of European 
insurance M&A and determinants such as the growth of acquirers, geographical 
diversification, full diversification, and pre-M&A participation—or the negative 
relationship of determinants such as acquirers’ size and relative size of the 
target—is confirmed by our calculations. However, for some other determinants, 
namely M&A experience and industry relatedness, our findings do not support 
the underlying hypotheses derived from the literature review. Given that the 
  
260 
large majority of our findings are similar to those reported by previous papers on 
the success of insurance M&A, we suppose that we have received accurate and 
meaningful results. In conclusion, based on the accumulated evidence from 
past empirical studies, as well as our own analysis, we can state that M&A 
transactions in the European insurance industry that are conducted by small, 
fast-growing life/health acquirers, on average, perform significantly better than 
transactions conducted by large, slow-growing property/casualty acquirers, 
respectively. Moreover, geographical diversification, full diversification (i.e., 
industry and geographical diversification), and (in the short term) pre-M&A 
participation are associated with higher returns. In addition, empirical research 
points to an outperformance of insurance transactions announced in phases of 
strong M&A activity as compared to weak-phase M&A transactions.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
There are, however, several points of criticism and limitations that must be 
considered when interpreting the results of the underlying investigation.  
 
First, and above all, the use of capital market data and success metrics relying 
on such data could be generally criticized. We decided to evaluate the success 
of insurance M&A from the perspective of acquiring firms’ shareholders and 
defined success accordingly. Consequently, we chose to adopt a capital 
market-based approach and thereby placed the interests of shareholders above 
those of other constituents. Besides the criticism of neglecting the interests of 
other key stakeholders, we have to deal with other well-known weaknesses of 
this approach, ranging from the requirement of firms being publicly quoted to 
the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency (see Table 4 in Chapter 
2.3.2.2.2). In the short-term study, we have to face the problem that stock price 
changes are primarily based on the expectations of investors and other market 
participants regarding the future cash flow implications of this business 
combination and not on realized cash flows. As outlined earlier, this can be 
mitigated by extending the event window, which however exaggerates the 
problem of a possible overlay of other events unrelated to a specific M&A 
transaction. Yet, our study not only controls for industry-specific confounding 
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factors by using a sophisticated benchmark (see Section 4.3.5.2), but also for 
various company-specific confounding factors by adjusting all stock market 
series of the involved insurance firms for quotation changes, dividend 
payments, rights issues, and stock splits (see Section 4.3.9). Moreover, due to 
the research design, our empirical analysis is not able to account for detailed 
specifics of individual M&A transactions. However, this is not the objective of 
our investigation. Instead, we examine whether it is possible to obtain generally 
applicable statements regarding the success of insurance M&A and the 
influencing factors. 
 
Second, criticism can be leveled at the descriptive SD approach applied in this 
work. Using a descriptive comparison design to investigate stochastic 
dominance has the disadvantage of a strong influence of the standard error and 
hence of a high rate of wrong rejection of stochastic dominance. Yet, besides 
being simpler and more convenient in calculation as compared to a statistical 
test, the descriptive approach relies solely on the observations without making 
any restrictive assumptions on the distributions of returns (e.g., its 
independence). In our case, therefore, it is particular meaningful to compare the 
return distributions of the acquirer and the benchmark portfolio via a descriptive 
comparison. In addition, given our sample size of slightly above 100 
transactions, the descriptive approach appears more appropriate. Besides a 
lack of evidence of the statistical significance of the descriptive SD approach, 
our empirical study is vulnerable to criticism concerning the explanatory power 
of the individual determinants under investigation. Due to our research design, it 
is not possible to assess the statistical significance of the overall results, the 
determinants, and the associations and interactions between these various 
determinants. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that the objective of our work lies in 
testing the reliability and validity of the results of previous literature on the 
success of insurance M&A and the underlying success factors. Therefore, 
earlier findings form the starting point of our empirical investigation, and the 
hypotheses about the success of insurance M&A, the determinants, and cause-
effect relationships are primarily based on the significant findings of previous 
research. A closely related point of criticism concerns the process of building 
our hypotheses. As stated, these are primarily derived from the empirical 
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observations of the extant insurance M&A literature (even if only based on the 
findings of one single study) rather than from theoretical considerations in the 
literature. This procedure is aimed at investigating what we can learn from 
previous empirical research on the success of insurance M&As and its major 
influencing factors. Theoretical rationales and predictions are of secondary 
importance for our analysis and therefore have only been considered in our 
study when our empirical investigation displays a contradictory result against 
earlier studies. 
 
Furthermore, the second part of this work could be criticized for certain issues 
regarding the specification of our study’s components, such as the choice of the 
investigation period, the sample selection, the choice of the benchmark, the 
formation of subsamples, and the exclusion of non-surviving firms. Firstly, the 
selected investigation period from 1993 to 2009 is only a snapshot of recent 
M&A activity in the European insurance industry, and hence predictions for 
future M&A activity based on the results can only be made to a certain degree. 
Moreover, this investigation period includes two different M&A waves (i.e., the 
fifth M&A wave in the years 1993 to 2000 and the sixth wave from 2003 to 
2008), with each wave consisting of the four different phases of the M&A cycle 
(i.e., upswing, peak, downturn, and bottom). Still, these last two M&A waves are 
comparable, as they comprise resembling characteristics and hold similar 
underlying motivations (see Section 2.2.5). Further, the influence of the 
individual phases of the M&A cycle as a potential influencing factor for M&A 
success is also investigated by our SD analysis. Secondly, as we have 
exclusively analyzed the European market, we cannot warrant that the results of 
our study will be fully applicable to the US insurance market. Thirdly, although 
previous studies have verified its usefulness, concerns about the 
appropriateness of the applied benchmark could arise. Yet, when using a SD 
approach to evaluate the return distribution of a portfolio of acquiring firms, the 
only correct way of benchmarking is to use a single-firm benchmark with a 
similar mean and volatility of returns. To assure a meaningful comparison, 
benchmark firms are not only matched by geographic region, industry, and 
subindustry, but also by their book-to-market ratio. Fourthly, existing 
discrepancies between the results of our study and the existing literature may 
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possibly be attributed to differences in the operationalization of determinants 
and in the formation of subsamples. To illustrate this, see the following example 
of the determinant “acquirer’s line of business.” We define acquirer’s line of 
business according to their Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
codes (see Section 4.3.2). Others, such as Akhigbe (2001) and Schertzinger 
(2008), form subsamples of acquiring insurance firms depending on acquirers’ 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Moreover, in our study, acquiring 
firms are classified into the subsamples “life/health,” “property/casualty,” and 
“multi-line.” In contrast, Akhigbe and Madura (2001) subdivide acquiring 
insurance firms into “life” and “non-life,” Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) 
distinguish between “life,” “reinsurance,” and “others,” and Schertzinger (2008) 
splits acquirers into “P&C,” “life,” “re,” “agents/brokers,” and “others.” 
Consequently, these differences in operationalization and in the formation of 
subsamples might be possible explanations for inconsistencies between our 
findings and those of previous studies. A further potential weakness of our study 
is the survivorship bias, which is the exclusion of the non-surviving (delisted) 
companies, which might generate a slight bias toward the final performance 
estimate. However, we have consciously chosen to exclude non-survivors 
because the expected distortions of excluding non-survivors appears relatively 
small in comparison to the distortions that are likely to occur when including 
them in our sample. Last but not least, it has to be mentioned that our work 
focuses exclusively on the acquisition of insurance firms. Therefore we are 
unable to consider portfolio transfers of insurance contracts, which are also of 
great relevance to the industry. 
 
In addition to these limitations of our empirical analysis, the literature overview 
in the first part of this work suffers from the shortcoming of containing only a 
selection of publications written in English and German. Nevertheless, several 
papers reviewed also analyze the effects of M&A in an international setting, 
resulting in a global perspective on this topic. Hence, additional or even 
conflicting evidence from papers published in other languages is not to be 
expected. Moreover, since adopting a capital market-based approach to 
evaluate the performance and financial success of European insurance 
transactions was found to be the best fit, our literature review has a distinct 
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focus on empirical studies using capital market data as well as measuring 
performance effects instead of evaluating efficiency changes. Despite this, 
accounting-based studies (e.g., efficiency studies) were still included in the 
review to broaden the focus of our evaluation.  
 
5.3 Implications 
Despite these limitations, our work contributes to the existing body of literature 
and to a better understanding of the effects of M&A transactions in the 
insurance industry in the following ways. Firstly, we classify the literature into 
various research categories and provide an up-to-date literature review on the 
success of insurance M&A. Secondly, besides investigating the short-term 
market reaction to the announcement of M&A in the European insurance 
market, we also assess the long-term success of such corporate activity and 
thus respond to the lack of empirical knowledge concerning the long-term 
effects of insurance M&A. Thirdly, in contrast to former capital market research, 
we do not apply the traditional event study approach in which the evaluation is 
solely based on a single value, that is, the average return. Instead, we adopt a 
stochastic dominance approach and investigate the entire distribution of 
acquiring and benchmark firms’ returns.  
 
In addition to these contributions, our work has several important implications 
and directions for future research, as well as implications for investors, 
shareholders and managers of insurance companies, in particular for the 
management of European acquiring insurance firms.  
 
First of all, as shown by this dissertation, the accumulated evidence offers many 
important insights into the overall success of insurance M&A and its influencing 
factors. Yet, our work also points to the need for further empirical research on 
this topic, in particular on the long-term success of European insurance M&A. 
The lack of sufficient and consistent evidence on this long-term effect demands 
additional empirical research. In addition, the effects of these few determinants 
for which the results of earlier studies could not be confirmed by our 
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investigation (i.e., the method of payment and industry relatedness) need to be 
addressed in future M&A research. 
 
Moreover, previous research suggests that a complete understanding of the 
effects of M&A transactions is only possible by case-specific studies. 
Consequently, several earlier studies recommend the use of a smaller sample 
size and a case-by-case examination to assess the individual determinants of 
insurance M&A success. For example, Pilloff and Santomero (1998)573 and 
Schertzinger (2008)574 postulate case-by-case examinations of financial M&A to 
fully capture the individual value drivers of each transaction. Future studies 
could follow this suggestion and thus enhance the research design. In order to 
perform such a deep and thorough fundamental analysis, however, general 
statements concerning the overall success of insurance M&A and its influencing 
factors, as derived in our work, are required. 
 
Future research could also broaden the existing empirical analyses by 
extending the transaction process under investigation. Our empirical 
investigation and the analyzed papers herein primarily focus on the first two 
phases of the transaction process, namely the planning and transaction phase. 
The integration phase, which is outlined by several papers as having substantial 
impact on the success of an M&A transaction,575 is not examined by the studies 
in our final sample. This third phase needs to be included in the analysis to 
gauge insights into the individual value drivers of each M&A transaction. 
 
Furthermore, an important methodological implication of this research is worth 
noting. The applied SD methodology has not been used by other researchers 
                                            
 
573 “But, recently, a new thread of the literature has developed which we find somewhat more 
promising. The recent interest in understanding individual cases, looking into the process of 
change for a particular merger and the realized outcome from the event, seems potentially 
rewarding and revealing” (Pilloff & Santomero 1998, p. 60). 
574 Certainly, these empirical analyses provide a solid perspective on the average transaction 
and its major determinants of success, but they do not account for detailed specifies of 
individual transactions” (Schertzinger 2008, p. 303). 
575 E.g., Cummins and Weiss (2004, p. 11), Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006, p. 63), Gerds 
(2006, p. 1), The Boston Consulting Group (2007, p. 1), Gerds and Schewe (2008, p. 19), 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008, p. 17), Schertzinger (2008, p. 10), and The Boston Consulting 
Group (2009c, p. 21). 
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investigating the success of M&A transactions in the insurance industry. As this 
approach, however, considers the full distribution of firms’ returns instead of 
only relying on the average return, it offers a promising tool for evaluating 
corporate M&A activity. Nevertheless, in his dissertation work on the application 
of the SD methodology to financial data, Klaever (2006) expresses the need for 
statistical inference and supports the use of statistical tests for stochastic 
dominance. Klaever modifies existing statistical tests according to the needs of 
financial stock market data. Such a modified statistical SD test could be applied 
by future investigators in order to obtain significant and more reliable results. 
 
In general, insurers should continue to look for M&A opportunities and build on 
inorganic growth. Based on insurance M&A research from recent decades, 
M&A transactions by US insurance companies will induce on average a positive 
market reaction for all involved parties, that is, the acquirer, the target, and 
consequently the combined entity. Also in the long run, these US deals will 
mostly be value enhancing for all companies involved. In contrast, in the 
European insurance market, the announcement of an M&A transactions triggers 
a negative initial stock price response for the acquiring European insurance 
firm. Yet, as shown by our SD analysis, this short-term underperformance of 
acquiring European insurers diminishes over time, and over a longer period of 
time, there is no underperformance of acquiring European insurers. Concluding 
from these results, management of European insurance firms, on average, 
should highlight the non-negative long-term performance effects. This 
communication strategy will help to mitigate the negative market reactions to 
the announcement of such deals. The clear change in relative performance over 
time is primarily driven by the positive wealth effects of medium-experienced 
acquirers, insurers that expand internationally and pursue transactions of small 
and medium size, and transactions that were conducted in periods of below-
average economic growth. The additional analysis of the major determinants of 
M&A success shows the different influences of the various determinants 
depending on the time frame and might help the management of European 
insurance companies to improve future performance in the field of external 
growth. Also, shareholders and investors should be well aware of the time-
dependent effects of European insurance M&A, as well as its influencing 
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factors, and choose their investment strategies accordingly. By following certain 
general guidelines, which have been outlined herein, M&A transactions in the 
European insurance market are also very likely to be a success for all involved 
companies. In summary, not only in the US insurance market, but also in the 
European insurance sector, M&A transactions seem to be a viable model and 
are likely to lead to success. 
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Appendix 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 21: ICB and GICS structures for company classification576 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
576 Source: Own research and in reference to http://www.icbenchmark.com/Site/ICB_Structure. 
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Tables 
Table 39: Survey of studies 
In 2006, Abhyankar, Ho, and Zhao (2006) were the first ones to use the idea of 
stochastic dominance for examining the long-run post-merger stock performance 
of acquiring firms. The authors compare performance by using the entire 
distribution of returns rather than only the mean, as in traditional event studies. 
Analyzing a sample of 305 UK public acquiring firms, in general, they find that 
acquiring UK firms do not significantly underperform within three years after a 
merger, since they do not observe any evidence of a first- or second-order 
stochastic dominance relation between acquirer and benchmark portfolios. 
Second, the authors find that acquirers paying excessively large premiums are 
stochastically dominated by their benchmark portfolio, implying that overpayment 
is a possible reason for post-merger underperformance. They further outline that 
cash-financed mergers outperform stock-financed ones. Finally, they do not 
observe any evidence that glamour acquirers underperform value ones, as no 
stochastic dominance relations between the two exist. In general, their results 
underline the importance of examining long-run post-merger stock performance 
from alternative perspectives. 
Agrawal and Jaffe (1999) examine long-run stock returns following mergers and 
acquisitions. The authors review the existing literature on the financial 
performance of M&A, concluding that long-run performance is negative following 
mergers, though performance is non-negative (and perhaps even positive) 
following tender offers. However, the effects of both methodology and chance 
may modify this conclusion. Two explanations of underperformance (speed of 
price adjustment and EPS myopia) are not supported by the data, while two other 
explanations (method of payment and performance extrapolation) receive greater 
support. 
Anderson, Ennsfellner, and Lewis (2004) investigate the production efficiency 
change of the Austrian insurance market in the period 1994–1999 using firm-
specific data on life/health and non-life insurers. They use a Bayesian stochastic 
frontier to obtain aggregate and firm-specific estimates of production efficiency 
across insurer types and time. The study provides strong evidence that the 
process of deregulation had positive effects on the production efficiency of 
Austrian insurers. The life/health and non-life firms showed similar patterns of 
development in that they were less efficient during the years 1994–1996 and 
significantly more efficient in 1997–1999.  
Andre, Kooli, and L’Her (2004) study the long-term performance of 267 
Canadian mergers and acquisitions that take place between 1980 and 2000, 
using different calendar-time approaches with and without overlapping cases. 
Their results suggest that Canadian acquirers significantly underperform over the 
three-year post-event period. Further analysis shows that their results are 
consistent with the extrapolation and the method-of-payment hypotheses; that is, 
glamour acquirers and equity-financed deals underperform. The authors also find 
that cross-border deals perform poorly in the long run. 
In one of the first of several reports on post-merger integration, The Boston 
Consulting Group (2007) addresses key strategic and tactical issues that should 
be considered before and during any integration, as well as their implications for 
developing a post-merger integration game plan. In the later studies of The 
Boston Consulting Group (2008a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010), a range of topics 
dealing with the post-merger integration of a target’s business into an acquirer’s 
organization are considered. The 2008a study concentrated on several key 
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issues that need to be taken into account when acquirers integrate five core 
functions—namely information technology, research and development, 
procurement, production and networks, and sales and marketing—are explored. 
Further special issues, such as carving out value from spinoffs, working 
productively with unions, and rising to the challenges of rapidly developing 
economies, are addressed in The Boston Consulting Group’s (2008b) study. 
The Boston Consulting Group (2009b) study brings many of the topics 
discussed in the previous reports to life. In contrast, the 2010 report exclusively 
refers to the biggest PMI challenges for cross-border transactions. 
In its study on value creation in insurance, The Boston Consulting Group 
(2009a) presents a short-term event study analysis of more than 1,100 M&A 
deals that also involve American and European insurance companies. The 
primary focus of this analysis is on the pre-merger phase and on strategic factors 
such as the relative size of the target company, geographic and industry focus, 
and the timing of the deal. 
Beatty (1999), who investigates M&A conducted by large public Canadian 
companies, expressly underlines the essential need for managers to pay much 
attention to the human side of these M&A deals. The author also reduces the 
litany of recommendations about managing the human dimension to a few critical 
ones. 
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) design a framework for evaluating the 
causes, consequences, and future implications of financial services industry 
consolidation. They further review the extant research literature within the context 
of this framework and suggest fruitful avenues for future research.  
Whereas most research of post-acquisition integration has focused on the 
integration of individual business units, Chakrabarti and Mitchell (2004) pay 
particular attention to corporate level integration processes, such as the 
standardization of integration routines and synchronization of integration activities 
across a firm's business units. The authors argue that corporate level acquisition 
activities and post-acquisition integration processes strongly influence long-term 
corporate performance, particularly as a firm that comprises interdependent 
business units becomes geographically diffuse. They additionally state that 
acquisitions tend to increase system diversity and goal diversity across business 
units. Some goal diversity is beneficial, but excessive goal diversity and the 
existence of system diversity can reduce long-run corporate performance by 
requiring greater managerial effort and increasing the opportunity cost of 
managerial efforts. The negative effects become stronger as a firm becomes 
geographically diffuse or if business units are interdependent. Finally, the authors 
conclude that firms that employ active corporate level integration processes—
particularly firms that acquire frequently and have interdependent business units 
—can enhance the benefits and eliminate some of the problems of diversity. 
Boubakri, Dionne, and Triki (2006) examine the long-run performance of M&A 
transactions in the property-liability insurance industry. The authors specifically 
investigate whether such transactions create value for bidders’ shareholders and 
assess how corporate governance mechanisms affect such performance. Their 
results show that M&A create value in the long run, as buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns are positive and significant after three years. While tender offers appear 
to be more profitable than mergers, the authors’ evidence does not support the 
conjecture that domestic transactions create more value than cross-border 
transactions. Furthermore, positive returns are significantly higher for frequent 
acquirers and in countries where investor protection is better. Internal corporate 
governance mechanisms are also significant determinants of the performance of 
bidders. 
The article by Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) investigates the prevalence of 
financial synergies as a motive for merger-and-acquisition activity in the property-
liability insurance industry. Two hypotheses are developed and tested based 
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upon theories of information asymmetries and firm financing decisions: (1) that 
financial synergies are a primary motive for insurance mergers in general and (2) 
that mergers motivated by financial synergies will be more prevalent in periods 
following negative industry capital shocks. The hypotheses are tested via 
analysis of accounting ratios of acquisition targets in the period 1980 through 
1990 in relation to those of non-acquired firms of similar characteristics, and via 
analysis of acquisition characteristics. The hypothesis that financial synergies are 
a motive for mergers following negative industry capital shocks receives strong 
support.  
Cummins and Weiss (2000) analyze the economic impact of the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions in the global reinsurance market in the years 1992 to 
1998. The authors’ empirical analysis explores several hypotheses based on 
these theories. Using a sample consisting of the 130 largest global reinsurers, the 
authors estimate industry capacity employing a lognormal option pricing model to 
estimate the loss payments that would be made by reinsurers that experience 
industry losses of various sizes. The results show that consolidation has 
increased the capacity of the industry to finance catastrophic risk. They also 
estimate mean-standard deviation efficient frontiers based on book value returns 
on equity in the industry. The results show that consolidation has improved 
efficiency in the industry by increasing average firm size, thus enhancing 
diversification. In addition, Cummins and Weiss find that less efficient and 
undercapitalized firms are more likely to be acquired than efficient and better-
capitalized firms, thus providing the opportunity for acquiring managers to 
improve efficiency in the industry. Overall, the results strongly support the 
hypothesis that consolidation has improved both the capacity and the efficiency 
of the global reinsurance market. 
Using the same data set as was used in their previous paper (Cummins & Xie, 
2005) and further extending the time frame of analysis to the period 1994–2003, 
Cummins and Xie (2008) analyze the productivity and efficiency effects of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the US property-liability insurance industry. 
The authors use a data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity 
indices to determine whether M&A are value enhancing, value neutral, or value 
reducing. The analysis examines efficiency and productivity change for acquirers, 
acquisition targets, and non-M&A firms. They also examine the firm 
characteristics associated with becoming an acquirer or target through probit 
analysis. The results provide evidence that M&A in property-liability insurance 
were value enhancing. Acquiring firms achieved more revenue efficiency gains 
than non-acquiring firms, and target firms experienced greater cost and allocative 
efficiency growth than non-targets. Factors other than efficiency enhancement 
are important factors in property-liability insurer M&A. Financially vulnerable 
insurers are significantly more likely to become acquisition targets, consistent 
with corporate control theory, and they also find evidence that M&A are motivated 
to achieve diversification. However, there is no evidence that scale economies 
played an important role in the insurance M&A wave. 
Another paper by Cummins and Xie (2009) analyzes acquisitions and 
divestitures in the US property-liability insurance industry during the period 1997–
2003. It estimates the valuation effects of firms’ structural changes using an event 
study methodology; in particular, it examines the effects of diversification versus 
focus over the dimensions of both geographical areas and business sectors. The 
paper also analyzes the relationship between a firm’s pre-acquisition efficiency 
and its event-induced abnormal returns. It finds that acquirers, targets, and 
divesting firms all earn significant positive abnormal returns. Acquisitions that 
focus on both geography and business earn the highest abnormal returns, while 
other types of acquisitions earn a close-to-zero abnormal return. Acquirers with 
higher cost efficiency or revenue efficiency earn higher abnormal returns, while 
divesting firms with higher revenue efficiency earn lower abnormal returns. 
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Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) study the stock market valuation of mergers 
and acquisitions in the European banking industry. Based on a sample of very 
large deals observed from 1988 to 1997, they document that, on average, the 
size-adjusted combined performance of both the bidder and the target at the 
announcement time is statistically significant and economically relevant. Although 
their sample shows a great deal of cross-sectional variation, the general results 
are mainly driven by the significant positive abnormal returns associated with the 
announcement of domestic bank to bank deals and by product diversification of 
banks into insurance. Their results are remarkably different from those reported 
for US bank mergers. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia explain their different results as 
stemming from the different structure and regulation of EU banking markets, 
which are shown to have more similarities between each other than with the US 
market. 
DeNoble, Gustafson, and Hegert (1988) describe several acquisition pitfalls 
and how to avoid them. The authors explain how neglecting the post-merger 
integration process can undermine the performance of a strategically sound 
acquisition. They additionally offer guidelines to improve the quality of this crucial 
acquisition planning and implementation phase. 
Fields, Fraser, and Kolari (2005) investigate whether bank/insurance 
combinations (bancassurance) for US and non-US mergers between 1997 and 
2002 created value for the bidding firm. Bancassurance mergers in their sample 
generate small positive and insignificant CAR of 0.42% in (-1;0). By distinguishing 
between bank and insurance bidders, the authors get a clearer picture: Bank 
bidders earn a small positive and significant CAR of 0.37% in (-1;0) at the 10% 
level, while insurance bidders experience small positive and insignificant CARs 
0.63% in (-1;0). Even though the size of the acquirer is not an important 
determinant, the bidder returns are driven by economies of scale and scope. 
Furthermore, these bidder returns are more likely to be positive if the merged 
companies fit, thereby enabling the creation of synergies between the two entities 
as well as reducing risk. 
In a related study, the same authors reexamine the wealth effects of 
bank/insurance combinations (bancassurance). Fields, Fraser, and Kolari 
(2007) find positive bidder, target, and combined wealth gains and no significant 
risk shifts for shareholders of the acquiring company (positive and significant 
CARs in acquisitions of publicly traded targets are observed for the acquirers 
[CAR of 1.07% in (-1;0) at the 1% level], targets [CAR of 2.98% in (-1;0) at the 
1% level] and overall [CER of 1.89% in (-1;0) at the 10% level)]. Further on, the 
magnitude of these wealth effects is significantly related to the relative size of the 
target (indicator for economies of scale), economies of scope, and the locations 
of acquirer and target. These results suggest that the bancassurance 
architectural structure for financial firms does offer some benefits.  
Floreani and Rigamonti (2001) examine the stock market valuation of mergers 
in the insurance industry between 1996 and 2000 in Europe and in the United 
States. The authors form a sample of 56 deals in which the acquiring company is 
listed. Their data reveals that insurance company mergers enhance value for 
bidder shareholders. Over the event window (-20;+2), their abnormal return is 
3.65%. The abnormal returns for acquiring firms are larger the greater the relative 
size of deal value. Floreani and Rigamonti also find that mergers occurring 
between insurance companies located in the same European country are not 
valued positively by the market, while cross-border deals appear to increase 
shareholder’s wealth. The analysis of a subsample of simultaneously listed 
bidders and targets reveals that the combined insurance companies experience 
significantly positive abnormal returns—over the event window (-20;+2), 
shareholders gain 5.27%—and consistent with previous findings, target 
shareholders substantially increase their wealth. 
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Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008) investigate what factors might help to explain the 
internationalization strategy of banks and insurance companies by comparing 
determinants of cross-border M&A in these two industry sectors. The authors 
empirically show that between 1990 and 2003, the internationalization of banks 
and insurance companies followed similar patterns. Distance and economic and 
cultural integration are important determinants for both the banks’ and the 
insurance companies’ expansion abroad. Furthermore, they do not find evidence 
that cross-border M&A are more frequent between similar countries, as predicted 
by the new trade theory. Finally, their results support the hypothesis that implicit 
barriers to foreign entry are more important in explaining the behavior of banks 
than of insurance companies. 
The paper by Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) investigates share-price 
performance following corporate takeovers. The researchers use multifactor 
benchmarks from the portfolio evaluation literature that overcome some of the 
known mean-variance inefficiencies of more traditional single-factor benchmarks. 
Studying 399 US takeovers consummated in the 1975–1981 period, they 
conclude that previous findings of poor performance after takeover are likely due 
to benchmark errors rather than mispricing at the time of a takeover. 
Fustec and Faroult (2011) search for reasons why almost 50% of all M&A 
transactions become a whithe elephant for the involved firms and destroy value. 
The authors argue that intangible assets must be better assessed during the due 
diligence process and propose the French intangible assets measurement 
approach to remedy this deficiency. 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) highlight the role of "organizational fit" in acquisition 
success and suggest that the regularly adopted choice perspective that portrays 
the corporate executive analyzing acquisition opportunities as a rational decision 
maker be supplemented with a process perspective that recognizes the 
acquisition process itself as a potentially important determinant of activities and 
outcomes. 
In the early 1970s, Kitching (1974) summarized the acquisition experiences of 
95 US and European corporations and thereby tried to provide recommendations 
for multinational corporation executives for improving their prospects for 
European expansion. Kiching’s paper outlines the importance of factors such as 
the country and industry chosen, the kind of diversification attempted, the 
purchase method, and various characteristics of the acquired company (e.g., 
profitability, size, and market share) in determining the success of these deals. 
As a last point, guidelines are drawn from these experiences. 
Klumpes (2006) examines the relationship between mergers and acquisitions, 
efficiency, and scale economies in the major European insurance markets. Cost 
and revenue efficiency are estimated over a period of significant consolidation 
and harmonization of currency and insurance regulation rules. Contrary to prior 
US-based research, acquiring firms achieve greater efficiency gains than either 
target firms or firms that have not been involved in mergers or acquisitions. 
Financially vulnerable firms are more likely to be acquisition targets. This activity 
has not however in general had a beneficial effect on efficiency of target firms in 
the industry. Overall, mergers and acquisitions in the major European insurance 
markets reflect the effects of market segmentation and concentration and the 
differences in regulatory framework between UK and Continental European 
countries. 
In Lee and Mansor’s (2008) study, the long-term share performance of bidding 
firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia exchange during the period of January 2000 to 
December 2004 are analyzed. The authors find that bidding firms slightly 
underperform following the post-acquisition period. This underperformance 
persists even after controlling for overlapping acquisitions and matching firms in 
terms of industry, firm size, and book-to-market ratios. However, this 
underperformance is not statistically significant different from zero. Further 
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analysis reveals that long-term returns are insignificantly different from zero, 
irrespective of the method of payment. 
Loderer and Martin (1992) analyze the post-acquisition stock-price performance 
of acquiring firms. Between 1966 and 1986, there were more than 10,000 
domestic acquisitions in the US of legally independent firms in which the acquirer 
traded on the New York or American Stock Exchange. An investment in each 
acquiring firm on the date the acquisition was completed (held for 500 trading 
days) would have yielded an equally weighted return of 21%. The return on a 
share in the market portfolio, by comparison, would have been 36%, or more than 
50% higher. The difference in investment performance is likely to reflect, at least 
in part, differences in systematic risk. But after risk is controlled for, acquiring 
firms are often found to underperform the market. Therefore, the evidence on 
post-acquisition performance appears to be sensitive not only to the estimation 
technique, but also to the sample investigated. Loderer and Martin reexamine this 
issue with a comprehensive sample of domestic acquisitions by firms traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
during the years 1966–1986. The authors find abnormal performance in three 
years but not in five years following the acquisition. Negative performance in the 
second and third years after the acquisition is most prominent in the 1960s and to 
a lesser extent in the 1970s, but not in the 1980s. 
Using 947 acquisitions during 1970–1989, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find a 
relationship between post-acquisition returns and the mode of acquisition and 
form of payment. During a five-year period following the acquisition, on average, 
firms that complete stock mergers earn significantly negative excess returns of -
25.0 percent, whereas firms that complete cash tender offers earn significantly 
positive excess returns of 61.7 percent. Over the combined pre-acquisition and 
post-acquisition period, target shareholders who hold on to the acquirer stock 
received as payment in stock mergers do not earn significantly positive excess 
returns. In the top quartile of target-to-acquirer size ratio, they earn negative 
excess returns. 
Lubatkin (1983), who provides a literature review on studies analyzing the 
effects of M&A transactions, suggests the following propositions: (1) Mergers do 
not provide real benefits, since (i) managers make mistakes in selecting the 
proper merger candidate and the proper price and/or (ii) managers may seek to 
maximize their own wealth at the expense of stockholder’s wealth; (2) mergers do 
provide real benefits, but (i) administrative problems may accompany mergers 
and cancel out the benefits, (ii) methodological problems have prevented 
empirically based studies from detecting the benefits, and/or (iii) only certain 
types of merger strategies benefit the stockholders of an acquiring firm. 
Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog (2006) investigate the long-term 
profitability of corporate takeovers, in which both the acquiring and target 
companies are from Continental Europe or the UK. The authors employ four 
different measures of operating performance that allow them to overcome a 
number of measurement limitations of the previous literature, which yielded 
inconsistent conclusions. Both acquiring and target companies significantly 
outperform the median peers in their industry prior to the takeovers, but the raw 
profitability of the combined firm decreases significantly following the takeover. 
However, this decrease becomes insignificant after the authors control for the 
performance of the peer companies, which are chosen in order to control for 
industry, size, and pre-event performance. None of the takeover characteristics 
(such as means of payment, geographical scope, and industry-relatedness) 
explain the post-acquisition operating performance. Still, they find an 
economically significant difference in the long-term performance of hostile versus 
friendly takeovers and of tender offers versus negotiated deals: The performance 
deteriorates following hostile bids and tender offers. The acquirer’s leverage prior 
to takeover seems to have no impact on the post-merger performance of the 
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combined firm, whereas the acquirer’s cash holdings are negatively related to 
performance. This suggests that companies with excessive cash holdings suffer 
from free cash flow problems and are more likely to make poor acquisitions. 
Acquisitions of relatively large targets result in better profitability of the combined 
firm subsequent to the takeover, whereas acquisitions of a small target lead to a 
profitability decline. 
Meglio and Risberg (2010) posit that inconsistent findings in the academic 
literature on the effects of M&A are due to methodological issues (different 
methods for performance evaluation), rather than to the fragmentation and 
existence of substantive gaps in current M&A literature. As stated by the authors, 
the M&A field has become marred by a set of bureaucratic method techniques 
that trivialize research with little organizational relevance. They further ask for 
changes in the way knowledge in the M&A field in terms of research designs and 
sources of data is produced. To accomplish this, the authors address 
methodological issues about the study of M&A as processes instead of as 
onetime events in order to bring forward some ideas on how to learn more about 
M&A processes. 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003) examine a sample of 12,023 
acquisitions by public firms from 1980 to 2001. The equally weighted abnormal 
announcement return is 1.1%, but acquiring firm shareholders lose $25.2 million 
on average upon announcement. This disparity suggests the existence of a size 
effect in acquisition announcement returns. The announcement return for 
acquiring-firm shareholders is roughly two percentage points higher for small 
acquirers, irrespective of the form of financing and whether the acquired firm is 
public or private. The size effect is robust to firm and deal characteristics, and it is 
not reversed over time.  
Nakamura (2005) analyzes how deregulation and liberalization have influenced 
Japanese firms’ M&A behavior and their efficiency. His doctoral dissertation 
addresses the following research questions: To marry or not to marry? Do 
Japanese firms gain from choosing a Japanese bride or a foreign bride? What 
type of "personality" do the Japanese firms look for when searching for M&A 
brides? Accordingly, his thesis explores both the Japanese M&A process and the 
effects these M&A have had on firm performance. He performs not only a 
qualitative investigation (by investigating the determinants and transaction 
partner selection) of Japanese M&A, but also a quantitative analysis (by 
comparing the pre-M&A and post-M&A technical and production efficiency of the 
M&A group with the results of a non-M&A group of firms). 
Nguyen and Kleiner (2003) examine various organizational factors that 
negatively impact the integration process. They suggest eight principles to make 
the integration more effective and successful. The factors discussed are based 
on empirical findings, literature, and case studies. The major causes include 
improper managing and strategy, culture differences, delays in communication, 
and lack of clear vision. Therefore, the keys to a successful integration process 
are a hands-on leadership style, a bias for action, involvement of the entire staff, 
continuous focus on customers, and most of all, open and honest communication 
with employees. 
Nissim’s (2010) paper first describes the insurance business and discusses how 
insurance activities are reflected in financial reports, and then building on the 
discussion and analyses, the valuation of insurance companies is evaluated. 
When describing the insurance business (including activities and organization of 
insurance companies, products and services, distribution channels, competition, 
regulation, taxation, and risks and risk management), the author provides a short 
summary on studies dealing with M&A activity in the insurance industry.  
Pautler (2003) presents a review of the business consulting literature on the 
effects of mergers and post-merger integration, investigating whether mergers 
achieve the goals of the executives involved, whether these deals enhance 
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shareholder value relative to industry benchmarks, and what characteristics the 
more successful deals have compared to the less successful ones. 
In his doctoral work, Schertzinger (2008) not only provides a literature review of 
previous studies dealing with value creation in insurance M&A transactions, he 
also conducts an event study and identifies determinants of successful 
transactions, such as transaction timing and diversifying transaction strategy, 
through a multivariate statistical analysis. This analysis of M&A in the European 
insurance industry is further deepened by two case studies that illustrate success 
factors specifically related to the conduct of transactions in greater detail.  
Settnik (2006) provides an extensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
effects of M&A transactions, with an exclusive focus on the German insurance 
market. The author relies on an accounting-based ratio analysis for investigating 
the success of insurance transactions. 
Shim (2011a) investigates the relationship between mergers and acquisitions 
and efficiency change in the US property-liability insurance industry for the years 
1990–2004. The cost, revenue, pure technical, scale, and allocative efficiency are 
estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The empirical results reveal 
that acquirers’ overall cost and revenue efficiency decline following M&A. This 
finding implies that M&A has the potential to create inefficiencies, perhaps due to 
scale diseconomies and post-merger integration problems. Shim’s analysis 
presents a number of other interesting results. Geographically focused insurers 
achieve greater cost and revenue efficiency than geographically diversified 
insurers, supporting the strategic focus hypothesis. Insurers with the independent 
agency distribution are less cost and revenue efficient than insurers using direct 
marketing distribution. Mutual insurers are more cost efficient than stock firms, 
and unaffiliated single firms are more cost and revenue efficient than group 
insurers. 
Similar to his 2011a study, Shim (2011b) examines the relationship between 
mergers and acquisitions, diversification and financial performance in the US 
property-liability insurance industry over the period 1989–2004. Risk-adjusted 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Z-score, and total risk measured 
by earnings volatility are considered as relevant indicators of performance. The 
author finds that acquirers’ financial performance decreases and earnings 
volatility increases during the gestation period after M&A, perhaps due to 
increased frictional costs associated with post-merger integration and agency 
problems. The author finds that more-focused insurers outperform product-
diversified insurers, implying that the costs of diversification outweigh the 
benefits. These findings are robust to alternative risk and diversification 
measures. He also finds that marginal increases in commercial line share are 
associated with higher risk-adjusted profits, but these gains are offset by the 
extra costs from product diversity when the initial share is low. For insurers 
initially concentrated in commercial line, a marginal increase in commercial line 
share is related to higher performance due to the positive effects of both direct 
exposure and indirect focus. 
Schoenberg’s (2006) paper investigates the comparability of four common 
measures of acquisition performance: cumulative abnormal returns, managers’ 
assessments, divestment data, and expert informants’ assessments. 
Independently, each of these measures indicated a mean acquisition success 
rate of between 44% and 56% within a sample of British cross-border 
acquisitions. However, with the exception of a positive relationship between 
managers’ and expert informants’ subjective assessments, no significant 
correlation was found between the performance data generated by the alternative 
metrics. In particular, ex ante capital market reactions to an acquisition 
announcement exhibited little relation to corporate managers’ ex post 
assessments. This is seen to reflect the information asymmetry that can exist 
between investors and company management, particularly regarding 
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implementation aspects. Overall, the results suggest that future acquisition 
studies should consider employing multiple performance measures in order to 
gain a holistic view of outcomes, while in the longer term, opportunities remain to 
identify and refine improved metrics. 
 
 
Table 40: Overview of Klaever’s efficiency results concerning the application of 
various tests on stochastic dominance577 
 
                                            
 
577 Source: Klaever (2006, p. 158). The first column gives all 30 companies listed in the German 
DAX. In the wider second and third columns, the efficient stocks, depending on the considered 
stochastic dominance tests employed and the time period under investigation, are presented. 
The efficient stocks are denoted with a bullet. The stocks not considered for the 10-year period 
are denoted with a hyphen. 
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Table 41: Annual real GDP growth by expenditure578 
 
 
                                            
 
578 Source: Eurostat. 
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